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ABSTRACT 
 
For several decades, the Audit Committee (AC) has been a subject of substantial 
research interest in developed countries including the U.S.A. and the U.K. However, 
this still remains a relative new topic in developing countries. In an attempt to examine 
the scenario of AC practices from the perspective of an emerging economy like 
Bangladesh, this study investigates the state of AC practices in the companies listed on 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE).   
 
This study was undertaken through a questionnaire survey and an interview survey in 
order to collect the data. The respondents of these surveys consisted of four sample 
groups, namely: the AC Chairperson, the Company Secretary, the Head of Finance, and 
the External Auditor. The objective of the interviews was to complement the findings of 
the questionnaire survey by obtaining a greater insight into the issue. 
 
The findings of the study indicate that the overall effectiveness of ACs in Bangladesh is 
not at a satisfactory level. More specifically, the observations made in the study include: 
(i) the ACs are mostly dominated by executive directors; (ii) the expertise (in terms of 
qualification and experience) of AC members is not at a satisfactory level; (iii) the AC 
members do not devote much time to the committee‘s affairs; (iv) the independent 
members of the committee are not adequately remunerated for the time and effort 
devoted to the company; and, (v) although the ACs are playing an important role in 
some areas including financial reporting, external auditing and internal auditing, there is 
still plenty of scope where the ACs can play a more proactive role. The study also found 
that the opinions of three sample groups namely, the AC Chairperson, the Company 
Secretary and the Finance Head were similar in most of the aspects of AC practices 
while the External Auditor group differed from the other three groups in some areas.   
 
Furthermore, the current study identified areas that need improvement in order to obtain 
more effective services from the ACs in Bangladesh. These include: (i) lack of 
qualification of the AC members; (ii) lack of experience of the AC members; (iii) 
majority of executive members in the ACs; and, (iv) lack of diligence of the AC 
members. 
 
The measures that can be taken to improve the effectiveness of ACs in Bangladesh 
include issues such as: (i) introducing new rules in relation to AC composition (in terms 
of minimum qualification and experience of AC members, and the number of 
independent members); (ii) enhancing the monitoring of compliance with the existing 
rules in relation to AC practices (instead of leaving them on a ‗comply or explain‘ 
basis); and (iii) strengthening the internal audit functions of the company. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The attention on Corporate Governance (CG) has grown exponentially over the last two 
decades, especially after the major corporate collapses of some of the largest companies 
in the world (for example, Enron, WorldCom, Harris Scarfe, One.Tel, and Andersen). Its 
urgency has gained extra momentum because of the on-going global economic 
recession. In particular, CG is now a first order issue in most of the economies where 
firms are usually run by controlling shareholders (Albuquerue and Wang, 2008) and a 
growing numbers of companies are attempting to adopt better CG practices (Garay and 
Gonzalez, 2008). Its significance in terms of the overall value creation for the 
companies has been widely recognised by researchers. For example, Bryan et al. (2004); 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Dey (2008) highlighted that the value of a firm 
can be significantly affected by its CG rules and practices. 
 
CG was traditionally known as the ways in which a firm safeguards the interests of its 
financiers; for example, its investors, lenders, and creditors. The modern definition, 
however, defines it as the framework of rules and practices by which a board of 
directors ensures accountability, fairness, and transparency in the firm's relationship 
with its stakeholders; namely, the financiers, shareholders, customers, management, 
employees, government, and the community. This framework consists of: (i) explicit 
and implicit contracts between the firm and the stakeholders for the distribution of 
responsibilities, rights, and rewards; (ii) procedures for reconciling the sometimes 
conflicting interests of stakeholders in accordance with their duties, privileges, and 
roles; and, (iii) procedures for proper supervision, control, and information flows to 
serve as a system of checks-and -balances (Cadbury, 1992). The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles of CG states: 
 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company‟s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
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governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. (OECD, 1999). 
 
Researchers (such as: Genron and Bedard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Sori et al., 
2007; Osma and Noguer, 2007; and Mallin, 2010) highlighted the role of the Audit 
Committee (AC) as an important mechanism within the governance structure. The AC is 
an operating committee of a company's board of directors that is in charge of some 
oversight roles, including: financial reporting and disclosure; external auditing, internal 
auditing, and control. The committee acts as a liaison between the company's 
management, the board of directors, and the internal and external auditors. Millstein 
(1999) highlighted the evolution of ACs as a CG mechanism and pointed out that the 
movement to progress CG was initiated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission‘s (SEC‘s) early focus on the structure and role of ACs. A growing number 
of recent studies (for example, Chen et al, 2008 and Beasley et al, 2009) also 
emphasised on the role of an AC in strengthening overall CG practices in the company.  
Klein (1998a) argued that if CG mechanisms are substitutable, then strong alternative 
CG mechanisms should mitigate the need for the firm to have an active and independent 
AC. The origin and further development of ACs took place mainly in the developed 
countries including, the U.S.A. and the U.K. and, therefore, much of the literature has 
been written about ACs in these countries (Vanasco, 1994; Goddard and Masters, 2000; 
Bedard and Gendron, 2010). Academically, there has been limited research on ACs, 
especially in the context of small emerging economies and no specific research, to the 
best of the researcher‘s knowledge, has been undertaken on AC practices in a 
Bangladeshi context. 
 
Bangladesh has witnessed significant developments in every sector of its economy over 
the last two decades (as discussed in Chapter Two). These developments led to an 
increased perception of the importance of financial reports and their impact on the 
national economy as a whole. Some major steps have been undertaken to promote good 
governance practices within corporations; for example, the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued a notification in 2006 with some guidelines for CG as well as 
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AC practices for joint stock companies listed on the two stock exchanges namely, the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). However, 
despite its increasing importance, the scenario of AC effectiveness in Bangladeshi 
corporations remains to be studied. Therefore, this study specifically aims to conduct an 
empirical investigation into the practices of ACs in Bangladesh. This introductory 
chapter presents the background for the thesis and focuses on the following issues: 
research objective and questions (Section 1.2); rationale of the research (Section 1.3); 
methodology of the study (Section 1.4); the structure of the thesis (Section 1.5); and, 
conclusion (Section 1.6). 
 
1.2 Research Objective and Questions 
The objective of this research is to contribute to the understanding of the AC practices 
from the perspective of an emerging economy. To pursue this aim, the study solicits 
opinions of four important groups of respondents namely, (i) the AC chairpersons; (ii) 
the company secretaries; (iii) the finance heads; and (iv) the external auditors of the 
companies listed of the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE).   
 
In line with the above objective, the study endeavours to answer the following research 
questions: 
(a) What is the current state of the AC practices in Bangladesh? 
(b) What are the main factors that affect the AC practices in Bangladesh? 
(c) What major steps can be undertaken to enhance the effectiveness of ACs in 
Bangladesh? 
(d) Is there any significant difference in the perception of different espondent 
groups in respect of the current state of AC practices in Bangladesh? 
 
From the main research questions above, the following subsidiary questions are derived: 
1.  How are the AC members appointed? 
2.  To what extent do the AC members have required expertise in related areas 
including accounting/auditing? 
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3.  To what extent do the AC members have sufficient experience? 
4.  To what extent do the ACs include independent/external directors? 
5.  To what extent is the size of ACs appropriate in performing their 
responsibilities? 
6.  To what extent are the ACs provided with sufficient resource? 
7.  To what extent are the ACs delegated required authority by the BoDs? 
8.  To what extent do the ACs have ready access to relevant information? 
9.  To what extent are the AC members willing to undertake (assume) their 
responsibilities? 
10. To what extent do the AC members devote sufficient time to the committee 
activities? 
11. How is the agenda of AC meetings chosen? 
12. How often are AC meetings held? 
13. To what extent can the AC members talk freely in AC meetings? 
14. To what extent do the ACs play a role in financial reporting? 
15. To what extent do the ACs play a role in external auditing? 
16. To what extent do the ACs play a role in internal auditing? 
17. To what extent do the ACs interact with external auditors/internal auditors/ 
management of the company? 
18. To what extent are the ACs independent? 
19. To what extent are the ACs effective? 
20. To what extent does the background of AC members affect AC effectiveness 
in Bangladesh? 
21. To what extent does independence of ACs affect their effectiveness in 
Bangladesh? 
22. Are the existing regulations in Bangladesh sufficient for effective AC 
practices? 
23. What other measures can be taken to improve the effectiveness of ACs in 
Bangladesh? 
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1.3 Rationale of the Study 
Generally, there has been limited research that specifically focuses on AC practice 
although it has been widely recognized as a very effective mechanism for ensuring good 
governance in corporate affairs. Pomeranz (1997) noted that very little is known about 
the actual practices of ACs and the majority of AC studies have been conducted in the 
context of developed countries including, the U.S.A., the U.K., Canada, and Australia 
(Bedard and Gendron, 2010). Therefore, the scenario of AC practices in emerging 
economies is still under-researched. For example, Tsamenyi et al. (2007) highlighted 
that, in contrast to the numerous studies on CG in developed countries, minimal 
research has been conducted in developing countries. The current study attempts to offer 
an insight into the AC practices in Bangladesh and underline the need for reform in this 
area. Thus, the study will contribute to the understanding of actual scenario of AC 
practices in developing economies and add to the knowledge in accounting.  
 
Further, many studies such as: Kalbers and Fogarty (1993); Collier (1996); and, Collier 
and Gregory (1998) reported that little empirical research has been conducted to 
investigate actual effectiveness of ACs. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), for instance, 
claimed that the formation of an AC does not provide evidence about the actual levels of 
monitoring that will be carried out. Sommer (1991) noted that a corporation having an 
AC as part of its governance structure and having an effective AC are, of course, 
different matters. Therefore, this study is intended to reinforce the idea that establishing 
an AC is one thing, but establishing an effective AC is another.  
 
A final point on the significance of this research is its contribution to the literature in the 
field of AC effectiveness.  Essentially, there has been very little research on the 
effectiveness of ACs, and their perceived role can be generally viewed as a ‗vaguely 
unsuccessful, yet meritorious, endeavour to create a more level playing field for external 
and internal auditors, vis-a-vis operating management‘ (Pomeranz, 1997). Previous 
studies have discussed mainly two different frameworks of AC effectiveness. For 
example, DeZoort et al. (2002) proposed an AC effectiveness model which focuses on 
the input factors of AC (such as: composition, authority, resources, and diligence) while 
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Turley and Zaman (2004) explained an AC effectiveness framework, focusing on 
performing AC‘s roles (such as: roles in financial reporting, external auditing, and 
internal auditing) successfully. Some other researchers, however, examined the impact 
of the input factors of AC on the outputs such as: restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; 
Agrawal and Chadha 2005); fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley et al., 2000); going-
concern reports (Carcello and Neal, 2000); auditor changes (Carcello and Neal 2003); 
and stock price reaction (DeFond et al., 2005). The AC process, or how AC members 
assess information and oversee activities (for example, procedure of AC meetings), has 
also been highlighted by some researchers (for example, Bedard and Gendron, 2010) as 
another important factor in developing a better understanding of AC effectiveness. 
Therefore, it will be more meaningful and significant if AC effectiveness is evaluated 
considering its input (e.g. composition), process (e.g. meeting), and output (e.g. role) 
dimensions. In line with this, the current study proposes an AC effectiveness model (in 
Chapter Four) considering all of these three dimensions, and investigates the 
effectiveness of ACs in Bangladesh accordingly. In light of the above facts, this study is 
necessary and will hopefully contribute significantly to the existing gap in the literature. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
A comprehensive review of the literature was undertaken in order to gain a thorough 
understanding on the subject of CG and AC in various countries. For example, in the 
U.K. the review included: Collier (1996); Windram (2000); Mallin et al. (2005); 
Chambers (2005); and Guest (2008). In the U.S.A. it included: Hawley and Williams 
(1996); Carcello and Neal (2003); Chen et al. (2008); Chan and Li (2008); DeZoort et 
al. (2008); Petra and Laukatos (2009); Krishnan and Lee (2009); and Beasley et al. 
(2009). In other economies such as: Australia, Nigeria, Bahrain, China, India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, the literature review included: Hussain and Mallin (2003); Allen 
(2005); Haron et al. (2005); Kiel and Nicholson (2006); Farooque et al. (2007); Lin et 
al. (2008); Jackling and Johl (2009); Ehikioya (2009); Lin and Liu (2009); Christopher 
et al. (2009); and Siddiqui (2010). A review of the prevailing CG environment in 
Bangladesh, focusing on the regulatory framework, has also been undertaken.  In 
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addition, discussions were held with several Bangladeshi auditing and accounting 
practitioners and regulators. These discussions were conducted in an informal manner 
and in the form of an unstructured interview to facilitate the choice of modes for 
collecting data for this study. Following the feedback of these discussions and the 
methods used in similar previous studies, two stages of data collection process were 
deemed necessary to achieve the objective of the study. 
 
The first stage of the data collection was the administration of a questionnaire survey to 
gather opinions from four separate (but important) sample groups on the current AC 
practices in Bangladesh. Creswell (2003) regarded survey design as a numeric 
description of the trends, attitudes, or opinions of the population. The questionnaire 
survey of this study aimed to acquire respondents‘ opinions on different aspects of AC 
practices on a 5-point Likert Scale. The broad areas of AC covered in the questionnaire 
included: composition, size, resources, authorities, diligence, meeting, and role. The 
questionnaire included some factors that affect AC practices in Bangladesh, as well as 
soliciting some suggestions from the respondents regarding how AC effectiveness can 
be improved in Bangladesh. This approach allows the researcher to identify important 
and emerging issues which require further explanation and insight, and this necessitated 
a second stage of the data collection process for this study. 
 
The second stage involved semi-structured interviews which were undertaken after the 
completion of the first stage of data collection (i.e. the questionnaire survey). The prime 
aim of the interview survey was to complement the questionnaire survey findings as 
well as to gain a deeper understanding of the current state of AC practices in 
Bangladesh, which might not have been possible through the use of a questionnaire 
survey alone. Therefore, because of the unique features surrounding the research 
questions, and the context of this study, a combination of a quantitative and a qualitative 
approach was deemed necessary. Their use ensures that a comprehensive investigation 
has been made and that sufficient data has been collected to answer the research 
questions. Using both methods of data collection also enabled triangulation of the 
findings and made the research more robust and reliable. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The chapter by chapter outline of the thesis is illustrated in Figure 1.1. It is divided into 
eight chapters. The current chapter discussed the background and the rationale for the 
study, outlined the research objectives and briefly presented the research methodology 
to be used in the study. This chapter essentially draws attention to the need for 
comprehensive research into AC practices in Bangladesh. Chapter Two outlines an 
overview of the CG environment in Bangladesh, including a brief discussion of the 
economy and regulatory framework. Chapter Three reviews the research literature 
pertinent to CG and includes a discussion on the theoretical underpinning of the 
research, different CG models, and the AC‘s roles in the CG arena. Chapter Four 
evaluates the literature on various aspects of ACs such as: composition, process, roles, 
effectiveness, and developments of ACs. Chapter Five provides a discussion of the 
research methodology and design of the study. This chapter illustrates the two stages of 
data collection, namely the administration of the questionnaire survey and the conduct 
of the semi-structured interview surveys. The research hypotheses have also been 
described in this chapter. Chapter Six discusses the questionnaire survey findings in two 
parts namely, descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. Chapter Seven discusses the 
results of the interview survey and triangulates these with the findings of the 
questionnaire survey. Finally, Chapter Eight presents a summary of the thesis and 
highlights the major policy implications of the study. The chapter also admits some 
limitations of the study and guides the scope for further research. 
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Figure 1.1: Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Research Questions 
Rationale of the study 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Corporate Governance 
Environment in 
Bangladesh 
 
Chapter Three 
Review of Literature on 
Corporate Governance 
 
Chapter Four 
Review of Literature on 
Audit Committee 
 
Chapter Five 
Research Methodology 
Chapter Six 
Analysis and Discussion of 
Questionnaire Survey 
Findings 
 
Chapter Seven 
Analysis and Discussion of 
Interview Survey Findings 
 
Chapter Eight 
Overview 
Policy Implication 
Limitation 
Future Research Scope  
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1.6 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter highlights the background of the research and also gives a 
brief introduction to the research problem and research questions. The existing gap in 
the literature is illustrated and the rationale of the study has been highlighted. The 
chapter also justifies the research by pinpointing the lack of empirical research on the 
issue, its contribution to accounting knowledge, and its potential benefits to Bangladesh. 
At the end, the road map of how the thesis has been laid out is depicted and discussed.  
 
Interestingly, Li and Harrison (2008) noted that country-specific factors heavily 
influence CG practices and, therefore, it is important to give a brief introduction to the 
prevailing CG environment in Bangladesh, including its economic condition and the 
regulatory framework in relation to CG practices. Therefore, the next chapter outlines 
the CG environment, particularly, the economic and regulatory environment present in 
Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT IN 
BANGLADESH 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate Governance (CG) is strongly linked to the larger environment within which 
firms operate (LaPorta et al., 1998, 1999). In particular, CG environment of a country 
mainly encompasses its economy, capital market, and regulatory framework. This study 
deals with Audit Committee (AC) practice which is a key mechanism of CG arena, this 
chapter therefore, provides an overview on the current CG environment in Bangladesh. 
This chapter has been divided into seven sections. Section 2.2 presents an economic 
overview of Bangladesh and Section 2.3 discusses the capital market environment. The 
institutional framework of CG in Bangladesh is presented in Section 2.4. The CG 
regulatory environment in Bangladesh is discussed in Section 2.5 whilst the CG codes 
and guidelines for Bangladeshi companies are outlined in Section 2.6 and finally, 
Section 2.7 summarises the chapter.    
 
2.2 Economic Overview 
Bangladesh is considered to be one of the developing economies in South Asia. 
According to the gradation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bangladesh in 
2010 has significantly improved in terms of its economy size and was ranked the 44th 
largest economy in the world whereas it was ranked the 49
th 
largest economy in 2009. 
The Bangladesh economy has grown at the rate of 6% to 7% annually over the past few 
years. Although more than half of the Gross Domestics Product (GDP) is generated 
through the service sector, nearly two-thirds of Bangladeshis are employed in the 
agricultural sector. In addition, garment exports and foreign remittances made a 
significant contribution to the economic growth of the country. A brief overview of the 
Bangladeshi economy is provided in the following subsections. 
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2.2.1 Economic History 
East Bengal, a province of undivided India, was historically a prosperous region of 
South Asia.  As early as the thirteenth century, the region was developing as an agrarian 
economy. In particular, Dhaka (now the capital city of Bangladesh) grew into an 
important commercial city during the Mughal Empire (1674-1818). After the partition 
of India and Pakistan in 1947, the united Pakistan's five-year plans opted for a 
development strategy which was based on industrialisation. But, the lack of natural 
resources meant that East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was heavily dependent on 
imports, creating a balance of payments problem. Without a substantial industrialisation 
program, or adequate agrarian expansion, the economy of East Pakistan steadily 
declined. Following the violent events of 1971, which led to independence, the new 
nation had few experienced entrepreneurs, managers, administrators, engineers, or 
technicians. There were critical shortages of essential food grains and other staples 
because of wartime disruptions. External markets for jute had been lost because of the 
instability of supply and the increasing popularity of synthetic substitutes. The foreign 
exchange resources of the new state were minuscule, and the banking and monetary 
system was unreliable. The war of independence had crippled the country‘s major 
infrastructure, including the transportation system. 
 
However, Bangladeshi leaders slowly began to turn their attention to developing new 
industrial capacity and rehabilitating its economy. In 1980‘s, government undertook 
some major economic policies (such as: privatising public industries, reinstating 
budgetary discipline, and liberalising the import regime) in order to encourage and 
attract private investment and accelerate the economic progress. In the late 1990s, the 
government's economic policies became even more entrenched and some of the early 
gains were lost, which was highlighted by a precipitous drop in foreign direct 
investment in 2000 and 2001. According to the World Bank Report, foreign reserves 
dropped markedly in 2001-2002, US$1.58 billion on 30 June 2002. However, with a 
smooth and exponential growth thereafter, on 31 December 2010 total foreign reserves 
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stood at US$10.70 billion
1
, which is the 63rd largest reserve in the world. Therefore, it 
can be said that the aid-dependence of the country has significantly been reduced in 
recent years. 
 
2.2.2 Gross Domestic Product Growth 
GDP and its growth is a very powerful indicator of the economic condition of any 
country.  The GDP of Bangladesh at market price along with its growth are shown in the 
following table. 
 
Table 2.1: Analysis of GDP and its Growth (in GDP, Billion Bangladeshi Taka-BDT) 
Description/Fiscal Year 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
GDP (Market price) 4157.28 4724.77 5458.22 6147.95 6905.71
2
 
GDP (Constant price) 3952.85 4424.59 5017.23 5771.52 6516.83 
Growth Rate  6.63% 6.43% 6.19% 5.74% 6.02% 
Source: Bangladesh Economic Review, 2009-10 and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2008-09 
 
Table 2.1 shows that GDP has grown steadily over the last five years at a rate of 6% to 
7%. The growth rate of GDP in 2009-10 was 6.02% and this was higher than that of 
some neighbouring countries including Myanmar (5.26%) and Pakistan (4.79%)
3
. It is 
important to note that even in years of on-going world recession; Bangladesh has been 
able to maintain a steady GDP growth rate.  A sector wise breakdown is presented in 
Table 2.2 to give a better picture of the growth rate of GDP in Bangladesh.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Source:  "The World Fact Book: Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold", Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), U.S.A: January 31, 2011. 
2
 USD 1= BDT 67.36 (June 30, 2006); 67.58 (June 30, 2007); 67.44 (June 30, 2008); 
67.69 (June 30, 2009); and 67.97 (June 30, 2010), source: http://www.gocurrency.com 
/v2/historic-exchange-rates.php? 
3
 Source: GDP Growth Rate List by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, 2010. 
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Table 2.2: Analysis of GDP (in Billion BDT) and its Growth by Sector 
Subsector Description 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Agriculture and Forestry GDP 622.23 701.24 802.01 894.26 993.32 
Growth (%) 5.23 4.69 2.93 4.10 4.36 
Fishery GDP 163.17 177.83 197.90 218.06 241.30 
Growth (%) 3.91 4.07 4.18 4.16 4.50 
Mining and Quarrying GDP 46.43 53.22 61.52 70.91 81.96 
Growth (%) 9.26 8.33 8.94 9.84 10.5 
Industry (Manufacturing) GDP 689.23 811.78 939.01 1064.45 1187.44 
Growth (%) 10.77 9.72 7.21 6.68 5.92 
Electricity, Gas and Water GDP 53.92 55.90 60.70 65.42 71.77 
Growth (%) 7.67 2.10 6.77 5.91 6.98 
Construction GDP 327.97 375.43 438.54 501.25 572.24 
Growth (%) 8.31 7.01 5.68 5.70 6.81 
Wholesale and Retail Trade GDP 569.84 660.11 782.20 882.76 982.16 
Growth (%) 6.75 8.04 6.82 6.21 5.30 
Hotel and Restaurant GDP 28.53 32.89 38.89 44.60 51.19 
Growth (%) 7.45 7.52 7.55 7.58 7.62 
Transport, Storage  
and Communication 
GDP 432.06 489.08 569.07 642.80 713.95 
Growth (%) 7.98 8.03 8.55 8.01 7.20 
Financial Intermediations GDP 66.84 77.44 89.55 102.45 115.95 
Growth (%) 8.50 9.18 8.89 8.99 8.35 
Real Estate, Renting and 
Other  Business Activities 
GDP 321.57 349.29 380.58 416.16 456.00 
Growth (%) 3.69 3.76 3.75 3.81 3.84 
Public Administration  
and   Defence 
GDP 110.36 127.43 144.27 163.60 199.30 
Growth (%) 8.15 8.41 6.21 7.01 14.90 
Education GDP 99.35 117.76 135.31 154.94 182.58 
Growth (%) 9.05 8.96 7.80 8.05 11.15 
Health and Social Work GDP 90.22 103.07 118.19 133.91 153.98 
Growth (%) 7.79 7.64 7.02 7.20 9.05 
Community and Social 
Services 
GDP 382.83 435.68 502.00 583.64 674.91 
Growth (%) 4.09 4.58 4.62 4.70 4.74 
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Table 2.2 shows that some sectors such as: Health and Social Work; Education; 
Financial Intermediaries; Public Administration and Defence; Transport and 
Communication; and Hotel and Restaurant grew at a steady rate of more than 7% in 
recent years. It must be noted however, that Bangladesh economy has not yet been able 
to achieve its long expected double digit GDP growth rate. This happened mainly 
because the slow growth of one large sector (i.e. Agricultural sector), and also decrease 
in the growth rate of another large sector (i.e. Industry and Manufacturing sector). 
 
2.2.3 Savings 
Savings tend to become investment in the country and therefore, it is a key indicator of 
an economy. The savings are of broadly two types, namely: domestic savings and 
national savings. A country's domestic saving is defined as household (private) saving 
as a percent of household sector disposable income, while national saving is the sum of 
the savings of both the private sector and the public sector. National saving is generally 
equal to a nation's income minus consumption and government purchases. Table 2.3 
presents the rate of savings (as a percentage of GDP) for the recent five fiscal years. 
 
Table 2.3: Analysis of Savings as a Percentage of GDP 
Fiscal Year Domestic Savings National Savings 
2005-06 20.25 27.67 
2006-07 20.35 28.66 
2007-08 20.31 30.21 
2008-09 20.09 29.57 
2009-10 19.78 29.65 
Source: Bangladesh Economic Review, 2009-10 
 
Table 2.3 shows that the domestic savings rate in Bangladesh is currently around 20%, 
and the national savings rate has generally been around 30% over the last five years. It 
is relevant to mention here that the national savings rate in Bangladesh is almost similar 
to that of India (around 30%) and higher than that of Pakistan (around 15%). 
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2.2.4 Investments 
For economic development savings need to be invested and investment is therefore, 
another important economic indicator of a country. Table 2.4 presents the year wise rate 
of investment for the previous five fiscal years. 
 
Table 2.4: Analysis of Investments as a Percentage of GDP 
Fiscal Year Total Investment Govt.  Investment Private Investment 
2005-06 24.65 6.00 18.65 
2006-07 24.46 5.45 19.01 
2007-08 24.21 4.95 19.26 
2008-09 24.37 4.70 19.67 
2009-10 24.35 4.62 19.74 
Source: Bangladesh Economic Review, 2009-10 
 
The above table shows that government investment declined from 6% to 4.62% of GDP 
in the last five years, while private investment has slightly increased. This slow down in 
investment mainly happened because of various political instabilities (including strikes, 
hartals, arrest of many political leaders and businessmen by then military dictated 
caretaker government etc.) during the period when the businessmen were reluctant to 
invest in Bangladesh.  
 
From the above discussions, it can be concluded that since independence in 1971 
Bangladesh has made significant economic progress with good standing major 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as: GDP, savings and investment. The GDP growth 
over the last five years consistently remained above 6 percent. The economy has shown 
remarkable resilience despite the losses caused by two consecutive destructive cyclones 
(i.e. ‗Sidr‘4 in 2007, ‗Ayla‘5 in 2008), and also the adverse effects arising from an 
                                                 
4
  Cyclone Sidr was the strongest named cyclone in the Bay of Bengal. Sidr formed in the central Bay 
of Bengal, and quickly strengthened to reach peak 1-minute sustained winds of 260 km/h (160 mp/h), 
which would make it a Category-5 equivalent tropical cyclone on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. Save the 
Children and Red Crescent Society estimated that the number of deaths could be up to 10,000. 
5
  Cyclone Aila hit the Bangladesh / India border on Monday 25 May 2009 causing widespread 
destruction; millions of people have been affected. 
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unprecedented price hike of crude oil in the international market. The satisfactory 
growth of the import-export trade, an increasing trend in the flow of remittance, and the 
favourable balance of the current account have kept the external sector stable. As a 
result, the on-going global economic recession, as well as the earlier East Asian 
financial crisis of the 1990s
6
, did not a have significantly adverse impact on the 
economy of Bangladesh. 
 
2.3 Capital Market 
Recently, the capital market in Bangladesh has significantly expanded in terms of 
number of securities, trade volume, and market capitalisation. There are two stock 
exchanges in Bangladesh namely, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong 
Stock Exchange (CSE). Basic laws that regulate capital market are: (i) Securities Act 
1920; (ii) Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969; (iii) Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act 1993; (iv) Stock Exchange Transaction Regulations, 1998; and, (v) 
Depository Act 1999. The market is continuously monitored by a dedicated regulator: 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The following subsections briefly 
discuss the role of these three key players in Bangladeshi capital market. 
 
2.3.1 Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC was established under the Securities and Exchange Commission Act. 1993 
with the objective to ensure the compliance of capital market laws, rules and regulations 
by the intermediaries and persons and institutions related to the capital market. The 
chairman and members of the Commission are appointed by the government and have 
overall responsibility to administer securities legislation.  The SEC is a statutory body 
and it is attached to the Ministry of Finance. Missions of the SEC include: (i) protecting 
the interests of securities investors; (ii) developing and maintaining fair, transparent and 
                                                 
6
  Also called the "Asian Contagion", this was a series of currency devaluations and other events that 
spread through many Asian markets beginning in the summer of 1997. The currency markets first 
failed in Thailand as the result of the government's decision to no longer peg the local currency to the 
U.S. dollar. Currency declines spread rapidly throughout South Asia, in turn causing stock market 
declines, reduced import revenues and even government upheaval. 
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efficient securities markets; and (iii) ensuring proper issuance of securities and 
compliance with securities laws. The functions of the SEC are discussed in a later part 
of this chapter (subsection 2.4.1); however, the three main monitoring activities of the 
SEC are briefly discussed as following. 
 
2.3.1.1 Market Categorisation 
The stocks and securities listed both on the DSE and the CSE are categorised into five 
groups (namely, A, B, G, N and Z) on the basis of their profitability, operation, failure to 
hold an AGM, and accumulated losses. The SEC monitors whether the securities are 
categorised properly. The securities of a company that holds a regular AGM and has 
paid 10% or more in dividends in the previous financial year are placed in category ‗A‘. 
Category ‗B‘ includes the securities of companies that hold a regular AGM but has paid 
less than a 10% dividend in the previous financial year. The companies which are yet to 
start their commercial operations are included in category ‗G‘ and the newly listed 
companies up to their first AGM after listing are included in category ‗N‘. Finally, 
category ‗Z‘ includes securities of those companies that do not hold a regular AGM, 
and/or has paid no dividend in the most financial year and/or has accumulated a loss 
which is higher than the paid up capital. This categorization helps the stakeholders in 
taking informed decisions by indicating the status of companies. 
 
2.3.1.2 SEC Surveillance 
The SEC has a surveillance system to ensure the protection of investors‘ interests and to 
safeguard the integrity of the markets. The SEC keeps a constant vigil on the activities 
of stock exchanges to ensure the effectiveness of the surveillance system.  
 
2.3.1.3 Supervising Intermediaries and Resolving Complaints 
The SEC supervises whether the capital market intermediaries (e.g. brokers/dealers/ 
merchant banks etc.) and stock exchanges are operating according to the securities laws. 
Furthermore, it resolves the complaints received against issuer companies under the 
securities laws.  
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2.3.2 Dhaka Stock Exchange 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE)
7 
was established in 1954 as the East Pakistan Stock 
Exchange Association Ltd. and it started formal trading in 1956. It was renamed as the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd in 1964. After the liberation war in 1971, trading was 
discontinued for five years due to a nationalisation policy, trading resumed in 1976. The 
DSE is a self-regulatory not-for-profit organization and supervises the functions of 
listed companies. Transaction and transfer of most of the securities listed on the DSE 
are now executed in electronic form. Number of total securities (including companies, 
debentures, mutual funds, treasury bonds, and corporate bonds), market capitalisation, 
and the general price index of the DSE in last five years are presented in the following 
table. 
 
Table 2.5: Analysis of DSE Securities, Market Capitalisation, and Price Index 
Description June 30, 
2006 
June 30, 
2007 
June 30, 
2008 
June 30, 
2009 
June 30, 
2010 
Change 
2009-10 
Total Listed Securities 303 325 378 443 450 1.58% 
Total Listed Companies 256 259 271 282 243 (13.83%) 
Market Capitalization (Billion Taka) 215.42 475.86 931.03 1241.30 2700.74 117.57% 
Market Capitalization as (% of GDP) 5.18 10.07 17.06 20.19 43.92 117.53% 
General Price Index 1040.47 1764.18 2588.03 2520.15 5111.63 102.83% 
Source: SEC Annual Reports of 2006-07; 2007-08; 2008-09; and 2009-10 
 
It can be seen in Table 2.5 that the number of securities as well as companies listed on 
the DSE increased every year from 2006 till 2009. This was because new companies 
and securities were listed every year. It should be highlighted that the number of listed 
companies decreased by around 14% in 2009-10. This happened because a total of 35 
companies were delisted from the DSE and sent to the ‗Over The Counter (OTC)‘ 
market mainly for their non-compliance of the rules and regulations of the DSE and the 
SEC. The table also shows that the end of June 2010, the total market capitalization 
                                                 
7
  The DSE is registered as a Public Limited Company and its activities are regulated by its Articles of 
Association rules & regulations and bye-laws along with the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 
1969, Companies Act 1994 & Securities & Exchange Commission Act, 1993. 
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amounted to a total 2700.74 billion taka, as opposed to 215.42 billion taka on 30 June 
2006. It is important to note that market capitalization has significantly increased (more 
than 100%) in 2009-10.  The total market capitalisation as of 30 June 2010 was 43.92% 
of the total GDP of that fiscal year, while it was only 5.18% in 2005-06. The general 
price index increased from 1040.47 to 5111.63 in the last five years, despite a slight 
decrease in 2008-09. The table reflects that the market capitalization and price index of 
the DSE have expanded at an unusually higher rate (more than 100%) in 2009-10.  
 
2.3.3 Chittagong Stock Exchange 
The Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) commenced operations in October, 1995. It is 
also a self-regulatory not-for-profit organization and its management structure is the 
same as that of the DSE. The CSE started the first on-line trading system in the 
Bangladesh capital market in 1998. The number of total securities and companies, and 
the price index of the CSE in the last five years are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 2.6: Analysis of CSE Securities and Price Index 
Description June 30, 
2006 
June 30, 
2007 
June 30, 
2008 
June 30, 
2009 
June 30, 
2010 
Change 
2009-10 
Total Listed Securities 213 219 231 245 232 (5.31%) 
Total Listed Companies 198 204 216 227 204 (10.13%) 
General Price Index 2879.19 5194.77 9050.56 10477.67 18116.05 72.90% 
Source: SEC Annual Reports of 2006-07; 2007-08; 2008-09; and 2009-10 
 
Table 2.6 shows the similar picture of the CSE as was shown in Table 2.5 in relation to 
the DSE. The general price index increased from 2879.19 to 18116.05 in the last five 
years, and there was a 72.90% increase in 2009-10. The number of listed securities as 
well as companies declined because of the delisting of some companies from the stock 
exchanges as explained in case of the DSE. 
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2.4 Institutional Framework of Corporate Governance in Bangladesh 
It is a widely accepted fact that institutions play a crucial role in shaping governance. A 
sound institutional framework is a precondition for good governance and a strong 
institutional set-up can foster accountability, transparency, equity and fairness 
(Farooque et al., 2007). Currently, in Bangladesh there is no strict CG rule for the 
companies to comply with. As discussed earlier, the SEC, the DSE, and the CSE are the 
three key players in Bangladeshi capital market. However, few other organisations such 
as: the Bangladesh Bank (BB), the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms 
(RJSC), the Investment Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB), play some important roles in 
this respect. Aside from these, the Board of Investment (BOI) provides some support 
services, while the Institute of Chartered Accountant-Bangladesh (ICAB) regulates 
financial reporting standards. In this regard, Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) noted that the 
SEC, the BB, and the ICAB are some of the pioneer bodies working to ensure better CG 
in Bangladesh. The following subsections discuss the role of some of the key regulators 
who monitor CG practices within Bangladeshi corporations. 
 
2.4.1 The Securities and Exchange Commission 
As stated earlier, the SEC was established under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act, 1993. The SEC is a statutory body and it is attached to the Ministry of 
Finance. The main functions of the SEC include: 
 Regulating the business of the Stock Exchanges, or any other securities market; 
 Registering and regulating the business of stock-brokers, sub-brokers, share 
transfer agents, merchant bankers and managers of issues, trustee of trust deeds, 
registrar of an issue, underwriters, portfolio managers, investment advisers and 
other intermediaries in the securities market; 
 Registering, monitoring, and regulating collective investment schemes, 
including all forms of mutual funds; 
 Monitoring and regulating all authorised self regulatory organisations in the 
securities market; 
 Prohibiting fraudulent and unfair trade practices in any securities market; 
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 Promoting investors‘ education and providing training for intermediaries of the 
securities market; 
 Undertaking investigation and inspection, inquiries and audit of any issuer or 
dealer of securities, the Stock Exchanges and intermediaries; and, 
 Conducting research and publishing information. 
 
2.4.2 Stock Exchanges 
Despite the fact that the majority of business corporations in Bangladesh are not listed 
on any of the stock exchanges (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008), the capital market appears 
to be dominated by the equity market, based on two stock exchanges: the DSE and the 
CSE. As already stated, the DSE was established in 1954 and the CSE started its 
operations in 1995. Both exchanges are self-regulated, private sector entities which 
must have their operating rules approved by the SEC. Each stock exchange: (i) 
establishes listing requirements; (ii) approves, suspends or removes listing privileges of 
companies; (iii) monitors listed companies in compliance with legal regulatory 
provisions; and, (iv) permits dual listing. The stock exchanges are registered as a public 
limited company. Their activities are regulated by its Articles of Association rules, 
regulations, and bye-laws, along with: the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, 
Companies Act 1994, and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993. The 
major functions of the two stock exchanges include: 
 Listing of companies (as per the Listing Regulations); 
 Providing the screen based automated trading of listed securities; 
 Settlement of trading (as per the Settlement of Transaction Regulations); 
 Market administration and control; 
 Market surveillance; 
 Monitoring the activities of listed companies (as per the Listing Regulations);  
 Publication of a monthly review; and 
 Announcement of price sensitive or other information about listed companies 
through online communication. 
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2.4.3 Bangladesh Bank 
The central bank of Bangladesh (known as the BB) was established via the Bangladesh 
Bank Order, 1972 (P.O. No. 127 of 1972). The BB operates as a modern, dynamic, 
effective, and forward-looking central bank to manage the country‘s monetary and 
financial system, with a view to stabilising the internal and external value of 
Bangladeshi Taka conducive to rapid growth and development of the economy. To 
uphold the vision, and in pursuant with the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972 the BB‘s 
mission is to promote and maintain macroeconomic and price stability through: 
 Formulating and implementing appropriate monetary policy consistent with the 
country‘s national development goals; 
 Pursuing prudent policies to ensure stable internal and external value of Taka; 
 Identifying policy priorities for implementation by the government through 
assessing the transmission channels and the interactions of monetary policy with 
fiscal and other macroeconomic policies and their impact on the economy; 
 Proposing necessary legislative measures to attain the central bank‘s objectives 
and perform its functions, including strategies and regulations for, and 
supervision of, banking companies and financial institutions, with the aim of 
providing efficient financial intermediation and financial services to large, 
medium, small, and micro enterprises and to pro-poor activities ; 
 Giving advice to the government on the interaction of monetary policy with 
fiscal and exchange rate policies, on the impact of various policy measures on 
the economy; and, 
 Analysing priority macroeconomic issues for policy advice, and the 
dissemination of information to attain the central bank‘s social responsibility. 
 
2.4.4 Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms 
The RJSC is the sole authority which facilitates formation of companies and keeps track 
of all ownership related issues as prescribed by the laws in Bangladesh. It is primarily 
responsible for the registration of public limited companies. However, it also deals with 
the private companies, foreign companies, trade organisations, societies, and partnership 
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firms. The registered firms are legally obliged to send all financial and non-financial 
information to the RJSC, which in turn examines the level of compliance of the firm in 
accordance with the Companies Act, 1994, and other regulations. The Companies Act 
also empowers the RJSC to investigate any improper activities in connection with the 
violation of the act and to take disciplinary measures (ADB, 2003). The two major 
functions and activities of the RJSC are: 
 To incorporate companies (including trade organisations), societies, and 
partnership firms under the respective Companies Act, 1994, Societies 
Registration Act, 1860 and Partnership Act, 1932; and, 
 To administer and enforce the relevant statutory provisions of these acts in 
relation to the incorporated companies (including trade organisations), societies 
and partnership firms. 
 
2.4.5 The Investment Corporation of Bangladesh 
Institutional investors, being an important part of the capital market, can improve the 
transparency and accountability of the board and management, and protect both the 
firm‘s interests and those of the general investors. The Investment Corporation of 
Bangladesh (ICB) plays a pivotal role for the small and medium investors through 
mutual fund operations, investors' scheme, and portfolio management. The government 
controlled ICB was incorporated in 1976 under the Investment Corporation of 
Bangladesh Ordinance 1976. Since then, the ICB has expanded its operational scope in 
three broad areas: merchant banking, mutual fund operations, and stock brokerage 
activities. The ICB has floated 15 of a total of 31 listed mutual funds that currently exist 
in the stock markets. Chowdhury and Chowdhury (1998) observed that the ICB is 
making a significant contribution to the development of the country's capital market by 
creating both demand and supply of securities. The investors' account scheme of the 
ICB is an effort to create demand for securities in the capital market through mobilising 
the general investors‘ savings into that market. At the same time, it enhances the supply 
of attractive securities through the flotation of several mutual funds and unit certificates.  
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2.4.6 Board of Investment 
The Board of Investment (BOI) was established by the Investment Bank Act of 1989 to 
promote and facilitate investment in the private sector, both from domestic and overseas 
sources, with a view to contribute to the socio-economic development of Bangladesh. It 
is headed by the Prime Minister and is a part of the Prime Minister's Office. Major 
functions of the BOI include: 
 Providing necessary facilities and assistance in the establishment of industries; 
 Implementing investment related government policies; 
 Preparing the investment schedule; 
 Registering private sector industrial projects; and, 
 Identifying competitive investment sectors and facilitating investment by 
providing information and services. 
 
2.4.7 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) 
One of the most critical challenges of CG in Bangladesh is the absence of uniform 
standards in financial reporting and auditing practices, in both listed and non-listed 
firms. For example, a study of the World Bank and the IMF conducted by Rahman and 
Zannat (2003) identified the ‗compliance gaps‘ between the applicable accounting 
standards and actual practices, as major weaknesses of corporate financial reporting. 
The study indicated that some auditing firms undercut others through compromising on 
the audit fees, and so violated the directives of the ICAB (ICAB, 2003). The ADB 
(2003) observed that the accounting standards and tax regulations appear to benefit 
controlling shareholders of the business groups in relation to maximising the profits and 
dividends of the controlling shareholders, redirecting profit (to other business units), to 
minimise overall tax liability, and to investing in the most profitable unit by ignoring the 
interests of the minority shareholders of the listed firm (or unit). In addition, Sobhan 
and Werner (2003) argued that these accounting standards do not require firms to 
disclose many financial and non-financial details, and so help firms to demonstrate a 
favourable picture. The study referred to the problems of auditing in Bangladesh as a 
‗vicious circle‘ where the firms and shareholders are reluctant to pay higher audit fees 
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while the audit firms find very little motivation to provide quality personnel and 
auditing with such low remuneration. Therefore, the statutory framework of accounting 
and auditing in Bangladesh needs to be strengthened in order to improve the investment 
climate, attract foreign investment, mobilise domestic savings, underpin securities 
market development, facilitate the healthy growth of financial markets, and enable 
regulatory bodies. 
 
A professional self-regulatory body named ‗the ICAB‘ was set up under the Bangladesh 
Chartered Accountants Order, 1973 with an aim to bring uniformity in accounting and 
auditing practice of the organizations. The ICAB regulates the auditing firms in line 
with the Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Order, 1973, Chartered Accountants Bye-
laws, 1973, and the directives or decisions of the ICAB Council. Following the 
recommendation of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the ICAB has 
adopted thirty-two International Accounting Standards (IASs) as Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BASs) and also eight International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs). The ICAB has also adopted thirty-six International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA) as Bangladesh Standards on Auditing (BSA). Based on the principles 
and best practices of the CG of the OECD and other developed and developing 
economies, the ICAB has developed codes of CG and recommended their inclusion in 
the Securities and Exchange rules (Ahmed, 2004). 
 
2.5 Regulatory Environment 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) concluded that the legal protection of investors is an 
essential element of an effective CG system. CG is affected by: (i) legislative content, 
such as shareholder protection laws (La Porta et al., 1998); (ii) judicial efficiency 
(Klapper and Love, 2004); and (iii) support for business (Klapper and Love, 2004), 
which are cumulatively described as regulation. To understand the corporate 
environment in any country, a review of the legal requirements relating to corporate 
entities is necessary. Despite the government‘s inability to legislate the personal 
integrity of key players (Walker, 2003), the pertinent legal system which significantly 
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varies around the world is a universally important CG mechanism in order to provide 
the protection of investors‘ rights (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999b, 2000; Cornelius, 2005). 
Major corporate laws and regulations governing the financial and non-financial firms in 
Bangladesh include: the Companies Act, 1994; the Bank Companies Act, 1991; the 
Financial Institutions Act, 1993; the Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972; the Bankruptcy Act, 
1997; the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969; the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act, 1993; the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987; the Insurance Act, 
1938; Insurance Corporations Act, 1973; and the Income Tax Ordinance, 1984. 
Moreover, there are subsequent amendments of the above acts, together with numerous 
rules, schedules or notifications issued by the regulatory and professional bodies to 
exercise their supervisory and surveillance activities. Whilst the scope of these acts is 
briefly discussed in the subsequent sections, this section outlines the drawbacks of the 
existing Companies Act, along with the inconsistencies in the existing laws and 
regulations. 
 
The Companies Act, 1994 (the Act) is the prime corporate law of the country that 
defines the operational boundaries for Bangladeshi firms with respect to their 
incorporation, governance principles, structures and responsibilities, and transparency 
and accountability. It governs a number of areas, including: the creation, functioning 
and dissolution of companies; the relationship of shareholders to a company; periodic 
disclosure and audit requirements; the functions of the RJSC; and, the jurisdiction of the 
courts in relation to companies. The Act defines the rights of both the majority and the 
minority shareholders. Shareholders are not intended to get involved in the day-to-day 
management of a company. However, the Act highlights some supervisory functions to 
be undertaken by the shareholders in the form of rights to attend meetings, appoint and 
remove directors, and to obtain financial information, as well as approve the balance 
sheet annually. The Act also provides various mechanisms for shareholders to enforce 
these rights. The principal mechanism is the ability to bring a suit for minority 
protection under Section 233 of the Act. It also establishes the overall power and 
responsibilities of the RJSC (and other regulatory bodies), and sets broader guidelines 
for the judiciary to make judgements on all corporate affairs. 
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The ADB (2003) identified various loopholes in the existing Companies Act, and made 
a number of recommendations for the Companies Act, 2004. The ADB observed the 
following deficiencies in developing and enhancing an appropriate environment for CG 
in relation to shareholder rights and board structures. 
 The notice period for the annual general meeting (AGM) is too short; for 
example, generally 14 days and 21 days for special resolutions; 
 Firms are given more flexibility to hold their AGMs, with negligible penalties 
for not holding them. Virtually, no authority is left to the SEC; 
 In the absence of any provision on the place of the AGM the sponsors can 
choose to hold the meeting in remote areas so as to stop minority shareholders 
from attending; 
 Provision of proxy voting can be made without requiring the issues of voting to 
be clearly explained in the proxy form; 
 There is no provision for cumulative voting for the election of directors, or for 
minority representation on the board; 
 A shareholder resolution is not needed for several corporate decisions, such as: 
related party transactions, large borrowing, anti-takeover devices and spin-off of 
a significant subsidiary; 
 There are no provisions for having an Audit Committee (AC), an independent 
director, or a quorum for the directors' meeting; 
 There is no measure to protect whistle-blowers from direct or indirect retaliation 
for reporting improper activities; and 
 There are inadequate provisions for the procedure and timing for declaring 
dividends and for disciplinary measures for the non-payment of dividends.   
 
While the Act remains outdated in the context of a dynamic corporate world, several 
positive legislative initiatives have recently been undertaken to give the central bank 
more authority and responsibility. For example, the Bangladesh Bank (Amendment) 
Act, 2003, the Bangladesh Bank (Nationalisation) (Amendment) Act, 2003, and the 
Bank Company (Amendment) Act, 2003, were approved by the Bangladeshi Parliament 
in order to redefine the roles and responsibilities of the BB, giving it more authority and 
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accountability for its activities. Moreover, the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002, 
and subsequent amendments appear to assign the BB with greater responsibility for 
preventing money laundering offences. Apart from the SEC, the BB plays an important 
role in the monitoring of CG practices within the country‘s financial institutes. In 
Bangladesh, financial sectors are subject to close monitoring and supervision by both 
the BB and the SEC. As a result, more restrictions are imposed on this sector while the 
non-financial sectors are, to some extent, a little more relaxed (Bhuiyan and Biswas, 
2007). 
 
However, the lack of consistency and compatibility amongst various corporate laws and 
regulations remains critical to the development of CG. The inconsistent laws, and 
overlapping of powers and responsibilities, tend to be major deterrents for the 
regulatory agencies to exercise their monitoring and surveillance activities. This, in turn, 
makes the financial reporting and auditing practices of some firms more problematic; 
this is especially true for the banks, leasing, and insurance companies that operate under 
multiple regulators. In reality the government cannot legislate the personal integrity of 
key players (Walker, 2003), and no amount of legislation can substitute for the trust, 
faith, and confidence necessary for Good Corporate Governance (GCG) practices 
(Chaudhury, 2004). As the lead regulatory body overseeing corporate accounting and 
reporting, the SEC has a critical role to ensure that public company boards are properly 
structured and organised. It also has the responsibility to ensure that it has the resources 
to accomplish the objectives of adding value to shareholders, minimising the risk of the 
key shareholders, and it should hold management responsible for corporate results 
(Walker, 2003).  
 
2.6 Corporate Governance Guidelines in Bangladesh 
Although no remarkable corporate scandals have so far emerged in Bangladesh to 
demonstrate the necessity of CG, the stock market crashes in 1996
8
 (which left investors 
                                                 
8
The DSE all shares price index rose to 3648.75 on 5th November, 1996 starting from 865 on 1st June, 
1996- 322% increase within a spate of only 158 days. The Market Capital that was Tk. 56.52 billion by 
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wary of the capital market for many years) and recently in 2011
9
  are worth 
remembering. Although there is no recognized CG code in Bangladesh, a complete code 
of CG was developed for Bangladeshi companies by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute 
(BEI)
10
 in 2003, with direct support from: the Department for International 
Development (DFID), the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the Global Corporate 
Governance Forum (GCGF). Subsequently, the ICAB came up with a series of CG 
principles and rules to be followed (Mazumder, 2006). The code for CG practices 
developed by ICAB was based on the OECD principles of CG (discussed in Chapter 
Three) and other best practices (Ahmed, 2004). Furthermore, in 2006 the SEC issued a 
notification (as an order) included some CG guidelines for the companies listed on the 
stock exchanges. These guidelines are very similar to the guidelines in the CG code that 
was developed by BEI and ICAB.  
 
2.6.1 Code of Corporate Governance for Bangladesh 
In August 2003 the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) invited a number of 
prominent individuals from the private sector, the government, NGOs, and other 
relevant bodies to begin the process of formulating a code of CG for Bangladesh. 
Convening this taskforce on CG was an outcome of BEI‘s research and advocacy work 
on strengthening CG practices in Bangladesh. Members of the taskforce provided 
essential guidance and direction to the development of the new code. In addition, 
distinguished guest experts were invited to certain taskforce meetings and they provided 
invaluable input and expertise on specific aspects and sections of the code.  The code of 
CG, therefore, prescribes the principles, procedures, and process through which better 
                                                                                                                                               
end 1995 reached Tk. 168.11 (137% increase) by end 1996 (Mazumdar, 2006). 
9
 The DSE all price share index fell down by 41.66% within a spate of less than 3 months (i.e. DSE 
General Price Index fell down from over 8918.51 (December 05, 2010) to 5203.08 (February 28, 2011). 
10
 The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) was established in 2000 as a non-profit research centre 
focusing on the growth of private enterprise in Bangladesh. It promotes and articulates issues of 
importance to the private sector and seeks to influence policy and to initiate measures crucial to the 
development of a market-oriented economy as well as to promote the sustainable growth of trade, 
commerce and industry. In 2003, the BEI formulated a Code of Corporate Governance for Bangladesh 
with the assistance from some international donors, namely: the Department for International 
Development (DFID), the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Global Corporate Governance Forum 
(GCGF). 
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CG practices may gradually be introduced. As such, the code is organised into 
principles and guidelines. Organisations can start on the path to better CG first by 
acknowledging the principles of CG and then incorporating them through their own 
initial implementation strategies, which they must nevertheless justify and explain. 
Siddiqui (2010) noted that, consistent with CG codes in other parts of the world, the 
BEI CG code incorporated notions of independent directors, separation of the chairman 
and the CEO, and the institution of an audit committee. The CG guidelines given by the 
BEI and the ICAB recommend a single tier board structure (where the directors are 
elected by the shareholders), the presence of independent directors on the board, and the 
separation of the chairman and the CEO.  
 
2.6.2 SEC Guidelines on Corporate Governance  
One of the most recent and significant developments in CG in Bangladesh is SEC‘s 
notification no. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08 (issued on 20 February 2006) 
where detail guidelines on company‘s board and AC in terms of their size, membership, 
chairmanship, reporting authorities, and responsibilities are stated. The companies have 
to either comply with these guidelines or explain for their non-compliance. Both stock 
exchanges have also included these guidelines in their respective listing requirements. 
These guidelines are presented in detail as following: 
 
1.00 BOARD OF DIRECTORS: 
 
1.1. Board’s Size 
The number of board members of the company should not be less than five, and 
not more than twenty. 
Provided, however, that in the case of banks and non-bank financial institutions, 
insurance companies and statutory bodies for which separate primary regulators 
like Bangladesh Bank, Department of Insurance etc. exist, the board of those 
companies should be constituted as may be prescribed by such primary 
regulators in so far as those prescriptions are not inconsistent with the aforesaid 
condition. 
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1.2. Independent Directors 
All companies should encourage effective representation of independent 
directors on their board of directors so that the board, as a group, includes core 
competencies considered relevant in the context of each company. For this 
purpose, the companies should comply with the following: 
(i) At least one tenth (1/10) of the total number of the company‘s board of 
directors, subject to a minimum of one, should be independent directors. 
(ii) The independent director(s) should be appointed by the elected directors. 
 
1.3. Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
The positions of the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer of the 
companies should preferably be filled by different individuals. The chairman of 
the company should be elected from among the directors of the company. The 
board of directors should clearly define respective roles and responsibilities of 
the chairman and the chief executive officer. 
 
1.4 The Directors’ Report to Shareholders 
The directors of the companies should include following additional statements in 
the directors‘ report prepared under section 184 of the Companies Act, 1994:- 
(a) The financial statements prepared by the management of the issuer company 
present fairly its state of affairs, the result of its operations, cash flows and 
changes in equity. 
(b) Proper books of account of the issuer company have been maintained. 
(c) Appropriate accounting policies have been consistently applied in 
preparation of the financial statements, and that the accounting estimates are 
based on reasonable and prudent judgement. 
(d) International Accounting Standards, as applicable in Bangladesh, have been 
followed in preparation of the financial statements, and any departure there from 
has been adequately disclosed. 
(e) The system of internal control is sound in design and has been effectively 
implemented and monitored. 
33 
(f) There are no significant doubts upon the issuer company‘s ability to continue 
as a going concern. If the issuer company is not considered to be a going 
concern, the fact along with reasons thereof should be disclosed. 
(g) Significant deviations from last year in operating results of the issuer 
company should be highlighted and reasons thereof should be explained. 
(h) Key operating and financial data of at least preceding three years should be 
summarised. 
(i) If the issuer company has not declared a dividend (cash or stock) for the year, 
the reasons thereof should be given. 
(j) The number of Board meetings held during the year and attendance by each 
director should be disclosed. 
(k) The pattern of shareholding should be reported to disclose the aggregate 
number of shares (along with name wise details where stated below) held by: (i) 
Parent/Subsidiary/Associated companies and other related parties (name wise 
details); (ii) Directors, Chief Executive Officer, Company Secretary, Chief 
Financial Officer, Head of Internal Audit and their spouses and minor children 
(name wise details); (iii) Executives; and (iv) Shareholders holding ten percent 
(10%) or more voting interest in the company (name wise details). 
 
2.00 CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO), HEAD OF INTERNAL 
AUDIT AND COMPANY SECRETARY: 
 
2.1. Appointment 
The company should appoint a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), a head of internal 
audit and a company secretary. The board of directors should clearly define 
respective roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO, the head of internal 
audit, and the company secretary. 
 
2.2. Requirement to Attend Board Meetings 
The CFO and the company secretary of the companies should attend meetings of 
the BoDs, provided that the CFO and/or the company secretary should not attend 
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such part of a meeting of the board of directors which involves consideration of 
an agenda item relating to the CFO and/or the company secretary. 
 
3.00 AUDIT COMMITTEE: 
The company should have an audit committee as a sub-committee of the board 
of directors. The audit committee should assist the board of directors in ensuring 
that the financial statements reflect true and fair view of the state of affairs of the 
company and in ensuring a good monitoring system within the business. The 
audit committee shall be responsible to the board of directors. The duties of the 
audit committee should be clearly set forth in writing. 
 
3.1. Constitution of Audit Committee 
(i) The audit committee should be composed of at least three members. 
(ii) The board of directors should appoint members of the audit committee who 
should be directors of the company and should include at least one independent 
director. 
(iii) When the term of service of the committee members expires or there is any 
circumstance causing any committee member to be unable to hold office until 
expiration of the term of service, thus making the number of the committee 
members to be lower than the prescribed number of three persons, the board of 
directors should appoint the new Committee member(s) to fill up the 
vacancy(ies) immediately or not later than 1 (one) month from the date of 
vacancy(ies) in the committee to ensure continuity of the performance of work 
of the audit committee. 
 
3.2. Chairman of the Audit Committee 
(i) The board of directors should select one member of the audit committee to be 
chairman of the audit committee. 
(ii) The chairman of the audit committee should have professional qualification 
or knowledge, understanding and experience in accounting or finance. 
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3.3. Reporting of the Audit Committee 
 
3.3.1. Reporting to the Board of Directors 
i) The audit committee should report on its activities to the board of directors. 
(ii) The audit committee should immediately report to the board of directors on 
the following findings, if any:- 
(a) Report on conflicts of interests; (b) Suspected or presumed fraud or 
irregularity or material defect in the internal control system; and (c) Suspected 
infringement of laws, including securities related laws, rules and regulations.  
 
3.3.2. Reporting to the Authorities 
If the audit committee has reported to the board of directors about anything 
which has material impact on the financial condition and results of operation and 
has discussed with the board of directors and the management that any 
rectification is necessary and if the audit committee finds that such rectification 
has been unreasonably ignored, the audit committee should report such finding 
to the commission, upon reporting of such matters to the board of directors for 
three times or completion of a period of 9 (nine) months from the date of first 
reporting to the board of directors, whichever is earlier. 
 
3.4. Reporting to the Shareholders and General Investors 
Report on activities carried out by the audit committee, including any report 
made to the board of directors under condition 3.3.1 (ii) above during the year, 
should be signed by the chairman of the audit committee and disclosed in the 
annual report of the issuer company. 
 
4.00. EXTERNAL/STATUTORY AUDITORS 
The issuer company should not engage its external/statutory auditors to perform 
the following services of the company; namely:- 
(i) Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions;(ii) Financial information 
systems design and implementation; (iii) Book-keeping or other services related 
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to the accounting records or financial statements; (iv) Broker-dealer services; (v) 
Actuarial services; and (vi) Internal audit services.  
 
5.00 REPORTING THE COMPLIANCE IN THE DIRECTOR’S REPORT 
The directors of the company shall state, in accordance with the annexure 
attached, in the directors‘ report whether the company has complied with these 
conditions. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to present an overview on the CG environment in 
Bangladesh. It is demonstrated that although the economy of Bangladesh is gradually 
improving, the capital market is yet to make a significant contribution to the overall 
economic development of the country. The current CG environment prevailing in 
Bangladesh still does not provide sufficient legal, institutional, or economic motivation 
for stakeholders to encourage and enforce CG practices; hence, failure in most of the 
constituents of CG is witnessed in Bangladesh (Haque et al. 2007). Of the CG codes for 
Bangladeshi corporations, the most significant development is the SEC guidelines on 
CG, as well as AC practices, which were issued in 2006.  
 
This chapter has presented an overview of the CG environment in Bangladesh. Since 
the study focuses on the AC practice which is an aspect of CG, the next chapter reviews 
the literature on the various facets of CG. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on 
Corporate Governance (CG) which is relevant to the current study. The chapter is 
divided into nine sections. Section 3.2 discusses the concept of CG and focuses on its 
evolution. Section 3.3 outlines the theories contributing to the development of CG. 
Section 3.4 discusses some of the CG principles and guidelines, whilst the various CG 
models being practised around the world are highlighted in Section 3.5. CG practices in 
developing countries in general, and in Bangladesh in particular, are discussed in two 
separate sections namely, Section 3.6 and Section 3.7, respectively. The role of the 
Audit Committee (AC) as a CG mechanism is presented in Section 3.8 and, finally, 
Section 3.9 summarises the chapter. 
  
3.2 The Issue of Corporate Governance 
In recent years, academic attention on CG has grown exponentially, especially after the 
collapse of many large companies around the world (as mentioned in Chapter One). 
These companies were blamed because of their lack in business ethics, fraudulant 
accounting practices, and weak regulations. The collapse of these companies was also a 
wake-up call for many in the developed countries because, prior to these high profile 
bankruptcies and failures, many commentators had blamed only developing countries 
for poor CG practice, and lack of disclosure and transparency. The need for strong 
governance is evidenced by the various reforms and CG standards which were 
developed, at both national and international levels, such as: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the U.S.A., CLERP 9
11
 in Australia, Combined Code in the U.K., and the Organization 
                                                 
11
In Australia, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) 
Act 2004 (also known as CLERP 9) became law on 1 July 2004. 
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for Economic Development [OECD] Code
12
. The urgency of CG gained momentum 
because of the on-going global economic recession and it is now a first order issue in 
most of the economies where firms are often run by controlling shareholders 
(Albuguerue and Wang, 2008). More companies in a growing number of countries are 
increasingly attempting to adopt better CG practices (Garay and Gonzalez, 2008). 
 
CG generally means the system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled. More specifically, it implies the relationship between all the stakeholders in 
a company, the way in which a company is governed, and how it deals with the various 
interests of its customers, shareholders, employees and society at large. Daily et al. 
(2003), and Udayasankar and Das, (2007) defined CG as the determination of the broad 
uses to which organisational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts 
among the myriad participants in organisations. Further, it has been described as:  
 
Corporate governance is the process of supervision and control intended to 
ensure that the company‟s management acts in accordance with interest of 
shareholders” (Parkinson, 1994, cited in Solomon, 2007).  
 
Similarly, Lewis (1999) defined CG as:  
 
The whole system of rights, processes and controls established internally and 
externally over the management of a business entity with the objective of 
protecting the interests of all stakeholders.  
 
Leadership, direction, control, transparency, and accountability attributes lie at the heart 
of sound and effective CG according to Huse (2005); and Van den Berghe and Louche, 
(2005) [cited in Jamali et al., (2008)].  It can be argued that CG encompasses the entity's 
Board of Directors (BoDs) and its overall organisation structure, management, and ACs 
(Rezaee, 1997). CG emanates from a set of relationships, and it is imposed through a 
separation of ownership from managers. In this regard, Sir Adrian Cadbury observed 
that:  
 
                                                 
12
The ‗OECD Principles of Corporate Governance‘ were endorsed by OECD Ministers in 1999 and have 
become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders. 
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Corporate governance is considered to be withholding balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and community goals. The 
governance framework is required to encourage the efficient use of resources 
and equally to ensure accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations 
and society (Cadbury, 1992; 2000; 2003). 
 
Over the last two decades CG has become of increasing importance to managers, 
academics and policy makers. The attention which is now given to the CG structure of a 
firm seems to imply that it has a critical impact on the responsive ability of a firm to 
those external factors that impinge on its performance. A substantial review of the 
literature shows that these concerns are in reality not entirely new; for example, Berle 
and Means (1932) noted the relative lack of accountability of corporate managers and 
argued that corporate performance would be improved if corporations had monitors to 
oversee the managers (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). Cadbury (2002) goes further and 
claims that CG has been with us since companies began to take their present form. 
Meanwhile, Higson (2003) argued that although CG is not a new phenomenon, it 
certainly came to prominence in the 1990s. The Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA) reported that before 1980 there was no reference to the term CG in 
either professional or academic literature (CIMA, 1999). However, Millstein (1999) 
stated that the report of Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) frames the issue of improving 
corporate financial reporting in the CG context because the evolution of modern CG 
that began in the 1970s was rooted in financial reporting issues. Similarly, Vinten (1998) 
claimed that CG is not a new issue, and stated that it may be dated back to when 
incorporation with limited liability became available in the nineteenth century, with the 
need for legislation and regulation.   
 
More attention has been paid to CG over the past few years due to the debate 
surrounding the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee in 1992 on the financial 
aspects of CG (Collier, 1997). Keasey and Wright (1997) argued that there is no doubt 
that CG has been one of the key business topics of recent years, and that it will continue 
to be so for the foreseeable future. In the U.K., for example, several influential 
proposals have been produced with an attempt to settle the practical issues (Cadbury, 
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1992, 1995; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; Turnbull, 1999; Higgs, 2003, FRC, 2008, 
2010). Academic interest in these issues has significantly grown as concern on CG gains 
ascendancy in corporate board rooms and the offices of policy makers. Evidence for this 
can be seen in the number of recently published studies on issues relating to CG (for 
example, Braun and Sharma, 2007; Chan and Li, 2008; Dey, 2008; Chen et al., 2008; 
Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008; John and Young, 2008; Beasley et al., 2009; Brown et 
al., 2009; Choi et al., 2009; Garcia-Meca, and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009; Hoitrash et al., 
2009; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Krishan and Lee, 2009; Laux and Laux, 2009; Ward et 
al., 2009; and Siddiqui, 2010). 
 
In addition, several recent studies (for example, Brennan, 2006; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2006; Mueller, 2006; Chong and Lopez-de-Silance, 2006, 2007; Raja and Kumar, 2007; 
Larker, et al., 2007; Choi, et al. 2007; Kroll, et al., 2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Soobaroyen and Sheikh-Ellahi, 2008) attempted to assess the impact of CG on 
organisational performance. Almost all of these studies have found a positive relation 
between key CG variables and a firm‘s performance. There are, however, a few notable 
exceptions to this rule; for example, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found a negative 
association between board independence and a firm‘s performance. Nevertheless, CG is 
considered by many as a performance driver of a firm and a guarantee of the credibility 
of its financial reports (Mir and Seboui, 2008). It is also seen as a means of improving 
efficiency in the economy (Ahmed and Yusuf, 2005). In addition, McConomy and 
Bujaki, (2000) argued that a key objective of CG system should be the enhancement of 
shareholders‘ value. 
 
An effective CG system also helps in ensuring an appropriate division of power among 
shareholders, the BoDs, and management (McConomy and Bujaki, 2000). Keasey and 
Wright (1997) noted that the importance of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) was in 
motivating managerial behaviour towards improving the business; or, in other words, of 
directly controlling the behaviour of managers. GCG contributes to better company 
performance by helping a board in discharging its duties in the best interests of the 
shareholders (FRC, 2010). Also, Ow-Yong and Guan (2000) noted that the importance 
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of CG is its contribution to both business prosperity and accountability. The idea of CG 
is to provide a framework to strengthen the internal control mechanism to check 
irregularities in companies. The role of effective practice of CG is in constraining 
earning management has been noted by Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009). 
Cornett et al. (2009) also argued for independence board in order to constraint earning 
management. Solomon (2007) suggested that CG is the system of checks and balances, 
both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas 
of their business activity. 
 
Keasey and Wright (1997) argued that the key elements that constitute CG concern 
include: (i) the enhancement of corporate performance via supervision or monitoring of 
management performance; and (ii) the assurance of management accountability to 
shareholders and other stakeholders. These aspects of governance and accountability are 
closely interrelated and introduce both the efficiency and the stewardship dimensions to 
CG. They revolve around the accountability of those in control of companies to those 
with the residual financial interest in corporate success, normally the shareholders; 
however, when a company is approaching insolvency other stakeholders (such as, 
creditors) become part of the widening discussion (Vinten, 1998). Abbott and Parker 
(2002) claimed that the effectiveness of the monitoring function is increased by the 
inclusion of external (i.e. non-management) directors. External/non-executive directors, 
who are presumably independent of management, reduce opportunities for the board to 
become an instrument of top management and they limit the management‘s ability to 
benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. The board of the company is the key 
to the adoption and implementation of CG best practices (Hussain and Mallin, 2003). A 
study conducted in a Bahraini context by Hussain and Mallin (2002) found that the best 
CG practices are present in those companies that have BoDs which are dominated by 
external directors. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that CG generally describes the way that companies are 
managed and controlled, ensuring the successful operation of the organisation within the 
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legitimate boundaries, while still satisfying the needs of stakeholders. Because of its 
significance CG has become a top priority for regulatory bodies, with the objective of 
providing better and more effective protection to all stakeholders (Ahmad, 2004).   CG 
mechanisms are believed to enable companies to attract financial and human capital, to 
perform efficiently, and to generate long-term economic value for their shareholders, 
while respecting the interests of stakeholders and society as a whole. 
 
3.3 Theoretical Underpinning of Corporate Governance 
The development of CG has been affected by theories from a number of disciplines, 
including: Finance, Accounting, Law, Management, and Organisational Behaviour 
(Mallin, 2010). In other words, a number of different theoretical frameworks have 
recently evolved to explain and analyse CG (Solomon, 2007). The seminal work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed an ‗Agency Theory‘, which was based upon 
conflicts of interest between various contracting parties, namely: shareholders, 
corporate managers, and debt holders. Since then a huge body of literature has evolved 
to explain both the nature of these conflicts and the means by which they may be 
resolved. Blair (1995) identified four major perspectives for the CG issue: Agency 
Theory, Transaction Cost Theory, Market Myopia Theory, and Stakeholder Theory. In 
addition, the relevance of Stewardship Theory and Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) 
are also supported in a number of different CG studies. The development of CG is a 
global occurrence and, as such, is a complex area including legal, cultural, ownership, 
and other structural differences. Therefore, some theories may be more appropriate and 
relevant to some countries than others (Mallin, 2010).  Despite the concept of CG 
encompasses a number of theories, the researcher believes that agency theory and 
stakeholder theory will make the most significant contribution to the current study. 
However, all of these theories are discussed in more detail below, focusing on their 
contribution in the development of CG. Figure 3.1 illustrates the main theories that have 
significant contribution to the development of CG.  
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Figure 3.1: Theories Relating to Corporate Governance
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3.3.1 Agency Theory 
CG is a broad theory concerned with the alignment of management and shareholder 
interests (Grant, 2003). It has been described further: 
 
Many definitions of corporate governance stress the potential conflicts of 
interest between insiders (managers, boards of directors, and majority 
shareholders) and outsiders (minority shareholders and creditors) of the 
company. The set of internal and external mechanisms to balance these conflicts 
of interest is usually known as CG (Garay and Venezuela, 2008). 
 
Therefore, CG specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the 
different actors inside the corporation, which are: Chief Executive Officer (CEO), board 
members, managers, shareholders and stakeholders (Goyer, 2001). Arthur Levitt defined 
CG as the relationship between the investor, the management team and the BoDs of a 
company (Levitt, 2002). Larcker et al., (2007) emphasised on CG as the set of 
mechanisms that influence the decisions made by managers when there is a separation 
of ownership and control. Osman (2006) further argued:  
 
The need for CG arises from the potential conflicts of interests among 
stakeholders in the corporate structure. These conflicts of interest often arise 
from two main reasons. First, different stakeholders have different goals and 
preferences. Second, the stakeholders have imperfect information as to each 
other‟s actions, knowledge, and preference.  
 
CG finds its foundation in the ‗world of incomplete contracts‘ (Hart, 1995 cited in Ward 
et al., 2009). Incomplete contracts exist when agents and/or managers possess more 
information than do the principals and/or shareholders and, therefore, the interests of 
agents and principals have the potential to diverge. In highlighting the relevance of 
agency theory in CG, Christopher et al. (2009) noted that the essential concern of CG 
arises from the separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations. 
Imam and Malik (2007) noted that the need for CG arises from the potential for agency 
conflict. The key agency problem is between the controlling owner-management and 
outside shareholders. Jenson and Meckling (1976) defined an agency relationship as: ―a 
contract under which one person (the principal) engages another person (the agent) to 
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perform some services on his/her (the principal‟s) behalf‖. Agency relationship is also 
defined as a contractual process whereby owners delegate some of their authorities and 
responsibilities to a team consisting of expert member(s), and they then expect this team 
to exercise their expertise in the best interests of the firm‘s operational success. Muth 
and Donaldson (1998) described agency relationship as delegation of power by the 
owner to the management. Eisenhardt (1989) discussed two main causes of agency 
problems, namely: conflict of interests, and different attitudes towards risk between 
owner and management. Agency theory focuses on the notion of an agency relationship 
in which the principal delegates responsibilities to the agent, risk is shared between the 
entities, and there is a potential conflict of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). In line with 
agency theory, the central problem of CG is how the shareholders ensure that self-
seeking executives act in the shareholders‘ interests rather than their own (Hendry, 
2005). Berle and Means (1932) argued that when shareholders are not able to monitor 
management properly, the company‘s assets might be used for the welfare of 
management instead of maximising the company‘s wealth. 
 
Chrisman et al. (2004) noted that this conflict arises from information asymmetry 
between owners‘ and managers, and so there exists a gap between the two. Agency 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, in particular, develop under 
information asymmetries between agents and principals. In this respect, Chrisman et al. 
(2004) also described that one of the main causes behind this conflict is the information 
asymmetry between owners and managers, which emerges because of a knowledge gap 
about the company‘s internal operations. The principals (owners) need quality 
information to monitor, control, and motivate the agents; whereas, the agents 
(management) have full control over the information flow. This sometimes leads to 
information asymmetry which, in turn, becomes the cause of the agency problem 
(Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2008). These problems occur when managers in possession 
of information make decisions that are self-serving, such as: engaging in executive 
perquisites, shirking behaviour (moral hazard), or misrepresenting their skills and 
abilities (adverse selection) in the hiring process (Eisenhardt, 1989; Rutherford and 
Buchholtz, 2007; Rutherford et al, 2007). Jenson and Meckling (1976) further reported 
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that the extent of agency conflicts varies across the firms, depending on the level of 
discretionary power which is applied by the management. 
 
The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue 
private benefits (Albuquerue and Wang, 2008). Sometimes, shareholders may prioritise 
their own welfare at the cost of other stakeholders, and so they tend to influence 
management decision in order to maximise short term profit. Management prefers to 
maximise the wealth of the firm by earning sustainable long term profits. Consequently, 
conflicts of interests between owners and management emerge and can grow 
exponentially. Management decisions and activities need to be monitored for 
accountability purposes. Close monitoring is possible when owners themselves can 
actively participate in this monitoring process. However, because of the high cost 
involvement, and in some cases due to the lack of expertise and knowledge, they cannot 
be actively involved in the process. Nevertheless, the board has to set monitoring 
mechanisms because of their oversight responsibilities to shareholders (Johnson et al., 
1996). 
 
In respect of emerging economies, Peng and Heath (1996) contended that the lack of 
legality for formal governance mechanisms creates a weak governance environment, 
which can create a potentially severe agency problem. Young et al. (2001) identified 
some of the factors that make the agency problem worse in emerging economies, for 
example: family ownership and control, state owned enterprises, poor legal protection 
of minority shareholder rights, concentrated ownership structures, and strategy and 
competitiveness. Family ownership has an informal but powerful influence on CG, 
although it is not clear under which conditions it provides a net gain (Schulze et al, 
2002). In emerging economies, many firms are controlled by families (La Porta et al., 
1999a). This family ownership structure is frequently found in Bangladesh (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008). Siddiqui (2010) also noted that concentrated ownership is a common 
phenomenon in Bangladeshi companies. Schulze et al. (2001) argued that the relations 
between principals (i.e. family owners) and agents (i.e. family-member managers) are 
probably based on emotions, sentiments, and informalities, which results in less 
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effective monitoring of family managers. This means that family owners and family-
member managers not only reduce the effectiveness of any internal and external control 
mechanisms, but they also expose their firms to a self-control problem which harms 
both themselves and those around them. Family ownership may sometimes cause ‗weak 
governance‘ and ‗low trust‘ environment that offers little protection against traditional 
principal-agent conflicts (Dharwadkar et al, 2000). In fact, in all countries reformers 
have begun attempting to reduce the power of family-owned business groups. Since the 
family members hold the majority of shares in family ownership, they could be 
considered as large shareholders. The benefits of large shareholders are theoretically 
clear (such as having the interest, as well as the power, to get their money back). Large 
investors represent their own interests, which need meet the interests of other investors, 
employees, and managers in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Large investors 
usually dominate the board and exercise undue influence on management decisions. 
Orbay and Yurtoglu (2006) argued for the presence of large shareholders as a potential 
solution to the typical agency problem between manager and dispersed shareholders. 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) recognised that large investors may tend to 
maximise their wealth and ignore the wealth of other investors and employees. They do 
so particularly when their control rights significantly exceed their cash flow rights, 
which usually happens if there is a substantial departure from one-share one-vote 
(Grossman and Hart, 1988). 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) indicated that it is the role of BoDs to reduce agency problems 
and costs arising from the separation of ownership from decision control. Solomon 
(2007) described some of the ways in which shareholders can monitor company 
management and help to resolve agency conflicts. Hoitash et al. (2009) contended that 
agency problem can be mitigated through effective internal control over financial 
reporting imposed by owners. Many studies have suggested some incentives to motivate 
management in minimising the agency problem (for example, Ward et al., 2009). Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) explained a positive agency theory by linking managerial 
incentives for voluntary financial disclosure.  Again, in some circumstances, instead of 
acting as substitutes, monitoring and incentive alignment may act as complements to 
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one another. This can be happening where the presence or addition of one mechanism 
strengthens the other, and so leads to more effective governance in addressing agency 
problems. For instance, Rutherford et al. (2007) empirically examined the 
complementarities of board monitoring and the CEO incentive systems, and found that 
CEO stock options complemented boards that monitor through formal meetings.  
 
Meanwhile, Dharwadkar et al. (2000) contended that this may require more than 50% 
ownership. Dominated majority ownership structures are likely to prevail across the 
corporate landscape and are able to effectively control Principal-Agent problems, and 
can consequently become the rule in emerging economies. In emerging economies, 
dominating ownership structures are associated with the need to resolve Principal- 
Agent problems. One recommended way to resolve this problem that has been argued in 
literature is to include an independent, external director on the board. Jackling and Johl 
(2009) argued for the agency theory and agreed with the study of Nicholson and Kiel, 
(2007) who noted that the greater proportion of outside directors in the board, the higher 
the corporate performance of the firm. Ehikioya also agreed to one notion of this theory 
and found that CEO duality (same person holding both positions of CEO and Chairman) 
has an adverse impact on a firm‘s performance. However, Jackling and Johl (2009) 
disagreed with the notion and did not find any evidence to conclude that a CEO‘s 
duality roles have any detrimental effect of corporate performance. Advocates of CG 
have identified internal and external governance mechanisms that reduce the agency 
problem (Agarwal and Knoeber, 1996 cited in Ehikioya, 2009).  Dey (2008) found that 
firms with greater agency conflicts have better CG mechanism in place. Their study also 
argued that role of various CG mechanisms in a firm are a function of the level of 
agency conflicts in the firm. Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) described CG as 
a means of reducing agency conflict in the firms. DeZoort el. al. (2002) argued that in 
order to deal with the problems arising from agency relationship,  the BoDs has to 
assume the oversight roles of a monitoring CEO and other managers, approving a firm‘s 
strategies and evaluating their control systems. 
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While the board usually hires an expert and knowledgeable body to oversee 
management activities on its behalf, the AC is a subcommittee under the CG framework 
to which the board delegates some of its crucial oversight responsibilities. Chen et al. 
(2008) studied non-U.S. companies trading shares in the U.S. market, and argued that 
effective AC can resolve agency problems of foreign companies no matter which CG 
model  is being followed in the company‘s home country (different CG models are 
discussed in a later section of this chapter). Dey (2008) found the level and intensity of 
agency problem is less in those firms where ACs are more effective in terms of 
composition and functioning. The AC alleviates the agency problem by facilitating the 
timely release of unbiased accounting information by managers to shareholders, 
creditors and so on; thereby, reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders (Klein, 1998b). Since managers usually do not have to interact frequently with 
shareholders, a distance in terms of trust might exist due to this communication gap. 
The AC can act as a bridge of such gap. Chen et al. (2008) found that the AC can help to 
maintain contact between a management and its shareholders. They also mentioned that 
the effectiveness of an AC in resolving agency problems is also applicable to foreign 
companies, even though their home countries adopt different CG systems. Since an AC 
mainly performs the monitoring role, the effect of this committee on a firm‘s 
performance is better explained by agency theory than by the other theories (Bedard et 
al., 2008). Therefore, the AC has been well recognized by researchers and practitioners 
alike as an effective mechanism in minimising the agency conflict in a company. 
 
3.3.2 Stewardship Theory 
As mentioned earlier, agency theory argues that shareholders' interests require 
protection by the separation of ownership from control. Stewardship theory argues that 
shareholders' interests are maximised by sharing the roles of board chair. However, 
many studies have found that both theories are equally relevant to CG issues. For 
example, Kashif (2008) studied the relationship between CG and a firm‘s performance 
in two different financial markets (i.e. the Malaysian and Australian financial markets) 
and found results that confirm the CG relevance of both agency theory and stewardship 
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theory. One of the basic assumptions of this theory is that the agents have access to 
superior information. Since the principals cannot always monitor the agents' behaviours 
and activities, it raises a concern that the agents will take advantage of this position to 
maximise their self-interest at the expense of the principals (Beaver, 1981). Davis et al. 
(1997) noted that the essential assumption underlying the prescriptions of stewardship 
theory is that the behaviours of the executive are aligned with the interests of the 
principals. In other words, those principals who are not directly involved in the running 
of the business always feel that they are at a disadvantage compared to those agents who 
have access to more information. This is further exacerbated by the assumption that 
agents always seek self-interest as they are not the owners of the company. Further, the 
agents' roles in society may conflict because they are both members of the community 
and self seeking individuals (Lewis and Collins, 1990). 
 
Cornelius (2005) defined CG as the stewardship responsibility of corporate directors to 
provide oversight for the goals and strategies of a company, and also to foster their 
implementation. Stewardship theory, therefore, favours governance mechanisms that 
support and empower the firm‘s management and disfavours those that monitor and 
control it. Stewardship theory suggests that the most crucial factor influencing 
organisational performance and shareholder returns is designing the organisational 
structure so that managers can take effective action (Chitayat, 1985). It is acknowledged 
that stewardship theory adopts a contrasting view of the duality-performance debate 
(Braun and Sharma, 2007). Advocates of stewardship theory argue that authoritative 
decision-making under the leadership of a single individual (as both chairman and 
CEO) leads to an increase in the firm‘s performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009). This theory proposes that managers do have similar interests 
to the corporation, in that the careers of each are linked to the attainment of 
organisational objectives, and their reputations are interwoven with the firm‘s 
performance and shareholder returns (Davis et al., 1997 cited in Young and Thyll, 
2008). Accordingly, the focus is on the inside directors‘ ability to promote shareholders‘ 
value through their superior knowledge of the company (Beasley et al., 2009). 
Stewardship theory advocates the value of self-motivation towards what is good, 
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assuming that managers, or the board of a firm, are self-motivated to serve the best 
interests of the firm and its owners. Given the absence of an inner motivational problem 
among executives, stewardship theory focuses on facilitative, empowering structures 
that allow effective and efficient decision making by managers. 
 
Stewardship theory presumes that executive managers, far from being opportunistic, are 
honest and that they are good stewards of the corporate assets (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Donaldson and Davis (1994) argued that the managers 
are good stewards of corporations who, being motivated by their own achievement and 
responsibility needs, work hard to increase shareholders' wealth. According to this 
theory, the economic performance of a firm is improved if power and authority are 
concentrated in a single executive who is both CEO and chairman. Depth of knowledge, 
commitment, access to current operating information and technical expertise are vital to 
run a company efficiently, and CEOs, who are deemed to possess these advantages, will 
be able to provide more effective leadership if they also hold the chair's position on the 
board. The idea of trusteeship echoes the stewardship theory in many ways (Kay and 
Silberston, 1995) since it puts emphasis on the concept that managers have numerous 
motivations other than simply maximising their own benefits. Earlier, Etzioni (1975) 
argued that managers, when faced with a situation which brings no direct personal 
advantage, may still base their job on a sense of duty. Hawley and Williams (1996) 
claimed that this would lead to a situation where either the boards are mainly executive-
dominated or there are no boards at all. Turnbull (1997) suggested that boards can be 
made redundant with the presence of a dominant active shareholder, particularly when 
the shareholder is a family or government. Tricker (1996) noted that company law 
imposes a fiduciary duty upon managers towards the shareholders and, therefore, 
managers can be easily trusted with the stewardship of the company assets. In short, the 
stewardship theory of CG thrives on the concept of managers being self-motivated 
towards working for the best interest of the company and other related parties. Each 
stakeholder plays an important part in creating an environment where transparency and 
accountability are encouraged, enforced, and rewarded. Tricker (1984) described 
accountability in stewardship theory as the means by which those who manage and 
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oversee the affairs of the company are held to account for their stewardship of corporate 
assets. 
 
3.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Although stakeholder theory has evolved gradually since the 1970s (Solomon, 2007), 
one of the pioneering expositions of this theory was introduced by Freeman in 1984 
when he defined a stakeholder as: ―any individual or group who can affect or is affected 
by achievement of the organization‟s objectives”. Stakeholder theory takes account of a 
wider group of constituents rather than simply focusing only on shareholders (Mallin, 
2010). Thus, stakeholders can include shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, 
creditors, communities in the vicinity of the company‘s operations, and the general 
public. Some extreme proponents of this theory suggest that environment and future 
generation can also be included as stakeholders. One commonality characterising all 
definitions of stakeholders is to acknowledge their involvement in an ‗exchange‘ 
relationship (Pearch, 1982; Freeman, 1984; Hill and Jones, 1992). Stakeholder theory 
highlights that the interests of different groups, and argues for the possibility of 
favouring one group‘s interest over that of another (Jones and Wicks, 1999). It also 
suggests that the company is a separate organisational entity, and that it is connected to 
different parties in achieving a wide range of purposes (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
 
Proponents of the stakeholder theory emphasise that the corporation could not exist 
without the contributions of groups like customers, employees, the community of which 
it is a part, and the environment; therefore, managers should consider how their 
decisions affect these other constituents (Stovall et al., 2004). McAlister et al. (2003) 
argued that this theory presumes a collaborative and relational approach to business and 
its constituents. Supporters of this theory argue that the CG problem turns round the 
objective function of the corporation. The notion that the firm's goal is to maximise 
shareholders' welfare is regarded as being too narrow. Rather, they suggest that the goal 
of the firm should be extended to include the maximisation of the welfare of other 
stakeholders, such as: employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, the environment, and 
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the community (Freeman, 1984). Solomon (2007) contended that a basis for stakeholder 
theory is that companies are so large, and their impact on the society is so pervasive, 
that they should discharge accountability to many more sectors of the society than 
solely their shareholders; they should include employees, suppliers, customers, 
creditors, communities in the vicinity of the company's operations, and the general 
public. Creditors have an interest in getting their loans repaid on schedule; suppliers 
have an interest in securing fair prices and dependable buyers; customers have a stake in 
getting value for money. Basically, this theory is used to help understand the groups and 
individuals that can affect, and are affected by, the achievement of an organisation's 
purpose, and those effects may be economic, regulatory, technological, social, political 
and managerial. 
 
In support of stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston (1995) pointed out that 
managers are responsible to deploy their wise decisions and best efforts in obtaining 
benefits for all stakeholders. Similarly, Wang and Dudley (1992) noted that the BoDs 
cannot ignore its responsibilities in safeguarding a stakeholder‘s interests. CG ensures 
the conformance of corporations with the interests of investors and society by creating 
fairness, transparency and accountability in business activities among employees, 
management and the board (Oman, 2001). John et al. (2008) reported that corporate risk 
taking and growth of the firm are positively associated with the quality of stakeholders‘ 
protection. However, sometimes excessive risk taking by the firm leads to the value of 
the firm being destroyed (Goel and Thakor, 2008), which is contradictory with 
stakeholder theory. Sternberg (1997) rejected stakeholder theory because she considered 
it to be incompatible with business or with CG. In her view, the theory rules out the goal 
of business which is to maximise long-term owner value. Turnbull (1997) disagreed 
with Sternberg's arguments because she had inadequate empirical evidence to support 
her views, and this supported the theory. Previously, stakeholder theory was believed to 
be an opponent of agency theory because of many significant differences between these 
two theories. But in recent years, there is a growing perception among theorists and 
practitioners that these two paradigms may in fact be compatible and they can be 
combined within one single paradigm (Wheeler et al., 2002). Hill and Jones (1992) also 
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argued that stakeholders theory and agency theory perspectives of organisational 
phenomena are no longer viewed as mutually exclusive interpretations, instead they 
may indeed be interpreted in one single model. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that a growing body of literature and empirical evidence argues 
that by taking account of all stakeholders, instead of shareholders alone, the company is 
more likely to achieve the long term profit maximisation which is also conducive to 
sustainable wealth maximisation. Hillman et al. (2001) found that the inclusion of 
stakeholders on the board merely improves their relation and performance. They 
emphasised the board effectiveness in this regard. A well-functioning AC ensures a 
better CG practice in a firm, which ultimately leads to the overall welfare of many 
stakeholders. Dey‘s (2008) conclusion is notable in this respect, he mentioned that an 
organisation‘s performance and stakeholders‘ value are positively affected by various 
governance mechanisms, including AC. Stakeholders‘ interest have been emphasized in 
the definition of effective AC given by DeZoort et al. (2002). They argued that the 
ultimate goal of the AC is to protect all stakeholders‘ interests and welfare. 
 
3.3.4 Resource Dependency Theory 
Some researchers (for example, Cohen et al., 2007b) have found some similarities 
between RDT and agency theory. RDT proposes that actors lacking in essential 
resources will seek to establish relationship with (i.e. be dependent upon) others in order 
to obtain needed resources. In fact, RDT claims that the mutual appointment of directors 
generates benefits to the firm in terms of higher performance. This claim was supported 
by the findings of a recent study by Jackling and Johl (2009). The study found that the 
larger the board size was then the higher was the corporate performance. This notion 
has also previously been argued by Hilman and Dalziel (2003); Dalton, et al. (1998) and 
Pearce and Zahra (1992). RDT is useful in addressing the role of directors as boundary 
spanners between the organisation and the environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 
cited in Young and Thyll, 2008). Directors‘ professional appointments (lawyers or 
bankers, for example) enhance the organisational functioning by providing access to 
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resources needed by the firm. RDT theory suggests that the external parties' ability to 
command those resources which are vital for an organisation, gives those parties power 
over it. This means that if a foreign partner brings a resource necessary for the 
company's success, then the external partner will gain power relative to the local 
partner. It also implies that a partner's control will be focused on those activities to 
which this partner brings resources. This theory, therefore, leads to the conclusion that 
the partners' ability to govern a firm depends not only on the relative size of their equity 
holdings, but also on the significance of the essential tangible and intangible resources 
which they bring to the firm (Child et al., 1997). 
 
Organizational success in RDT is defined as organisations maximising their power 
(Pfeffer, 1981). Research on the bases of power within organisations began as early as 
Weber (1947), and has included much of the early work conducted by social exchange 
theorists and political scientists. A generalisation of power-based arguments from intra-
organizational relations to relations between organizations began as early as Selznick 
(1949). RDT characterises the links among organisations as a set of power relations 
based on exchange resources. Resource dependence asserts that the board‘s primary role 
is to assist management with strategy and resource acquisition (Cohen et al. 2007a; 
Nicholson and Kiel 2007). Board‘s role is that of helper or partner, rather than a monitor 
of the management (Beasley et al., 2009). In emerging economies, it is likely that local 
partners and local markets are unable to provide the more sophisticated resources 
required by firms. This leads them to becoming highly dependent on their foreign 
partners for items such as technology, management systems, training, and professional 
support services. Most emerging economies suffer from the shortage of fund, expertise, 
and institutional channels to adequately finance their working capital requirements, or 
expansion investment; Bangladesh is no exception in this regard. RDT implies a 
reasonable reliance on the foreign partner in overcoming these lacks and shortages. 
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3.3.5 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory has been developed to explain the problems of an information 
imbalance in the labour markets, it also looks at how this can be reduced by the party 
with more information signalling to others (Morris, 1987). Basically, the theory has got 
some similarities to agency theory because it also recognises the separation of 
ownership and control in modem corporations, and it suggests that market pressures on 
management motivates management to disclose all of the information which is material 
to investors (Ross, 1979). However, one of the basic assumptions of this theory, which 
makes it slightly different from agency theory, is that there are signalling costs that are 
inversely related to the quality of information (Morris, 1987). Despite information 
imbalances, management has motives to provide quality information to reduce 
signalling costs (especially the effect on share price). Managers with superior 
information on the demand for its product disclose more to convince both competitors 
and the capital market of the quality of its product, thereby increasing the value of the 
firm's stock. Similarly, the firm would also like to convince its competitors that 
demands are low, which reduces the competitors' output and increases the informed 
firm's profit (Gigler, 1994). Morris (1987) further argued that when the sellers of 
information provide a general disclosure then the buyers of information will not be able 
to differentiate the products, resulting in no change in price.  
 
On the other hand, if sellers of high quality products disclose more, the buyers of 
information will be able to differentiate the product, resulting in higher prices. But for 
sellers of lower quality products then it will be to their advantage not to disclose extra 
information as buyers may be able to differentiate the product, causing the price to be 
low. In short, Morris (1987) indicated that the signalling motives are greater when the 
quality of the product is high. Ross (1979), however, argued that firms with no 
information, or with bad news, also have to give signals, just like those with good news, 
in order to distinguish their firms from others. In the case of firms with bad news, 
Skinner (1994) stated that the managers of these firms also have a legal motivation to 
disclose the bad news as they may cause reputation losses if they fail to do so at the 
appropriate time. Ross (1979) further asserted that for firms which have previously 
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made a disclosure, a failure to do so later will be regarded by the market as a signal that 
the unpublished data are harmful, thus it logically builds a powerful motivation to 
disclose, even on the part of those firms with really bad news. 
 
In fact, signalling theory is based on the assumption that information is not equally 
available to all parties at the same time and, therefore, that information asymmetry is the 
rule. Signalling theory states that corporate financial decisions are signals sent by the 
company's managers to investors in order to shake up these asymmetries. Therefore, 
corporate affairs should be clearly disclosed to the stakeholders so that they can take 
their rational and informed decision. The role of the AC as a CG mechanism in ensuring 
full disclosure of corporate affairs has been widely recognised, and will be discussed in 
more detail in a later section of this chapter.   
 
3.3.6 Market Myopia Theory 
Keasey et al. (1997) indicated that the proponents of Market Myopia Theory implicitly 
assert that the goal of a firm is not only to maximise shareholder‘s wealth, but also to 
maximise other stakeholders‘ wealth.  Charkham (1994) and Sykes (1994) noted that the 
Market Myopia Theory identifies the short-term as the central problem in the Anglo-
Saxon CG system (which is discussed in Section 3.5). They argue that the capital 
market produces excessive pressure on a corporation‘s managers to focus excessively on 
short-term stock price gain at the expense of long-term growth and investments (such as 
research and development). According to Keasey et al. (1997) the share price is not a 
reliable guide to the future value of the firm. Moreover, this theory suggests that one of 
the roles of accounting is to provide information for the capital markets through a 
process of formal and informal sets of contracts between self-interested parties 
(Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992). Thus, the information needs of these users act as constant 
pressure on companies to increase both the quality and quantity of their disclosure. This 
view has been supported by Gray and Roberts (1989) who pointed out that stock market 
pressures appear to dominate political pressures in encouraging disclosure. The theory 
suggests that the impetus for disclosure is to help in reducing investor uncertainty and, 
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therefore, risk and the required rate of return (Cooke, 1989). A lower rate of return to 
shareholders means a lower cost of capital for the company, and this is in line with the 
company's objective to raise capital at the lowest possible cost (Spero, 1979). In 
addition, the lower the uncertainty or risk perceived by investors then the higher will be 
the share price. This is made possible by making disclosure that will enhance the 
company's image and reputation in the eyes of potential investors (Gray and Roberts, 
1989). 
 
3.3.7 Transaction Cost Theory 
Like agency theory, transaction cost theory also deals with the issues regarding how to 
co-ordinate the individual interests of both owner and management in order to protect 
the best interest of the shareholders at large. However, one of the fundamental 
differences between agency theory and transaction cost theory is that the former 
considers that managers pursue their perquisites while the latter describes how 
managers are often opportunistic. The central idea of transaction cost theory, as 
proposed by Williamson (1996), is that corporations experience massive economic 
costs, and corresponding economic advantages, in each transaction that they carry out. 
Solomon (2007) noted that: “Transaction cost theory is based on the fact that 
companies have become so large and complex that price movements outside companies‟ 
direct production and the markets coordinate transaction”. Williamson (1996) pointed 
out: ―Transaction cost theory has been developed to facilitate an analysis of the 
comparative costs of planning, adapting and monitoring task completion under 
alternative governance structure”. Williamson‘s (1996) study argued that the unit of 
analysis in transaction cost theory is a transaction which occurs when any goods or 
service is transferred across a technologically separate interface. According to 
Williamson (1996), transaction cost theory arises firstly from two human factors (for 
example, bounded rationality and opportunism), and secondly from three environmental 
factors (for example, uncertainty, small number of trading and asset specify). 
Williamson further argued that the three dimensions of a transaction affect the type of 
governance structure which is chosen for the transactions which are: asset specificity, 
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uncertainty, and frequency. As asset specificity and uncertainty increase, the risk of 
opportunism increases. Thus, decision-makers are more likely to choose a hierarchical 
governance structure. As frequency increases, the comparative advantage of using 
market governance structures decreases because the costs of hierarchical governance 
structures can be amortised across more instances of the transaction. 
 
The above discussion indicates that CG literature has investigated the role of the board 
in quite some detail and has presented various theories. It is evident that no single 
theory in isolation can provide a complete understanding of the board‘s role (Daily et 
al., 2003; Lynall et al., 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
Similarly, Tricker (2009) pointed out: ―Corporate governance, as yet, does not have a 
single widely accepted theoretical base nor a commonly accepted paradigm...  the 
subject lacks a conceptual framework that adequately reflects the reality of corporate 
governance”. Despite the marked differences between the various theories, all attempt 
to describe the same problems, but from a different perspective. The above discussion 
has also depicted many commonalities among them in terms of their key concepts. CG 
mechanisms, an effective AC in particular, can contribute directly or indirectly to these 
theories. CG is still seeking its theoretical foundations; however, the main theory that 
has affected its development, and that provides a theoretical framework within which it 
most naturally seems to rest, is agency theory (Mallin, 2010). She also noted that 
stakeholder theory is coming more into play as companies increasingly become aware 
that they cannot operate in isolation to a wider stakeholder constituency. Further, it is 
clear that agency theory is related to most of the theories discussed above, and it 
encompasses the basic idea of these theories. AC is believed as an effective mechanism 
in resolving an agency problem in an organisation (Chen et al., 2008; Dey, 2008; 
Bedard et al., 2008). AC‘s role in reducing agency gap is stated by Sarens et al. (2009) 
as: 
 
The AC attempts to protect the principals‟ interest by monitoring the agents‟ 
actions and thus reduces the information asymmetry that exists between the 
owners, management and other stakeholders.  
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3.4 Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
A number of countries across the world have introduced or revised CG codes during the 
last two decades. Despite some contextual differences between the countries, the 
common aims of these codes were to ensure more transparency and accountability in 
corporate affairs, as well as to increase investors‘ confidence in the stock market as a 
whole. The development of the codes has often been driven by financial scandal, 
corporate collapse, or similar crises (Mallin, 2010). There is no universal code of CG; 
however, events in the corporate world (such as the collapse of many giant corporations, 
the changing pattern of share ownership, and the internationalisation of cross-border 
portfolios) have led various countries and international organisations to develop some 
principles of CG which may be followed in the context of different countries (Hussain 
and Mallin, 2002 cited in Reaz, 2006). One of the most influential guidelines has been 
the 1999 OECD Principles of CG. Apart from OECD principles, some other CG 
guidelines (for example, Cadbury Committee, 1992, 1995; Greenbury Committee, 1995; 
Hampel Committee, 1998; and Turnbull Committee, 1999) are also frequently used as 
useful references. The Combined Code (2003) of CG was initially issued in 1999, a 
revised edition was published in 2003. The Combined Code integrates the previous 
guidelines given by different committees. The following subsections discuss the main 
contents of the OECD principles and the Combined Code. 
 
3.4.1 The OECD Principles 
The OECD principles were originally issued in 1999, and have since become the 
international benchmark for CG. They form the basis for a number of reform initiatives, 
by both the government and private sectors. The principles were revised in 2003 to take 
into account the developments in CG since 1999. The new principles were agreed by 
OECD governments in April 2004. These principles, which are non-binding, have been 
widely accepted as providing the broad framework for countries to use.  It is expected 
that countries should then adopt their own country-owned CG frameworks; taking 
account their unique culture, and regulatory and legislative systems.   
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Table 3.1: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
Principle Explanation 
(1) Ensuring the basis for an 
 effective CG framework 
The CG framework should promote transparent and efficient 
markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly 
articulate the division of responsibilities among different 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
(2) The rights of shareholders and  
key ownership functions 
The CG framework should protect and facilitate the exercise 
of shareholders‘ rights. 
(3) The equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
The CG framework should ensure the equitable treatment of 
all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. 
All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights. 
(4) The role of stakeholders in CG The CG framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual 
agreements and encourage active co-operation between 
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and 
the sustainability of financially sound corporations. 
(5) Disclosure and transparency The CG framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company. 
(6) The responsibilities of the board The CG framework should ensure the strategic guidance of 
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the 
board, and the board‘s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders. 
 
The OECD principles of CG, which were originally adopted by the thirty member 
countries of the OECD, have become a reference tool for countries all over the world 
(Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005). While evaluating OECD principles, Krambia-Kapardis 
and Psaros (2006) noted that: 
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Guiding much of the corporate governance reform in developing economies has 
been the OECD principles of corporate governance, issued in 1999. While the 
OECD Principles have been an important benchmark for many countries to base 
their corporate governance strategies around, there also have been some 
problems in their implementation. A review of the 1999 principles by an OECD 
established Steering Group led to a revamping of the principles in 2004. In 
summary, the Steering Group found that while the principles were sound, there 
were problems with respect to their implementation. Inter alia, two key areas 
where the principles were not being upheld were in respect of independent 
boards of directors and independent auditors. In respect of both of these areas 
the revised 2004 OECD principles of corporate governance have been 
strengthened. 
 
3.4.2 Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
Although the first version of the U.K. Code on CG was produced in 1992 by the 
Cadbury Committee, the Combined Code was formally issued in 1999 in order to 
provide guidance on some key aspects of CG such as: BoDs, remuneration, accounting 
and auditing, and relations with shareholders.  It was again revised in 2003, when it 
incorporated the substance of the Basel Committee Report (2001), the Higgs Report 
(2003), and the Smith Guidelines (2003). It is now known as the U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code (the Code).  All companies with a premium listing of equity shares in 
the U.K. are required under the listing rules to report on how they have applied the code 
in their annual report and accounts. Stock exchange listed companies are required to 
report on how they have applied the main principles of the code. They either confirm 
that they have complied with the code's provisions or, where they have not complied, 
they are requested to provide an explanation. The code is reviewed and updated at 
regular intervals by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). In May 2010, the FRC 
issued a new edition of the code which has been applied to the financial years beginning 
on or after 29 June 2010. The code comprises principles on five broad sections, which 
are outlined as following (FRC, 2010): 
 
Section A: Leadership 
 Every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively 
responsible for the long-term success of the company. 
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 There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the 
running of the company‘s business. No one individual should have unfettered 
powers of decision. 
 The chairman is responsible for leadership of the board and ensuring its 
effectiveness on all aspects of its role. 
 As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors 
should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy. 
 
Section B: Effectiveness 
 The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, 
experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to 
discharge their respective duties and responsibilities effectively. 
 There should be a formal, rigorous, and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors to the board. 
 All directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to 
discharge their responsibilities effectively. 
 All directors should receive induction on joining the board, and they should 
regularly update and refresh their skills and knowledge. 
 The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a form, and 
of a quality, appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. 
 The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own 
performance, and that of its committees and individual directors. 
 All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to 
continued satisfactory performance. 
 
Section C: Accountability 
 The board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company‘s position and prospects. 
 The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant 
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risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should 
maintain sound risk management and internal control systems. 
 The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering 
how they should apply the corporate reporting and risk management, and 
internal control principles; and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with 
the company‘s auditor. 
 
Section D: Remuneration 
 Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain, and motivate 
directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company 
should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant 
proportion of the executive directors‘ remuneration should be structured so as to 
link rewards to corporate and individual performance. 
 There should be a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on 
executive remuneration, and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual 
directors. No director should be involved in deciding his or her own 
remuneration. 
 
Section E: Relations with Shareholders 
 There should be a dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding 
of objectives. The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a 
satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place. 
 The board should use the AGM to communicate with investors and to encourage 
their participation. 
 
3.5 Corporate Governance Models 
The governance structure of a corporation in a given country is determined by several 
factors, including: the legal and regulatory framework outlining the rights and 
responsibilities of all parties involved in CG; the de facto realities of the corporate 
environment in the country; and, each corporation‘s articles of association. Therefore, it 
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is possible to outline a ‗model‘ of CG for a given country. Amidst growing recognition 
of sound governance, different countries are addressing the issue of CG from different 
angles (Becht et al., 2005). A system of CG refers to a country-specific framework of 
legal, institutional, and cultural factors through which stakeholders can influence 
managerial behaviour (Li and Harrison, 2008). There are several such country-specific 
systems that work as determinants of CG practices around the world. While CG is 
emerging as an increasingly crucial area of modern management due to recent corporate 
meltdowns, frauds and criminal investigations, researchers have signalled the need for 
‗new theoretical perspectives and new models of governance‘ (Jensen, 2001; Monks and 
Minow, 2004; Daily et al., 2003 cited in Young and Thyil, 2008). One significant effect 
of national environmental differences is a variation in corporate ownership structures 
(Charkham, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) 
distinguished between two broad categories of corporate ownership structure across 
countries. In one category, which includes the U.K. and the U.S.A., ownership is more 
dispersed among a large number of unrelated individual and institutional investors. In 
the other category, there are the countries of Continental Europe (lead by Germany) and 
Japan, in which the ownership of individual firms is often concentrated within a small 
number of directly related firms, banks, and families. However, a number of scholars, 
such as Scott (1985), DeJong (1989) and Moerland (1995ab), have all suggested that 
there are four systems of CG, which originate from relatively rich and industrialised 
countries, they are: 
(i) Anglo-Saxon System (i.e. U.S.A., U.K., Canada, Australia etc.); 
(ii) Japanese System; 
(iii) Germanic System (i.e. Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Austria, Denmark, Norway, Finland); and 
(iv) Latin European System (i.e. France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal). 
 
3.5.1 Anglo-Saxon System of Corporate Governance 
Maximisation of ‗shareholders‘ value‘ is a central element in the Anglo-Saxon 
governance system. The three major players in this CG system are: management, 
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directors, and shareholders. The Anglo-Saxon model assumes the separation of 
ownership and control in most publicly-held corporations. The interests of shareholders 
and management may not always coincide. Laws governing corporations in countries 
using the Anglo-Saxon model attempt to reconcile this conflict in several ways. Most 
importantly, they prescribe the election of a board of directors by shareholders and 
require that boards act as fiduciaries for shareholders‘ interests by overseeing 
management on behalf of shareholders. Management often has a strong influence over 
relatively weak boards. The Anglo-Saxon system mainly stems from the governance 
practices of the U.S.A., the U.K., and some other English-speaking countries such as 
Canada and Australia. According to Weimer and Pape (1999), firms in these countries 
must commit themselves to the priority objective of maximising shareholder wealth, 
and they have strong legal back-up to protect the shareholders‘ interest through laws 
that give rise to the principle of ‗one share one vote‘ (Franks and Mayer, 1990). 
Corporations in countries which follow the Anglo-Saxon model are usually governed by 
one single BoDs which consists of both internal and external members. The external, or 
non-executive, directors supervise and advise the managerial directors on major policy 
decisions in line with the best interest of the shareholders (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
 
According to FIBV (1996), the stock market is very strong and active in Anglo Saxon 
countries. The Anglo-Saxon countries have an active market for corporate control, 
referred as a ‗takeover market‘, with common takeover techniques such as mergers, 
tender offers, proxy fights and leveraged buy-outs (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Abowd 
and Bognanno (1995) found that performance-based remuneration is an important part 
of the total managerial compensation in the U.S.A., accounting for one third of total 
compensation of CEOs in 1992. The lengths of economic relationships mark another 
characteristic of CG systems, these relationships tend to be short-term in the Anglo-
Saxon system. Such short-term and unstable relationships result from unrestricted 
markets for capital, labour, goods, and services which ensure rapid adjustment to 
changing circumstances (Gelauff and Den Broeder, 1996). In particular, the AC is 
currently becoming as a widely accepted governance mechanism in the corporations.  
As more countries are converging toward an Anglo-Saxon model of CG, ACs are widely 
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accepted to establish confidence in financial markets (Collier and Zaman, 2005 cited in 
Chan and Li, 2008). 
 
Therefore, the Anglo-Saxon model is characterised by: share ownership of individual, 
and increasingly institutional; investors not affiliated with the corporation (known as 
outside shareholders or ‗outsiders‘); a well-developed legal framework defining the 
rights and responsibilities of three key players (i.e. management, directors, and 
shareholders); and a comparatively uncomplicated procedure for interaction between 
shareholder and corporation, as well as among shareholders during or outside the AGM. 
 
3.5.2 Japanese System of Corporate Governance 
The Japanese model is characterised by: a high level of stock ownership by affiliated 
banks and companies; a banking system characterised by strong, long-term links 
between bank and corporation; a legal, public policy and industrial policy framework 
designed to support and promote ‗keiretsu‘13; boards of directors composed almost 
solely of insiders; and a comparatively low (in some corporations, non-existent) level of 
input of outside shareholders, caused and exacerbated by complicated procedures for 
exercising shareholders‘ votes. 
 
Equity financing is the most important source of fund for Japanese corporations. 
Insiders and their affiliates are the major shareholders in most Japanese corporations. 
Consequently, they play a major role in both individual corporations and in the system 
as a whole. Conversely, the interests of outside shareholders are marginal. The 
percentage of foreign ownership of Japanese stocks is small, but it may become an 
important factor in making the model more responsive to outside shareholders. In the 
Japanese model, the four key players are: 
(i) Bank (a major inside shareholder); 
                                                 
13
  A ‗keirets‟ is a set of companies with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings. It is a 
type of business groups linked by trading relationships as well as cross-shareholdings of debt and 
equity. 
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(ii) Affiliated company or ‗keiretsu‘ (a major inside shareholder); 
(iii) The management; and 
(iv) The government. 
 
It should be noted that the interaction among these players serves to link relationships 
rather than balance powers, as in the case in the Anglo-Saxon model. The Japanese 
model may be pictured as an open-ended hexagon: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Japanese Model of Corporate Governance 
 
The base of Figure 3.2, with four connecting lines, represents the linked interests of the 
four key players: government, management, bank, and ‗keiretsu‘. The open lines at the 
top represent the non-linked interests of non-affiliated shareholders and outside 
directors, because these play an insignificant role. 
 
The Japanese system is more driven by the cultural dimension of the CG when 
compared to other systems of governance. It can be argued that 'family values' 
encompass all characteristics of the Japanese governance system. In legal aspects, the 
ICMG (1995) have suggested that little emphasis is placed on litigation in Japan. The 
BoDs of Japanese firms include an office of representative directors and an office of 
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auditors. Aoki (1984a) and Corbett (1994) claimed that Japanese firms often set up an 
informal sub-structure of the BoDs, which results in the inclusion of both inside and 
outside members. In the Japanese model, employees and shareholders exert 
considerable influence on managerial decisions. Aoki's (1984ab) studies present a model 
which views Japanese firms as a coalition of the body of employees and the body of 
shareholders, which is targeted and mediated by the management. Japanese commercial 
codes view shareholders as important stakeholders, but for cultural reasons their role is 
different from those in the other governance systems (ICMG, 1995). Zielinski and 
Holloway (1991) suggested that sometimes the shareholders hold shares for symbolic 
reasons; for example, because they are considered as a ticket of admission to the 
corporate network.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.2 (p. 68), the government is one of the key players in the Japanese 
CG system; for example, the government directed industrial policy guides the 
governance of Japanese corporations. The Japanese government has been pursuing an 
active industrial policy to assist Japanese corporations since the 1930s. Furthermore, the 
Japanese government encourages the formation of ‗keiretsu‟ and maintains close 
relationships with these business groups. Similarly, the ‗keiretsu‟ ensures government 
representation on the company‘s board (Aras and Crowther, 2009). 
 
Japanese banks are believed to be salient influential stakeholders in the Japanese system 
(Harrison, 1997; Corbett, 1994). The Japanese stock market is the oldest in Asia, 
playing a very active role in the economy (Harrison, 1997). Because takeovers are 
frowned upon (Moerland, 1995a), there is no active market for corporate control in 
Japan. The ownership structure is marked by stable cross-holdings between financial 
and non-financial companies and, consequently, ownership is more widely dispersed 
than in the Germanic system but the concentration is still higher than in the U.S.A. 
Abowd and Bognanno (1995) suggested that performance-based pay is not very 
common in Japan. The ICMG (1995) indicated that the issue of managerial 
remuneration is of much less interest to stakeholders than in many other countries. 
According to Weimer and Pape (1999), the presence of ‗keiretsu‘ and the concept of 
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long-term employment together with 'familyism' indicate long-term and stable 
economic relationships in the Japanese governance system. 
 
3.5.3 The Germanic System of Corporate Governance 
The German CG model differs significantly from both the Anglo-Saxon and the 
Japanese model, although some of its elements resemble those of the Japanese model. In 
Germany the legal system is quite explicit in finding that firms do not have a sole 
responsibility to pursue the interests of shareholders. Indeed, this CG system is 
somewhat ambivalent towards minority shareholders, allowing them the scope for 
interaction by permitting shareholders‘ proposals but also permitting companies to 
impose voting rights restrictions. Most German corporations have traditionally preferred 
bank financing over equity financing. As a result, German stock market capitalisation is 
small in relation to the size of the German economy. Furthermore, the level of 
individual stock ownership in Germany is low, reflecting the traditionally conservative 
investment strategy of most Germans. It is not surprising, therefore, that the German 
CG structure is geared towards preserving relationships between the key players, 
notably banks and corporations. 
 
The Germanic system considers corporations as autonomous economic entities which, 
rather than concentrating on shareholder benefits alone, value partnership among 
different stakeholders (Moerland, 1995a). Studies by Edwards and Fischer (1994), and 
Kaplan (1995) suggest that most of the Germanic system countries have a two-tier 
board system comprising a management board and a supervisory board. Legally the 
supervisory board monitors the management board, but in practice it gives advice to the 
management board on major policy decisions and possesses the authority to appoint or 
dismiss the management board. The influence of independent shareholders on 
managerial decision-making is limited in the Germanic model because the Anglo-Saxon 
trademark of ‗one share, one vote‘ does not prevail. Another characteristic of the 
Germanic system is that large banks are very influential stakeholders of corporations. 
Banks in Germany can hold large share blocks, unlike in the U.S.A. where such a 
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practice is legally restricted (Weimer and Pape, 1999). The ICMG (1995) suggested that 
the economic relationship among stakeholders is generally long-term. Gelauff and Den 
Broeder (1996) indicated that sizeable and stable shareholdings by non-financial 
corporations and banks facilitate long-term and stable economic relationships in the 
Germanic system of CG. However, the stock markets in the Germanic system play a far 
less active role than in Anglo-Saxon countries, and it is rare to find a market for 
corporate control in this system (Weimer and Pape, 1999). The ownership structure of 
Germanic countries may be responsible for inactive or weak markets of corporate 
control because concentrated ownership, which is common in Germany, can more easily 
and directly influence managerial actions. 
 
Three unique elements of the German model distinguish it from the other models. 
Firstly, the German model prescribes two boards with separate members. This implies 
that German corporations have a two-tiered board structure consisting of a management 
board (composed entirely of insiders, that is, executives of the corporation) and a 
supervisory board (composed of labour/employee representatives and shareholder 
representatives). The two boards are completely distinct and no one may serve 
simultaneously on a corporation‘s management board and supervisory board. Secondly, 
the size of the supervisory board is set by law and cannot be changed by shareholders. 
Thirdly, in Germany and other countries which follow this model, voting right 
restrictions are legal and limit a shareholder to voting a certain percentage of the 
corporation‘s total share capital, regardless of share ownership position. 
 
3.5.4 Latin European System of Corporate Governance 
Latin European countries follow a CG system which is something of a hybrid cross 
between the Anglo-Saxon system and the Germanic system, showing a closer 
resemblance to the latter (Weimer and Pape, 1999). For example, firms in France have 
the option to choose from either a one-tier board system (as in the U.S.A. and U.K.), or 
a two-tier board system (as in Germany). The ICMG Report (1995) indicated that 
around 98 per cent of the listed companies have chosen the unitary, or one-tier, board 
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system, leaning towards the Anglo-Saxon model. Similarly, shareholders in the Latin 
European system have more influence than in the Germanic system, yet their influence 
is less decisive than that in the Anglo-Saxon system. In addition, the employees‘ 
influence on managerial actions is less institutionalised than in the Germanic system 
(DeJong, 1989). Shareholder influence in Latin European countries stems from financial 
holdings and cross shareholdings, and government and family control (Moerland, 
1995ab). For example, although in France and Spain shareholding by banks is as 
important and as common as it is in Germany, Italy is closer to the Anglo-Saxon system. 
Stock markets play a very negligible role in Latin countries when compared with Anglo-
Saxon environments; however, Moerland (1995b) suggested that despite the absence of 
an active takeover market there have been more hostile takeovers in this system than in 
the Germanic. Again, a concentrated ownership structure in Latin countries explains the 
absence of the market for corporate control, which is more akin to the Germanic model. 
As in the Germanic system, performance-based compensation is not very common in 
Latin countries; however, Abowd and Bognanno (1995) argued that the percentage of 
executive remuneration in France is similar to that in the U.K. and Canada.  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that CG models differ according to the variety of 
capitalism in which they are embedded. Cuervo (2002) argued that no one single model 
of CG appears to be applicable everywhere. According to Franks and Mayer (1994), the 
differences in CG models between countries do not occur because of the way in which 
financial systems are used to fund the companies, but rather because of the differences 
in the way that ownership and control are organised. It may vary by country and sector 
and, even for the same corporation, over time, depending on: the differences in market 
structures, development of the institutional framework, legal and regulatory systems, 
and cultural and societal values (Iskander and Chamlou 2000; Cuervo 2002). There 
seems to be a recent pattern of convergence in CG systems. As Iskander and Chamlou 
(2000) mentioned that the globalisation of markets seems to provide firms with the 
impetus to converge operational and governance practices in the form of reduced risks 
for the investors, and a decreased cost of capital to the firm. Cuervo (2002) however, 
observed that the trend of convergence does not necessarily entail a movement towards 
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a single model, but rather a transition in the direction of common guiding principles of 
information, transparency, and accountability.  
 
Therefore, despite the four different models which have been discussed, they come from 
two dominant school of thoughts namely: (i) the Anglo-Saxon Model (also known as the 
liberal model); and (ii) the Continental European and Japanese Model (also known as 
the coordinated model) (Clarke, 2007; Rossouw and Sison, 2006; Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004 cited in West, 2009). While, the liberal model that is common in Anglo-
Saxon countries tends to give priority to the interests of shareholders, the coordinated 
model recognises the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the 
community. Each model has its own distinct features. Thus, the liberal model of CG 
encourages radical innovation and cost competition, whereas the coordinated model of 
CG facilitates incremental innovation and quality competition. It is important to note 
that all CG models have evolved mainly in developed countries on the basis of the CG 
practices which are conducted in those countries. On the other hand, developing or least 
developed countries follow developed countries in this respect. However, CG practices 
in terms of models vary across these economies. The next section discusses the CG 
practices of developing economies. 
 
3.6 Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries 
In contrast to the numerous studies on CG in developed countries, limited research 
studies have been undertaken on the extent to which the CG issues of developed 
economies are applicable to emerging economies. The minimal research, conducted on 
the use of CG in developing countries, mainly focuses on the CG practice of an 
individual country. The increasing pace of globalisation and democratisation in most 
developing countries, however, calls for the enhancement of governance practices in 
these countries (Reed, 2002). The attention to the developing world‘s CG becomes more 
necessary when it is realised that the success of on-going economic reforms largely 
depends on the quality of CG (Nenova, 2004). Oman (2001) stressed the importance of 
implementing sound CG for the sake of development, suggesting that its use can 
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increase the flow, and decreases the cost of financial capital and can stimulate 
productivity growth. Developing countries are constantly seeking investment, 
particularly foreign investment, into trade and industry, and CG plays an important role 
in tapping investment by boosting investor confidence. Deregulation and privatisation 
has created scores of new firms with millions of new investors, including: shareholder-
suppliers of equity finance, creditor suppliers of debt finance, and employee-suppliers 
of human capital (Oman, 2001). 
 
Several studies have regarded the development of appropriate CG system as one of the 
greatest challenges of low-income countries in achieving sustainable financial sector 
development and economic growth (e.g. Nenova 2004; Oman and Blume 2005; 
Iskander and Chamlou 2000). The particular importance of a robust CG regime in 
developing countries is evident in several recent studies that have advocated a strong 
system for encouraging inward investment and nourishing long-term economic growth 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Lynham et al, 2006; Visser et al., 2006). Important changes have 
indeed been occurring in CG systems in all major industrialised, and even some 
emerging countries, in recent years (De Nicolo et al., 2008 cited in Yoskikawa and 
Rasheed, 2009). CG in developing economies is gradually attracting attention (Oman, 
2001; Lin, 2001). This has been given impetus as the East Asian crises, along with debt 
crises in Russia and Brazil, have exposed the problems of poor CG in developing, as 
well as emerging, markets (Allen, 2005; Oman et al., 2003). The growth in international 
capital flows to developing countries stresses the importance of improved CG. 
 
Apart from the widely discussed Anglo-Saxon and Continental European models, 
another governance system seems to aggregate multiple related shareholders acting 
within and across business groups in Asia and Latin America (Cuervo 2002). In most 
developing economies the most common pattern of ownership is family-based rather 
than the Berle and Means (1932) pattern of dispersed ownership. Singh et al. (2002) 
argued that the family-based system of CG is often associated with relationship 
banking. This means that the family-based system is almost identical to the bank-based 
Continental European model. In this respect, the nature of governance problems in the 
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relationship based system is fairly different from that of the market-based systems in the 
Anglo-Saxon economies (Tsui and Gul 2000; Singh et al. 2002; La Porta et al., 1999a). 
As Rajan and Zingales (1998) stated: "... Market-based systems require transparency as 
a guarantee of protection ... By contrast; relationship-based systems are designed to 
preserve opacity, which has the effect of protecting the relationship from the threat of 
competition”. The actual ownership of family-run companies is opaque given the 
widespread use of pyramiding, cross-holdings, and the use of non-public trusts 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2008). The study of Ehikioya (2009) found an adverse effect on a 
firm‘s performance if its board includes two or more members from the same family. 
The characteristics of family-owned businesses are that they are expected to have 
unique agency problems which are linked with CG and a firm‘s performance (Jackling 
and Johl, 2009). The uniqueness of this agency problem was explained by La Porta et al. 
(1999b) who suggested that although the agency problem in developed countries is 
between managers and shareholders, in developing countries the problem exists 
between the majority and minority shareholders. 
 
Ahunwan (2002) argued that in some cases where the conflict between managers and 
shareholders arises in developing countries, it is worsened by ill-functioning capital 
markets, information asymmetry, and a lack of adequate infrastructure. Developing 
countries‘ corporate structures are characterised by the majority shareholder‘s desire to 
maintain control over firms, the reliance on debt finance, weak financial markets, and an 
ineffective legal system (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002). An optimal solution to a firm's 
governance problem seems to be constrained by the institutional, legal and political 
environment in a developing economy. Western governance mechanisms might not be 
suitable for use in Asia because of the dominance of family-controlled and relationship-
based governance structures (Prowse 1994; Tsui Gul, 2000). Singh et al. (2002) argued 
that the market-based system has specific governance problems, which involve agency 
costs, asymmetric information and incomplete contracting. They also argue that the 
family-based system not only solves the agency problems far better than the Anglo-
Saxon model, but also escapes from short-termism as well as the speculative problems 
of the stock market-based model. Moreover, this system tends to be more beneficial to 
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the long-term economic development of emerging economies. The relationship-based 
system of some emerging markets (as well as of European countries like Germany) has 
very successful records of fast long-term growth, which is often superior to that of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Nevertheless, Van Den Berghe and Carchon (2003) outlined 
several pitfalls of the family based governance system, including: conflicts of interest, 
higher monitoring costs, and higher asymmetries. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
Barclay et al. (1993) also observed that large controlling shareholders can cause agency 
problems because they tend to maximise their wealth at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
 
In a seminal World Bank study that outlines the CG agenda for developing nations, 
Nenova (2004) noted that developing countries face challenges in various areas in terms 
of sound CG. The author argued that the main governance problem in low-income 
countries is value transfer from non-controlling shareholders or stakeholders to that of 
dominant large shareholders. Such abuse becomes easier with concentrated ownership 
(which is often in the hands of a few families), ineffective disclosure practices, a weak 
legal framework and enforcement, and problems in the audit environment. The rise of 
governance in developing countries is the result of poor economic performance and the 
consequent high international debt levels which necessitate the intervention of 
international financial bodies such as the World Bank. Increased focus on governance 
issues is included by these bodies as part of the general reforms (Reed, 2002). Thus, the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the IFC have worked to encourage the improvement of 
governance levels in emerging markets (McKinsey, 2001). The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, issued in 1999 and subsequently revised in 2004, also includes 
much guidance about corporate governance reform in developing economies.  Measures 
to improve CG in developing countries that have been suggested include: encouraging 
the use of equity instead of debt for growth, increasing overall investor confidence 
through governance issues (such as shareholder rights and increased transparency), 
strengthening of capital market structures (such as listing requirements and banking 
reforms), and encouraging the use of competition to improve the performance of 
domestic firms (Reed, 2002 cited in Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
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A detailed picture of CG in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) states has been provided by 
the research of Estrin and Wright (1999). Taking advantages of provisions of the 1989 
legislation, under which enterprises had options to buy out, insider dominance became 
overwhelming in these economies (Filatotchev et al., 1992; Estrin and Wright, 1999; 
Frydman et al., 1996; Boycko et al., 1995; Buck et al., 1999). Following the initial 
transitions, inefficiency of the FSU states that capital markets exacerbated the CG 
problems by inhibiting the takeover mechanisms (Estrin and Wright, 1999). In many 
FSU countries, outside ownership was obstructed, as was evident in the Russian case. 
Bleaney et al. (1999) reported that there was large entrenchment by management in 
terms of purchasing shares from employees, and resistance to takeover by outsiders. 
Despite the official endorsement of relevant accounting legislation, there have been 
serious problems in its enforcement for financial reporting purposes in FSU states 
(Estrin and Wright, 1999). This problem is more severe in private companies: firstly, 
where there are pervasive effort to hide profit (EBRD, 1998); secondly, where the 
practice of tunnelling may imply that assets are transferred out of firms by controlling 
owners without other owners being aware (Harris, 1997); thirdly, where reported asset 
value could be fictitious (Shama and Merrell, 1997); and fourthly, where only a board 
seat may enable one to acquire necessary information (Wright et al., 1998). 
 
A report by the World Bank (2003) highlighting the practices of CG in Chile revealed 
that the Chilean system attempts to ensure shareholder rights through formal ownership 
registration and full disclosure of information to shareholders. However, taking 
advantage of concentrated ownership many controllers maintain control at 67 per cent in 
order to make fundamental corporate decisions, thereby ignoring small and outside 
shareholders. Although Chilean corporate law restricts cross-holdings, dual class shares 
with restrictive/preferential rights to appoint directors are allowed. Firms in Chile must 
disclose the identities of their twelve largest shareholders. However, it is possible that 
conglomerates may be controlled through private holding companies and, therefore, in 
reality it can be difficult to identify a firm's controller. Chile has a market for corporate 
control to a limited extent (Walker, 2001). Abuse of corporate assets and abuse in 
connected party transactions remain a recurrent problem in Chile. The CG system 
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requires companies to disclose information (such as financial statements, directors' and 
auditors' reports, board members' compensations, purchase of shares and sale of 
company securities and any related party transactions) yet, despite these requirements, 
there are no obligations on the firms to disclose some important information (such as 
changes in equity, company objectives, material foreseeable risk factors, internal 
control, and material issues regarding stakeholders and governance structures and 
policies). Moreover, the accounting and audit standard followed in the Chilean 
corporate sector falls far behind the international accounting and audit standards. 
Concerns are increasing (particularly in small to medium size Chilean firms) regarding 
the quality, qualification, and commitment of the board members (Spencer, 2000). 
 
As in many other developing countries, the debate about, and developments in, CG in 
South Asia does not have a long history. Godbole (2002, 1996a, 1996b) indicated that 
the large business empires holding control of firms through family and/or concentrated 
ownership often ignore stakeholders' interest, which leads to a perspective that CG in 
India is still an ‗infant‘. In support of this view, Dadiseth (1997) and Basu (1999) 
suggested that the CG model in India failed to address important issues (such as 
corporate conscience and consciousness, and the culture of transparency in 
organisations). The need for a credible and strong regulatory mechanism is urgent in 
order to strengthen CG practice in India because the current situation is far from 
satisfactory (Mehta and Godbole, 2002). Various reforms were undertaken in the 1990s 
to improve CG in India. The formation of the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) in 1992 was a particularly significant event. The establishment of the SEBI 
resulted in the formation of four major committees, they are: Bajaj Committee in 1996, 
Birla Committee in 2000, Chandra Committee in 2002, and the Narayanan Murthy 
Committee in 2003. The aim of these committees is to review governance issues and to 
propose governance laws and reforms. Many of the governance reforms and 
recommendations advocated by these committees were formally implemented by the 
SEBI, for example through the enactment of ‗clause 49‘ of the listing agreements. These 
reforms include increasing the number of outside directors, dealing with the issue of 
duality, and the existence of financial expertise of directors.  
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India is not alone in this move towards CG; for example, in Pakistan there is now a code 
for CG to which all listed companies are now required to comply. Sri Lanka also has a 
code of best practice on CG drawn up by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri 
Lanka. In each country, the codes have begun the process of encouraging or requiring 
companies to recognise the importance of GCG practices. However, the mere 
emergence of detailed governance codes in developing countries does not necessarily 
mean that de facto practices will improve (Wanyama et al., 2009).   
 
While this section has discussed on CG practices in developing economies (including 
the FSU, Chile, and India), the next section gives particular focus on the CG practices in 
Bangladesh. 
 
3.7 Corporate Governance Practices in Bangladesh 
There is evidence to suggest that there are country specific factors that may impact on 
setting the framework of CG (Guest, 2008; Cornelius, 2005). Li and Harrison (2008) 
found that national economy and culture have dominant influence on CG structure in a 
country. Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) noted that in Bangladesh, although no remarkable 
corporate scandals have emerged to feed the necessity of corporate governance, the 
stock market crash of 1996 which left investors wary of the capital market for many 
years is worth remembering. Bangladesh has lagged behind some of its neighbours in 
CG development (Gillibrand, 2004) because of a number of specific factors, including 
the legal and regulatory environment. Recently, Siddiqui (2010) highlighted the 
persistent weaknesses in the Bangladeshi CG regime. He also explained that 
Bangladesh has failed to develop a recognised code of CG. The first substantial 
initiative was taken by a private consulting firm, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute 
(BEI), in August 2003 when it conducted a diagnostic study in this field (as described in 
Chapter Two). Based on their study, the BEI published the CG code for Bangladesh in 
March 2004 (BEI, 2004). Subsequently, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh (ICAB) issued a set of principles and rules to be followed (Mazumdar, 
2006). In January 2006, the SEC has issued an order with some CG guidelines for the 
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companies listed on DSE to be followed on a ‗comply or explain‘ basis. The issue of CG 
in financial and non-financial firms has received considerable attention and recognition 
as one of the most critical developmental issues in Bangladesh (Haque et al., 2006; 
Haque, 2007). They also reported that most of the companies in Bangladesh do not 
come to the capital market to meet their financing needs, partly because of the 
controlling owners‘ fear of losing control and meeting increased disclosure 
requirements. The concept of CG in general and minority shareholders‘ rights in 
particular, is generally unfamiliar to the general investors in Bangladesh (Haque, 2007). 
 
Although Siddiqui (2010) highlighted that Bangladesh has adopted an Anglo-Saxon 
model of CG, the CG system prevailing in Bangladesh is arguably a hybrid of outsider-
dominated market-based systems (i.e. the market or compliance based model of the 
U.S.A. and the U.K.) and the insider-dominated bank-based systems (i.e. the control or 
relationship-based model of Germany and Japan) (Farooque et al., 2007). Some of the 
institutional features of Bangladesh include: a less developed capital market which 
results in a weak stock market (Islam and Khaled 2005), the absence of an active market 
for corporate control, generally concentrated ownership, high reliance on bank 
financing, a passive managerial labour market, and poor incentive contracts for 
management. The economic negligence experienced by the country under British 
colonial rule for nearly two centuries has been a significant contributor to the country‘s 
poor institutional and corporate base. As a result, the corporate environment in 
Bangladesh lacks an effective market based CG system. Although broadly categorised 
as a common-law country, Bangladesh has a relatively unsophisticated legal and 
regulatory framework. The problems of a weak regulatory regime are further aggravated 
by poor enforcement of whatever laws and statutes exist to secure satisfactory 
outcomes. 
 
Similarly, the financial reporting environment in Bangladesh (i.e., general disclosure 
framework in accounting and auditing) is not in accordance with full conformity with 
international standards. In fact, financial disclosure is made primarily to satisfy the tax 
authorities rather than meet the needs of investors, and markets do not necessarily 
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reward more transparent firms. The SEC in Bangladesh has made it mandatory for listed 
companies to comply with International Accounting Standards (IASs) and International 
Standards on Auditing (ISAs) as applicable in Bangladesh in form on Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BASs) and Bangladesh Standards on Auditing (BSAs) 
respectively. In relation to the reliability and comparability of financial information, 
Karim and Ahmed (2005) noted that the general level of compliance of Bangladeshi 
firms to IASs is at very satisfactory level. 
 
Lack of adequate disclosure is another issue that has weakened CG in Bangladesh. 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) examined the level of Bangladeshi corporate compliance 
with the local disclosure requirements. They constructed an index of disclosure 
consisting of 94 mandatory items and applied it to a sample of 63 listed companies. 
Using stepwise regression analysis, Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) found that the level of 
corporate compliance with Bangladeshi disclosure requirements is significantly and 
positively associated with companies being subsidiaries of multinational companies (p< 
0.05), their accounts audited by large firms (p< 0.05), and their accounts prepared by 
qualified accountants (p< 0.10). The size of the company has no significant association 
with, the level of mandatory disclosure in the Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) study. 
 
The corporate sector in Bangladesh is predominantly owned and controlled by founder 
families or groups of families, or foreign owners. Siddiqui (2010) found that the 
corporate sector in Bangladesh is characterised by high ownership concentration. Uddin 
and Choudhury (2008) found that families have a dominant presence in all aspects of 
CG in Bangladesh. Farooque et al. (2007) and Haque et al. (2006) also noted extensive 
family control over corporate firms prevailing in Bangladesh. Similarly, Imam and 
Malik, (2007) found that the ownership of firms is largely concentrated in a few hands 
that directly control the business. This ownership structure is by no means similar to the 
pyramidal structure found in Japan and some other East-Asian countries. Most of the 
families in Bangladesh hold shares independently in a particular company or group of 
companies that they control. The prevalence of family-owned businesses, together with 
state ownership, thus plays a significant role. The listed companies are not free from this 
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prototype of governance, which is fittingly called ‗family capitalism‘ or ‗crony 
capitalism‘14 (ADB, 2003). Under the Companies Act 1994, a maximum of 50 percent 
of the total issued capital can be retained by sponsor directors (i.e., the promoters of the 
company who also act as directors until the first directors are elected) while going 
public. The remaining portion is distributed to the general public, financial institutions, 
non-resident Bangladeshis, and employees of issuing companies.  
 
Therefore, the ownership structure has evolved as a dominant mechanism of 
governance. Although La Porta et al. (1999a) found that family-ownership is a common 
everywhere; the influence of such ownership in corporate affairs is more visible in 
developing economies like Bangladesh (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). Families who 
hold a large portion of shares of the company have extensive influence on the decision-
making process. Corporate boards generally lack independence due to founder-family 
control, with minimal representation of minority shareholders and institutional 
investors. Haque et al. (2006) mentioned three key features of CG in Bangladesh (i.e. 
concentrated ownership and sponsors‘ control, family oriented board and family aligned 
executive management) all of which are signs of weak CG in practice. In many cases, 
the current system in Bangladesh does not provide sufficient legal, institutional, or 
economic motivations for stakeholders to encourage and enforce GCG practices. As a 
result, there are few rewards for companies that institute GCG practices and no penalties 
for failing to do so. 
 
Although Uddin and Hopper (2003), and Muzumder (2006) noted that the most 
powerful stakeholders in Bangladeshi corporations include the BoDs, auditors and 
regulators, dominant shareholding families have treated BoDs as conduits for 
implementing their own agenda. The important decisions involving company affairs are 
made at family meetings and such decisions are given a stamp of approval in board 
meetings merely to ensure that the legal requirements under the Companies Act are met 
                                                 
14
 Crony capitalism is a term describing an allegedly capitalist economy in which success in business 
depends on close relationships between business people and government officials. It may be exhibited by 
favouritism in the distribution of legal permits, government grants, special tax breaks, and so forth. 
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(ADB, 2003). The intertwining of management and the board reduces the opportunities 
for the board to prevent insider dealing and preferential treatment. Minority 
shareholders‘ rights are largely ignored or suppressed. Even non-executive directors fail 
to give independent judgement in enhancing corporate wealth for all shareholders 
because the nominees tend to have business or social connections with the controlling 
shareholder group (ADB, 2003). The above features of corporate firms create an 
inevitable conflict between dominant shareholder(s) and minority share-holders, as 
indicated by Williamson (1979), Grossman and Hart (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983) 
and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Oman et al. (2003) contended that the key potential 
conflict of interest in developing, transition, and emerging market countries (like 
Bangladesh) tends to arise, not between managers and shareholders like in the U.S. and 
the U.K., but between controlling shareholders and other shareholders, on the one hand, 
and investors, on the other. There are plenty of opportunities for controlling 
shareholders of unethical business practice or to expropriate wealth from outside 
shareholders. This is central to the quality of CG in Bangladesh impacting firm 
performance as predicted by agency theory. 
 
Ahmed and Yusuf (2005) regretted that the current system in Bangladesh does not 
provide sufficient legal, institutional, or economic motivation for stakeholders to 
encourage and enforce CG practices. Poor bankruptcy laws, no push from the 
international investor community, limited or no disclosure regarding related party 
transactions, weak regulatory system, general meeting scenario, lack of shareholder 
active participations are some of the individual constituents that have been identified by 
Ahmed and Yusuf (2005). Desired level of reforms in institutions or sectors can begin to 
provide the internal and external motivation for transparency and accountability that 
will lead to better CG. Bangladesh is currently trying to attract more investment, both 
from domestic and foreign investors, to improve its economic performance. To achieve 
these, there should be more recognition that CG is integral and necessary to the 
development of the private sector in Bangladesh. Although the studies noted that the 
scenario of CG practices in Bangladesh is not at the expected level, the regulations in 
terms of investor protection which existed in Bangladesh has been regarded more 
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investor friendly than that of the neighbouring countries. For example, the World Bank 
has ranked Bangladesh as 20th for ‗Investor Protection‘ ranking15, which is the best 
among all south Asian countries while India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam were ranked 29th, 
70th, and 143rd, respectively. 
 
3.8 Role of the Audit Committee in Corporate Governance 
The AC is arguably the most important of the subcommittees which is formed by the 
board (Mallin, 2010). A growing number of studies (such as: Genron and Bedard, 2006; 
Turley and Zaman, 2007; Sori et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008 and Beasley et al., 2009) 
have recently been undertaken which emphasise the roles of the AC in strengthening 
overall corporate governance.  CG has a positive impact on corporate auditing 
processes, and vice versa (Lin and Liu, 2009; Turley and Zaman, 2001). The true 
effectiveness of auditing is subject to the actuality and the development of the CG 
environment, including AC practice (Holm and Laursen, 2007). Lin and Liu (2009) 
further noted that CG plays an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of the audit 
function. In the effort to devise ways of bringing about good governance in companies, 
one of the issues that has taken an increasing importance is how best to harness the 
oversight process to achieve more fully the goal of quality corporate financial reporting. 
This brought about the idea of AC, which is at the core of the corporate financial 
reporting process (BRC, 1999).  
 
Furthermore, Pomeranz (1997) claimed that the AC is being recognised as simply 
another board committee, although one which has to work in tandem with the entire 
board. Moreover, Jonas and Young (1999) pointed out that in today's corporate 
environment, concepts such as board accountability and AC effectiveness are 
increasingly important topics of discussion, and they are also increasingly becoming 
subject of CG studies and surveys. Jennings (2002) argued that the goal in the creation 
of independent ACs is to provide shareholders with the assurance that someone from 
                                                 
15
  Source: International Finance Corporation (World Bank) Ranking (2011) on ‗Doing Business: 
Measuring Business Regulations.  
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outside the company is watching over the activities, practices, and behaviours of 
managers and the company‘s employees. Mautz and Neary (1979) claimed that the AC 
is indeed a useful device that can provide an additional safeguard in CG. Smith (2003) 
claimed that ACs would be beneficial, not only in increasing the level of assurance 
against catastrophic failure and gross malfeasance but it would also offer improvements 
on a wider front, raising the overall standard of CG for all companies that establish ACs. 
 
Millstein (1999) claimed that prior to the 1970s the boards of directors were 
management-dominated, passive, and generally inert. Such passivity was largely 
overlooked and boards of directors were not expected to do much more than rubber-
stamp the management's decisions. Burke et al (2001), after a review of the BRC (1999) 
and other recommendations concerning CG and ACs, noted that: "the essence of these 
recommendations to ACs is that effective internal control leads to responsible financial 
reporting”. Klein (1998a) argued that if CG mechanisms are substitutable, then strong 
alternative CG mechanisms should mitigate the need for the firm to have an active and 
independent AC. In 2001, the Basel Committee (2001), which had twenty members and 
a chair from many international countries, issued a paper on internal audit in banking 
organisations and the relationship of the supervisory authorities with internal and 
external auditors. The solution they recommended was the creation of a permanent AC 
to meet the practical difficulties that may arise from the board‘s task to ensure the 
existence and maintenance of an adequate system of controls. The AC plays an 
instrumental role in ensuring the quality of financial reporting (Abbott and Parker, 
2000). Rezaee and Lander (1993) described this as a visible interest by boards of 
directors, and especially audit committees, in ethical behaviour, strong internal controls, 
and enforcement procedures to limit the risk that fraud will occur. Again, Rowland 
(2002) claimed that: 
 
The new rules strive to further the monitoring model and activate the BoDs with 
respect to the financial reporting process by creating audit committees that are 
independent, capable, and imbibed with the incentive to oversee management's 
production of financial statements. 
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Verschoor (1992) described the significance of ACs on CG: 
 
The establishment of standing audit committees of the BoDs in public 
corporations followed by their assumption of greater oversight responsibilities 
for matters of internal control, financial reporting, and auditing has been 
described by at least one prominent authority as the most significant new 
development affecting corporate governance in this century. 
 
Burke et al (1996) further claimed that the AC is of critical importance in fulfilling the 
oversight responsibilities of governing boards with regard to an organisation‘s financial 
reporting, internal controls, and external audit process. Similarly, Datta (2000) pointed 
out that a system of GCG promotes a relationship of accountability between the 
principal actors of sound financial reporting, that is: the board, the management and the 
auditor. It holds the management accountable to the board, and the board accountable to 
the shareholders. The role of an AC flows directly from the board oversight function. It 
also acts as a catalyst for effective financial reporting. The BoDs has primary 
responsibility for the financial statements which are prepared by the accounting 
function. The BoDs delegates the responsibility for overview of the financial reporting 
process and the external and internal audit functions to an AC, in which case there 
should be close communication between the AC and the internal and external auditors 
(Rainsbury et al., 2008). Klein (1998b) noted how an AC can alleviate the agency 
problem in the firm, and can also reduce the information asymmetry between insiders 
and outsiders. Bradbury (1990) also argued that ACs reduce information asymmetry 
between executive and non-executive board members. DeZoort (1997) mentioned that 
the ACs assume the important responsibility of representing boards of directors on 
oversight matters related to financial reporting, auditing, and overall CG. Their study 
further noted that, in an effort to protect the shareholders' interests, the ACs monitor 
management, the external auditor, and the internal auditor. Moreover, Datta (2000) 
discussed that a proper and well functioning CG system exists when the three main 
groups (i.e. the board, the management, and including the internal and the external 
auditor) responsible for financial reporting form the three legged stool that supports 
responsible financial disclosure and active oversight. 
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Since the AC is a sub-committee of the full board and monitors this process, the AC has 
an important role to play in the process. Among the different committees that can be 
created to monitor the actions of the BoDs, previous research assigns the AC a very 
important role within the governance structure (Osma and Noguer, 2007). In discussing 
the importance of ACs as a mechanism for CG, Millstein (1999) pointed out that the 
movement to progressive CG, which included regulatory and voluntary measures to 
improve overall board independence and oversight, was initiated by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission‘s (SEC‘s) focusing on financial reporting and  structure 
ACs. It is totally consistent, therefore, that GCG practice points to the AC as the focal 
point for improvements in financial reporting (Millstein, 1999). Rezaee (1997), after a 
review of current reports and recommendations concerning ACs, said that: "these 
reports underscore the oversight role of the AC as an important factor in promoting the 
quality of CG and enhancing public confidence in the financial reporting process".  
Furthermore, DeZoort (1997) explained that corporate boards and ACs have incentives 
to avoid the negative consequences (e. g. litigation and damage to reputation) of failed 
monitoring efforts. Although the AC is only one dimension of a broad-based CG, a lack 
of appropriate AC oversight can ultimately contribute to corporate failure and diminish 
public confidence in the mechanism (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Conversely, recent 
evidence suggests that strong CG has the potential to increase audit effectiveness and 
efficiency by reducing: firstly, the auditor's perceptions of client business risk; secondly, 
the auditor's control risk judgements for specific audit assertions; and thirdly, the 
amount of planning substantive testing.  
 
However, Pomeranz (1997) highlighted that the mere labelling of a group of directors as 
‗the AC‘ will not by itself create an effective monitoring organisation. Likewise, 
Kleinman and Farrelly (1996), and Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) claimed that the 
use of ACs does not necessarily mean that CG is being practised effectively. Also, 
Barker (2002) questioned the suggestion that better ACs are the solution to the crisis of 
trust in the profession, because if CG in general is defective, then a better mechanism 
for selecting the boards of directors is required. The answer to poor standards of audit, 
inadequate controls, poor financial accounting and low ethical standards as Barker 
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(2002) described: "It is not an audit committee which will act as watchdog, but higher 
standards of ethical behaviour, frank disclosure and a real understanding of the duties 
imposed on a professional which, when applied will lead to trust without policies”. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The issue of CG has gained attention since the early twentieth century. The many 
corporate collapses in the late 1990s and early 2000s have highlighted the need to make 
management and directors of public companies more accountable, and they have led 
governments to actively promote higher standards of CG. It has been described as: 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies” (FRC, 
2010). It is the process carried out by the BoDs, and its related committees, on behalf 
of, and for the benefit of, the company's stakeholders, to provide direction, authority, 
and oversights to management (Sobel, 2005). CG ensures that shareholder rights are 
safeguarded, stakeholders‘ interests are reconciled, and that a transparent environment is 
maintained wherein each party is able to assume its responsibilities and contribute to the 
corporation‘s growth and value creation (Page, 2005 cited in Jamali et al., 2008). 
Murthy (2006) argued that GCG in a corporate set-up maximises the value of the 
shareholders legally, ethically, and on a sustainable basis, while ensuring equity and 
transparency to all stakeholders. An effective CG system has been found elsewhere to 
assist in the attainment of high level financial performance and market valuation 
(Klapper and Love, 2004; Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008).  
 
In the context of the growing separation of ownership and control, issues such as 
economic performance and corporate sustainability have provided the impetus for an 
added focus on CG. The dominating theory in CG supports the existence of agency 
problems, which are particularly embedded in governance where opportunism is 
institutionalised and executives are presumed to be rationally economic (Lubatkin et al., 
2005; cited in Ward et al., 2009). Like other South Asian countries, family based 
ownership pattern of firms is a common CG feature in Bangladesh and concepts of the 
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Anglo-Saxon CG model dominate in the local practice of CG. The discussion on 
international principles and practices of CG clearly indicates that there is no single 
governance style which is followed around the world, but it can be seen that most 
developing economies follow the concepts of the Anglo-Saxon model. However, the 
developing economies are clearly less advanced in the area of CG and need a more 
stringent focus on their practices because their corporate sector characteristics greatly 
differ from those in the developed world. Hence, it is not wise to completely replicate 
Western governance practices in developing countries. Rather, a detailed picture of their 
own CG scenario would pave a way to develop a more prudent governance framework 
by understanding the underlying problem areas. 
 
This chapter has focused on CG literature including its theoretical underpinnings and 
developments across the world. Discussion of CG literature in this chapter also argues 
that one of the key mechanisms under a CG system is the AC which is the research issue 
of this study.  Therefore, it is important to review the studies conducted on AC practices 
and the next chapter therefore, evaluates the academic literature on the various facets of 
ACs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE AUDIT COMMITTEE IN 
CONTEXT-A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature discussed in the last chapter has already pinpointed that the Audit 
Committee (AC) is one of the key mechanisms in Corporate Governance (CG). A 
competent, committed, and independent AC has been described as ‗one of the most 
reliable guardians of the public interest‘ (Levitt, 2000; Beasley et al., 2009). An AC, 
also known as a board‘s sub-committee, aims to guarantee the reliability of the 
accounting information provided by the management. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 
2002), section (2) defines AC as: 
 
A committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the BoDs of an 
issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting 
processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer. 
 
The aim of this chapter is therefore, to review the literature on the different aspects and 
roles of ACs. Following this introduction, Section 4.2 looks at the purposes of 
establishing the ACs. The advantages and disadvantages of having ACs in practice are 
discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Section 4.5 presents some widely 
accepted international guidelines on ACs; Section 4.6 evaluates the literature on AC 
attributes, while Section 4.7 outlines the roles of ACs. The concept of AC effectiveness 
is discussed in Section 4.8 and the significance of an effective AC is discussed in 
Section 4.9. A model of AC effectiveness is presented in Section 4.10 whilst Section 
4.11 presents the developments of AC around the world. Finally, Section 4.12 
summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2 Purposes of Audit Committees 
The need of auditing evolves mainly to ensure transparency and accountability in 
corporate affairs, where owners appoint a professional management to look after the 
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business on their behalf. Normanton (1966) noted that: “Without audit, no 
accountability; without accountability, no control; and if there is no control, where is 
the seat of power?” This famous quotation crystallises the idea that the audit is a 
necessary independent attestation of the accountability to the stakeholders by the 
stewards of the enterprise; that is, by the Board of Directors (BoDs). However, where 
the principal stakeholders and the stewards are the same (as with an owner-managed 
firm), there is arguably less need for the audit (Chambers, 2005). The developments of 
ACs in the U.K. and the U.S.A. have been driven by concerns about the credibility of 
financial reporting, particularly in relation to the issue of auditor independence. The 
report of the Cadbury Committee (1992) provided an outline of AC structure and 
membership, terms of reference, and a range of duties for the AC, but it offered no 
explicit statement as to its purpose. Given the nature of the recommendations, from the 
Cadbury perspective the AC would appear to represent the means by which the 
conformance role of the board might be more effectively achieved (Tricker, 1994). 
Ezzamel and Watson (1997) observed: 
 
The Cadbury Report does not spell out precisely what the new subcommittees 
are meant to achieve... and how, other than by simply attending meetings, the 
non-executives are to hold executives more accountable through these new 
committees. 
 
The key purpose of establishing an AC is to focus on issues of control and 
accountability on the corporate affairs. This view of the AC role is confirmed by 
commentators such as Demb and Neubauer (1992), who described an AC as „the 
personification of the board's stewardship responsibility‟. Cobb (1993) identified four 
main purposes of establishing ACs, namely: 
(i)   Reduction of board liability; 
(ii)  Establishing a link between the external auditor and the board; 
(iii) The reduction of illegal activity; and 
(iv) The prevention of fraudulent financial reporting. 
The Treadway Report (Treadway Commission, 1987) firmly emphasised that the 
primary role of the AC is to oversee the financial reporting process of the company. 
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Pomeranz (1997) noted: “Audit committees and their perceived roles can be seen as 
vaguely unsuccessful, yet meritorious, endeavours to create a more level playing field 
for external and internal auditors”. Bradbury's study on AC formation in New Zealand 
(Bradbury, 1990) suggested that ACs are established mainly to increase the credibility 
of financial statements. Porter and Gendall (1993) discussed AC development in 
Canada, the U.S.A., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. They identified corporate 
failure as the primary stimulus in the development of ACs, and traced their changing 
role and duties over time. They concluded with a warning that too much may be 
expected of an AC, leading to ‗unfulfilled expectations and in undermining confidence 
in ACs‘. Teoh and Lim (1996) explained the establishment of ACs in Malaysia as a 
response to corporate scandals. 
 
However, in considering the purpose for which the ACs are established, Bradbury's 
cautionary remarks on the impact of institutional arrangements which vary between 
countries are important, as confirmed by Guthrie and Turnbull (1995) who suggested 
that in Australia, the ACs as currently conceived are unable to meet their objectives, 
which are defined as: “Although many currently believe that audit committees were 
developed to protect investors...audit committees, in fact, were developed to protect 
non-executive directors ... from being misled by management”. Turnbull (1994) 
explained that all hierarchical management systems must condense information. The 
study also noted: 
 
It is not in the self-interest of subordinates to provide information about short-
comings for which they are accountable. The result is that boards with outside 
directors, and even those with executive directors, are at risk of being kept in the 
dark. Historically, this is why outside directors developed audit committees. 
Investor interests are incidental to the purpose of audit committees in protecting 
directors as becomes evident from reading the publications of the leading audit 
firms on this topic. 
 
Some commentators (for example, Marrian, 1988) have observed that less explicit 
reasons for AC establishment may exist. Eichenseher and Shields (1985) linked the 
incidence of AC formation in the U.S.A. to the appointment of leading (`Big-Eight') 
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auditing firms, suggesting that this was a response to increased directors' liability. 
However, their study did not identify this as an explicitly articulated reason for AC 
formation, but instead inferred it from company behaviour. The importance of implicit 
reasons for AC establishment is further emphasised by Harrison's discussion of the 
strategic use of board committees to enhance and maintain corporate legitimacy 
(Harrison, 1987). Collier (1996) also offered a detailed analysis of the rise of ACs in the 
U.K., examining the literature on AC effectiveness, and concluded that evidence of their 
effectiveness was very limited and certainly insufficient to support their rapid increase 
in popularity. 
 
The academic literature on ACs is thus inconclusive on the matter of their purpose. 
Nevertheless, the most extensive focus in this literature is on the effectiveness of ACs 
and how this may be achieved. The literature on CG has generally supported the notion 
that the presence of an effective AC complements good governance. Therefore, ACs 
should be formed in all organisations, in addition to having proper internal control 
systems in place, in order to ensure transparency and accountability in these 
organisations.  
 
4.3 Advantages of Audit Committees 
Several advantages of ACs are put forward by different researchers, such as: Kunitake 
(1983); McDonald Report (1988); Pincus et al. (1989); Haka and Chalos (1990); Luecke 
and Westfall (1990); DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991); Cadbury Committee (1992); Porter 
and Gendall (1993); Guthrie and Turnbull (1995); Wolnizer (1995); Adams (1997); 
Spira (1999a); Archambeault and DeZoort (2001); Osman and Noguer (2007); Sori et 
al., (2007); Chen et al. (2008); Sarens et al. (2009); and FRC (2010). Their arguments 
can be summarised as saying that an AC: 
 Improves the quality of financial reporting, by reviewing the financial 
statements on behalf of the BoDs; 
 Creates a climate of discipline and control which will reduce the opportunity for 
fraud; 
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 Enables the non-executive directors to contribute an independent judgement and 
play- a positive role; 
 Strengthens the position of the external auditor by providing a channel of 
communication and forum for issues of concern to be raised; 
 Provides a framework within which the external auditor can assert his 
independence in the event of a dispute with management; 
 Strengthens the position of the internal audit function by providing a greater 
degree of independence from management; and, 
 Increases public confidence in the credibility and objectivity of financial 
statements. 
 
Guthrie and Turnbull (1995) argued that two general themes emerge concerning the 
advantages of ACs. The first theme is that ACs help the independence of non-executive 
directors, as well as that of the internal and external auditors. Secondly, ACs improve 
the quality of accounting financial reporting and auditing within the host organisation. 
An AC is also effective in minimising opportunistic accounting choice behaviour since 
its functions include a review of the firm's accounting methods and changes in 
accounting methods (Pincus et al, 1989). Caplan (1999) highlighted the significance of 
ACs in detecting errors, irregularities and fraudulent practices in the firm. Since an AC 
restricts management's choice of accounting methods that are not representational and 
faithful, extra protection is afforded to debt holders as well as shareholders (Pincus et al, 
1989). By monitoring the financial reporting and auditing processes, ACs also reduce 
information asymmetries between a company‘s internal and external agents, and 
consequently they mitigate agency costs. An AC is as a delegate body of the BoDs 
which is charged with safeguarding and advancing the interests of shareholders 
(Wolnizer, 1995; Klein, 1998b; Garcia et al., 2003). An AC is thus viewed as a 
monitoring mechanism intended to reduce information asymmetries between insider and 
outsider (i.e. management and non-management) board members (Eichenseher and 
Shields, 1985; Pincus et al., 1989; cited in Pacheta-Martinez and De Fuentes, 2007). 
The significance of ACs in strengthening internal control has been noted in many 
studies; for example, Wolnizer (1995); DeZoort (1998); Tan and Kao (1999); and 
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Millichamp (2002). All of these studies have addressed the importance and implication 
of AC‘s role, and its credibility and reliability in case of firm‘s control mechanism, as 
well as investors‘ decision making process. 
 
A great deal of research [for example, Public Oversight Board (POB), 1993; Turpin and 
DeZoort, 1998; Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 1999; McDaniel et al., 2002] has 
addressed the importance of the ACs in ensuring credibility of financial reporting and 
auditing process. Vinten (2003) argued that most AC chairpersons commend the 
recommendations as having exerted a positive influence on corporate reporting and 
internal controls. Verschoor (1992) claimed that the establishment of standing ACs of 
the BoDs in public corporations, followed by their assumption of greater oversight 
responsibilities for matters of internal control, financial reporting, and auditing, has 
been recognized as the most significant development affecting CG.  
 
4.4 Disadvantages of the Audit Committees 
Despite having numerous advantages, the ACs and their roles have been criticised by 
some researchers; for example, Rainsbury et al. (2008) noted that the AC sometimes 
limits the growth opportunity of a firm. McMullen (1996) claimed that ACs are 
considered as: „The creatures of the company's management rather than the watchdogs 
over shareholders' interests‟. Critics also argue that many ACs hesitate to stop 
management misdeeds because they fear rocking the boat and lack access to 
knowledgeable lower level employees. The theoretical arguments against ACs were 
pointed out by: Marrian (1988); Bradbury (1990); Cadbury Committee (1992); Porter 
and Gendall (1993); Guthrie and Turnbull (1995); Collier (1992); Collier (1996); 
Pomeranz (1997); Barker (2002); and, Rainsbury et al. (2008). The disadvantages as 
highlighted in these studies can be summarised as follows: 
 The AC sometimes may cause encroachment on the functions of the executive 
and dilution of executive authority, or may pre-empt management responsibility; 
 The AC may cause the diversion of non-executive directors from their strategic 
and other roles into the routine matters of audit and financial reporting; 
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 The AC might reduce contact between the auditors and the board;  
 Sometimes, the AC is used only as a rubber stamp to confirm management 
decisions; and, 
 AC meetings sometimes simply become a waste of their members‘ time. 
 
However, these disadvantages support the idea that establishing an AC is one thing, but 
establishing an effective AC is another. Sommer (1991) noted that: "A corporation 
having an AC as part of its governance structure and having an effective AC are, of 
course, different matters". It is an accepted truth that an AC is not, and cannot be, a 
panacea (Macdonald Commission, 1988; Porter and Gendall, 1998). Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1993) claimed that any AC is more effective than no AC; however, the 
formation of an AC does not provide evidence about the actual levels of monitoring that 
will be performed. Rittenberg and Nair (1994), and Mendez and Garcia (2007) noted 
that the existence of an AC alone does not provide sufficient control, nor does it ensure 
that the company will maintain a high standard of financial reporting integrity. Further, 
Porter and Gendall (1993) claimed that while such procedures can reduce the potential 
problems, the benefits of having an AC can be realised only if it is composed of suitably 
qualified members. Therefore, the drawbacks of ACs that have been pointed out are not 
always caused by the AC itself but because of its weak practice in the company. In fact, 
establishing an effective AC can minimise (if not eliminate) these short comings and 
contribute to ensure better governance of corporate affairs. 
 
4.5 International Guidelines on Audit Committee 
There are some international guidelines that recommend different aspects of an AC 
(including its composition, process, roles and functions). Among these, the U.K. 
Combined Code on CG (2003), the Treadway Report (1987), the BRC Report (1999), 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) are well recognised. A summary of these guidelines 
is presented in the following sub-sections. 
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4.5.1 Combined Code on Corporate Governance for the U.K. 
The Combined Code on CG (Combined Code) is a set of principles of GCG and 
provides a code of best practice which is aimed at companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). It is essentially a consolidation and refinement of a number of 
different reports and codes concerning opinions on GCG, including: the Cadbury 
Committee (1992), the Greenbury Committee (1995); the Hampel Committee (1998) 
and the Turnbull Committee (1999). As already stated in Chapter Three, the Combined 
Code was issued in 2003 in order to provide guidance on some key aspects of CG, 
namely: directors, remuneration, accounting and auditing, and relations with 
shareholders. The Code is reviewed and updated on a regular basis by Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC). Section C(3) of the Code outlines that the board should 
establish formal and transparent arrangements in the name of AC for considering how 
they should apply the financial reporting and internal control principles and for 
maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company‘s auditors. A comprehensive 
guideline on AC practices has been given in the following six subsections (Combined 
Code, 2003; FRC, 2008): 
(i) The board should establish an AC of at least three, or in the case of smaller 
companies, two independent non-executive directors. In smaller companies the 
company chairman may be a member of, but not chair, the committee in addition to 
the independent non-executive directors, provided he or she was considered 
independent on appointment as chairman. The board should satisfy itself that at least 
one member of the AC has recent and relevant financial experience. 
(ii) The main role and responsibilities of the AC should be set out in written terms of 
reference and should include: 
 Monitoring the integrity of the financial statements of the company, and any 
formal announcements relating to the company‘s financial performance;  
 Reviewing significant financial reporting judgements contained in them; 
 Reviewing company‘s internal financial controls and, unless expressly addressed 
by a separate board risk committee composed of independent directors, or by the 
board itself, to review the company‘s internal control and risk management 
systems; 
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 Monitoring and review the effectiveness of the company‘s internal audit 
function; 
 Making recommendations to the board, for it to put to the shareholders for their 
approval in general meeting, in relation to the appointment, re-appointment and 
removal of the external auditor and to approve the remuneration and terms of 
engagement of the external auditor; 
 Reviewing and monitor the external auditor‘s independence and objectivity and 
the effectiveness of the audit process, taking into consideration relevant U.K. 
professional and regulatory requirements; and 
 Developing and implementing policy on the engagement of the external auditor 
to supply non-audit services, taking into account relevant ethical guidance 
regarding the provision of non-audit services by the external audit firm; and to 
report to the board, identifying any matters in respect of which it considers that 
action or improvement is needed.  
(iii) The terms of reference of the AC, including its role and the authority delegated 
to it by the board, should be made available. A separate section of the annual report 
should describe the work of the committee in discharging those responsibilities. 
(iv) The AC should review arrangements by which staff of the company may, in 
confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in matters of financial 
reporting or other matters. 
(v) The AC should monitor and review the effectiveness of the internal audit 
activities. Where there is no internal audit function, the AC should consider whether 
there is a need for an internal audit function and make a recommendation to the 
board. The reasons for the absence of such a function should be explained in the 
relevant section of the annual report. 
(vi)The AC should have primary responsibility for making a recommendation on the 
appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditors. If the board does 
not accept the AC‘s recommendation, it should include in the annual report (and in 
any papers recommending appointment or re-appointment) a statement from the AC 
explaining the recommendation and should set out reasons why the board has taken 
a different position. 
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4.5.2 The Treadway Report 
In 1987, the Treadway Report in the U.S.A. (known as the Report of the National 
Commission of Fraudulent Financial Reporting), offered the following eleven 
recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of ACs, which were to be the foundation 
of corporate financial governance (Vanasco, 1994; Vinten, 2003; and Alleyne, 2006): 
 The AC should have adequate resources and authority to discharge its 
responsibilities; 
 The AC should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers of the company‘s 
financial reporting process and its internal control system; 
 The AC should review management‘s evaluation of the independence of the 
company‘s public accountants; 
 The AC should oversee the quarterly as well as the annual reporting process; 
 The SEC should mandate the establishment of an AC composed solely of 
independent directors in all public companies; 
 The SEC should require the ACs to issue a report describing their 
responsibilities and activities during the year in the company‘s annual report to 
shareholders; 
 A written charter for the AC should be developed. The BoDs should approve, 
review, and revise it when necessary; 
 Before the beginning of each financial year, the AC should review 
management‘s plans to engage the company‘s independent public accountant to 
perform management advisory services; 
 Management should inform the AC of second opinions sought on significant 
accounting issues; 
 Together with top management, the AC should ensure that internal auditing 
involvement in the entire financial reporting process is appropriate and properly 
co-coordinated with the independent public accountant; and, 
 Annually, the AC should review the programme that management establishes to 
monitor compliance with the company‘s code of ethics. 
 
100 
4.5.3 The Blue Ribbon Committee 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), co-chaired by John Whitehead and Ira Millstein, 
was set up on 6 October 1998 by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) in response to the concern expressed by Arthur Levitt, the chairman of the 
SEC, about the financial reporting process.  In February 1999 the committee issued its 
report with some recommendations designed to: 
(i)   Strengthen the independence of ACs; 
(ii)  Increase the effectiveness of audit committees; and, 
(iii) Improve the relationship between boards and their audit committees, the 
activities of auditors, and management. 
 
In December 1999, the SEC approved changes to its rules to implement several of the 
BRC‘s recommendations with respect to AC composition and practices. The seven 
board areas of AC on which the committee recommended are: 
(i) Independence of the AC; 
(ii) Financial literacy of AC members; 
(iii) AC structure and process; 
(iv) AC relationship with management including the internal auditor and with 
the outside auditor; 
(v) Practical improvements to AC oversight and enhancing the external auditors‘ 
interaction with the AC; 
(vi) Instituting AC disclosure; and, 
(vii) Mandatory audit of the interim financial reporting.   
 
4.5.4 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act) was approved by the U.S. House of 
Representatives by a vote of 423:3, and by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 99:0. It was 
signed into law on 30 July 2002 by the then president George W. Bush. The main 
purpose of the Act was to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
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corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes. The 
Act, more commonly referred to as SOX, was named after its sponsors, Senator Paul 
Sarbanes and Representative Michael Oxley. The fundamental groundwork of the Act is 
to provide investors and the public with increased trust in accounting and financial 
reporting. Throughout this review various components of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 are explored in greater detail, predominantly those dealing with CG and internal 
controls. Discussions with practising certified public accountants, along with opinions 
from other professionals in the business community, helps to assess the effectiveness 
and ultimate usefulness of the Act‘s fundamental objectives. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was created to protect investors‘ interests by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. The Act requires companies to make 
new disclosures on internal controls, ethics codes and the composition of their ACs on 
annual reports. Thus, these stringent requirements force companies to be more thorough 
about ensuring the validity of their financial reporting process. Under the Act, a five 
member board will oversee auditors, accounting firms are not allowed to provide other 
services to companies whose accounts they audit, and independent directors must sit on 
the ACs. The Act states that an AC is a committee established by, and amongst, the 
BoDs of a company, for the purpose of overseeing the accounting, financial reporting 
process and audits of the financial statements. Rezaee et al. (2003; cited in Alleyne et 
al., 2006) stated that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted the following six requirements for 
the ACs: 
 The AC should be composed entirely of independent members of the BoDs; 
 The AC should be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and 
oversight of the work of external auditors; 
 The AC should have authority to engage advisors; 
 The AC should be properly funded to effectively carry out its duties; 
 The auditors must report to the AC on all ‗critical accounting policies and 
practices‘ used by the client; and 
 The SEC should issue rules to require public companies to disclose whether at 
least one member of their AC is a ‗financial expert‘. 
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4.6 Audit Committee Attributes 
There is empirical evidence (for example, Scarborough et al., 1998; and Raghunandan 
et al., 2001) to suggest that the composition of an AC greatly improves the level of 
interaction and reporting access of internal audit. Scarborough et al. (1998) examined 
the relationship between the AC and internal audit. They found that AC composition
16
 
does influence the extent of interaction between the AC and internal audit. While 
limited to the examination of the AC role in internal control assessment, this study 
provided evidence that AC composition influences the effectiveness of the AC in 
relation to internal controls. Raghunandan et al. (2001) examined the association 
between AC composition and the committee's interaction with internal auditing. They 
found that AC composition influences the extent of committee interaction with internal 
auditing.  
 
There is a growing number of studies on the attributes of ACs, mainly focusing on the 
significance of committee members‘ knowledge, experience, diligence, and 
independence. For example, Bedard and Gendron (2010) highlighted that AC members 
should possess certain personal characteristics in terms of qualification and competence. 
Hoitash et al. (2009) described positive association between AC attributes and internal 
control quality of the firm. Raghunandan et al. (2001; cited in Myers and Ziegenfuss, 
2006) defined AC quality as independent and financially literate AC members. An AC 
cannot be effective if it does not have the ‗right people‘ as members (Sabia and 
Goodfellow, 2005). Sharma et al. (2009) noted that AC members‘ diligence is a key 
factor for an effective AC. Regulators recognise that some attributes are important for 
AC membership, among which independence and financial competency are vital 
(Bedard et al., 2008). Much of the research on ACs examines the relation between: AC 
inputs (e.g. independence, expertise, or diligence) and financial reporting outputs (e.g. 
abnormal accruals) (Klein 2002; Bedard et al., 2004, 2008); restatements (Abbott et al., 
2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005); fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley et al., 2000); 
going-concern reports (Carcello and Neal, 2000); auditor changes (Carcello and Neal 
                                                 
16
 In terms of all members being independent/external and at least one members having financial and 
accounting background (Scarborough et al., 1998). 
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2003); and stock price reaction (DeFond et al., 2005). These studies generally conclude 
that independence, expertise, diligence, meeting, and the size of AC are positively 
associated with higher quality financial reporting and auditing. The relevant literature 
on these attributes of ACs is discussed below. 
 
4.6.1 Audit Committee Independence 
The existence of an independent AC is a sign of the firm‘s commitment to good 
corporate governance (GCG) practice (Sommer, 1991). Many prior studies (for 
example, Bedard and Gendron, 2010 and Abbott et al., 2007) have pinpointed that AC 
composition is a vital factor and the committee‘s independence has been described as a 
pre-requisite of its effectiveness. The utility of the auditing function depends upon the 
quality of the audit, which is determined by the independence and expertise of the 
auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Watkins et al., 2004). Therefore, ACs should be independent 
of the organisation‘s management in order to perform an oversight role and so protect 
the shareholders‘ interests. It may be argued that if the members of an AC are 
independent from management and owners of the organisation, then they should be able 
to deter management from manipulating financial results. Beasley (1996) noted that the 
incidence of financial fraud is negatively associated with the independence of the BoDs. 
However, the persistence of accounting scandals has led to a profound reconsideration 
of the workings of ACs, with special attention being paid to their composition and 
independence from managerial teams. The Treadway Commission (1987), the Cadbury 
Report (1992), the American Law Institute (1994), and the BRC Report (1999) have all 
recommended that independent directors should be included in the ACs. Carcello and 
Neal (2000) concluded that the scope of demonstrating impartial view and fair 
judgement has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the AC. This scope varies 
depending on how the committee is composed and structured. The primary duty of an 
AC is to protect stakeholders‘ interest and in doing so it requires a conducive 
environment in the firm (Lee et al., 2004). Bedard et al. (2004) argued that more 
objective oversight of financial reporting process can be ensured if the AC includes the 
more independent members. 
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Furthermore, Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009) argued that an independent AC 
can potentially improve the quality and credibility of financial reporting. Cohen and 
Hanno (2000) highlighted the importance of AC independence for evaluating 
management actions in respect of risk assessment. The highly regarded BRC (1999) 
recommends that an AC should be composed only of directors who have no relationship 
with the firm that may interfere with its independence. The AC members should not 
have any sort of relation or connection with the firm that may hamper their 
professionalism and fairness. The three main categories of relationships that can hinder 
the independence of ACs as identified in the regulatory literature are: employment, 
personal relationship, and business relationship (Bedard and Gendron, 2010). The 
committee can be valuable informers to shareholders as its focus is on ensuring supply 
of reliable, sufficient and trustworthy information about business operation, control and 
management activities. The presence of inside executive directors in the committee may 
jeopardise the prime objective of forming the committee. If the majority of AC 
members are appointed from the internal management team, then it is obvious that the 
committee cannot achieve this objective independently. Studies by Dechow et al. (1996) 
and Klein (2002b) have noted that the inclusion of more independent members in AC 
minimises the likelihood of financial fraudulent activities. Gendron et al. (2004) 
mentioned that members who are willing to be active and effective in the AC should 
have a probing attitude which helps them assess the management‘s various decisions. 
However, this attitude is reflected, and can be demonstrated if, the majority of 
committee members are independent directors (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996). 
 
The independence of an AC is important for carrying out its monitoring responsibilities 
which delegated by the board. Chan and Li (2008) noted that the inclusion of expert 
independent directors in board and AC enhances the firm value significantly. Many 
stock markets already include independent members in the ACs in their listing 
requirements; for example, under the new listing requirements of NYSE and NASDAQ 
no AC member is to have any relationship with the company which may interfere in 
carrying out responsibilities for the company independently. The independence of ACs 
is also important for ensuring quality financial reporting. Independent members‘ 
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dominance in the AC advertises problems in financial reporting, ensures fair assessment 
of reporting and auditing process, and facilitates the firm in effective decision making 
(Abbott et al., 2004). Independent members are ideally appointed in the AC because of 
their reputation and exposure in this area. Therefore, they tend to be sincere in carrying 
out their duties. The involvement of independent directors in the AC of a firm that 
experiences failure in their financial reporting process is likely to ruin their reputation 
and career (Srinivasan, 2005). The independence of an AC is also reflected in adherence 
to accounting principles. For example, Carcello and Neal (2003) found a positive 
relation between the ratio of independent directors in the AC and the optimism of 
company‘s going concern disclosure. Roles of AC ultimately lead to positive impact in 
terms firm‘s earning, value creation and goodwill. Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) 
revealed that the inclusion of independent members in AC has a positive impact in 
improving the reporting quality. The establishment of an AC aims to delegate the 
responsibilities of hiring external auditors, and to facilitate and supervise their work and 
the AC should be composed of a majority of independent members (Olivencia Report, 
1998 cited in Osma and Noguer, 2007). 
 
The leadership (i.e. the chairmanship) of an AC is another important factor for its 
effective functioning. Even if all members are not independent directors in the 
committee, the chairman should be elected from amongst the independent directors. In 
some firms, the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) hold the chairman positions of the 
ACs. This not only hampers the independence of the committee but also may keep the 
committee away from serving its assigned duties. Beasley and Salterio (2001) reported 
that an independent AC is more likely to be associated with a larger proportion of non-
employee directors on the board, and is less likely to be associated with CEO duality. 
Chan and Li (2008) commented that holding the position of AC chairman and CEO by 
the same individual hampers AC independence and is negatively associated with the 
value of a firm. 
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4.6.2 Committee Members’ Knowledge and Experience 
Researchers (such as: Beasley and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; 
McDaniels et al., 2002; Bedard et al., 2004; Bedard and Gendron, 2010) argue that 
members‘ knowledge/expertise or experience is directly associated with the effective 
functioning of an AC. Since the main task of an AC is to oversee corporate financial 
reporting and the auditing process, its members should possess sufficient expertise to 
understand the issues to be investigated or discussed by the committee (Lin et al, 2008). 
Positive relationship between members‘ financial knowledge and AC effectiveness has 
been found in many studies; for example, Treadway Commission (1987); DeZoort et al., 
(2001); Felo et al. (2003); and Defond et al. (2005). Furthermore, POB (1993) 
mentioned that the lack of adequate knowledge and relevant experience causes an 
inability and failure of AC members to understand their roles and responsibilities in the 
firm. The absence of these qualities also affects the technical aspects of some of the 
committee‘s roles, particularly in case of internal control evaluation (Abdolmohammadi 
and Levy, 1992; DeZoort, 1998; Tan and Kao, 1999; Gendrol et al., 2004; Haron et al., 
2005).  Knapp (1987) highlighted that there occurs frequent disputes between external 
auditors and management about accounting estimations. The ACs are responsible to 
resolve these disputes and to do so the committee members have to have adequate 
knowledge and expertise in a related area.  DeZoort (1998) also described the necessity 
of auditing and internal control experience for AC members, particularly in detecting 
fraudulent activities and internal control weaknesses. The AC members who have 
accounting and auditing experience can play a leading role in the committee by 
providing valuable views, justification, and comments, which can increase a 
committee‘s productivity (Bonner and Lewis, 1990).  
 
Furthermore, Pomeroy (2010) noted that the AC members with accounting experience 
are particularly thorough in their investigation and review of accounting decisions made 
in the company. Kirk (2000) concluded that a decision made without engaging 
competent members may impair the judgement made by an AC. Libby and Luft (1993) 
emphasised on the necessity of discrete measures which focus the effect of accounting 
related decisions making in the firm. This decision making sometimes becomes 
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complex and requires special knowledge and skills. In this respect, the argument made 
by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) is notable, that is, depending on the nature of their 
complexity, accounting tasks may require a certain level of ability, knowledge, and 
skills. In deciding on some of the complex accounting related issues, data and their 
literal interpretations alone are not enough; rather they require technical knowledge and 
wider experience. Relevant experience provides a wide range of broader concepts for 
solving of accounting problems, instead confining the problem solved by a data driven 
approach (Moeckel, 1990). Tan and Kao (1999) pointed to the essence of an individual‘s 
competence in performing assigned responsibilities. People who have relevant 
experience and knowledge can demonstrate better performance and prove their 
competence. McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) identified members‘ expertise in 
accounting reporting, internal control, and auditing as important inputs in an effective 
AC. To some extent, the goal of AC and independent auditors is very similar (i.e. fair 
practice in financial reporting and better judgement about firm‘s financial matters). 
DeZoort (1998) found that an AC which has members with prior experience in auditing 
has greater credibility and less conflict of opinion with the external auditor. However, 
accounting financial experts may make them less willing to join firms with poor CG 
(Langan 2003, and Engel 2005). Krishnan et al. (2009) found that the accounting 
financial expertise of AC members complements strong CG; which is consistent with 
the results of Choi et al. (2004), DeFond et al. (2005), and Dhaliwal et al. (2006). 
 
Because the responsibilities of an AC include the assessment and evaluation of the 
corporate ethical environment, financial information, regulatory compliance, internal 
control and information systems; AC members should have the requisite qualification 
and expertise to discharge these responsibilities. Policy makers believe that financial 
expertise on ACs would „enhance its effectiveness in carrying out its financial oversight 
responsibilities‟ (SEC, 1999; cited in Krishnan and Lee, 2009). The BRC (1999) 
recommends that at least one member should have accounting or related financial 
management expertise. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991, which was passed by the U.S. Congress in response to the then 
savings and loan scandals, requires that ACs in banking institutions should include 
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members with banking or related financial management expertise and have access to 
outside legal counsel (McMullen, 1996 cited in Alleyne, 2006). Archambeault and 
DeZoort (2001) found that companies that had suspicious switches of external auditors 
were those who had fewer AC members with experience in accounting, auditing, or 
finance. This might happen because external auditors feel comfortable to deal with 
someone who has experience or expertise in a similar area, and so they are more 
motivated in their works. 
 
The level of financial knowledge and skill of AC members has obvious consequences in 
dealing with different financial issues. For example, Corcello et al. (2006) conducted a 
study on the impact of certain types of financial expert groups, including accountants 
and financial brokers performing AC‘s financial oversight duties. Their study argued 
that the first group (i.e. accountants) is effective in evaluating a firm‘s compliance with 
accounting standards and treatments, while the second group is crucial in reviewing a 
firm‘s investment project plans. This implies that the members‘ background in terms of 
education and experience influences their focus in the committee‘s activities. Therefore, 
it is wise to include members in ACs who have expertise and knowledge in accounting 
and auditing because most of the responsibilities of an AC are related to these areas. 
Kinney (2000) described the impact of financial knowledge on the welfare of all 
stakeholders. This knowledge is particularly required when the committee deals with 
external auditors to ensure the fulfilment of their statutory tasks (Beasley, 2000). This 
expertise is needed especially when the AC interacts with the internal auditors on a 
regular basis and maintains a cooperative relationship between external auditors, 
management, and internal auditors (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996). Knowledge 
and expertise on accounting of the members of an AC is obvious and desired because an 
AC‘s monitoring role includes reviewing financial statements and assessing the degree 
of aggressiveness and conservatism of the accounting policies and accounting estimates 
(Rainsbury et al., 2008). An AC member having financial expertise possesses the ability 
to provide a professional evaluation on the financial estimates, and the appropriateness 
of accounting principles and disclosure practices of the firm. Because of the inclusion of 
reputed financial experts in the AC, a company is supposed to be transparent in quality 
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financial reporting and can gain a positive impression in the market. In light of this, 
DeFond et al. (2005) found a more positive market reaction by the announcement of 
inclusion of financial experts in the AC of a firm when compared to that of a non-
financial expert. 
 
Although Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) argued that appointing AC members from a wide 
variety of backgrounds may create a feeling of inadequacy and inefficiency in terms of 
accounting related technical knowledge, the benefits of AC members‘ financial or 
accounting expertise is acknowledged by a significant number of researchers. The 
significance of an AC members‘ background is also evidenced in IPO pricing and 
earnings management. The AC members who have a financial expertise are also 
effective in minimising under-pricing in the case of an IPO, and they are also effective 
in preventing unwanted earnings management. An AC at the time of the IPO has no 
effect on under-pricing, unless its members are independent and have expertise in 
financial matters, in which case the AC decreases significantly the level of under-
pricing of the IPO (Bedard et al., 2008). Dhaliwal et al. (2006) found that the firms with 
accounting financial experts are less likely to engage in earnings management, and that 
this is more pronounced for the firms with GCG in practice. Xie et al. (2003) also noted 
that firms having AC members with financial expertise limit management in engaging 
unauthorised earnings management.  Thus, a firm with a strong CG may also push for 
the appointment of an accounting financial expert for its AC. Also, from the perspective 
of a potential AC appointee, a firm with strong CG may be an attractive prospect 
because it may alleviate concerns about added scrutiny from regulators and added 
litigation risk. Similarly, Krishnan and Lee (2009) documented a strong negative 
association between litigation risk and AC members with accounting financial expertise. 
 
The above discussion explicitly argues that AC members should have relevant expertise 
for performing the committee‘s roles effectively. But which type of expertise is required 
for the committee members is not clearly defined. Expertise is defined in the BRC 
(1999) as: 
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Past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional 
certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background 
which results in the individual‟s financial sophistication, including being or 
having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight 
responsibilities.  
 
Some researchers have highlighted the need for relevant qualification, while others have 
emphasised on the need for relevant work experience. Again, many studies have argued 
that the AC members should have mixture of both qualification and work experience in 
this area. BRC (1999) defined financial experts as those who have work experience in 
the top level of accounting and finance and/or a CPA, or equivalent, qualification. They 
include CEOs and top level mangers with financial oversight responsibilities. The 
‗accounting‘ financial expertise in Defond et al. (2005) is defined as directors with work 
experience as public accountants, auditors, principal accounting officers, and 
controllers. The ‗non-accounting‘ financial expertise includes all CEOs or presidents of 
for-profit corporations. Lee et al. (2004) defined financial experts as having a CPA 
qualification and/or work experience as any or more of the position of: investment 
bankers, venture capitalists, CEOs, Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), Vice President 
(VP) of Finance, controller, or treasurer. DeZoort et al. (2001) found that AC members 
with CG experience and/or financial reporting and audit expertise, can deliver credible, 
reliable, and effective judgement when any dispute relating to a financial decision 
arises. McDaniel et al. (2002) examined the difference in quality judgement between 
two groups, namely financial literates and financial experts, and found the latter to be 
more effective in performing the responsibilities of an AC member. Both technical 
knowledge and work experience are found to have an impact on a committee‘s 
performance. McDaniel et al. (2002) also argued that the inclusion of financial experts 
in AC improves the quality of overall financial reporting. 
 
There are a growing number of studies that address the benefits of inclusion of financial 
experts in the ACs. Using an event study methodology, Defond et al., (2005) found 
significant positive abnormal returns around the appointment of ‗accounting‘ financial 
experts to the AC, but not around the appointment of non-accounting financial experts 
and directors without any financial expertise. The firms with AC members who have 
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financial expertise, are less likely to be subject to censure for poor financial reporting 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2004; Farber, 2005; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996), are 
more likely to have higher quality earnings (Qin, 2007), and also are more likely to 
reduce earnings management for firms with weaker CG mechanisms (Carcello et al., 
2006). Further, the ACs with financial experts, are more likely to promote more 
conservative financial reporting when there exists strong CG practice (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2008). 
 
4.6.3 The Size of the Committee 
Some researchers (e.g. Pincus et al., 1989) reported that the size of an AC is an 
influential factor for its effective functioning. Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) 
documented a positive relationship between the size of an AC and the quality of 
financial reporting, which is also consistent with the findings of Felo et al. (2003).  
Although AC size is affected by the size of the BoDs and the company, a large AC may 
not necessarily result in more effective functioning because more members in an AC 
may lead to unnecessary debates and delay the decisions (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1996; 
Yermack, 1996; Scarbrough et al., 1998 cited in Lin et al., 2008). Therefore, the current 
requirement on AC size as laid down by the market regulators in the U.S.A. and the 
U.K. is a minimum of three members (NACD, 2002; ICAEW, 2001), while some 
empirical studies have found that the normal AC size in the U.S.A. and the U.K. is three 
to five (Carcello and Neal, 2000; Raghunandan et al., 2001; Spira, 2002; Davidson et 
al., 2004). As per the new requirements, every firm listed under NYSE and NASDAQ 
must have an AC with a minimum of three members. Furthermore, the best practices 
suggest that the AC should include at least three members to provide the necessary 
expertise for the oversight function (Cadbury Committee, 1992; the BRC, 1999). 
However, some researchers (for example,  Yermack, 1996; Scarbrough et al., 1998; Lin 
et al., 2008; and Bedard and Gendron, 2010) have argued that a large AC may not 
necessarily result in more effective functioning as more members in the AC may lead to 
unnecessary debates in the meeting and delay in taking decisions. 
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4.6.4 The Authority and Resources of the Committee 
Authority and resource are two vital factors for an effective AC. Most AC guidelines 
(for example, the Treadway Report, 1987; the Cadbury Committee, 1992; the BRC, 
1999; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; and, the Combined Code, 1999, 2003) recommend 
that the AC should be provided with sufficient authorities and resources for its effective 
functioning. The AC requires significant resources to perform effectively because of the 
wide scope of responsibilities (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). Arthur Anderson (1994) 
noted that it is deemed extremely important that the ACs have unrestricted access to all 
relevant internal and external information to fulfil their oversight responsibilities. 
Recommendations made in AC related guidelines and studies can be summarised as: 
 The AC should delegated adequate authority to carry out their responsibilities; 
 The AC should have ready access to relevant information if required; 
 The AC should get prompt responses from management while carrying out its 
duties; 
 The AC should be provided with sufficient resources including secretarial 
support to carry out its responsibilities; and, 
 AC members are paid adequate remunerations and benefits for giving their time 
and effort to the company.   
 
4.6.5 Diligence of the Committee 
Members‘ diligence is very important in performing the responsibilities of an AC 
effectively and with integrity (Sharma et al., 2009). Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) also 
reported that AC members‘ diligence is one of the main components of its effectiveness. 
Diligence simply means conscientiousness in paying proper attention to a task, giving 
the degree of care required in a given situation. The success of any committee largely 
depends on its members‘ sense of responsibilities and willingness to devote adequate 
time for the committee‘s activities. The responsibilities of the AC should be specified in 
a charter, which should be reviewed from time to time (Mohamad and Sori, 2001). Lee 
and Stone (1997) explained ‗diligence‘ as ‗willing to be effective‘. Members‘ diligence 
is reflected by their willingness to undertake responsibilities and the time devoted for 
113 
them. Gendron et al. (2004) mentioned that members who are willing to be active and 
effective in the AC should have a probing attitude in mind which helps in assessing 
various management decisions. Because diligence is extremely subjective when 
observed directly, many researchers have used AC meeting frequency as a proxy of 
diligence (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). The highlights regarding AC diligence noted 
in the above mentioned studies are summarised below: 
 There should have a charter (terms of reference) for the AC stating its objectives, 
duties and responsibilities; 
 The AC charter should be reviewed annually; 
 AC members should have a clear understanding of their responsibilities; 
 Members of the AC should wilfully assume their responsibilities; and, 
 AC members should give sufficient time to devote in committee‘s affairs. 
 
4.6.6 Meetings of the Committee 
The importance of AC meeting frequency has been recognised by many researchers 
including Spira (2002) and Anderson et al. (2004). The meetings are not mere rituals 
devoid of interest to managers and auditors (Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron and Bedard, 
2006) instead meaningful and substantive meetings are consistent with an agency 
perspective (Beasley et al., 2009). In studying the collapse of Andersen, Chen and Zhou 
(2008) noted that the number AC meetings is an important mechanism of CG. However, 
authoritative statements on CG are silent on meeting frequency and length of meeting, 
and this absence of regulatory guidelines affords ACs considerable discretion in this 
area (Sharma et al., 2009). A few studies (for example, McMullen, 1996; Collier and 
Gregory, 1998; ICAEW, 2001) have reported that ACs in companies in the U.S.A.  and 
the U.K. held meetings on an average of four to six times per year, with an average 
duration of three to four hours per meeting. Menon and Williams (1994) suggested for a 
minimum of two meetings in a year. Furthermore, Abbott et al. (2007) noted that an 
effective AC should meet at least four times annually. However, Sharma et al. (2009) 
noted that there was an average of 3.75 AC meetings annually in New Zealand, while R 
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and R (2007) reported that the ACs of the U.S. S&P SmallCap 600
17
 companies meet 
around seven times in a year. Interestingly, a negative association between AC 
independence and meeting frequency was found by Sharma et al. (2009).  This might 
happen because an independent AC can perform freely as par its plan, and it does not 
have to meet for discussion frequently. The study further revealed that financial literacy 
of AC members, size of the AC, and board independence are all positively associated 
with AC meeting frequency. Bedard and Gendron (2010) noted that the number of 
meetings is not frequently associated with AC effectiveness; instead the AC should meet 
as often as its responsibilities require. 
 
Nevertheless, the recommendations of a minimum number of meetings to guarantee 
effective AC control are supported by the empirical evidence of a positive relationship 
between meeting frequency and the quality of a firm‘s accounting information (Xie et 
al., 2003; Abbot et al., 2004). It is argued that effective control is unlikely to occur if an 
AC holds a single yearly meeting, or none at all (Menon and Williams, 1994; Klein, 
1998a; Collier and Gregory, 1998; Deli and Gillan, 2000).  The process of AC meetings 
is important for better outcomes from the meetings (Bedard and Gendron, 2010). 
Conducive environment in the meetings depends on the role of chairman, and he can 
make the meeting effective ensuring all participants can express their fair concerns 
freely (Raghunandan et al., 1998; the BRC, 1999; Sabia and Goodfellow, 2005). This 
requires an independent and congenial AC environment where members can discuss 
issues freely. Kirk and Siegel (1996) also mentioned that if members of the AC meet the 
chairman in advance of the meeting to talk about any issue in less pressured 
environment, it is beneficial for the members to clarify their objectives and also for the 
chairman to have the opportunity be prepared for a fruitful discussion. 
 
Current best practices suggest that a meeting agenda is one of the key factors that make 
the ACs more effective and, therefore, the agenda of the meeting should also be 
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 The S&P (SmallCap) 600 is an equity index representing 600 small-sized companies in various 
industries. Being launched in 1994 by the Standard & Poors Corp., the S&P 600 Index is considered as a 
benchmark for evaluating the investment potential of profitable small companies. 
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carefully chosen (Sabia and Goodfellow, 2005). Most proponents of AC reform argue 
that effective ACs should set their own agendas and determine the types of information 
that they want to review before meetings (NACD, 2000). In fact, some (for example, 
Batson, 2003; Breeden, 2003) have noted that the usurpation of these responsibilities by 
senior management at Enron and WorldCom contributed to the financial frauds at those 
entities. A similar concern was noted at Hollinger International Inc. (Paris et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, Gendron and Bedard (2006) and Spira (2002) noted that management can 
influence the agenda or information flow to its interest. Beasley et al (2009) found that 
agendas are typically set well in advance of the meeting, and the AC chair often sets the 
agenda, with input from the CFO and other committee members, consistent with Spira‘s 
(2002) finding that the agenda is driven by the finance director and the AC chairperson. 
 
The above discussion on AC attributes clearly states that the effective functioning of an 
AC is greatly influenced by some of its attributes, including: composition, diligent, 
authority and meeting process. While an AC is regarded as a key element in the CG 
process of companies, its attributes in fostering effective CG has been the subject of 
much debate (Sommer, 1991; Wolnizer, 1995; Chen et al., 2008). For example, scholars 
have argued that many AC members lack critical attributes including independence and 
expertise in oversight (Vicknair et al., 1993), and that whether ACs are discharging their 
important responsibilities is not sufficiently understood (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). 
Some studies (for example, Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998) have also argued that the 
adoption of an AC may be primarily symbolic and that the benefits associated with them 
are more rhetorical than substantive. Independent AC members with significant relevant 
knowledge and experience have been found to have a positive impact on AC diligence 
(Scarbrough et al., 1998; Raghunandan et al., 2001, and Zain and Subramaniam, 2007). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) not only imposes the independence of members of ACs, 
but it also stipulates that at least one member of an AC should have far reaching 
experience in the field of finance. McHugh and Raghunandan (1994), Scarborough et al. 
(1998), Yeo (2001) and Christopher et al., (2009) went one step further to indicate that 
AC independence is further enhanced if the members, in addition to being independent, 
have the technical expertise to understand the work of the internal audit function.  
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4.7 Roles of Audit Committees 
Although the ACs existed in practice for a long time, the perceptions on AC‘s role have 
evolved continuously (Lin et al., 2008). Before the 2000s there were varied views on the 
roles of ACs in the Western literature, but a relative consensus has emerged in recent 
years following the promotion of AC function in CG by market regulators and 
professional bodies. The early advocates argued that an AC mainly reviews the financial 
statements prepared by the management before being they are given to BoDs. The roles 
of ACs have expanded substantially in the last two decades. For instance, as required by 
the Treadway Commission (1987), the ACs should oversee companies‘ internal control 
and co-ordinate the work of internal and external auditors (IIA, 1993; Guthrie and 
Turnbull, 1995; the BRC, 1999). Later, AC‘s roles were further expanded to include 
monitoring of the management‘s financial performance or accountability, and the 
internal controls, as well as to be a means to enable non-executive directors to oversee 
the ethical behaviours of the management in respect of compliance with regulations and 
the company‘s codes of conduct (DeZoort, 1997, DeZoort et al., 2002; ICAEW, 1997, 
2001; Spira, 2002). The role of an AC was extended to enhance auditor independence, 
or to ensure the quality of financial reporting and auditing process (Mautz and 
Neumann, 1970b; CICA, 1981; the Bradbury, 1990; Abdolmohammadi and Levy, 1992; 
ICAEW, 1997; the BRC, 1999). In other words, the AC serves as a link between BoDs 
and the external auditor, and it mediates potential conflicts or disputes between the 
management and auditors, all of which ultimately facilitates auditors to perform their 
job more independently (KPMG Peat Marwick Thorne, 1991; Collier, 1993; Vinten, 
1995; Carcello and Neal, 2000). 
 
The ACs are traditionally responsible for oversight of auditing matters relating to the 
company‘s financial reporting (Brown et al., 2009). Lin et al. (2008) noted AC oversight 
roles and responsibilities for improving internal control, rules compliance, sound 
corporate financial reporting, and auditing processes. The key elements of an AC‘s 
oversight roles as mentioned in the BRC (1999) include: 
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Ensuring that quality accounting policies, internal controls, and independent 
and objective outside auditors are in place to accurate, high quality and timely 
disclosure of financial and other material information to the board, to the public 
markets, and to shareholders.  
 
This monitoring function is normally delegated to the AC as an entrusted body of the 
board. “The audit committee monitors the financial reporting process, the effectiveness 
of the company‟s internal controls, its internal audits where applicable, and its risk 
management systems” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006 
cited in Sarens et al., 2009). AC‘s role has been widened to look not only at the financial 
reporting process, but also to assess the risks faced by companies (which includes 
competition, environmental, financial, legal, operational, regulatory, strategic and 
technological responses) (Pomeranz, 1997; NACD, 2000; KPMG, 1999, 2008).  
 
The following list is an attempt to summarise the key roles of ACs as noted in a number 
of studies (for example, Baruch, 1980; Marsh and Powell, 1989; Vanasco, 1994; 
Chambers, 2005; Lambe, 2005; Daly and Bocchino, 2006;   Mir and Seboui, 2008; 
Chen et al., 2008; and Laux and Laux, 2009) and recommended by the AC guidelines 
(such as: the Cadbury Report, 1992; the Olivencia Report, 1998; the BRC,  1999; 
AICPA, 2004): 
 To review the integrity of the company‘s financial statements; 
 To advise the board on the reliability of financial and perhaps other information 
to be published in the name of the board; 
 To oversee the financial reporting and disclosure process; 
 To monitor the choice of accounting policies and principles; 
 To provide recommendations to the BoDs on the appointment of the external 
auditors, the audit fee, and any matters of resignation or dismissal; 
 To discuss the nature and scope of the audit with the external auditor; 
 To review the management letter from the external auditor; 
 To monitor the independent auditors‘ qualification and independence; 
 To monitor the effectiveness of internal control process of the company; 
 To review any significant findings of internal investigations; 
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 To review and advise on company‘s risk management strategies; and 
 To oversee of regulatory compliance, ethics, and whistleblower hotlines. 
 
Therefore, it is quite clear that in recent years the AC has become one of the main pillars 
of CG system in companies around the world. An AC is critical to the success of an 
organization, with the responsibilities to monitor the effectiveness of the internal audit 
function, and the internal control system, and review the financial statements and 
thereby have a more efficient vigilant internal control in the organization. Verschoor 
(1993) identified responsibilities in overseeing the systems of financial reporting, 
external auditing, and internal control. The roles of an AC in overseeing and monitoring 
financial reporting process, internal controls, and external auditing are also noted by 
Sori et al. (2007) and Sharma et al. (2009). Although an AC performs different types of 
responsibilities, the key areas where an AC plays significant roles are discussed below. 
 
4.7.1 Role in Financial Reporting  
Ensuring reliable financial information is one of the most important functions of the AC 
(Rezaee and Farmer, 1994). There is pressure from the oversight role for the AC to get 
more involved to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process. The 
establishment of AC improves the quality and accuracy of financial information 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; McMullen, 1996), ensuring that the officers responsible 
for reporting and disclosure are more closely monitored and controlled. The role of an 
AC in overseeing financial reporting has been studied by a huge number of researchers 
(such as: Mautz and Neumann, 1970a; Braiotta, 1986; Luecke and Westfall, 1990; 
Rittenberg and Nair, 1994; Rezaee and Farmer, 1994; Wolnizer, 1995; Lee and Stone, 
1997; Porter and Gendall, 1998; Spira, 2002; Smith, 2003; Gendron et al., 2004; 
Gendron and Bedard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Cohen et al,. 2007a; Laux and 
Laux, 2009; Bedard and Gendron, 2010). These studies have generally noted that ACs 
are expected to: 
 Review all financial statements, whether interim or annual, before they are 
approved by the BoDs and publicly disseminated to ensure their objectiveness, 
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accuracy, and timeliness; 
 Review all existing accounting policies, and concentrate on the impact on the 
financial statements of any changes in accounting policies including the likely 
impact of any contemplated changes; 
 Appraise key management estimates, judgements, and valuations where they are 
thought to be material to the financial statements; 
 Evaluate the adequacy of financial statement disclosures; 
 Review adequacy of organisation's structure, including management's 
implementation of internal controls; and, 
 Review all significant transactions, especially those that are non-routine and 
those that might be illegal, questionable, or unethical. 
 
4.7.2 Role in Internal Auditing 
Spira (1999a) mentioned that AC members should be able to comprehend the firm‘s 
total internal control process so that they can effectively prevent and/or mitigate 
financial reporting failure and potential management frauds. The AC is responsible for 
monitoring the integrity and performance of a firm‘s internal audit functions (Laux and 
Laux, 2009). The role of an AC in monitoring and overseeing internal auditing activities 
has also been clearly discussed in EACLN (2008)
18
. The AC can strengthen the entity's 
internal audit function by ensuring that management has established, and is maintaining, 
an adequate and effective internal audit structure (Beasley et al. 2009; Turley and 
Zaman, 2007; Rezaee and Farmer, 1994). Beasley et al. (2009), studying AC oversight 
process within forty-two U.S. public companies, found that AC members largely depend 
on internal auditors in evaluating the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting. The study also reported the necessity of frequent meetings between AC 
members and internal auditors, which supports the view of Braiotta (1990; 1999). 
Private meetings between the AC and the head of internal audit division serve the 
purpose of enhancing and protecting the independence of the internal audit function 
                                                 
18
  The European Audit Committee Leadership Network (EACLN) is a group of audit committee chairs, 
drawn from Europe's leading companies, who are committed to improving the performance of audit 
committees and enhancing trust in financial markets. 
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(Braiotta, 1999 cited in Christopher et al., 2009). Oliverio and Newman (1993 identified 
the interaction between the internal auditors and the AC is likely to enhance the 
effectiveness and objectivity of internal audit functions. Sharma et al. (2009) noted that 
the internal audit division acts as a comfort provider for the AC. A summary of the 
above studies in relation to AC‘s role in internal auditing can be found in  Wolnizer 
(1995), who stated that ACs are expected to: 
 Evaluate the independence and competence of internal audit function; 
 Discuss with the chief of internal auditors about internal audit reports, 
effectiveness of internal controls and problems in performing the internal audit. 
 Review the scope of internal audits planned for the year; 
 Review management's response to internal auditors' recommendations; 
 Review and approve the internal audit budget; 
 Review the relationship between internal and external auditors and coordination 
of their work; and, 
 Appoint and dismiss the head of internal audit. 
 
4.7.3 Role in External Auditing 
The involvement of ACs in dealing with external auditor has been the subject of many 
studies (for example, Rezaee and Farmer, 1994; Wolnizer, 1995; Kirk and Siegel, 1996; 
Lennox and Park, 2007; and Beasley et al., 2009; Bedard and Gendron, 2010). The AC 
is a valuable instrument for initiating direct contact with the independent (external) 
auditor, participating in the selection of the external auditor, and promoting effective 
communication between the independent auditor and corporate directors (Rezaee and 
Farmer, 1994; Beasley et al. 2009). Lennox and Park (2007) claimed that the AC is 
responsible for hiring the external auditor and overseeing audit quality. Meanwhile, 
Kirk and Siegel (1996) argued that external auditors need support of the BoDs in 
performing their duties objectively and with integrity. To work independently, the 
external auditors need to have access to some relevant resources of the firm. At the same 
time, their activities need to be monitored and evaluated in order to ensure their 
accountability. Beasley et al. (2009) also found AC members dependency on external 
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auditors in performing their oversight responsibilities. Bedard and Gendron (2010) 
mentioned that one of the main responsibilities of ACs is to oversee the external audit 
function, including the selection, compensation, work, and independence of the external 
auditors. In respect of the effective functioning of AC, Zain and Subramaniam (2007) 
emphasised the need for a good relationship between external auditors and AC through 
private meetings and informal communication. Therefore, an AC can play a significant 
role in dealing with external auditors in terms of their appointment, resources, 
independence, monitoring and evaluation. In the case of annual audit and external 
auditors, Wolnizer (1995) mentioned that the ACs are expected to: 
 Review the findings of the external audit; 
 Determine the completeness and appropriateness of management's response to 
audit findings; 
 Evaluate independence of external audit function; 
 Review the reasonableness of the external audit fees; 
 Arbitrate in disputes between management and auditors; 
 Nominate external auditors; and 
 Review the engagement letter prepared for the independent auditors. 
 
4.7.4 Other (Miscellaneous) Roles 
Apart from the above three broad roles, an AC performs some other various roles for the 
company; including advising on risk management strategies, overseeing the 
compliances of regulatory and ethical issues, and bridging the gap between board, 
management, internal auditors and external auditors. Carcello et al. (2002) described the 
AC as a ‗communication bridge‘ between management, and the internal and external 
auditor. Similarly, Mallin (2010) stated that the AC provides a useful ‗bridge‘ between 
both internal and external auditors, and the board; helping to ensure that the board is 
fully aware of all relevant issues related to the audit. The committee regularly meets 
with outside auditors and internal financial managers to review the internal control 
process, financial reporting system, and external audit process and they then report the 
updates to the BoDs (Klein, 2002a). A similar issue was addressed by Williams (2007) 
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who argued that the practice of holding separate sessions for meetings between 
independent AC members, and external and internal auditors without the presence of 
executive directors brings an open, useful and dynamic forum, especially on issues that 
may be sensitive to the executives. AICPA (2004) described an AC‘s roles in the risk 
management of the company.  Chambers (2005) also highlighted AC‘s role in advising 
management on risk management policies, and in overseeing the regulatory compliance, 
ethics and whistleblower hotlines. 
 
Although risk management has been noted as an essential part of CG to be overseen by 
AC (Chambers, 2005; Sarens et al, 2009; Mallin, 2010), several studies have proposed a 
separate risk management committee to assist the board in this regard; for example, 
Brown et al. (2009) argued for the necessity of the creation of a separate risk 
management committee to interface with and assist the board and AC. Similarly, De 
Lacy (2005) recommended the separation of the risk management committee from the 
AC. However, the establishment of a strong internal audit section in the firm also helps 
the AC in risk management where a separate risk management committee is not in 
place. The NYSE requires all listed companies to establish and maintain an internal 
audit function in order to provide management and the AC with continuous assessment 
of the company‘s risk management frameworks and its internal controls (Pforsigh, et al. 
2006). In Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) has published similar 
requirements (Kleffner, et al., 2003). 
 
Therefore, it is quite clear from the above discussion that the AC is established with the 
aim of enhancing confidence in the integrity of an organisation's processes and 
procedures relating to internal control and corporate reporting. An AC provides an 
‗independent‘ reassurance to the board through its oversight and monitoring role. 
Among the many responsibilities that the boards entrust the AC with are the 
transparency and accuracy of financial reporting and disclosures, the effectiveness of 
external audit functions, the robustness of the systems of internal audit and internal 
controls, the effectiveness of anti-fraud, the ethics and compliance systems, and the 
review of the functioning of the whistleblower mechanism.  
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4.8 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
The mere existence of an AC alone does not provide sufficient control, nor does it 
ensure that the company will maintain a high standard of financial reporting integrity 
(Rittenberg and Nair, 1994; Mendez and Garcia, 2007). It needs to perform effectively 
and care must be taken to structure, staff, and support the AC to ensure its effectiveness. 
With a number of recent high-profile financial fraud cases at the start of the new 
millennium, academic and industry now seek for effective ACs in order to provide 
sound monitoring (Chan and Li, 2008). Some questions remain about the effectiveness 
of these regulations (Romano, 2005). The AC is one of the key mechanisms of CG 
(Chen et al, 2008) and its effectiveness is crucial for sound CG practices in the 
organisation. Campbell (1990) and Vicknair et al. (1993) reported that the lack of 
effective AC practice is a significant factor behind rigorous financial problems of 
companies. Effectiveness is an elusive concept that can be approached through several 
models, none of which is appropriate in all circumstances (Cameron, 1981). 
Furthermore, Spira (1998a) considered that: "there is no discussion of the meaning of 
effectiveness, resources, or independence within the literature and this assertion is 
unsupported". Similar limitations were identified by Cameron (1986) when he surveyed 
studies of organisational effectiveness. He observed that evaluations of effectiveness are 
problematic with regard to arbitrary selection of criteria, and confusion between 
determinants and indicators. Lewin and Minton (1986) noted that the multiplicity of 
means and the plethora of ends, as well as the many management philosophies and 
associated organisation designs extant, have made the measurement of effectiveness into 
a very complex problem. It is complex because of the problems inherent in specifying 
some joint preference function, or in attempting to specify the weights in some multi-
attribute effectiveness measures. 
 
Lee and Stone (1997), in explaining the purpose of their study, noted that: “actual 
effectiveness is impossible to observe". Spira (1998b; 1999a) added that "the lack of 
clarity in the definition of audit committee purpose and the differences of emphasis 
observed internationally make the assessment of audit committee effectiveness 
problematic”. Cameron (1981) claimed that organisational effectiveness has become ‗an 
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enigma‘ and, therefore, the meaning of effectiveness in academic research is unclear. 
The author was probably very cautious about the exact measure of AC effectiveness 
because different researchers have explained the concept differently. Baugher (1981) 
suggested that there is often no single model for defining effectiveness in any given 
situation. The investigator may focus on a particular type of effectiveness; however, an 
operation can look at effectiveness from one perspective and ineffectiveness from 
another perspective. Baugher‘s (1981) study concluded that: "The investigator should 
determine which type of effectiveness is of the greatest concern to the constituency or 
constituencies to which he or she must report". Cameron (1986) agreed with the above 
statement, and also added that: "There cannot be a single theory about effectiveness and 
the primary task facing any investigator of effectiveness lies in determining the 
appropriate indicators and standards". For this reason, the selection of data by which to 
measure effectiveness is valuable because an organisation may be judged effective on 
the basis of bias. According to Lewin and Minton (1986), "organisations are effective if 
relevant constraints can be satisfied and if organisational results approximate or exceed 
a set of referents for multiple goals”.  
 
Cameron (1981) noted that the words effectiveness and efficiency are often confused. A 
large number of studies (for example, Jenkins and Robinson, 1985; Kalbers, 1992a; 
Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Rittenberg and Nair, 1994; Porter and Gendall, 1998; 
Millstein, 1999; Raghunandan et al., 2001; Smith, 2003) focused on AC effectiveness 
have used the word ‗effectiveness‘ to mean the ‗carrying out or fulfilling its specific 
oversight responsibilities or duties‘. Various studies (for example: Braiotta, 1986; 
Verschoor, 1989; Lee and Stone, 1997; Turley and Zaman, 2002; Watts, 2002; Zain and 
Subramaniam, 2007) have used ‗discharging their oversight responsibilities‘ for the 
definition of AC effectiveness. DeZoort (1998) defined effectiveness as: "a committee's 
collective ability to meet its oversight objectives". In addition, Baugher (1981) noted 
that: "The investigator should determine which type of effectiveness is of the greatest 
concern to the constituency or constituencies to which he or she must report”. The 
definition of an effective AC given by DeZoort et al. (2002) included its comprehensive 
roles and responsibilities, that is: “An effective audit committee has qualified members 
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with the authority and resources to protect shareholders‟ interests by ensuring reliable 
financial reporting, internal controls, and risk management through its diligent 
oversight efforts”. Woodlock and Claypool (2001) found that once the AC is made 
aware of its current practices, a comparison needs to be made between current practices 
and those that constitute best practices so that the AC, the CEO, the CFO, and the 
external auditor are better able to assess where to commit resources to close the gap 
between current and best practices. Moreover, Rowland (2002) claimed that the 
monitoring model is manifest in actual corporate practice when compared with best 
practice guidelines. A strong internal control function is a necessary criterion for an 
effective AC (Zain and Subramaniam, 2007) because the AC members especially rely 
on the work of the internal auditor in order to develop their own appreciation of the 
controls‘ effectiveness (Spira, 1999a). 
 
A well functioning AC should have a greater likelihood of detecting problems than an 
inactive one (Choi et al., 2004). Finally, AC related disclosure and report in the annual 
report is a necessary element for assessing the effectiveness of AC function (Spira, 
1998a; ICAEW, 2001; Ng and Tan, 2003; Lee et al., 2004). Relevant disclosures include 
a written charter or terms of reference specifying the AC responsibilities that have been 
endorsed or approved by BoDs, they also include AC reports demonstrating how an AC 
has fulfilled the described responsibilities during the year. The effectiveness of ACs 
depends, to a large extent, upon their diligence or activities; such as, the frequency, 
duration, and content of AC meetings (Teoh and Lim, 1996; Collier and Gregory, 1998; 
Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Ng and Tan, 2003; Abbott et al., 2004). In addition, some 
studies (for example, DeZoort, 1998; Scarbrough et al., 1998; Beattie et al., 2000; 
Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Braiotta, 2003; Song and Windram, 2004) contended that an 
effective AC should hold meetings with the management, and the internal and external 
auditors separately in order to exercise an effective oversight or monitoring role over 
the financial reporting and auditing processes. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that previous studies have discussed two different 
frameworks of AC effectiveness. For example, DeZoort et al. (2002) reviewed 37 
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empirical studies published between 1987 and 2002, and provided a framework with 
four fundamental determinants of AC effectiveness, namely: composition, authority, 
resources, and diligence. On the other hand, instead of focusing on the determinants of 
AC effectiveness, Turley and Zaman (2004) and Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) analysed 
the effectiveness of ACs using a framework which focused on successfully performing 
AC‘s roles. However, while having the ‗right people‘ as AC members and providing 
them with concrete responsibilities and resources are important inputs to AC 
effectiveness, they are not sufficient to ensure effectiveness (Bedard and Gendron, 
2010). Instead the process by which AC members assess information and oversee 
activities is important in this respect. In fact, process is a very important mechanism of 
an AC that explains how characteristics are translated into organisational outcomes. 
Gendron et al. (2004) noted that the AC process is an important factor in developing a 
better understanding of AC effectiveness. Bedard and Gendron (2010) explained that the 
dimensions of an AC process include: AC meeting, meeting agenda, questioning and 
leadership. However, performing AC roles successfully depends on the input factors 
(i.e. composition, authority, resource and diligence) and the processes by which an AC 
functions (e.g. meeting process) Therefore, it would be more comprehensive and 
accepted if AC effectiveness is evaluated considering its input (e.g AC composition), 
process (e.g. AC meeting) and output (e.g. AC roles) dimensions. The current study 
aims to investigate AC effectiveness in Bangladesh considering all of these three 
dimensions as AC effectiveness criteria. 
 
4.9 Significance of Audit Committee Effectiveness 
An effective AC is critical in enhancing the effective oversight of the financial reporting 
process and ensuring high quality financial reporting (Chen and Zhou, 2007). Empirical 
studies have revealed that the existence of effective AC is positively associated with the 
quality of financial reporting. For example, McMullen (1996) found that the presence of 
AC is negatively associated with financial restatements and sanctions by the U.S. SEC. 
Chambers (2005) noted that poor standards of CG (for instance, ineffective or non-
existent ACs) facilitate abuses (such as, fraudulent financial reporting). The significance 
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of AC effectiveness in preventing misstatement in financial reporting has been 
highlighted in many studies including Magee and Tseng (1990) and Dye (1991). An 
effective AC is now treated as a principal player in ensuring GCG and rebuilding public 
confidence in the financial reporting of a firm. A well functioning AC leads to the 
improvement of corporate financial reporting and the decrease of earnings management 
or financial frauds, as well as the increase of unqualified auditor reports (Wild, 1996; 
Carcello and Neal, 2000; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002b; Sharma, 2004; 
Bedard et al., 2004). In their study, Bryan et al. (2004) found positive association 
between the AC effectiveness and firm‘s earning. An effective AC serves as important 
CG mechanism to boost investors‘ confidence in GCG, to improve the trust in financial 
reporting processes, and it lends more credibility to the audited financial statements 
(McMullen, 1996; Urbancic, 1996; Spira, 1999b; the SEC, 1999, 2003; Rezaee et al., 
2003). The significance of an effective AC is visible in enhancing the quality of 
statutory auditing, which ultimately leads to better financial reporting. For example, 
Kunitake (1983) studied 580 AMEX listed firms and concluded that the firms without 
ACs in place change external auditors more frequently than those firms with ACs. 
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009) noted that the existence of AC reduces errors 
and irregularities in financial statements, and enhances the credibility of financial 
reporting; this result was consistent with the view of McMullen (1996).  
 
In contrast, there are a number of studies which have found opposite results; for 
example, Beasley (1996) found that there was no significant relationship between 
presence of AC and the likelihood of fraud or error. Furthermore, Pucheta-Martinez and 
Fuentes (2007) revealed that presence of AC has little or no impact on quality of 
financial reporting. However, it is widely accepted that an AC plays an important role in 
assuring the quality of financial reporting and corporate accountability. As a liaison 
between the external auditor and the board, the AC minimises information asymmetry 
between them, facilitates the monitoring process (Klein 1998b; Sori et al., 2007), and 
enhances the independence of the auditor (Mautz and Neumann, 1977). 
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An effective AC also significantly contributes to the establishment of a rigorous internal 
control function in the company, which ultimately reduces irregularities and fraudulent 
activities in the company‘s affairs. Zain and Subramaniam (2007) highlighted the 
leadership role of AC in supporting and guiding internal auditors. They also argued that 
an AC is perceived to hold an authoritative position which helps it to question the 
decisions made by management. As already discussed, independence is a pre-requisite 
for an effective AC. Klein (2002b) examined whether the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals has any relationship with AC independence and found a negative relation 
between AC independence and abnormal accruals, the impact of which is more 
pronounced when independent members in the AC are not a majority. Klein‘s (2002b) 
study concluded that independent ACs can monitor firms‘ earning processes more 
objectively. Xie et al. (2003) and Laux and Laux (2009) explained the role of AC in 
preventing earnings management. An independent AC is considered to be an effective 
mechanism in limiting earnings management (Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 
2009). Furthermore, Lin and Liu (2009) added that an effective auditing function can 
detect and disclose earnings management and other types of misconduct by business 
managers or controlling shareholders. Klein (2002b) and Bedard et al. (2004) found that 
AC‘s independence and financial expertise are negatively associated with earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary accruals. Chen et al. (2008) noted that an 
effective AC can play a significant role in resolving an agency problem (i.e. owner-
management problem) in the company. The study also found the influence of an 
effective AC in the higher earnings and returns of the company which is also consistent 
with the findings of Wild (1996).   
 
Therefore, it is clear from the above discussion that an effective AC contributes 
significantly in ensuring fair and sound practice of financial reporting, establishing 
rigorous internal control, and thus safeguarding stakeholders‘ interest. This ultimately 
leads to minimum irregularities, increased investors‘ trust, higher returns, and maximum 
wealth of the stakeholders. 
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4.10 Audit Committee Effectiveness Model 
The literature discussed in this chapter indicates that although the effectiveness of an 
AC is reflected by its roles and performance, it is still dependent on a number of factors 
(e.g. composition, authority, and independence). The empirical evidence also supports 
the positive impact of AC effectiveness in minimising agency conflict and maximising 
stakeholders‘ wealth. The following model of AC effectiveness (Figure 4.1) proposed by 
the researcher depicts the different factors that influence AC effectiveness as well as the 
significance of an effective AC.                                                                                              
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Figure 4.1: Audit Committee Effectiveness Mode1
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Figure 4.1 shows that the effectiveness of an AC mainly depends on the ability and 
scope of performance of its oversight roles, and on its responsibilities as delegated by 
the BoDs. The key functional areas where AC contributes are: financial reporting, 
internal auditing, external auditing, and a firm‘s compliance issues. The attributes of an 
AC (i.e. composition, members‘ expertise, independence, authority and diligence, and 
the size of the committee) and its decision making process (i.e. meeting) have obvious 
impacts in whether or not it carries out these roles successfully. This means that the 
effectiveness of an AC is heavily influenced by the input factors (e.g. composition, 
members‘ expertise, independence, authority and diligence, and size). An effective AC 
minimises the agency problem by reducing the information asymmetry between owners 
and management and also acts as a safeguard of all stakeholders‘ interests. The main 
outcomes of an effective AC are in: (i) producing more credible financial information; 
(ii) establishing rigorous internal control; (iii) preventing frauds and earnings 
management in the firm; and (iv) increasing firm‘s earnings and profit. All of these 
benefits ultimately lead to maximizing the long term wealth of a firm which is the 
ultimate goal of any business entity.  The model has guided the development of the 
survey questionnaire and interview checklist which are used in this study. More 
specifically, the survey instruments cover all of the AC attributes and roles that are 
included in the model. In addition, the AC effectiveness model has been used in 
analysing regression statistics obtained from the questionnaire survey data. The 
variables of multiple regression models have been chosen and categorised as par the AC 
effectiveness model.  
 
4.11 Developments of Audit Committees 
The concept of the AC is not new. For example, in 1872 a report was published on the 
AC of the Great Western Railway Co.
19
 (Dafinone, 2001). However, the recent global 
financial crisis has seen the collapse of several large international businesses (e.g. 
Enron), which illustrates the point that no industry or jurisdiction is immune from 
                                                 
19
 Created by an Act of Parliament on the 31st August 1835, the Great Western Railway (GWR) was one 
of the largest British railway companies, linking South West England and South Wales with London. 
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misstatement in financial reporting. After these notorious corporate scandals, the AC has 
increasingly come to be considered as a useful mechanism of CG (NACD, 2002; Spira, 
2002; Cohen et al., 2002; FRC, 2008; Sarens et al., 2009). In particular, the roles and 
functions of AC have been closely reviewed after 2001 (Rezaee et al., 2003; Alleyne et 
al., 2006). The AC is now considered as an effective mechanism to enhance board‘s 
oversight of management performance. It is also considered to be able to strengthen the 
financial reporting processes. Consequently, it is able to provide additional protection to 
shareholders, and public investors or creditors (DeZoort et al., 2002; Hemraj, 2003; 
Abbott et al., 2004; Pergola, 2005). Although the NYSE first endorsed the AC concept 
in 1938 (KPMG, 2006), it was virtually unheard of in the international arena before 
1970s (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1981). 
 
However, within less than three decades the number of large capital markets that require 
a public company to have an AC has increased considerably. For example, the U.S.A., 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand all now mandate that 
public companies have an AC as part of their corporate structure. Likewise, the U.K. 
and Germany impose an AC requirement on a ‗comply or explain‘ basis. In France, 
Japan, China and Taiwan, however, the formation of an AC is still voluntary (Tafara, 
2006). Although the AC has become a more common mechanism for ensuring GCG in 
some countries, they are still far from being universal. The inconsistency in the 
regulatory framework for the ACs around the world may pose a challenge to companies 
without ACs who want to list on foreign exchanges (e.g. NASDAQ in the U.S.A.) 
where establishing an AC is a regulatory requirement to comply for the companies. It 
could also have an impact on stock exchanges in the design and enforcement of 
regulatory requirements. Historically, ACs have always been associated with the roles of 
overseeing and monitoring the management as well as the external auditor. They also 
have a role in achieving proper CG and accountability in companies. However, the 
majority of AC studies have been done in the context of developed countries including, 
the U.S.A. and the U.K. (Bedard and Gendron, 2010).  
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In 1976, the NYSE made it compulsory for all listed companies to set up ACs which are 
comprised solely of outside directors. In the U.K., the Cadbury Committee (1992) made 
a strong recommendation that all listed companies should establish an AC. In Canada, it 
is now legally compulsory for most publicly held companies to have ACs. In view of 
the importance of an AC, this section briefly reviews the history of the AC with a focus 
on its formation and sustenance since its inception. Some notable landmarks in respect 
of AC international development are presented in the following tables. 
 
Table 4.1: Requirement to Establish an AC in Selected Countries 
Country Formation of AC (Year) Events/Comments 
Canada 1971 Enacted in Ontario Business Corporation Act 
1970 with effect from (w.e.f.) 01.01.1971 
USA 1978 Listing Requirements by NYSE w.e.f. 30.06.1978 
Singapore 1989 Enacted in Companies (Amendment) Act 1989 
Malaysia 1993 Listing Requirements by KLSE w.e.f. 01.08.1994 
Thailand 1999 Listing Requirements by Stock Exchange of 
Thailand w.e.f. First Quarter of 1999 
 
Table 4.2: Recommendation of Formation of an AC in Selected Countries 
Country Year Details 
Australia 1991 Bosch Working Party – Report on Corporate 
Practices and Conduct 
South Africa 1991 ACs-South African Institute 
of Chartered Accountants 
New Zealand 1992 Draft Code of Practice for Boards of Directors 
United Kingdom 1992 Cadbury Committee – Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of CG 
 
Although it is seen that the listing requirements and Business Act required the formation 
of AC in the U.S.A. and Canada, respectively, in the 1970s, there is documentation that 
that some committees resembling to the AC were formed before1870 in the USA 
134 
(McKee, 1979), and in early 1870s in England (Tricker, 1978). The importance of the 
AC, and the need for publicly owned firms to form the committee, is well documented 
in many reports, for example: the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting by the Treadway Commission (1987) in the U.S.A.; the Draft 
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of CG by the Cadbury Committee 
(1992; 1995) in the U.K.; the Report of the Commission to Study the Public‘s 
Expectations of Audits by the Macdonald Commission (1988) in Canada; ACs by the 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (1991); and, Corporate Practices and 
Conduct by the Bosch Working Group (1991) in Australia. The development of the AC 
which is considered in these reports mainly draws upon the experiences of companies in 
the U.K., U.S.A., and Canada. The following subsections discuss the development of 
AC in some developed and developing economies across the world. 
 
4.11.1 Development of the Audit Committees in the U.S.A. 
The development of ACs in the U.S.A. can be traced back to 1940 when both the SEC 
and the NYSE recommended setting up ACs for all listed companies on the NYSE 
following the case of Mc Kesson-Robbins in the late-1930s.  However, the idea of an 
AC did not become popular until 1967 when the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants issued a statement recommending that publicly-owned corporations 
appoint ACs composed of independent directors as part of the CG process to protect 
public interest and preserve the integrity of the nation's capital and financial markets. 
During the 1970s the NYSE actively encouraged the establishment of ACs by listed 
companies. In 1973 the NYSE recommended that each listed company form an AC 
comprising three to five independent directors. Since the 1970s, politicians in the U.S. 
have hotly debated the issue of AC, and the Moss Committee (a Congressional Sub-
committee) and the Metcalf Committee (a Senate Sub-committee) have recommended 
that the AC be made a listing requirement. In 1977 this recommendation became a 
listing requirement; it became effective on 30 June 1978. In the same year, the AICPA's 
BoDs reaffirmed this position, urging AICPA members to encourage corporate clients 
and employers to establish ACs. In 1978, the AICPA's Special Committee on the ACs 
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concluded that ACs were necessary for both corporate directors and independent 
auditors to fulfil their respective responsibilities. Furthermore, it endorsed the efforts of 
the stock exchanges, the NASD, and other bodies to require ACs.  
 
The movement towards a regulatory requirement for public companies to establish ACs 
gained momentum from the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
(the Treadway Commission, 1987). This Commission was formed with the aim of 
identifying the conditions that may lead to fraudulent financial reporting and the 
necessary steps to reduce the frequency of occurrence. In its report (1987), the 
Commission recommended that: “All public companies should be required by SEC rule 
to establish ACs composed solely of independent directors” so as to reduce the 
possibility of fraudulent financial reporting”. 
 
In 1994, the POB Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence (the Kirk Panel) issued its 
findings on ‗Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor‘, which 
identified the need for a strong relationship between ACs and the independent auditor in 
order to improve the overall financial reporting process. Finally, in 1999 the NYSE, the 
NASD and the Blue Ribbon Committee on ‗improving the effectiveness of corporate 
ACs‘ (established in September 1998 by the NYSE and the NASD) released its report 
announcing a few key recommendations to improve the quality of corporate financial 
reporting. In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in order to protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, therefore, was created to protect investors‘ interests by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures. The Act requires companies to make new disclosures 
on internal controls, ethics codes and the composition of their ACs on annual reports.  
 
4.11.2 The Development of Audit Committees in the U.K. 
Tricker (1978) provided evidence that some committees resembling the current AC were 
is in operation in England in the early 1870s. However, the development of ACs in the 
U.K. was slower than in other countries. The first public sector initiatives in respect of 
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ACs are in evidence from as early as 1973. The internal audit report on Civil Service in 
1973 noted the advantages of having an AC, which included the discussion of audit 
plans and results as one of its primary roles (Dafinone, 2001). In the U.K., private sector 
initiatives have been most active in the last three decades. It was only in 1987, after 
evidence of increasing failures and incidents of corporate fraud in Britain, that the Bank 
of England and an organisation called PRO-NED
20
 urged public companies to adopt 
ACs. In 1992 the Cadbury Report gave a boost to the idea of the AC. Their report made 
recommendations on the financial aspects of CG, with emphasis on the importance of 
properly constituted ACs in raising standards of CG. They recommended that all public 
listed companies in U.K. should establish ACs within the two years following May 
1992. The Hampel Report (1998) restated the recommendations with respect to the 
establishment, structure, role and duties of ACs in the U.K. Later, the Turnbull Report 
(1999) considered the role of the AC, and it highlighted that the annual review of the 
effectiveness of internal control should be delegated to the AC. 
 
In fact, there is neither a firm legal, nor a regulatory requirement for U.K. listed 
companies to have ACs, and they are still only quasi-mandatory across much of the 
U.K. government sector. For example, there is some discretion in the UK public sector: 
 
Because of the benefits outlined above there must be clear and strong reasons, 
which should be documented, for a decision not to establish an audit committee. 
In such a case, consideration should be given to making the fact that the audit 
committee does not accord with this control. (Treasury, 2003) 
 
Provision 4.3 of the Cadbury Code (1992) recommended that boards should have ACs, 
but the listing rules gave only a ‗comply or explain‘ status to the Cadbury provisions. 
The U.K.‘s Combined Code (1998) introduced apparently mandatory principles, while 
also continuing with discretionary provisions, but there was no mention of ACs in any 
of these principles. The Combined Code (2003) is even more complex, with main as 
well as supporting principles (both of which have the same apparent mandatory status) 
                                                 
20  The objective of the formation of PRO-NED was to promote the appointment of non-executives to 
Boards of Directors. 
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as well as ‗comply or explain‘ provisions; however, there continues to be no reference to 
audit committees in the apparently mandatory principles of the code. There is now much 
more extensive coverage of ACs within the discretionary ‗comply or explain‘ provisions 
of the Combined Code (2003). 
 
4.11.3 The Development of Audit Committees in India 
Although ACs evolved in 1940s as an effective CG mechanism in the U.S.A., it was not 
much heard of in India before the 1980s. In recent years the idea of ACs is gaining 
popularity in India, particularly in the country‘s banks and insurance companies. The 
first formal development of ACs in India was in 1991 during the economic reforms that 
placed substantial emphasis on the role of the external auditor and the AC. The 1992 
stock market scam and liberalisation of the economy contributed to the introduction of 
AC requirements. In 1998 the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) in its Code of 
Corporate Governance recommended companies to constitute ACs. The CII Code was 
the first, and probably a unique instance, where an industry association took the lead in 
prescribing AC standards for listed companies.  
 
Further, in October 1999 the Reserve Bank of India (the central bank) issued an order 
requiring all listed banks to establish an AC as a committee of Board of Directors, 
generally consisting of non-executive directors, of a company. The specified roles of the 
committee were to act as a liaison between the auditors, both internal and external, and 
the board of directors. Furthermore, the Companies (Amendment) Act (2000), among 
other things, provides for the formation and functioning of ACs (section 292A). Similar 
requirements for audit committees are prescribed under clause 49 of the Listing 
Agreement issued by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which required 
every listed company to have an AC generally consisting of non-executive directors of a 
company. In 2004 the clause was amended and the revised Clause 49 removed the non-
executive director requirement and instead specified that the ACs should have a 
minimum of three members with two-thirds of them being independent. Under this 
amended clause, all companies listed on the stock exchanges have to establish ACs in 
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their companies. In a recent study, Sarkar and Sarkar (2010) found that a majority of 
companies have constituted their audit committees with the minimum size (three) 
required under the regulations.  
 
4.11.4 The Development of Audit Committees in Bangladesh 
AC is a relatively new phenomenon in Bangladesh, and its establishment has not been 
made mandatory. Despite the significant importance of ACs, few boards in Bangladesh 
have effective ACs and almost none have nomination or remuneration committees 
[Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), 2003]. BEI (2005) further studied 57 companies 
of different business segments, and reported that 62% of the organizations in 
Bangladesh have ACs. In 2006, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued 
some guidelines regarding AC practices for the listed firms in Bangladesh. It is true that 
like other emerging economies, there is shortage of competent AC members in 
Bangladesh to work for around 250 listed companies and thousands of private limited 
companies. According to the SEC‘s record (as of January 31, 2010), a total of 185 (out 
of total 241 listed companies on the DSE) companies had an AC in place. In an 
emerging capital market there is a smaller pool of experienced AC members and, 
therefore, many AC members may be busy serving on numerous committees and boards 
and have less time to develop informal communication channels (Zain and 
Subramaniam, 2007). Haque et al. (2006) argued that in Bangladesh the practice of AC 
is more visible than that of the other subcommittees. Furthermore, ACs are more visible 
in financial institutions when compared to other sectors (possibly because of the tight 
regulations imposed on this sector by Bangladesh Bank along with the SEC and 
Ministry of Finance). To ensure better governance in all sectors and not just the banking 
sector, Ahmed and Yusuf (2005) suggested that establishing an independent AC should 
be made compulsory for all listed companies in Bangladesh. 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
In recent years, the AC has become a more common mechanism for ensuring GCG in 
firms (Chen et al, 2008). An AC, acting as an independent governing body, improves 
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CG practice in these firms (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). With the support from the 
board, along with the co-operation of employees and management team of the firm, the 
AC can perform its assigned duties duly (Haron et al., 2005). The main attributes of an 
AC may be abridged as: selection and nomination process, knowledge and expertise of 
AC members, independence from management; access to information; resources, 
diligence and meetings. The AC is responsible to perform multiple roles in the firm, and 
its effectiveness requires the ability of members to perform these roles properly. The 
activities of an effective AC are summarised in the definition by Marrian (1988): 
 
A committee of board comprising three to five directors with no operating 
responsibility in financial management. Its primary tasks are to review the 
financial statements, the effectiveness of company‟s accounting and internal 
control system, and the findings of the auditors and to make recommendation on 
the appointment and remuneration of external auditors. 
 
This chapter commenced with a description of the evolution of AC and ended with its 
developments around the world. The purposes, advantages, disadvantages and 
significances of ACs have been discussed with reference to the related literature. This 
chapter also discussed the attributes and activities of an effective AC, and then 
presented a conceptual framework of AC effectiveness. The next chapter discusses the 
details of the data collection and research methodology used for this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Research methodology is the roadmap that deals with the manners in which data will be 
collected, analysed and interpreted in order to achieve research objectives.  This chapter 
therefore, presents the research design and methods used to address the research 
problem, as outlined in Chapter One. It is structured as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the 
research objective, and Section 5.3 states the research questions. Section 5.4 offers a 
description of the research design and methods of the study. Details of data collection 
methods employed in this study (i.e. questionnaire and interview surveys) are discussed 
in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. Section 5.7 describes the statistical tools used for 
analysing questionnaire survey data while Section 5.8 discusses how the responses of 
interview survey have been analysed. Finally, Section 5.9 summarises the chapter. 
  
5.2 Research Objective 
As stated in Chapter One, the main objective of this research is to contribute to the 
understanding of the AC practices from the perspective of an emerging economy by 
undertaking an empirical investigation into the AC practices in companies listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE).  
 
5.3 Research Questions 
The research questions which follow are derived from the above stated objective, and 
from the comprehensive literature review which is presented in Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four. The literature review included relevant studies such as:  Verschoor 
(1993); Collier (1993); Menon and Williams (1994); Green (1994); DeZoort (1997); 
Rezaee (1997); Klein, (1998a,b; 2002a); ICAEW (2001); Jennings (2002); DeZoort et 
al. (2002); Al-Moataz (2003); Chambers (2005); Carcello et al. (2006); Alleyne and  
Greenidge (2006); Dhaliwal et al. (2006); Farooque et al. (2007); Pucheta-Martinez  and 
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De Fuentes (2007); Raghunandan and Rama (2007); Sori et al. (2007); and Zain and 
Subramaniam (2007)Abbott et al. (2007); Chen and Zhou (2007); Chan and Li (2008); 
Lin et al. (2008); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Brown et al. (2009); Sarens et al. (2009); 
Sharma (2009); and Siddiqui (2010). 
 
5.3.1 Principal Research Questions 
This study addresses the following four main questions: 
 What is the current state of the AC practices in Bangladesh? 
 What are the main factors that affect the AC practices in Bangladesh? 
 What major steps can be undertaken to enhance the effectiveness of ACs in 
Bangladesh? 
 Is there any significant difference in the perception of different respondent 
groups in respect of the current state of AC practices in Bangladesh? 
 
5.3.2 Subsidiary Research Questions 
From the main research questions, a set of subsidiary questions are derived: 
   How are the AC members appointed? 
   To what extent do the AC members have required expertise in 
accounting/auditing area? 
   To what extent do the AC members have sufficient experience? 
   To what extent do the ACs include independent/external directors? 
   To what extent is the size of ACs appropriate in performing their 
responsibilities? 
   To what extent are the ACs provided with sufficient resource? 
   To what extent are the ACs delegated required authority by the BoDs? 
   To what extent do the ACs have ready access to relevant information? 
   To what extent are the AC members willing to undertake (assume) their 
responsibilities? 
  To what extent do the AC members devote sufficient time to the committee 
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activities? 
  How is the agenda of AC meetings chosen? 
  How often are AC meetings held? 
  To what extent can the AC members talk freely in AC meetings? 
  To what extent do the ACs play a role in financial reporting? 
  To what extent do the ACs play a role in external auditing? 
  To what extent do the ACs play a role in internal auditing? 
  To what extent do the ACs interact with external auditors/internal auditors/ 
management of the company? 
  To what extent are the ACs independent? 
  To what extent are the ACs effective? 
  To what extent does the background of AC members affect AC effectiveness in 
Bangladesh? 
  To what extent does independence affect AC effectiveness in Bangladesh? 
  Are the existing regulations in Bangladesh sufficient for effective AC practices? 
  What other measures can be taken to improve the effectiveness of ACs in 
Bangladesh? 
 
5.4 Research Design 
Research design is the next step that researchers undertake following the formulation of 
the research objectives and questions (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008). A 
research design specifies the structure of research, and its function is to ensure that the 
evidence obtained would enable the researcher to answer the research questions as 
unambiguously as possible. Blalock and Blalock (1982) argued that the research design 
consists of a general set of operating guidelines within which the research is carried out. 
Furthermore, Punch (2005) noted that it is important to establish the research method 
after setting out the research questions. According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005), 
"research methods refer to systematic, focussed and orderly collection of data for the 
purpose of obtaining information from them, to solve/answer a particular research 
problem or question". Researchers around the world typically employ three main 
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different types of research methods, namely: the quantitative method, the qualitative 
method, and the mixed method. 
 
5.4.1 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research incorporates some statistical elements which are designed to 
quantify the extent to which a target group is aware of, thinks, believes, or is inclined to 
behave in a certain way. The quantitative approach employs quantitative measurement 
and uses different statistical analyses (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Gillham, 2000). 
Holland and Campbell (2005) argued that quantitative research has the advantage of 
generating standardised numerical data, along with describing and predicting a 
relationship for a large population with a high degree of confidence. Quantitative 
research can provide stronger forms of measurement, and establish more reliability, 
causality, and generalisation capability of the study findings (Bryman, 2001). The 
quantitative approach can deal with a large number of samples within a relatively short 
period of time, which helps to augment the method's generalisation capacity (Berg, 
2001).  
 
However, there are some disadvantages which stem from the point that quantitative 
methods attempt to neutralise the researcher, or to reduce or eliminate the researcher‘s 
influence on the research, to the extent that researchers become ‗disembodied 
abstractions‘ and depersonalised (Collins, 1992; Lamnek, 1988 ). Quantitative analysis 
of the relationships between variables creates a static view of social life or social 
processes (Cicourel, 1982). Further, Robson (2002) pointed out several disadvantages of 
quantitative research, referring to it as: “a field where it is not at all difficult to carry out 
an analysis which is simply wrong, or inappropriate for your purposes. And the 
negative side of readily available analysis software is that it becomes that much easier 
to generate elegantly presented rubbish". Furthermore, Maxwell (2005) regarded 
quantitative research as a structured approach that helps to ensure the comparability and 
generalisation ability of data across individuals, times, settings and researchers. 
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5.4.2 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is concerned with individuals' descriptive accounts of their 
perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views and feelings etc. It displays how these are put 
together into a framework which connects attitudes, behaviours and the discontinuities, 
or even contradictions, between attitudes and behaviour (Hakim, 1997). Qualitative 
research is broadly defined as any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at 
by any statistical procedure or other methods of quantification (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990). Qualitative methodology takes a descriptive, non-numerical approach to collect 
and interpret information, aiming at understanding the phenomenon. Many different 
opportunities present themselves for collecting qualitative data, such as: case studies, 
personal experiences, interviews, observations, and historical and visual texts (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994, 1998; Morse and Field, 1995; Symon and Cassell, 1998). 
 
Kvale (1996) noted that the qualitative approach entails alternative conceptions of social 
knowledge of meaning, reality, and truth in social science research. Researchers 
attribute various advantages in using a qualitative approach. Berg (2001) argued that it 
provides a greater depth of understanding of an issue. The author claimed that this 
procedure provides a means of accessing unquantifiable facts and seeks answers to 
questions by examining various social settings and those individuals who inhibit the 
settings. Furthermore, Babbie (2009) argued in favour of the qualitative method and 
highlighted that this method is an effective strategy for studying subtle nuances in 
attitudes and behaviour, and for examining social processes over time. The author also 
noted that flexibility and greater validity are vital advantages of qualitative methods. 
However, the qualitative approach also has some inherent shortcomings. For example, 
this type of study generally uses small samples, which are not always representative or 
typical and, therefore, valid generalisations cannot be made (Hakim, 1987). Reliability 
and transparency also remain low for qualitative methods (Berg, 2001; Bryman, 2001). 
Berg (2001) suggested that qualitative research is very time-consuming and leads to 
weaker forms of measurement. 
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5.4.3 Mixed Method 
In social science research, a mixed method (i.e. a combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods) is an approach which provides the opportunity for 'triangulation'
21
 
(Flick, 1992; Jick, 1979; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Maxwell, 1998; Leedy, 
1997; Roe, 1998; Scandura and Williams, 2000; Smith, 1991), since it effectively 
incorporates 'multiple research strategies' (Burgess, 1982). A mixed method can also 
help in bridging the schism between quantitative and qualitative research (Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech, 2004). Methodological works on this research paradigm have been 
supported by several authors; for example, Brewer and Hunter (1989); Creswell (2003); 
Greene et al. (1989); Johnson and Christensen (2004); Newman and Benz (1998); 
Reichardt and Rallis (1994); Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, 2003). Hence, the mixed 
method approach combines qualitative and quantitative approaches of data collection 
and/or analysis, concurrently or sequentially, in order to best understand the research 
issue. 
 
There are some unique advantages of employing the mixed method approach in 
research. For example, it enables triangulation, which theoretically should highlight if 
there is any inherent biasness in the data sources; and allows for its neutralisation when 
that data is used in conjunction with other data sources, and methods (Jick, 1979). When 
various methods reach the same conclusion, the results become more robust and this 
enhances the reliability of the findings. The combination of methods helps to capitalise 
the strengths of the two approaches, and compensate for the weaknesses of each 
approach (Punch 2005). Greene et al. (2005) mentioned that a mixed method strategy 
offers: 
(i)   More comprehensive understanding from multiple perspectives and lenses; 
(ii)  More insightful understanding from fresh and creative perspectives; 
(iii) Greater validity; and, 
(iv) Greater value consciousness and diversity of values. 
Despite these obvious merits, the use of mixed method as a research strategy has been 
                                                 
21
 Triangulation refers to the process of using multiple data collection techniques within one study to 
check the validity of the data derived (Denzin, 1978). 
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criticised by some authors. For example, Fielding and Fielding (1986) disagreed with 
Denzin's views that the mixed method reduces bias and improves validity, and Mason 
(2002) argued that adopting multiple methods may simply result in the derivation of 
data as they relate to different aspects of the same phenomenon. However, the 
derivation of data relating to varying aspects of the same phenomenon is not only 
helpful, but it can also be necessary in some cases. 
 
5.4.4 Choosing the Method for the Current Study 
There is no absolute data collection method which is always suitable for similar types of 
research. Choosing the appropriate method(s) for any study mainly depends on the 
nature of the research, the data to be collected, and the research purposes. The research 
methods are determined by the nature of the research question(s) (Field and Morse, 
1995).  Both Punch (2005) and Shulman (1988) insisted that different questions require 
different methods to answer them. According to De Vaus (2002), 
 
It is impossible to decide which method is the best. The relative strengths and 
weaknesses vary according to the characteristics of the survey. There are many 
factors affecting which method is the most suitable for a survey such as the 
purpose of the study, sample size and distribution, the time available and the 
environment and conditions under which the study is conducted. 
 
The main objective of this study is to state the scenario of prevailing AC practices in 
Bangladesh by eliciting the opinions of various groups, namely: the AC chairpersons, 
the company secretaries, the heads of finance, and the external auditors. Access to 
Bangladeshi firms for data collection is not always easy; it becomes even more difficult 
when the issue is company governance related like the current research issue (i.e. AC 
practices). Moreover, if the interview method alone is used, it would take up a lot of the 
valuable time of the participants. In addition, the purpose of this study is to obtain the 
views of as many participants as possible, so it did not seem to be practical to use the 
interview method alone. Apart from the review of literature on AC (as discussed in 
Chapter Four), discussions were held with several Bangladeshi auditing and accounting 
practitioners and regulators. These discussions were conducted in an informal manner 
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and in the form of unstructured interview to facilitate the choice of modes for collecting 
data for this study. Following the feedback of these discussions, two stages of data 
collection process were considered appropriate to achieve the objectives of the study. 
 
The study has, therefore, used both the quantitative method (in the form of a 
questionnaire survey) and the qualitative method (in the form of an interview survey) in 
gathering opinions on the research issues. Creswell (2003) regarded survey design as a 
numeric description of the trends, attitudes or opinions of the population. The 
qualitative part of this study is aimed at complementing the findings of quantitative 
method in order to make the findings more robust. Moreover, in the context of the 
research questions of the study, the interview method remains as an obvious option in 
order to capture a deeper understanding of the current state of AC practices prevailing in 
Bangladesh, and in suggesting ways of enhancing its effectiveness in Bangladesh. 
Considering the overall context of this study, both quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies have been considered to be very useful and this also facilitated the study 
to take the advantage of triangulation in making the study findings more robust and 
reliable. Therefore, the researcher has decided to utilise both questionnaire survey and 
interview survey methods in collecting data for the current study. These two instruments 
of data collections are discussed in more detail in the next sections.   
 
5.5 Questionnaire Survey 
Questionnaire survey is the most frequently used method in the social science field 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2001; 2008). In this method, all respondents are asked almost the 
same questions in the same circumstance (Easterby-Smith et al., 2001; Li et al., 2000; 
Merriam, 1988; Payne, 1980). The questionnaire survey is particularly useful in 
describing the characteristics of a large population (Babbie, 2009). Oppenheim (1992) 
noted the following advantages of questionnaire survey method. 
 The most obvious appeal of the mail questionnaire is the low cost. The mail 
questionnaire does not require a trained staff of interviewers; the processing and 
analysis of data are usually cost effective. The lower cost is particularly evident 
when the sample number is large. 
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 This method gives respondents the opportunity to think freely or consult other 
people rather than give immediate answers as in the case of interviews. Thus, it 
is useful in avoiding error arising from interviewer bias. 
 Through this method, researchers can reach the respondents who live at widely 
dispersed addresses or abroad. 
 The mail questionnaire provides greater anonymity for respondents.  
 The questionnaire method is also preferable when a question demands a 
considered answer, or if answers require respondents to consult personal 
documents or other people. 
 
Therefore, a questionnaire survey allows the collection of large volume of data from a 
sizeable population in a highly economical way (Saunders, et. al., 2007). The current 
study includes a sizeable population and a large volume of data needs to be collected. A 
self-explanatory questionnaire was designed to obtain information from the listed firms 
on AC practices. In designing the questionnaire, the study has also consulted previous 
similar studies (such as, Al-Maotaz, 2003, Sori, 2005) that dealt with AC practices in 
different countries.   
 
5.5.1 Study Population and Sample 
In sample based studies, it is necessary to clearly define the population being surveyed 
and to ensure that the sample selected provides an accurate representation of the 
population (Thomas, 1996). The population of the current study consists of all 
Bangladeshi joint stock companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). As per 
the SEC record as of 31 January 2010, a total of 185 companies had AC in place (out of 
a total 241 companies listed on the DSE). In the current study, the AC chairpersons, the 
company secretaries, the finance heads and the external auditors of these 185 companies 
are the key participants. Those companies who do not have ACs are excluded from the 
current study sample for three reasons, namely: (i) the objective of the study is to 
investigate the current AC practices in Bangladesh and the respondents were requested 
to offer their perception towards the existing practice (not the ideal practice) of ACs in 
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their own company or their client company(s) (in case of external auditors) having AC; 
(ii) one of the four survey respondent groups is the chairpersons of ACs; and (iii) as of 
31 January 2010, the number of DSE listed companies without ACs was only 56, which 
were only 23.24% of the total companies listed on the DSE. 
 
Choosing these four sample groups as survey participants is deemed appropriate 
because of their involvement with and knowledge about the ACs in Bangladesh. In case 
of the first group, the AC chairpersons, it is obvious to elicit opinions of the AC 
chairpersons because they know the AC practices perhaps more than any other group. 
The reasons of choosing company secretaries as one of the four respondent groups are: 
firstly, they provide secretarial supports to the ACs and keep all records of the ACs; and 
secondly, in most of the cases company secretaries act as the member secretaries of the 
ACs. This implies that they closely observe how ACs are actually functioning and, 
consequently, their views on the issue are considered to be very important in stating the 
current picture of AC practices. In this regard, Stiles (2001) noted that the company 
secretaries are the most suitable respondents to any Corporate Governance (CG) related 
survey because of the legal requirement attached to their positions and due to their 
responsibilities in administering company processes. Company secretary‘s involvement 
with the AC affairs is also noted in Smith Guidelines (2003) on AC practices. A few 
recent studies conducted on CG issues have included company secretaries as survey 
respondents. For example, Haque (2007) included company secretaries as survey 
respondents in his study on CG practices in Bangladesh. Furthermore, Annuar (2008) 
conducted a questionnaire survey on company secretaries in undertaking a research on 
CG in Malaysia. In respect of finance heads and external auditors, these two groups are 
more knowledgeable on the issue and, in almost every case they are not included in the 
ACs. That is why these two groups are considered as more suitable choices in obtaining 
objective and independent opinions regarding the AC practices. The choice of these two 
sample groups is also supported by Woodlock and Claypool (2001) who mentioned that 
the CFO (finance head) and the external auditor are better to assess AC practices of a 
firm. 
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The survey questionnaires were distributed to all AC chairpersons, company secretaries 
and finance heads of the 185 companies having ACs in place. Out of these 185 
companies, 25 finance heads were also in charge of company secretary‘s responsibilities 
and 10 company secretaries were in charge of finance head‘s responsibilities. This 
resulted that a total of 520 questionnaires (185 AC chairpersons, 160 company 
secretaries and 175 finance heads) were sent to these three sample groups.  In respect of 
external auditors, the study included the partners of auditing firms that conducted the 
statutory audit of the companies listed on the DSE in the most recent five years. It 
should be mentioned that the SEC has imposed some qualification for audit firms who 
can perform statutory audit of the listed companies. One of the criteria is that the audit 
firm must be a partnership or joint venture entity, but most of the audit firms in 
Bangladesh are owned by sole proprietor. Although there are a total of 210 registered 
audit firms in Bangladesh,  only 29 firms (as per ICAB record) were engaged in 
performing external auditing task for companies listed on the DSE within the last 5 
years and the study included all 105 partners of these 29 firms. Therefore, the total 
sample of the questionnaire survey is 625 to whom questionnaires were distributed.  The 
following table summarizes the sample size of the survey. 
 
Table 5.1: Analysis Showing the Sample of Questionnaire Survey 
Sample Group Sample Size Percentage 
AC Chairperson 185 30% 
Company Secretary 160 25% 
Finance Head 175 28% 
External Auditor 105 17% 
Total 625 100.00 
 
Since this study has included all 185 companies having ACs in place (which 
corresponds to the total population) then the sampling strategy does not seem to be a 
critical issue except for taking into consideration the non-response bias or missing 
information for the sample firms, as argued by Tuma (2004). The problem of non-
response bias was mitigated through extensive and repetitive efforts including follow up 
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reminder and/or call-backs as suggested by Thompson (2002). A statistical test was also 
run in order to detect if there were any such biasness, and this will be explained in a 
later part (subsection 5.5.8.2) of this chapter. 
 
5.5.2 Questionnaire Design 
Conducting a questionnaire survey is the process of translating concepts into 
measurable variables (Saunders et al, 2007). In respect of designing questionnaires, 
Bourque and Fielder (1995) suggested that in order to help potential respondents fill out 
the questionnaire without need for assistance, questions should be as easy as possible, 
short, and precise.  
 
5.5.2.1 Questionnaire Length 
Researchers should be aware that long questionnaires discourage the target respondents 
from completing the instrument and, consequently, it is either not fully completed or not 
returned at all (Al-Moataz, 2003). In both cases, the study's validity is seriously 
jeopardised. Therefore, the current researcher has tried to make the questionnaires as 
short and concise as possible, keeping in mind that all important aspects are covered. 
 
5.5.2.2 Form of the Questions 
According to Hussey and Hussey (1997), researchers sometimes disagree over the 
extent to which the form of questions should be structured. The questionnaire may 
include open-ended and/or close-ended questions, having taken into due consideration 
their advantages and disadvantages. Open-ended questions allow the participants to give 
answers in their own words, like an essay examination question (Weisberg et al, 1996; 
Peterson, 2000). Open questions offer the advantages that the respondents are able to 
give their opinions as precisely as possible in their own words. Academic researchers, 
who can take years to analyse interview data, use open-ended questions more often, but 
sometimes it becomes difficult to analyse these data. Dillman (1978; 2000) claimed that 
open-ended questions are likely to be used in two distinctly different situations: firstly, 
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when the respondents can express themselves freely; and secondly, when there are a 
very large number of possible answers, listing all of the options would increase the 
difficulty of answering to the questions.   
 
On the contrary, closed-ended questions offer a series of alternative choices of answers 
among which the respondents choose one, like a multiple-choice examination question 
(Weisberg et al, 1996). Closed questions are very convenient for collecting factual data 
and analysing responses since the range of potential answers is limited. It is also easy 
and inexpensive to work with the resulting data. If the closed-ended format is chosen, 
much care should be taken in writing the answer choices so that all possible options are 
included and none of these overlap (Weisberg et al, 1996). Dillman (1978; 2000) further 
pointed out that closed-ended questions are often used to establish priorities among 
issues and decide among alternative policies. Similarly, closed-ended questions are 
indispensable for exploratory studies in which the researcher's main purpose is to find 
the most salient aspects of a topic. The most frequent criticism of open ended questions 
is that the preferred options of all respondents are not stated (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
The appropriateness of either closed-ended or open-ended questions depends on the 
objective of the questionnaire, the respondents' level of information about the topic in 
question, the extent to which the topic has been thought through by respondents, the 
extent to which respondents are motivated to communicate on the topic, and the sample 
size of the study population (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
 
The aim of the questionnaire survey in this study is to obtain opinions on the current 
practices of ACs in Bangladeshi corporations. Hence, it requires constructing the 
questionnaire (see Appendix 3) in such way so that it is specific enough to reveal 
answers to the questions, yet general enough to allow respondents not to reveal any 
sensitive information. A closed-ended question, as mentioned earlier, offers a selection 
of answers from which the respondent is asked to select one. Therefore, all questions in 
this instrument are close ended and have been constructed according to the Likert Scale, 
as advocated by Bryman and Bell (2003), Hussy and Hussy (1997) and Zikmund (2000) 
for cases similar to the current study. It has used Five-Point Likert Scale with a value of 
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‗1‘ indicating that the respondent strongly disagrees to any particular factor/statement 
and the highest number ‗5‘ indicating that the respondent strongly agrees to the 
particular factor/statement in the actual practices in the corporation. The Five-Point 
Likert Scale has been used in case of this instrument in preference of the Seven-Point 
Likert scale since the target respondents seem to be uncomfortable with a complex scale 
of six or seven points. 
 
5.5.2.3 Structure of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire (see Appendix 3) developed for the study is divided into four broad 
parts. Part I is for respondent‘s background information and includes his/her education, 
experience, and qualification. Part II, the main part of the questionnaire, aims to gather 
respondents‘ opinions on 50 statements regarding current practices of ACs in 
Bangladesh. These statements have been grouped according to eight different aspects of 
ACs, namely: 
(A) Composition; 
(B) Authority and Resources; 
(C) Diligence; 
(D) Meeting; 
(E) Role in Financial Reporting; 
(F) Role in External Auditing; 
(G) Role in Internal Auditing;  and, 
(H) Overall practices. 
In Part III of the questionnaire, nine factors that are deemed to affect the AC practices in 
Bangladesh, have been listed, while Part IV lists ten possible steps to be taken for 
enhancing the effectiveness of ACs. As already mentioned, a 5 point Likert Scale (1= 
highly disagreed and 5= highly agreed) has been used in Parts II, III, and IV. The four 
sample groups were distributed the same set questionnaire, except for a few wording 
changes in the case of the external auditor group (for example, it is meaningless to ask 
an external auditor whether he/she has CA qualification). 
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The reason of grouping the statements into such small sections in the questionnaire was 
to reduce the possibility of boredom, which might induce the respondent to give up 
while responding to the questionnaire. The sub-division of the questionnaire has also 
been helpful in constructing the research hypotheses. The questionnaire was also 
designed to ensure that the respondents followed precise and specified instructions. As 
discussed earlier, the main objective of this study is to state the current practices of ACs 
in Bangladesh and this is covered in Part II, the key part of the questionnaire. 
Statements under eight different sections of this part have been discussed as follows. 
 
Section A: Composition 
The first section contains eight statements (S1-S8) to investigate the AC members‘ 
qualification, expertise, knowledge and independence because these are very influential 
elements for AC practices. Windram and Song (2000) indicated that financial literacy is 
a very significant determinant of AC effectiveness. Similarly, Bedard et al. (2004; 
2008); Raghunandan et al. (2001) and Pachuta-Martinez (2007) also focused on the 
importance of financial literacy and the independence of AC members. 
 
Furthermore, Defond et al. (2005); Dhaliwal et al. (2006); Lin et al. (2008); Krishnan et 
al. (2009); and Krishnan and Lee (2009) have noted the significance of accounting and 
financial expertise of AC members. Rainsbury et al. (2008) pointed out the necessity of 
accounting knowledge of AC members. In respect of AC size, NACD (2002) and 
ICAEW (2001) suggested that an AC should have a minimum of three members. Lin et 
al. (2008), however, argued that if an AC is too large then it can sometimes lead to 
unnecessary and meaningless debates in the committee‘s meetings. Guidelines on the 
composition of ACs in terms of members‘ attributes, its independence and size have also 
been given in the Treadway Report (1987); the BRC (1999); the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002); and the Combined Code (2003). Therefore, the statements included in this 
section are: 
S1: The AC members are appointed in consultation with the AC chairperson. 
S2: The AC members have sufficient knowledge on the entity's business. 
S3: The AC members have sufficient knowledge on Accounting and/or Auditing 
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practices. 
S4: The AC members have sufficient experience in Accounting and/or Auditing. 
S5: The AC members are capable of mediating problems in performing their 
duties. 
S6: The majority of AC members are independent /non-executive directors. 
S7: The Chairperson of the AC is an independent/non-executive director. 
S8: The size of the AC is appropriate for carrying out its duties properly. 
The null hypothesis for this group is: 
Ho (1): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups (AC Chairperson, Company Secretary, Finance Head and 
External Auditor) with respect to composition of the ACs are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Section B: Authority and Resources of the AC 
Section B consists of five statements (S9-S13) to obtain opinions on the authority and 
resources provided with the ACs. Arthur Anderson (1994) noted that it is deemed 
extremely important that ACs have unrestricted access to all relevant internal and 
external information to fulfil their oversight responsibilities. Clear guidelines on 
adequate authority and resources of AC have been provided in the Treadway Report 
(1987) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). Therefore, statements included in this 
section are: 
S9: The AC has adequate authority in order to carry out its responsibilities. 
S10: The AC has ready access to relevant information if required. 
S11: The AC receives prompt responses from the management in carrying out its 
duties. 
S12: The AC is provided with sufficient resources including secretarial support 
to carry out its duties. 
S13: The non-executive AC members are adequately paid for their time and 
efforts. 
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The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (2): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups with respect to authority and resources provided to the ACs are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Section C: Diligence of the AC 
This section consists of five statements (S14-S18) that focus on diligence of the AC 
members. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and Sharma et al. (2009) reported that AC 
members‘ diligence is one of the main components of its effectiveness. Lee and Stone 
(1997) explained the ‗diligence‘ as ‗willing to be effective‘. The statements included in 
this section are: 
S14: The AC has a charter which outlines its objectives, duties and 
responsibilities. 
S15: The AC charter is reviewed annually. 
S16: AC The AC members have a clear understanding of their responsibilities. 
S17: Members of the AC readily assume their responsibilities. 
S18: The AC members devote sufficient time to the committee's affairs. 
The null hypothesis for this group is: 
Ho (3): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups with respect to diligence of the ACs are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Section D: Meetings of the AC 
The proper functioning of any committee largely depends on its effective meetings. 
Section D includes eight statements (S19-S26) on the process of AC meetings. 
Importance of AC meeting frequency has been discussed by Chen and Zhou (2008); 
Anderson (2004) and Spira (2002). Abbot et al. (2004) and Sharma et al. (2009) 
suggested holding three to four AC meetings in a year as a good practice. In respect of 
agenda of AC meetings, NACD (1996) suggested that the agenda should be decided by 
AC itself without interfere from management and the agenda should be circulated 
among the members beforehand. Similarly, Beasely et al. (2009) suggested that AC 
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chairman should set the agenda taking input from the finance director and AC members. 
The statements included in this section are: 
S19: The agendas of the AC meetings are finalized by the chairperson. 
S20: The chairperson cooperates with other committee members before 
finalizing the agenda of the meetings. 
S21: The agenda and related materials are provided to members fairly ahead of 
the meetings. 
S22: All members can express their views freely and independently in the 
meetings. 
S23: The frequency of the AC meetings is sufficient to carry out its 
responsibilities. 
S24: The duration of the AC meetings is sufficient for a full discussion of 
important issues. 
S25: Non-members attend the AC meetings if required. 
S26: The minutes of the AC meetings are circulated to all members of the Board 
of Directors (BODs). 
The null hypothesis for this group is: 
Ho (4): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups with respect to the effectiveness of AC meetings are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
 Section E: Role in Financial Reporting 
Section E consists of six statements (S27-S32), which focus on the roles of AC in 
financial reporting process. The AC is primarily responsible for monitoring the integrity 
of firm‘s financial statements (Laux and Laux, 2009). The Combined Code (2003); the 
Treadway Report (1987); the BRC (1999) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) have 
discussed about AC‘s roles in financial reporting process of the company.  Similarly, 
Gendron and Bedard (2006); Turley and Zaman (2007) and Cohen et al. (2007a) 
highlighted AC‘s roles in financial reporting of the company. Hence, the statements 
included in this section are: 
S27: The AC reviews the integrity of companies' financial statements. 
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S28: The AC reviews accounting policies and any changes made therein. 
S29: The AC reviews accounting estimates and judgments done in preparing 
financial statements. 
S30: The AC reviews the compliance of the Accounting Standards (e.g. IAS, 
BAS etc.) in preparing financial statements. 
S31: The AC reviews the clarity and completeness of disclosures in financial 
statements. 
S32: The AC reviews other information (e.g. the auditors' report, financial 
highlights etc.) presented in the annual report. 
The null hypothesis for this group is: 
Ho (5): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups with respect to AC’s role in financial reporting are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Section F: Role in External Auditing 
This section contains eight statements (S33-S40) focusing on the role of AC with the 
external auditors because the AC is a valuable instrument for initiating direct contact 
with external auditor, participating in the selection of external auditor, and promoting 
effective communication between the external auditor and company management. Klein 
(2002a) argued for the importance of AC members‘ meeting with external auditors. The 
Treadway Report (1987); the BRC (1999); the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002); and the 
Combined Code (2003); have guided AC‘s roles in external auditing process of the 
company. Rezaee and Farmer (1994); Wolnizer (1995); and Beasley et al. (2009) also 
argued that the ACs can play important roles in this respect. The statements included in 
this section are: 
S33: External auditors are appointed and/or removed upon the recommendation 
of the AC. 
S34: The AC assesses and reviews the expertise and resources of the external 
auditors. 
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S35: The AC reviews and approves the terms of the Engagement Letter (EL)
22
 
prepared for the external auditors. 
S36: The AC monitors the external audit firm's compliance with the existing 
ethical and regulatory requirements in Bangladesh. 
S37: The AC reviews the findings of the annual audit obtained by the external 
auditors. 
S38: The AC reviews the management's responsiveness to the external auditors' 
findings. 
S39: The AC meets with the external auditors without the presence of the 
management to discuss any issues, problems or reservations arising from the 
audit. 
S40: The AC reviews and monitors the independence and effectiveness of the 
external auditing process. 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (6): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups in relation to AC’s role in internal auditing are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Section G: Role in Internal Auditing 
In this section, eight statements (S41-S48) have been directed to the respondents to 
investigate the roles of AC in internal auditing process of the company. The Combined 
Code (2003); the Treadway Report (1987); the BRC (1999) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) have discussed the role of an AC in internal auditing process of the company. 
Internal auditing is one of the critical resources of the AC in carrying out its 
responsibilities (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994; Montondon, 1995). Sarens et al. (2009) 
noted that internal audit section is a comfort provider for the AC. In addition, Apostilou 
and Strawser (1990) pointed out that in fulfilling the oversight responsibilities, the AC 
should rely on internal auditors for much of its information concerning corporate 
                                                 
22
 An engagement letter (EL) defines the legal relationship (or engagement) between a professional firm 
(e.g., law, investment banking, consulting, advisory or accountancy firm) and its client(s). This letter 
states the terms and conditions of the engagement, principally addressing the scope of the engagement 
and the terms of compensation for the firm 
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activities. Rezaee and Farmer (1994); Turley and Zaman (2007); Lennox and Park 
(2007); Laux and Laux (2009); and Beasley et al. (2009) also argued for AC‘s roles in 
this respect. Therefore, the statements included in this section are: 
S41:  The AC recommends and approves the appointment or termination of the 
heads of the internal audit division. 
S42: The AC approves and reviews the charter of the internal auditors. 
S43: The AC assesses and reviews the annual internal audit work plan. 
S44: The AC reviews the annual internal audit reports, budget and other 
findings. 
S45: The AC reviews and monitors the management's responsiveness to the 
internal auditor's findings and recommendations. 
S46: The AC meets with the head of the internal audit function without the 
presence of the management. 
S47: The AC enhances the independence of the internal auditors of the company. 
S48: The AC monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of internal audit function. 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (7): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups in relation to AC’s role in external auditing are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Section H: Overall Independence and Effectiveness of ACs 
This section consists of two (S49-S50) statements that attempt to explore the perception 
of participants about the overall effectiveness of AC in the company. It was difficult to 
classify these statements into any of the previous seven groups because of their generic 
nature.  The two statements included in this section are: 
S49: The AC can work independently. 
S50: The AC is effective. 
The null hypothesis for this group is as following: 
Ho (8): Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within four 
sample groups with respect to overall perception on independence and 
effectiveness of the ACs are statistically insignificant. 
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5.5.3 Pre Testing and the Pilot Study 
In the case of questionnaire survey, the success largely depends on the quality of 
questionnaire itself. Oppenheim (1992) indicated that the main factor in questionnaire 
design is clarity and, therefore, complex and confused wording should be avoided. 
Therefore, it is absolutely essential that a pilot study should be conducted to establish 
that the proposed questionnaire is intelligible and clear to members of the target 
population. Also, researchers must ensure that the questionnaire is unambiguous, 
reliable and valid for the purpose for which it is to be used (Oppenheim, 1992; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
 
In social science research much emphasis is given to piloting the questionnaire before 
its final distribution. The aim of the pilot survey is to establish that the proposed 
questionnaire is understandable and clear to the members of the target population. It is 
useful to pilot the questionnaire with a small sample of respondents to check its 
suitability for achieving the research aims and objectives (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Salant and Dillman (1994) mentioned that pre-testing a questionnaire is like ‗test-
driving‘ which may be a bit time-consuming but absolutely essential. Sinclair (1975) 
strongly recommended the pre-testing of a draft questionnaire to avoid ambiguity in 
question wordings so that all respondents understand the questions in the same way. 
Oppenheim (1992) commented: "pilot work can be of the greatest help in devising the 
actual wording of questions, and it operates as a healthy check”.  Sometimes, the 
pretesting of the questionnaire reveals very serious errors, oversights, or problems that 
would have spelled disaster if they had not been detected and corrected before going 
into the field or the mail. As well, Stebbins (2001) claimed: "the rise of quantitative 
research brought with it the need to pre-test measuring instruments and conduct pilot 
studies to iron out kink in procedures and sharpen precision so the main study could 
proceed as flawlessly as possible”. Pre-testing a questionnaire instrument is an 
important step in ensuring its reliability and validity (Thomas, 1996). Corbetta (2003) 
also stressed that spotting any need for changes in advance is essential and can only be 
afforded through pilot testing because when the actual fieldworks have begun it will be 
costly and time consuming to modify the questionnaire. 
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The questionnaire in this research went through a number of developmental stages 
before final distribution. In the first stage, a draft of the questionnaire was produced by 
writing down and grouping all questions and issues which had resulted from the 
literature review. This draft was then distributed among some PhD students of 
Accounting Section in Cardiff Business School and few faculty members of IBA, 
Dhaka University to elicit their comments (mainly on the wording, sequence and 
structure of the questionnaire). Babbie (2009) suggested that a pilot test should use the 
same class of people who are intended to answer the final questionnaire and that these 
people should complete the questionnaire themselves rather than having the researcher 
read through it. Following the comments obtained from them, the revised questionnaire 
was further sent to five academics in Bangladesh having a PhD in accounting/auditing, 
five AC chairpersons, five company secretaries, five finance heads and five external 
auditors. The aim of this stage was to assess whether the research instrument is valid for 
the task or not. Hussey and Hussey (1997) mentioned that validity is the extent to which 
the research findings accurately represent the real picture of the issue being studied.  An 
effect or test is valid if it demonstrates or measures what the researcher thinks or claims 
it does. In other words, in a validity assessment the basic question that the researcher 
tried to answer is: “Are we in fact measuring what we think we are measuring?‖ 
(Diamantopoulos and Schlegclmilch, 2000). In addition, another objective of piloting is 
to detect the validity and reliability of the questionnaire. According to Diamantopoulos 
and Schlegelmilch (2000), a measure that is valid is also reliable but the reverse is not 
necessarily true. 
 
Along with the revised questionnaire, a cover letter explaining the nature, and objectives 
of research was also sent to each participants of the pilot survey. The reviewers were 
requested to note their observations, and then make recommendations to the 
questionnaire and comment on the ways to develop it, as well as making suggestions 
that could facilitate the analysis of data. Most of the pilot survey participants opined that 
an anonymous questionnaire survey should be undertaken for this study and the 
researcher followed this suggestion. The following table presents the response rate of 
the pilot study. 
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Table 5.2: Analysis Showing the Response Rate of Pilot Study 
Piloting Groups Sent Response Response Rate (%) 
Academics 5 5 100% 
AC Chairpersons 5 2 40% 
Company Secretaries 5 3 60% 
Finance Heads 5 4 80% 
External Auditors 5 5 100% 
Total 25 19 76% 
 
Table 5.2 indicates that a total of 25 individuals from five different groups were 
approached for formal pre-testing, and that the overall response rate was 76% (i.e. a 
total of 19 out of 25).  It is noticeable that all academic and external auditors responded 
the survey while only two out of five AC chairpersons responded. 
 
The pre-testing of the survey questionnaire for this study obtained some valuable 
comments and ideas about the questionnaire's content, wording, and sequence; and 
hence, some modifications were required regarding the wording and scaling of certain 
questions, but not on any key content of the questionnaire. The pre-testing and piloting 
process took place in March and April 2010. 
 
5.5.4 Administration of the Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire was mailed to the sample participants in May 2010 after the 
subsequent amendments which were suggested in the pilot survey were made. The 
questionnaire pack included a set of questionnaires, two cover letters, an envelope with 
stamp (freepost) and return address. A cover letter is helpful in obtaining higher 
response rate because it explains the target respondents about the purpose, importance, 
and sponsors of the study. The first cover letter (see Appendix 1) was issued from the 
researcher explaining the nature and importance of the study, requesting to complete the 
questionnaire, assuring the strict confidentiality of their responses. The second letter 
(see Appendix 2) was from the supervisor to inform the purpose of the survey and the 
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importance of their responses. A reminder letter was sent to the sample participants who 
had not replied within four weeks of the first mailing. A final follow-up letter, including 
a questionnaire pack, was then sent registered by mail to all of the organisations that 
have not replied by the end of eighth week of the first mailing. In order to increase the 
response rate, the researcher followed up the survey with his best efforts. For example, 
the researcher also carried out field visits and used telephone, fax and e-mail 
communications to communicate with as many of the target respondents as possible. To 
motivate the respondents, in the questionnaire there was an offer of receiving a copy of 
research findings which was made to the respondents. 
 
5.5.5 Questionnaire Survey Responses 
Out of 625 mailed questionnaires, a total of 150 questionnaires were finally received in 
different stages, and 140 out of them were considered usable for the survey. A detailed 
breakdown of the questionnaire survey responses is presented in Table 5.3. 
  
Table 5.3: Analysis Showing the Response Rate of Questionnaire Survey 
Description Total 
Mailed 
Received 
within 4
th
 
week 
Received 
between 5
th
 
-
8
th
 week 
Received 
after 8
th
 
week 
Total 
Received 
Response 
Rate 
Total 
Usable 
 
AC Chairpersons 195 13 8 11 32 16% 30 
Company Secretaries 160 18 9 13 40 25% 37 
Finance Heads 175 22 10 14 46 26% 44 
External Auditors 105 16 8 8 32 31% 29 
Total 625 69 36 46 150 24% 140 
 
The above table shows that the overall response rate is 24% (or 150 out of 625). 
Because of the missing response in the case of the majority of statements, a total of 10 
received questionnaires could not be used and, therefore, responses from 140 
participants were used for analysis. Sample-group response rates were: 16% (AC 
chairpersons); 25% (company secretaries); 26% (finance heads); and 31% (external 
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auditors). One of the possible reasons for the relatively lower response rate in case of 
AC chairperson group might be that most of them do not have any permanent office in 
the company and that they are not regularly in the company. The possible explanation 
for comparatively higher response rate in the case of external auditors is that they are 
externals of the companies and, therefore, they are willing to share their views. 
However, considering the sensitivity of the research issue and Bangladeshi corporate 
environment, the overall response rate is found to be satisfactory. 
 
5.5.6 Profile of Respondents 
Although detailed characteristics of the survey respondents will be discussed in the next 
chapter, a brief profile (education, qualification and experience) of the survey 
respondents is presented in the following table: 
 
Table 5.4: Profile of Questionnaire Survey Respondents 
Description Education-Last Degree Education-Last 
Subject 
Professional 
Qualification 
Years of 
Experience 
Below 
Bachelor‘s 
Bachelor‘s  
& above 
Accounting Other Yes No Below 
10 years 
10 years 
& above 
Number 5 135 66 74 89 51 67 73 
Total 140 140 140 140 
 
It can be seen from Table 5.4 that almost all (96%) respondents had a bachelor‘s degree 
or higher level of education, while only 5 respondents finished their education at below 
bachelor‘s level. Regarding the major area of last education, 66 (47%) respondents have 
an accounting background and the other 89 respondents are from Finance, Economics, 
Management or other areas. Again, 89 respondents (64%) have one or more professional 
qualification (i.e. CA, ACCA, CMA, CFA, CS etc.) while 51 respondents do not hold 
any such qualification. Regarding the length of work experience, 73 respondents (52%) 
have previous work experience in related area for 10 or more years and the rest 48% 
respondents have less than 10 years work experience in related field. It is relevant to 
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mention here that the average length of experiences in related area of the respondents 
was 10.89 years (as presented in the Table 6.5 of Chapter Six). 
 
Therefore, Table 5.4 divides all respondents into two groups, categorised according to 
each of four characteristics, namely: education, subject, professional qualification and 
years of experience.  This division has opened up a scope to investigate whether there is 
any significant difference in responses between these groups.  However, two groups of 
respondents divided based on last education vary extremely in numbers (5 versus 135) 
and, hence, the researcher feels that comparison between these two groups will fail to 
draw any statistical inference. Therefore, there have been comparisons of three pairs 
divided on the other three characteristics. The mean scored of the responses towards 50 
statements of the questionnaire have been compared in form of the following three null 
hypotheses. 
 
Ho (9): Difference observed in the mean scales of responses between 
respondents having accounting subject and respondents having other subjects 
in last education is statistically insignificant. 
 
Ho (10): Difference observed in the mean scales of responses between 
respondents having professional qualification and respondents without 
professional qualification is statistically insignificant. 
 
Ho (11): Difference observed in the mean scales of responses between 
respondents having 10 and more years experience and respondents having 
below 10 years experience in related field is statistically insignificant. 
 
5.5.7 Validity 
Spector (1994) highlighted the importance of validating the research instrument. There 
are two types of validity of measurement that are of concern for most researchers, they 
are: content validity and construct validity (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002).   
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5.5.7.1 Content Validity 
The content validity of an instrument is the extent to which it provides adequate 
coverage of the topic under study. To evaluate the content validity of an instrument, 
researchers must first agree on what elements constitute adequate coverage of the 
problem. The content validity of the instrument of this study was established through 
the pilot study, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, the duration taken to complete the 
questionnaire by the pilot survey respondents was checked and timed to ensure that it 
was not so long that it made the participants shy away from completing it and answering 
all the questions. The questionnaire covers all the important aspects identified within the 
literature discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four of this thesis. However, 
comments obtained from pilot survey were incorporated before finally being used the 
questionnaire in the main study. 
 
5.5.7.2 Construct Validity 
This deals with the degree to which the scale represents the concept being measured 
(Tull and Hawkins, 1993). This validation situation is much more difficult; researchers 
still want assurance that their measurement has an acceptable degree of validity. The 
questionnaire used in this study contains clear and direct questions; this was reflected 
from the piloting tests, indicating that the construct validity is acceptable. Moreover, 
using the interviews as additional data gathering techniques contributes positively to the 
construct validity. Finally, the use of a Five Point Likert scale in the questionnaire has 
also contributed to improving the construct validity. 
 
5.5.8 Reliability 
Assessing the reliability of the data is important before making any statistical analysis. 
Reliability is concerned with the accuracy and precision of a measurement procedure 
(Sekaran, 2003). While validity is represented in the agreement between two attempts to 
measure the same trait through maximally different methods, reliability is the agreement 
between two efforts to measure the same trait through maximally similar methods 
(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). Similarly, Oppenheim (1992) described reliability as 
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‗consistency‘ between methods. More specifically, reliability refers to the degree to 
which an instrument or technique generates the same results each time it is used. The 
consistency of the results refers to similar observations being undertaken by different 
researchers on different occasions (Saunders et al., 2007). Reliable instruments are 
refined to the degree that they are useful enough at different times and under different 
conditions. 
 
5.5.8.1 Test of Reliability 
There are three common methods of estimating reliability (Frankfort-Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008) which are: the test-retest, the parallel-forms, and the 
split-half. Again, Saunders et al. (2007) and Hussey and Hussey (1997) noted three 
approaches to assess the reliability of the data, which are: the test-retest method, the 
split half method, and the alpha coefficient. 
 
The test-retest method is used to administer the instrument to the same group at two 
different times, and to compute the correlation in the two sets of scores. With this 
method, error is defined as anything that leads a person to get different scores from the 
two different measurements (Alreck and Settle, 1995; Oppenheim, 1992; Smith, 2003). 
In the parallel-forms method, the researcher develops two parallel versions of a 
measuring instrument. These two versions are administered to the same group of people, 
and then the two sets of results must be correlated in order to obtain an estimate of 
reliability. The split-half method estimates reliability by treating each of two or more 
parts of a measuring instrument as a separate scale. Each of the two parts is treated 
separately and scored accordingly. The two parts are then correlated (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008). The coefficient alpha method provides a summary 
measure of the inter-correlations that exists among a set of items. Coakes and Steed 
(1999) argued that the alpha coefficient is the reliability test that is most commonly used 
by researchers to check internal consistency. Coefficient alpha should be routinely 
calculated to assess the quality of measure. If alpha is low then this outcome suggests 
that some items do not share equally in the common core and should be eliminated 
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(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). The alpha coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, and it is 
common practice to take 0.60 as the minimum acceptable value of alpha. Smith et al 
(2008) and Robinson et al (1994), as quoted in Al-Mushayt (2000), claimed that the 
reliability coefficient in the order of 0.60 is acceptable, while De Vaues (1996) and 
Smith (2003) suggested a minimum alpha value of 0.70 and 0.80, respectively, for 
reliability purposes. The alpha value is calculated based on the average correlation of 
items within a test if the items are standardised. 
 
The equivalence measure of reliability for this study was done to focus on the internal 
consistence or internal homogeneity of the set of statements, which formed the 
statements in the questionnaire into groups as mentioned above. In this study, because 
of practical difficulties in adopting the other three methods, the researcher has decided 
to use the co-efficient alpha score to measure the reliability the survey questionnaire. 
Reliability tests were carried out on all groups of data (i. e. (A) Composition; (B) 
Authority and Resources; (C) Diligence; (D) Meeting; (E) Role in Financial Reporting; 
(F) Role in External Auditing; (G) Role in Internal Auditing; and (H) overall AC 
Practices). The test results are summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 5.5: The Reliability Analysis-Scale (ALPHA) 
Groups Coefficient Alpha Value 
AC Members Company 
Secretaries 
Finance Heads External 
Auditors 
Combined 
A 0.701 0.715 0.821 0.884 0.813 
B 0.908 0.875 0.847 0.895 0.887 
C 0.821 0.834 0.849 0.696 0.832 
D 0.766 0.776 0.766 0.889 0.843 
E 0.931 0.918 0.942 0.92 0.945 
F 0.906 0.892 0.781 0.89 0.884 
G 0.959 0.935 0.884 0.932 0.934 
H 0.813 0.826 0.702 0.743 0.752 
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Table 5.5 shows that the alpha coefficients in all cases are more than 0.70. These results 
indicate that the data obtained from questionnaire survey are reliable and suitable for 
further analysis. 
 
5.5.8.2 Investigating Non-Response Bias 
The possibility of occurrence of non-response bias arises when a significant part of the 
survey samples fails to return the questionnaire, and the data may consequently turn out 
to be invalid. It is well recognised in the literature that responses to mail questionnaires 
are generally poor, and it is a common phenomenon to see low return percentages. 
Hence, in order to ensure the reliability of the data, an attempt to diagnose the presence 
of non-response bias is essential (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Ku Ismail, 2003). 
Oppenheim (1966) and Wallace and Mellor (1988) put forward a technique to diagnose 
non-response bias by comparing the answers to the questionnaire provided by early 
respondents to those of late respondents. The rationale to this argument is that ‗late‘ 
responders are reasonable ‗surrogates‘ for non-respondents (Wallace and Mellor, 1988). 
Therefore, in this study, the first 20 questionnaires (5 from each sample groups) 
received from respondents were categorised as ‗early‘ and the last 20 questionnaires (5 
from each sample groups) as ‗late‘. The early and late responses were then compared 
with the aim of observing whether significant differences exist between the two groups. 
The Mann-Whitney Test result (p>.05) implies there was no significant difference 
between these two groups‘ response. Therefore, it can be inferred that the study findings 
are free from non-response bias. 
 
5.5.8.3 Investigating Self Selection Bias 
Another source of bias in survey-type studies is the self-selection bias (Whitehead, 
1991; Oppenheim, 1992; Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002). This bias might arise from the 
fact that ‗people are more likely to respond to a questionnaire if they see items which 
interest them‘ (Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002) and they may try to ‗respond‘ extra-well 
(Oppenheim, 1992) to the questions. Indeed, self-selection bias is a result of a pre-
existing interest factor, and it is more serious than the non-representative nature of the 
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population due to the existence of many unknown factors (Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002; 
Oppenheim, 1992). In the current study, much effort was given to diagnose the 
existence of self-selection bias. The current study deals with the practices of AC and to 
some extent it requires specialised expertise to respond to the survey. Although 
expertise in respect of AC has been explained in terms of educational background and 
experience, previous researchers (for example, McMullen, 1996; DeZoort, 1998; and 
Pomeroy, 2010) have placed more emphasis on experience. Hence, this researcher 
believes that people having more experience in the relevant area might find more 
interest in participating in the survey. Therefore, experience has been chosen as a 
criterion to test the self-selection bias. In the study, two groups of control and 
experimental respondents have been developed (Oppenheim, 1992). The control group 
consists of respondents with more than 10 years experience, while the experimental 
group comprised of respondents with less than 10 years experience. To investigate self-
selection bias the Mann-Whitney U Test was used; and  no such type of bias was found 
(p>.05, please see Table 6.14, p. 247). 
 
5.6 Interview Survey 
One of the most persistent criticisms of closed-ended questions, as used in the 
questionnaire survey, is that pre-set response options are likely to cause the respondents 
to give answers that they would not have given if they had the flexibility to answer for 
themselves. This short-coming of questionnaire survey necessitates the use of interview 
survey in research. Interviewing is defined as a conversation between two or more 
parties with a purpose to gather information (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Interviews 
can elicit what a person knows, perceives, likes and thinks (Cohen et al., 2007c). This 
method allows the researcher to control the interview situation, results in a higher 
response rate than the mail questionnaire, and the interviewer can probe for additional 
and detailed data. Finally, interviews are preferable when asking for longer, difficult, 
and open-ended questions (Warwick and Lininger 1975; Moser and Kalton, 1985; Frey 
and Oishi, 1995; DeVaus, 1996; and Frankfort- Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008).  
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5.6.1 Types of Interview 
In general, there are four types of personal interviews: structured, semi-structured, 
unstructured, and focus group interviews (Field and Morse, 1995) which are briefly 
discussed as following. 
 
In structured interviews, the questions are closed-ended and the sequence in which they 
are asked is also same in every interview. This type of interviews is more objective and 
easy to analyse, but less flexible. Sekaran (1992) described these as: "structured 
interviews are those conducted by the interviewer when he or she knows exactly what 
information is needed and has a predetermined list of questions that will be posed to 
respondents". 
 
The semi-structured interviews follow a less rigid format. Although still using 
standardised questions (covering socio-biographical details like age, sex, and 
educational qualification), there are also open-ended questions designed to elicit more 
qualitative information (Clarke, 1999). The strength of semi-structured interviews arises 
in the process of ‗open discovery‘, when the matters explored change from one 
interview to the next as different aspects of the topic are revealed (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997). In the semi-structured interview method, the researcher can enjoy the flexibility 
in terms of sequence of questions, response options, and probing questions, although 
there is a clear list of questions which is used as an interview checklist. 
 
The unstructured interview method, also known as ‗informal conversational interview‘, 
is the most open-ended approach to interviewing (Fontana and Frey, 2000). The 
unstructured interview provides maximum flexibility to pursue information in whatever 
direction appears to be appropriate, as well as enabling interviewees to answer questions 
within their own frame of reference. Furthermore, it gives the interviewee the 
opportunity to choose to talk at length about an issue. Sekaran (1992) stated: 
 
The type and nature of the questions asked of the individuals might vary 
according to the job level and type of work done by respondents. For instance, 
managers at top and mid levels might be asked more direct questions about their 
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perceptions of the problem and the situation. Employees at lower levels may 
have to be approached differently. 
 
The focus group interview is an interview with a small group of people on a specific 
topic. It allows researchers to focus upon group norms and dynamics around issues they 
wish to investigate. The extent of control of the group discussion determines the nature 
of the data produced by this method. According to Sekaran (1992), "focus groups 
typically consist of eight to twelve members randomly chosen, with a moderator leading 
discussions regarding a particular topic, item, or product ". 
 
5.6.2 Interview Method Used in the Study 
The main objective of conducting interview survey in this study was to allow the 
respondents to further develop their views since the closed questions of a questionnaire 
locked respondents into arbitrarily limited alternatives (Foddy, 1999). Structured 
interview method which is very much similar to questionnaire survey, does not seem 
suitable because this might not be able to elicit the insight of the issue. On the other 
hand, unstructured interview method is not considered to be suitable for this research 
because it takes too much time and would have been impractical from the interviewee's 
point of view. Also, the researcher feels that the main focus of the issue might have been 
lost if unstructured interviews were conducted. Furthermore, focused group interviews 
would have also been unsuitable because it would be difficult to interview groups of AC 
chairpersons or external auditors in Bangladesh due to their geographical dispersal and 
busy work schedules. The researcher also believes that using a semi structured interview 
method would facilitate more control over the time, content and the sequence of the 
interview. In addition, it allows the interviewer to ask probing or supplementary 
questions which might bring out more insight of the research issue. Therefore, in the 
second phase of data collection, semi-structured interviews were conducted to confirm 
the results obtained from the questionnaire survey and to obtain a better understanding 
of the findings. Weller (1998) argued that semi-structured interviews play an important 
role in developing of an exploratory models and the preparation for a systematic form of 
investigation. The semi-structured interview is claimed to frequently yield a high 
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percentage of return (Miller, 1991). In addition, it provides a way of generating 
empirical data about the social world by asking people to talk about their opinions. 
Adams and Schvaneveldt (1985) also noted several advantages of using semi-structured 
interviews over other forms of interview.  
 
5.6.3 Administration of the Interview Survey 
The interview participants were chosen from those respondents who had indicated in the 
questionnaire survey that they would be willing to participate in any further stage of the 
study. The interviewees were selected on a random basis, and the twenty participants 
consisted of: five AC chairpersons, five company secretaries, five finance heads, and 
five external auditors. The survey was undertaken in June and July 2010. The 
participants were contacted first to seek their appointments for an interview. Once an 
interviewee gave a date and time, they were sent the interview checklist so that they 
knew what would be discussed beforehand. Prior to undertaking the interviews, the 
researcher tried to collect some information about the companies in order to be fully 
prepared and able to conduct the interviews smoothly. In addition, each interviewee who 
had agreed to participate in the survey was contacted by telephone by the researcher on 
the working day before the scheduled interview as a final courtesy reminder and 
confirmation.  
 
An interview consent form (see Appendix 4) ensuring the confidentiality and anonymity 
of the responses was signed by each interviewee before staring the interview. At the 
beginning, the researcher introduced himself, described the study purpose and ensured 
the confidentiality of the interview responses. The duration of each interview was 60 to 
90 minutes. To facilitate smooth progress of interviews, a checklist (see Appendix 5) 
was also used in this regard. Before finalising the interview checklist, the researcher 
discussed the questions with an AC chairperson, a finance head and two external 
auditors so that no key point is missing from the list. The first section of the checklist 
highlights interviewee background for example, name, education, experience etc. The 
second section covers several questions on the current state of AC practices (including 
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importance of the AC, its composition, authority, diligence, various roles and overall 
effectiveness in Bangladesh). The third section dealt with the factors affecting AC 
practices in Bangladesh. The last section solicited interviewee‘s suggestion to enhance 
AC effectiveness in Bangladesh. The researcher tried to take as many hand-written 
notes as possible to record all the major contents of the interview responses because 
many of the participants did not want their responses to be tape-recorded. However, 
some interviewees were tape recorded and the responses were translated immediately. 
At the end, the researcher thanked the interviewees for their time and also offered a 
copy of the findings of the research. 
 
5.6.4 Profile of the Interviewees 
A brief profile of 20 interview participants is presented in Table 5.6, where ‗I‘ denotes 
interview which has been presented as per their sequences of taking place. In the table 
the external auditors‘ firms have been classified into two groups namely, Big 423 and 
Non-Big 4. It should also be mentioned that the size of companies (to which the other 
participants namely, company secretaries, AC chairpersons and finance heads are 
attached) has been measured in terms of the amount of paid up capital of the company 
as following: Large (more than 2,000 million BDT); Medium (1,000 to 2,000 million 
BDT); and Small (less than 1,000 million BDT). 
                                                 
23
 Four local audit firms in Bangladesh are affiliates of the Big 4 auditors i.e. Rahman Rahman Huq 
(RRH), Hoda Vasi Chowdhury, A Qasem & Co., and S F Ahmed are associated with KPMG International, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young, respectively (Kabir et al., 
2011). 
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Table 5.6: Analysis Showing the Profile of Interviewees  
Interview Position Academic 
Qualification 
Background Professional 
Qualification 
Years of 
Experience 
Size of the 
Company 
Industry Sector 
I1 External Auditor Master‘s Accounting CA 8 Big 4 - 
I2 Head of Finance Master‘s Accounting No 12 Small Real Estate 
I3 External Auditor Master‘s Accounting CA 17 Non-Big 4 - 
I4 Company Secretary Master‘s Management CS 7 Small Leasing 
I5 External Auditor Bachelor‘s Accounting CA 10 Big 4 - 
I6 AC Chairperson Bachelor‘s Finance No 6 Medium Textile 
I7 Head of Finance Master‘s Finance No 13 Large Bank 
I8 Company Secretary Master‘s Economics No 16 Small Power 
I9 AC Chairperson PhD Engineering No 16 Large Bank 
I10 External Auditor Master‘s Accounting CA & CMA 14 Non-Big 4 - 
I11 Company Secretary Master‘s Commerce CS 18 Large Real Estate 
I12 Head of Finance Master‘s Accounting CA 15 Small  Pharmaceutical 
I13 External Auditor Master‘s Accounting CA 12 Non-Big 4 - 
I14 AC Chairperson Bachelor‘s Accounting No 18 Medium Pharmaceutical 
I15 Company Secretary Master‘s Accounting CS & CA 8 Large Bank 
I16 Head of Finance Master‘s Accounting CA 15 Medium Power 
I17 AC Chairperson Master‘s Accounting CMA 12 Small Insurance 
I18 Head of Finance Master‘s Accounting CA 14 Large Bank 
I19 AC Chairperson Master‘s Economics No 9 Small Cement 
I20 Company Secretary Master‘s Finance CS 8 Medium Pharmaceutical 
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Table 5.6 states that 6 respondents had between 6 to 9 years experience in the job of a 
similar nature, while 14 respondents had 10 or more years of experience. Regarding 
academic qualification, 1 (one) completed PhD degree, 16 had completed a master‘s 
degree, and the other 3 (three) respondents had finished their education after completing 
their bachelor‘s degree. Regarding academic disciplines, 12 respondents had 
‗accounting‘ as the last academic area of concentration, and 7 (seven) respondents came 
from ‗other business or economics‘ disciplines. The majority (60% or 12 out of 20) of 
the interview respondents had obtained one or more professional qualification(s) (i.e. 
CA/CS/CMA). The profile of the interviewees clearly indicates that they were highly 
educated and experienced to make a significant contribution to the study by sharing 
their opinions, perceptions, and thoughts regarding AC practice in Bangladesh. 
 
The last two columns of the table (5.6) present the size and industry of the companies to 
which the interviewees are attached. It can be seen that out of 5 (five) external auditors 
interviewed, 2 (two) were from the Big 4 firms. The other 15 interviewee participants 
were chosen from a wide variety of sectors, including banking, textiles, leasing, the 
pharmaceutical industry, real estate, power, cement and insurance and these companies 
varied in terms of their size (i.e. large, medium and small).  
 
5.7 Analysis of Questionnaire Survey Data  
Data obtained from any research needs to be analysed and interpreted for it to be useful 
in meeting research objectives and answering the research questions (Saunders et al., 
2007). Kerlinger (1986) pointed out three different motives for the use of statistical 
analysis, namely: firstly, to reduce large quantities of data to a manageable and 
understandable form, secondly, to aid in the study of population and samples, and 
thirdly, to assist decision-making and to enable the deduction of reliable inferences. 
While the earlier sections of this chapter have illustrated various methods of data 
collection, this section states the statistical tests used to report the survey responses and 
to examine significant difference in responses within samples in respect of different 
aspect of AC practices in Bangladesh. 
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Although the data have been analysed after conducting the questionnaire survey, much 
thought has been given to the testing and analysis of results during the questionnaire 
design. The first step in analysis, especially in surveys, is the editing and coding of 
collected data. The researchers usually check the data to make sure it is as accurate as 
possible, consistent with other facts secured, uniformly entered, as complete as possible, 
and arranged to facilitate coding and tabulation. The statistical analysis of collected data 
can be used for two purposes, which are commonly referred to as descriptive and 
inferential (Pallant, 2001). The selection of statistical tests for analysing data depends 
on some factors (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) that include: the number of groups 
involved (independent variables), the number of subjects in each group, whether the 
groups were related or independent, and the measurement scale of the data values. 
 
There are two broad classifications of statistical tests used in data analysis, namely: 
parametric and non-parametric. The use of parametric tests is said to be appropriate 
when the following assumptions are adhered to (see Kinnear and Gray, 2009; Siegel, 
1995; Siegel and Castellan, 1988): 
 The observations must be independent of error; 
 The observations must have equal variance in the various treatment populations; 
 The observations must be drawn from normally distributed scores in the 
treatment of population; and, 
 The variables must have been measured in at least an interval scale. 
 
Conversely, non-parametric tests in social science research are as equally important as 
their parametric counterparts. Siegel and Castellan (1988) argued that behavioural 
scientists rarely have data that satisfy the assumptions of the parametric test, which 
includes achieving the sort of measurement that permits meaningful interpretation of 
parametric tests. This technique is considered distribution-free due to the fact that it 
makes no assumption about the distribution of scores in the population. In fact, the non-
parametric techniques do not necessitate measurement on an interval scale and do not 
require the data to fulfil the strict assumptions of the parametric methods, such as 
normality and homogeneity of variance. It is clear that the use of the non-parametric 
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techniques is more appropriate in this study, as the collected data is weaker than that of 
an interval scale. Moreover, the statistical test utilised is determined by the information 
in the scale. It is important to note that non-parametric techniques have been constructed 
to elude the requirement of numerous statistical assumptions as in the parametric 
techniques. Bereson and Levine (1992) and Siegel and Castellan (1988) documented a 
number of advantages of employing the non-parametric tests, namely: 
 Non-parametric methods may be used on all types of data; 
 Depending on the parametric procedures selected, non-parametric methods may 
be almost, or are even equally, as powerful as the classical procedures when the 
assumptions of the latter are met and may be quite a bit more powerful when the 
assumptions of the classical procedures are not met; 
 Non-parametric methods are generally easy to apply when the sample sizes are 
small; 
 Non-parametric methods make fewer, less stringent assumptions than the 
classical procedures; 
 Non-parametric methods permeate the solution of the problem without testing 
the parameters of the population; and, 
 Non-parametric methods may be more economical than classical procedures, 
since the researcher may increase power and yet save money, time and labour by 
collecting large samples of data which are more grossly measured and, therefore, 
solving the problem faster. 
 
Having considered that the questionnaire survey responses of this study are of opinion 
type on a scale based options, it was decided that non-parametric tests would be used in 
the present study to facilitate statistical analyses. According to De Vaus (2001), a 
statistical analysis should involve both descriptive and inferential types of analysis. The 
statistical techniques used for the purpose of analysing the data relevant to this research 
are reviewed in the following section. 
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5.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistical technique refers to transformation from raw data to a form 
that is organised and easy to interpret for descriptive information. This technique 
normally involves the calculation of mean, median, frequency distribution, percentage 
distributions, rank, skewness, kurtosis and standard deviation (SD) to help the 
researcher describe the characteristics or average scores and the variability of scores in 
the sample (Zikmund, 2000). The current study has used descriptive statistical measures 
(such as means, medians, frequency distribution, percentage, rank and standard 
deviation) to state current practices of ACs in Bangladesh.   
 
5.7.2 Analytical Statistics 
The analytical, or inferential, method is the process whereby conclusions and 
generalisations are derived from the raw data. The process starts from data collection, is 
followed by descriptive analysis, and completed by analysis of significance and 
differences. Therefore, the current study employs analytical statistics for two purposes: 
to examine the significance of responses, and to make inferences about the population 
parameters from the sample statistics through hypothesis testing. 
 
5.7.2.1 Testing the Significance of Responses 
The significance of the responses towards 50 statements of the questionnaire was 
examined by using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. For non-parametric sets of data, the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test can be used as substitute of one sample t-test in parametric 
statistics (Chan, 2003). The test computes the difference between the sample mean and 
the hypothesised value. Therefore, the mean score of responses was compared with 3 
(the mid score of the 5 point scale) to examine the significance of agreement or 
disagreement using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test.   
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5.7.2.2 Testing the Hypotheses 
Kerlinger (1986) mentioned four different reasons for using statistical analysis, which 
are: 
(i) To reduce a large quantity of data to a manageable and understandable form; 
(ii) To aid in the study of the population and samples; 
(iii) To assist decision making; and, 
(iv) To enable the deduction of reliable inference. 
 
Many statistical tools could be used for analysing the data collected from the 
questionnaire survey. However, the main objective of the analyses was to investigate 
current practices of the ACs in Bangladesh.  The idea was to generate an indicator to 
measure the variability of an individual response within a particular distribution. This 
study aimed to make inferences from sample statistics to the population parameters. 
Therefore, hypothesis testing was done to compare the opinions of respondents on the 
current practice of the ACs in Bangladeshi companies. In order to test the stated 
hypotheses, the researcher carried out two non-parametric tests, namely: the Kruskal-
Wallis One- Way Analysis of Variance Test Score, and the Mann-Whitney U Test. The 
following discussions briefly introduce these two testing techniques. 
 
A. The Kruskal-Wallis Test 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test is the non-parametric version of the parametric ANOVA Test 
for calculating the difference in the population mean. It is a test of one-way, between-
groups analysis of variance that allows a comparison of three or more groups (Pallant, 
2001). Borg and Gall (1983) stated that the Kruskal-Wallis Test is: "a statistical 
technique used to compare categorical data. It also gives a comparison of the 
distribution of individual variables from two or more different groups and produces a 
measure of relationship, called the contingency coefficient which is similar to the 
correlation coefficient". In addition, the conditions that should be met for the 
appropriateness of using the Kruskal-Wallis Test include: the data must be a random 
sample from a large population, the expected number in each category should not be too 
small, and the rule of thumb is to demand that at least five counts be expected in each 
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category (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). When the obtained value of Kruskal Wallis (H) 
test is significant, this indicates that at least one of the groups is different from at least 
one of the others. To identify the differing group, Kruskal Wallis pair-wsie comparison 
(six pairs of four groups
24
 i.e. 1 &2; 1&3; 1&4; 2&3; 2&4; 3&4) has been conducted. 
 
B. The Mann-Whitney U Test 
It is used to investigate the differences between two independent groups. This test 
compares the medians of the two groups and subsequently evaluates whether the ranks 
for the two groups differ significantly. The Mann-Whitney U Test is used to test the 
difference between two independent groups on a continuous measure. In respect of this 
test, Pallant (2001) noted that it converts the scores on the continuous variable to ranks, 
across the two groups; and that it then evaluates whether the ranks for the two groups 
differ significantly. In addition, the Mann-Whitney U Test is more powerful than the 
median test since it uses the ranks of the cases and it requires an ordinal (ranked) level 
of measurement. The test has been used in this study to compare means of responses 
from two groups divided on the basis of educational background, professional 
qualification and length of experience of the respondents.  
 
5.7.2.3 Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is used to identify the relationship between a dependent variable 
and one or more independent variable(s). More specifically, regression analysis helps us 
to understand how the typical value of the dependent variable changes when any one of 
the independent variables is varied while the other independent variables are held fixed 
(Allison, 1999). In order to investigate the AC effectiveness in Bangladesh, two 
multiple regression models have been derived using the questionnaire survey data. In 
the first model AC characteristics (i.e. composition, authority & resources, diligence, 
meeting) are independent variables and AC role (weighted average score of three key 
roles of an AC) is a dependent variable. In the second model, the three key roles (i.e. 
role in financial reporting, role in external auditing and role in internal auditing) are 
                                                 
24
 1= AC chairpersons; 2=Company secretaries; 3=Finance heads; and 4=External auditors. 
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independent variables and AC effectiveness is a dependent variable. The correlations 
(Spearman) of the variables of the regression models have also been presented to 
facilitate in ascertaining the association between the variables. The multicollinearity of 
the regression models has been investigated using the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs). 
It should be noted that there is no hard and fast rule regarding VIF value for determining 
presence of multicollinearity problem. For weaker models, the researchers paid note if 
the VIFs were of 4 (four) or more while for stronger models (if explains 50% or more) 
some researchers accepted VIFs up to 10 (Hair et. al, 1992). In this study, VIFs of 8 
(eight) or less have been accepted in examining the multicollinearity problem, 
considering that the regression models are very strong. 
 
5.7.2.4 Analysing the Significance of Test Results 
To analyse the statistical test results in Chapter Six, the researcher has assumed a 5% 
level of significance (i.e. a probability or p level of 0.05 or five times out of a hundred 
has been considered). When the p-value of a statistics is less than the significance level, 
the value of the statistic is said to be significant. The conventional probability, or p-
value, for deciding that a result is not due to chance has been set as equal to, or less 
than, 0.05 (i.e. five times out of a hundred). If we are willing to accept a 5% chance of 
making an error, we can construct a 95% confidence interval (Weisberg et al, 1996; 
Cramer, 1998). If the probability is less than 0.05, then it is thought unlikely to have 
been due to chance. If, on the other hand, the probability level of an outcome is above 
0.05, then that result is statistically non-significant in the sense that it is considered 
likely that it could have been due to chance (Cramer, 1998). In other words, the p-value 
is the probability that the null hypothesis is true. If the p-value is less than 0.05, we 
would say that the result is significant at the 0.05 level (Weisberg et al, 1996). To sum 
up, Kinnear and Gray (2000) posited: 
(i) If the p-value is greater than 0.05, H is accepted and the result is not 
significant; 
(ii) If the p-value is equal or less than 0.05 but greater than 0.01, H is rejected 
and the result is significant beyond the 5 per cent level; and, 
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(iii) If the p-value is less than 0.01, H is rejected and the result is significant 
beyond the 1 per cent level. 
 
5.8 Analysis of Interview Survey Responses 
The responses obtained from the interview survey have been analyzed following a 
‗Grounded Theory‘ approach. Grounded theory is most accurately described as a 
research method in which the theory is developed from the data, rather than the other 
way around. That makes this an inductive approach, meaning that it moves from the 
specific to the more general. Strauss and Corbin (1990) defined grounded theory as: 
 
"... a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop 
and inductively derive grounded theory about a phenomenon". 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) further defined grounded theory as: 
 
"... the theory derived from data, systematically gathered and analysed through the 
research process. In this method, data collection, analysis and eventual theory stand in 
close relationship to one another". 
 
The primary objective of grounded theory is to expand upon an explanation of a 
phenomenon by identifying the key elements of that phenomenon, and then categorising 
the relationships of those elements to the context and process of the research. The basic 
idea of the grounded theory is to read and re-read a textual database (for example, field 
notes) and discover or label variables called categories, concepts and properties, and 
their interrelationships. The ability to perceive variables and relationships is termed 
‗theoretical sensitivity‘ and is affected by a number of factors, including one's reading of 
the literature and one's use of techniques designed to enhance sensitivity (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). There are three methods of analysis involved in grounded theory from 
which sampling procedures are typically derived which are: open coding, axial coding 
and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
 
Open coding is the part of the analysis concerned with identifying, naming, categorising 
and describing phenomena found in the text, essentially, each line, sentence, and 
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paragraph. The process of naming or labelling things, categories, and properties is 
known as coding. Coding can be done very formally and systematically or quite 
informally. In grounded theory, it is normally done quite informally. For example, if, 
after coding much text, some new categories are invented; grounded theorists do not 
normally go back to the earlier text to code for that category. However, maintaining an 
inventory of codes with their descriptions (i. e. creating a codebook) is useful, along 
with pointers to the text that contain them (Parker and Roffey, 1997).  
 
Axial coding is the process of relating codes (categories and properties) to each other, 
via a combination of inductive and deductive thinking. To simplify this process, the 
grounded theorists emphasise causal relationships, and fit things into a basic frame of 
generic relationships. 
 
Selective coding is the process of choosing one category to be the core category, and 
relating all other categories to that category. The essential idea is to develop a single 
storyline around which all everything else is draped. There is a belief that such a core 
concept always exists (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Selective coding is about finding the 
driver that propels the story forward.  
 
In analyzing the interview responses in the study, the researcher followed the basic 
stages of grounded theory. Firstly, the ‗critical instances‘ of the interview transcripts 
were highlighted. This stage excluded things like digressions, repetitions and other 
irrelevant material. Secondly, ‗open coding‘ was done to assign the quotes to categories. 
A category is an abstract conceptual label which summarizes the key characteristics of a 
passage.  This was a relatively more time-consuming stage which involved working 
through the transcripts in turn to collect numerous quotes and examples of each existing 
category and to identify new ones.  Many categories were identified from the first 
transcript and then progressively fewer new categories from each successive transcript, 
as the proportion of new information decreases. The process of assigning quotes to 
categories was repeated for one transcript by a second, independent person to check the 
reproducibility of assigning quotes to categories.  At the end of this stage, an initial list 
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of categories was produced to facilitate the next stages. Thirdly,  the researcher 
performed ‗axial coding‘ which involved refining this list by deleting or combining 
some categories, followed by making connections between the categories and defining 
properties, for instance context and preconditions. Finally, ‗selective coding‘ was done 
and this involved the identification of a core category or broad themes from which the 
general findings were inferred. In this research, the researcher tried to attract 
interviewees by means of the prepared questions that let them tell a story about the 
scenario of AC practices in Bangladeshi companies. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
The present chapter has explained the research approach adopted in this study. It 
presented the factors that have influenced the choice of these techniques and 
approaches. It also reported the procedures followed in the design and development of 
the close-ended questionnaire. This chapter has also explained how the pilot study was 
carried out to develop the questionnaire, how it was conducted, and the benefits that had 
been gained from parties of piloting. It has provided details of the questionnaire survey 
procedures followed in the study. Furthermore, the chapter discussed the second phase 
of data collection which consisted of twenty semi-structured interviews. In brief, the 
chapter has given an elaborate picture of the research methodological issues of the study 
and discussed how these have been addressed. The next chapter presents in more detail 
the descriptive and inferential analyses of data obtained through questionnaire survey.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY FINDINGS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the findings of the questionnaire 
survey. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 presents the background 
of respondents; Section 6.3 highlights the descriptive statistics of the responses; and 
Section 6.4 discusses the statistical test results of the survey data.  Finally, Section 6.5 
summarises the chapter. 
 
6.2 Background of the Respondents 
It is important to introduce the background of respondents participating in the survey to 
understand the level of the respondents. Therefore, the education, qualification, and 
experience of the questionnaire survey respondents are discussed in this section in order 
to facilitate a better understanding on their background. 
 
6.2.1 Education 
Educational qualification is an important indicator about respondent‘s background. 
Therefore, the last educational degree of the four sample groups is presented in the 
following table. 
 
Table 6.1: Analysis Showing the Educational Qualification of Respondents 
Education 
(Degree) 
AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External 
Auditor 
Total 
No % No % No % No % No % 
Bachelor‘s 7 23 7 19 7 16 11 38 32 23 
Master‘s 20 67 28 76 33 75 16 55 97 69 
PhD 2 7 1 3 1 2 0 0 4 3 
Other 1 3 1 2 3 7 2 7 7 5 
Total  30 100 37 100 44 100 29 100 140 100 
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Table 6.1 shows that the majority (two-thirds) of AC chairpersons have obtained a 
master‘s degree, and 23% (or 7 out of 30) of the respondents in this group have a 
bachelor‘s degree. Similarly, 76% (or 28 out of 37) of the company secretaries had 
master‘s degree, and 7 (19%) company secretaries obtained bachelor‘s degree.  The 
table also presents that 75% (or 33 out of the 44) of the finance heads have completed a 
master‘s degree, and 16% of the respondents in this group have a bachelor‘s degree.  
Like the other three sample groups, the majority (55%) of external auditors have a 
master‘s degree, while 11 (38%) external auditors completed bachelor‘s degree. 
Therefore, out of total 140 respondents, the majority (or 97 out of 140) of respondents 
have completed a master‘s degree, 32 respondents have obtained bachelor‘s degree, 4 
respondents have a PhD and 7 respondents have another qualification (such as: M. Phil, 
PG Diploma, or below bachelor‘s degree).  Overall, more than 90% of the respondents 
have completed bachelor‘s or above level of education. This reflects that the 
respondents who participated in the questionnaire survey are highly educated and, 
therefore, their participation in the survey has enriched the quality of survey findings in 
depicting the current states of AC practices in Bangladesh. The following sub-section 
gives more detail of the subject in their last education. 
 
6.2.2 Academic Discipline 
Concentration/subject of education is another important criterion in analysing the 
respondents‘ capabilities of expressing objective views on any issue. For example, the 
respondents who hold accounting, auditing, finance, economics, or other business 
subjects in their education are perceived to be more knowledgeable on the current 
research issue (i.e. AC practice). Therefore, discipline of the last education of the 
respondents is presented in the following table. 
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Table 6.2: Analysis Showing the Academic Background of Respondents 
Discipline AC Chairperson Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External 
Auditor 
Total 
No % No % No % No % No % 
Accounting 9 30 14 38 20 45 23 79 66 47 
Finance 2 7 4 11 14 32 2 7 22 16 
Economics 3 10 3 8 3 7 0 0 9 6 
Management 5 17 5 13 2 5 1 3 13 9 
Marketing 1 3 4 11 1 2 1 4 7 5 
Others 10 33 7 19 4 9 2 7 23 17 
Total 30 100 37 100 44 100 29 100 140 100 
 
Table 6.2 shows that 30% (or 9 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons specialised in 
accounting, while 5 respondents are from management area. It is also notable that one-
third (or 10 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons participating in the survey are from 
different disciplines (including engineering, law, political science, and social science) 
which are less related to their job as AC chairpersons. This reflects the finding that one 
out of every three AC chairpersons does not have a relevant educational qualification to 
be able to fulfil his or her duties properly. Regarding the second group of respondents 
i.e. the company secretaries, 38% (or 14 out of 37) of the respondents studied 
accounting, while 7 (19%) of the company secretaries are from different non-business 
disciplines (such as: engineering, law, political science, and social science). The table 
also shows that 45% (or 20 out of 44) of the finance heads have studied accounting area, 
while 14 respondents of this group are from a financial discipline. It is encouraging that 
91% of the finance heads emanate from business (i.e. accounting, finance, management 
and marketing) or economics disciple which is related to their present occupation. In 
respect of external auditors, 79% (or 23 out of 29) of the respondents have studied 
accounting, and 2 were found to be from the finance area.  
 
Overall, 47% (or 66 out of 140) of the respondents are from accounting, while 22 (16%) 
respondents are from finance. It should be noted that almost one-sixth (17%) of the 
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respondents are from other different disciplines which are less related to the research 
issue (i.e. the AC practices). Nevertheless, it is important to note that a vast majority 
(almost 85%) of respondents are from business or economics disciplines, and the 
researcher believes that their participation in the questionnaire survey has enhanced the 
quality of findings and also has significantly contributed in attaining the objective of the 
study.   
 
6.2.3 Professional Qualification 
Since the current research is mainly related to the auditing, accounting and similar 
functions of the company, either of the two main qualifications namely, Chartered 
Accountant (CA) and Cost and Management Accountant (CMA) are held by the experts 
in these areas. Furthermore, the company secretaries holding a Chartered Secretary (CS) 
qualification are generally perceived to be more qualified. The following table presents 
an analysis of the professional qualification held by the respondents.   
 
Table 6.3: Analysis Showing the Professional Qualification of Respondents 
Qualification AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External Auditor Total 
No % No % No % No % No % 
CA 5 17 9 24 19 43 29 100 62 44 
CMA 1 3 1 3 4 9 3 10 9 6 
CFA 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 2 1 
CS 0 0 19 51 2 5 0 0 21 15 
Other 0 0 2 5 1 2 0 0 3 2 
None 24 80 10 27 17 39 0 0 51 36 
Total 30 100 37* 100 44** 100 29*** 100 140 100 
*4 Company Secretaries have both CA and CS qualifications. 
**1 Head of Finance has both CA and CMA qualifications. 
***3 External Auditors have both CA and CMA qualifications. 
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Table 6.3 shows that out of 30 AC chairpersons, the majority (80%) of respondents do 
not have any professional qualification. This seems to be important in understanding the 
procedure of financial reporting and auditing issues. Only 5 (17%) AC chairpersons are 
qualified Chartered Accountants (CAs) and one is a qualified Cost and Management 
Accountant (CMA). This result is of concern because McMullen and Raghunandan 
(1996) found that the companies with no problem in financial reporting were more 
likely to have a CPA on the AC than those companies that had experienced reporting 
problems. Table 6.3 also indicates that 51% (or 19 out of 37) of the company secretaries 
have a certified CS qualification, and 24% of the company secretaries are qualified 
CAs. However, 27% (or 10 out of 37) of the company secretaries do not have any 
professional qualification.  In respect of third sample group, finance heads, the table 
shows that 43% (or 19 out of 44) of the finance heads are qualified CAs, and 9% of the 
fiancé heads are qualified CMAs, while 39% of the respondents of this group do not 
have any professional qualification. Apart from a CA qualification, 3 external auditors 
are also CMA qualified. Overall, 44% (or 62 out of 140) of the respondents have a CA 
qualification, and 21 (15%) respondents have a CS qualification. This distribution is 
quite sensible because all external auditors are by default qualified CA, and the majority 
of company secretaries are expected to have a CS qualification due to the requirements 
of some organisations. It should be noted that 8 respondents have double qualifications 
(i.e. any two of the stated professional qualifications, namely: CA, CMA, CS, and 
CFA). Overall, the majority (64%) of respondents possess one or more professional 
qualification(s) and this means that they are highly qualified in their respective 
positions. The researcher believes that participation of such well qualified respondents 
has enhanced the objectivity and reliability of the study findings. 
 
6.2.4 Experience 
Previous work experience in a related job is important for the respondents in 
understanding the questions and responding to them properly. The experience of the 
respondents participating in the questionnaire survey is presented in the following two 
tables. 
192 
Table 6.4: Analysis Showing the Experience of Respondents 
Experience AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External 
Auditor 
Total 
No % No % No % No % 128 % 
Yes 21 70 34 92 44 100 29 100 128 91 
No 9 30 3 8 0 0 0 0 12 9 
Total 30 100 37 100 44 100 29 100 140 100 
 
Table 6.4 states that 30% (or 9 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons and only 3 company 
secretaries (8%) had not had previous experience in a related job. All of the finance 
heads and external auditors who participated in the survey had previous experience 
working in similar jobs. Overall, the majority (91%) of respondents had experience in a 
similar area to their current job. This indicates that most of the respondents had previous 
working experience. The researcher believes that opinions of these experienced 
participants have significantly contributed to achieving the objectives of the study. The 
following table presents the years of experience of the participants. 
 
Table 6.5: Analysis Showing the Length of Experience of Respondents 
Description AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance 
Head 
External 
Auditor 
All 
Respondents 
Holding Current Position 2.76 4.67 4.24 6.29 4.96 
Experience in Related Field 12.36 11.09 11.24 9.41 10.89 
 
Table 6.5 highlights that the mean of tenure at current position of the four sample 
groups are 2.76 years, 4.67 years, 4.24 years, and 6.29 years, respectively. Furthermore, 
the average years of work experience in related job are 12.36, 11.09, 11.24, and 9.41, 
respectively. Overall, the average tenure at current position of respondents is 4.96 years, 
and average experience in a relevant filed is 10.89 years. With regard to the tenure in 
current position, the average tenure of AC chairperson group is 2.76 years, which is 
significantly lower than that of other three sample groups. This might happen because 
AC practice is a new issue in Bangladesh, and is being monitored by the SEC only from 
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2006. Furthermore, the average length of experience of the external auditors as partners 
in their respective firms is 6.29 years, which is higher than that of the other three sample 
groups. This happens because, unlike other sample groups, most external auditors are 
self-employed and therefore, they tend to be less likely to change their jobs or 
organizations. The distribution reflects that the respondents had many years of 
experience, which indicates their capabilities in responding to the issues included in the 
questionnaire. 
 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Data description is typically the first step in analysing any set of information. 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe and summarise the basic features of the data in 
a study. It mainly includes graphical presentation, frequency table, mean, media, mode, 
ranking, skewness, kurtosis, and standard deviation of data. In the current study, the 
questionnaire survey data have been presented using some descriptive statistical tools 
including frequency table, mean, standard deviation and ranking. The following 
subsections present and analyse the descriptive statistics results of the questionnaire 
survey data. 
 
6.3.1 Responses towards the Statements on Audit Committee Practices:  
Frequency Distribution 
The following table presents the frequency of responses (in percentages) toward the 
statements included in the questionnaire. It should be noted that to facilitate the 
reporting and analysis, the ‗strongly disagree‘ and the ‗disagree‘ columns have been 
merged to ‗disagree‘ and similarly, the ‗strongly agree‘ and the ‗agree‘ columns have 
been merged to ‗agree‘ in the table.                                                                                   
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Table 6.6: Frequency (in percentage) Distribution of Responses toward the Statements on Audit Committee Practices in Bangladesh 
 
Statements AC Chairperson 
(N= 30) 
Company Secretary 
(N= 37) 
Finance Head 
(N= 44) 
External Auditor 
(N= 29) 
All Four Samples 
(N= 140) 
Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree 
A. Composition 
1. The AC members are appointed in 
consultation with the AC chairperson. 
3 17 80 19 8 73 11 18 71 24 38 38 14 19 67 
2. The AC members have sufficient 
knowledge on the entity's business. 
3 23 74 3 14 83 7 27 66 34 38 28 11 25 64 
3. The AC members have sufficient 
knowledge on Accounting and/or Auditing. 
3 33 63 3 41 56 7 48 45 52 28 20 14 39 47 
4. The AC members have sufficient 
experience in Accounting and/or Auditing. 
3 20 77 11 49 40 7 50 43 55 21 24 17 37 46 
5. The AC members are capable of 
mediating problems in performing their 
duties. 
10 10 80 3 30 67 2 43 55 34 34 32 11 31 58 
6. The majority of AC members are 
independent /non-executive directors. 
60 33 7 70 27 3 73 23 4 72 21 7 69 26 5 
7. The chairperson of the AC is an 
independent/non-executive director. 
47 33 20 65 16 19 68 18 14 62 21 17 61 21 18 
8. The size of the AC is appropriate for 
carrying out its duties properly. 
7 13 80 3 8 89 5 16 79 7 21 72 5 14 81 
B. Authority and Resources 
9. The AC has adequate authority in order to 
carry out its responsibilities. 
3 10 87 5 5 90 2 2 96 7 31 62 4 11 85 
10. The AC has ready access to relevant 
information if required. 
3 10 87 3 8 89 7 41 52 10 17 73 4 10 86 
11. The AC receives prompt responses from 
the management in carrying out its duties. 
3 20 77 3 5 92 0 7 93 14 28 58 4 14 82 
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Statements AC Chairperson 
(N= 30) 
Company Secretary 
(N= 37) 
Finance Head 
(N= 44) 
External Auditor 
(N= 29) 
All Four Samples 
(N= 140) 
Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree 
12. The AC is provided with sufficient 
resources to carry out its duties. 
3 17 80 8 3 89 7 9 84 7 28 65 6 13 81 
13. The non-executive AC members are 
adequately paid for their time and efforts. 
17 37 46 19 24 57 20 39 41 24 41 35 22 34 44 
C. Diligence 
14. The AC has a charter which outlines its 
objectives, duties and responsibilities. 
10 17 73 22 14 64 25 25 50 21 28 51 20 21 59 
15. The AC charter is reviewed annually. 13 33 54 30 41 29 32 39 29 45 38 17 31 37 32 
16. The AC members have a clear 
understanding of their responsibilities. 
3 13 84 6 24 70 2 32 66 17 34 49 7 26 67 
17. Members of the AC readily assume their 
responsibilities. 
13 7 80 3 27 70 9 23 68 3 31 66 7 22 71 
18. The AC members devote sufficient time 
to the committee's affairs. 
13 13 74 3 41 56 14 45 41 41 21 38 17 34 49 
D. Meeting 
19. The agendas of the AC meetings are 
finalized by the chairperson. 
7 7 86 5 8 87 5 5 90 10 17 73 6 9 85 
20. The chairperson cooperates with other 
committee members before finalizing the 
agenda of the meetings. 
0 20 80 5 22 73 7 41 52 17 52 41 5 34 61 
21. The agenda and related materials are 
provided to members fairly ahead of the 
meetings. 
0 0 100 0 5 95 0 7 93 3 24 73 1 9 90 
22. All members can express their views 
freely and independently in the meetings. 
0 0 100 0 14 86 2 5 93 7 28 65 2 11 87 
23. The frequency of the AC meetings is 
sufficient to carry out its responsibilities. 
0 7 93 3 16 81 5 14 81 17 14 69 6 13 81 
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Statements AC Chairperson 
(N= 30) 
Company Secretary 
(N= 37) 
Finance Head 
(N= 44) 
External Auditor 
(N= 29) 
All Four Samples 
(N= 140) 
Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree 
24. The duration of the AC meetings is 
sufficient for a full discussion of the issues. 
0 0 100 5 8 87 5 2 93 14 17 69 6 6 88 
25. Non-members attend the AC meetings if 
required. 
7 23 70 14 5 81 5 11 84 14 28 58 9 16 75 
26. The minutes of the AC meetings are 
circulated to all members of the Board of 
Directors (BODs). 
0 3 97 8 8 84 2 5 93 14 24 62 6 9 85 
E. Role in Financial Reporting 
27. The AC reviews the integrity of 
companies' financial statements. 
0 13 87 3 14 83 5 36 59 14 48 38 5 28 67 
28. The AC reviews accounting policies and 
any changes made therein. 
0 10 90 3 19 78 7 48 45 17 45 38 6 31 63 
29. The AC reviews accounting estimates 
and judgments done in preparing financial 
statements. 
3 17 80 3 32 65 11 43 46 17 48 35 9 36 55 
30. The AC reviews the compliance of the 
Accounting Standards (e.g. IAS, BAS etc.) 
in preparing financial statements. 
3 20 77 5 43 52 18 34 48 31 41 28 14 35 51 
31. The AC reviews the clarity and 
completeness of disclosures in financial 
statements. 
0 3 97 3 24 73 11 30 59 14 48 38 7 26 67 
32. The AC reviews other information (e.g. 
the auditors' report, financial highlights etc.) 
presented in the annual report. 
0 7 93 3 16 81 7 25 68 14 28 58 6 19 75 
F. Role in External Auditing 
33. External auditors are appointed and/or 
removed upon recommendation of the AC. 
10 37 53 19 32 49 27 39 34 21 58 21 20 41 39 
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Statements AC Chairperson 
(N= 30) 
Company Secretary 
(N= 37) 
Finance Head 
(N= 44) 
External Auditor 
(N= 29) 
All Four Samples 
(N= 140) 
Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree 
34. The AC assesses and reviews the 
expertise and resources of the external 
auditors. 
10 50 40 19 41 40 23 48 29 14 55 31 17 48 35 
35. The AC reviews and approves the terms 
of the Engagement Letter (EL) prepared for 
the external auditors. 
10 53 37 27 46 27 32 43 25 31 48 21 26 47 27 
36. The AC monitors the compliance of 
external audit firm's with the existing  
ethical and regulatory requirements in 
Bangladesh. 
7 23 70 11 46 43 18 39 43 24 48 28 15 39 46 
37. The AC reviews the findings of the 
annual audit obtained by the external 
auditors. 
3 3 94 5 22 73 2 34 64 7 31 62 4 24 72 
38. The AC reviews the management's 
responsiveness to the external auditors' 
findings. 
3 20 77 8 32 60 2 55 43 10 48 42 6 40 54 
39. The AC meets with the external auditors 
without the presence of the management to 
discuss any issues, problems or reservations 
arising from the audit. 
7 23 70 16 38 46 18 57 25 21 55 24 16 44 40 
40. The AC reviews and monitors the 
independence and effectiveness of the 
external auditing process. 
7 18 77 8 24 68 14 41 45 21 45 34 12 32 56 
G. Role in Internal Auditing 
41. The AC recommends and approves the 
appointment or termination of the heads of 
the internal audit division. 
7 30 63 16 33 51 20 39 41 24 41 35 17 36 47 
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Statements AC Chairperson 
(N= 30) 
Company Secretary 
(N= 37) 
Finance Head 
(N= 44) 
External Auditor 
(N= 29) 
All Four Samples 
(N= 140) 
Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree 
42. The AC approves and reviews the 
charter of the internal auditors. 
7 27 66 22 27 51 11 50 39 21 45 34 15 38 47 
43. The AC assesses and reviews the annual 
internal audit work plan. 
3 20 77 22 11 67 9 32 59 14 31 55 12 24 64 
44. The AC reviews the annual internal 
audit reports, budget and other findings. 
3 7 90 11 22 67 5 27 68 10 28 62 7 21 72 
45. The AC reviews and monitors the 
management's responsiveness to the internal 
auditor's findings and recommendations. 
3 13 84 8 22 70 9 18 73 10 17 73 8 18 74 
46. The AC meets with the head of the 
internal audit function without the presence 
of the management. 
3 20 77 11 38 51 11 45 44 14 45 41 10 38 52 
47. The AC enhances the independence of 
the internal auditors of the company. 
3 7 90 11 32 57 5 32 63 10 34 56 7 27 66 
48. The AC monitors and evaluates the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function. 
3 7 90 8 14 78 9 23 68 14 52 34 9 16 75 
H. Overall Practice 
49. The AC can work independently. 0 20 80 3 16 81 0 11 89 7 21 72 2 16 82 
50. The AC is effective. 3 23 74 0 24 76 2 32 66 21 48 31 6 31 63 
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6.3.1.1 Composition 
Table 6.6 shows that 80% (or 24 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons participating in the 
survey agreed with three statements on AC composition, namely:   
(i) The members are appointed after prior consultation with the AC chairman; 
(ii) The AC members are capable of mitigating problems; and, 
(iii) The size of the AC is appropriate. 
The majority of respondents in this group also agreed on the sufficiency of the AC 
members‘ relevant literacy and experience, but only 7% of respondents agreed that the 
majority of AC members are independent/non-executive directors. Similarly, only 20% 
of the AC chairpersons agreed that the AC chairperson is an independent director. The 
results indicate that the ACs in Bangladesh tend to be dominated by executive directors, 
and that the AC chairpersons play an important role in selecting the other members of 
the committee. 
 
The table also indicates that 73% (or 27 out of 37) of the company secretaries agreed 
that the AC members are appointed after prior discussion with the AC chairman, whilst 
83% (or 31 out of 37) of respondents agreed that the AC members have sufficient 
knowledge about the entity‘s business. The majority of respondents also agreed on the 
sufficiency of AC members‘ qualification, the AC members‘ capabilities in mandating 
problems, and the appropriateness of AC size. However, only 41% of the respondents in 
this group agreed that the AC members have sufficient experience. It should be noted 
that a significant portion of respondents (40%-50%) selected the ‗neutral‘ option in 
responding to the statements relating to previous experience and academic background 
in accounting and auditing. This might happen because many respondents felt hesitant 
to comment on the background of AC members who are also executive directors of the 
board. Regarding the independent AC members, only 1 (3%) company secretary agreed 
that the majority of AC members are independent directors, and only 19% of the 
respondents of this group thought that the chairpersons of ACs are independent 
directors. 
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In relation to the statements on AC composition, mixed responses were received from 
the finance heads. It can be observed that 79% of the finance heads agreed that size of 
the ACs is appropriate in order to carry out its duties, while only 2 (4%) of the 
respondents in this group agreed that the majority of AC members are independent 
directors. Furthermore, only 14% of the finance heads felt that the chairperson of the 
AC is nominated from among the independent directors. This reflects that the ACs in 
Bangladesh are mostly occupied and chaired by executive directors. A significant 
portion of respondents (around 50%) selected the ‗neutral‘ option when expressing their 
opinions about the relevant academic background and experience of the AC members. 
This might happen because the finance heads are either unsure about the background of 
the AC members or are unwilling to disclose the fact. 
 
It is further shown in Table 6.6 that only one statement relating to AC composition was 
agreed by the majority of external auditors. This statement was regarding the 
appropriateness of AC size and 72% (or 21 out of 29) of the external auditors agreed 
with this statement. It is worth noting that most of the external auditors either disagreed 
or remained neutral with the statements regarding the previous experience of the AC 
members in similar jobs and academic backgrounds in a related area. Regarding the 
inclusion of independent directors in the ACs, only 7% of external auditors agreed that 
the majority of AC members are independent directors and only 5 respondents (17%) in 
this group agreed that the AC chairperson is an independent member. Therefore, 
responses of the external auditors reflect that the ACs in Bangladesh are clearly lacking 
in the appointment of independent, experienced, and expert members.  One possible 
reason for this might be that the board is reluctant to appoint many independent 
directors because if the majority of members (including the chairperson of the 
committee) are independent directors who are appointed on the basis of their expertise, 
then the board will lose its control over the committee‘s affairs.  
 
Overall, the statement regarding the appropriateness of AC size was agreed with by 81% 
(or 113 out of 140) of the respondents, which was the highest number. This response is 
consistent with the findings of Pincus et al. (1989); Felo et al. (2003); and Pucheta-
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Martinez and Fuentes (2007) who highlighted that the appropriate AC size is a crucial 
component for AC effectiveness. However, a few studies (such as Kalbers and Fogarty, 
1996; Yermack, 1996; Scarbrough et al., 1998; Lin et al., 2008) have documented that a 
large sized AC may sometimes hinder its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the BRC (1999) 
and the ICEW (2001) have suggested that there should be a minimum of three members 
in an AC. In the context of the U.K. and the U.S.A., the ACs generally consist of 
between three to five members (Carcello and Neal, 2000; Raghunandan et al., 2001; 
Spira, 2002; Davidson et al., 2004). The combined response of all four sample groups 
suggests that size of the ACs as practised in Bangladesh is appropriate for them to 
function effectively. The majority (67%) of respondents also agreed that the AC 
members are appointed after consulting with the AC chairperson. On the other hand, 
only 5% (or 7 out of 140) of the respondents agreed that the majority of members of the 
AC are independent directors, and 18% of the respondents of agreed that the AC 
chairperson is an independent director. These findings reflect the inadequacy of 
independent members in the ACs of Bangladesh, while many studies (such as: the 
Olivencia Report, 1998; and Osma and Noguer, 2007) have argued in favour of a 
majority of independent members in ACs and noted that the chairperson should also be 
an independent director. Regarding qualification and experience, a great deal of research 
(for example, Beasley and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; McDaniels et al., 
2002; Bedard et al., 2004) has argued that experience and expertise in accounting/ 
auditing or related areas of the AC members is a vital factor in its effective functioning. 
It is important to note that the majority of respondents either disagreed or selected the 
‗neutral‘ option in the case of two statements relating to previous academic background 
and experience in relevant fields. This finding indicates the view that the AC members 
in Bangladesh are lacking in terms of qualification and experience. 
 
6.3.1.2 Authority and Resources 
Regarding the statements on authority of and resources provided to the ACs in 
Bangladesh, 87% (or 26 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons agreed that the ACs are 
delegated adequate authority with which to perform their duties, and that the ACs have 
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ready access to the required information when they need it. More than 75% of the 
respondents from this group also agreed that the ACs receive prompt responses to their 
queries from management, and that the ACs are provided with sufficient resources in 
order to carry out their duties properly. However, only 46% of the AC chairpersons 
agreed that the independent members are paid sufficient honorariums for their time 
devoted to the committee‘s affairs. 
 
Furthermore, around 90% (or 33 out of 37) of the company secretaries agreed with the 
four statements relating to authority and resources provided to the ACs, namely: 
(i)   The ACs are delegated enough authority to perform their duties; 
(ii)  The ACs have ready access to the required information; 
(iii) The ACs receive prompt response from management to their queries; and, 
(iv)  The ACs are provided sufficient resources to carry out their duties. 
On the other hand, only 21 (57%) of the company secretaries agreed that the 
independent AC members are adequately paid. However, the remuneration paid to the 
independent members of ACs was viewed as inadequate by the majority (57%) of 
respondents. Overall, the ACs in Bangladesh, as viewed by the company secretaries, are 
provided with sufficient authority and resources to carry out their duties.  
 
Table 6.6 also shows that 96% (or 42 out of 44) of the finance heads agreed that the ACs 
are delegated adequate authority in order to perform their duties properly, while 93% of 
the respondents in this group agreed that the ACs receive prompt response to their 
queries from management. The majority (around 60%) of finance heads disagreed or 
remained neutral to the statements on the sufficiency of payment to the independent 
members for their time. This indicates that the remuneration paid to the independent 
members is not enough compared to their time and efforts devoted to the committee‘s 
affairs. It is notable that 41% of the finance heads neither agreed nor disagreed (i.e. 
selected the ‗neutral‘ option) with the statement that the ACs have ready access to 
relevant information required for their job. In the interview survey (the second phase of 
the data collection, which is discussed in the next chapter), two finance heads were 
requested to explain why most of them remained neutral on this issue. They explained 
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that this was because the independent members rarely have such access, whereas the 
executive members of the committee have free access to the required information. This 
reflects the view that the independent members of the ACs in Bangladesh do not receive 
required information from the management in order to carry out their responsibilities. 
 
The majority of external auditors agreed with the first four statements relating to 
authority and resources provided to the ACs, while only 35% (10 out of 29) of the 
respondents in this group agreed with the statement that the independent AC members 
are paid sufficient remuneration compared to their time given to the committee‘s affairs. 
These responses suggest that the ACs in Bangladesh are delegated enough authority, and 
are also provided with the required resources for the smooth functioning of their tasks.    
 
The aggregated responses of all the 140 respondents in relation to the statements on 
authority of and resources of the ACs in Bangladesh imply that the ACs are provided 
with adequate resources and authority in order to carry out their responsibilities. This 
might happen because most of the AC members, including the chairpersons, are 
executive directors who are deemed to be powerful in the company. Out of the five 
statements on authority and resources of the ACs, the first four statements were agreed 
with by the majority (more than 80%) of respondents, while only 44% (or 62 out of 
140) agreed that the independent members are adequately paid when compared to the 
time and effort they give to the company. Overall, it is a sign of good practice that the 
ACs in Bangladesh are provided with sufficient authority and resources as suggested by 
the well-recognised AC guidelines, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). 
 
6.3.1.3 Diligence 
The majority of AC chairpersons agreed to all five statements on the diligence of ACs in 
Bangladesh. However, the lowest agreement (only 54% of respondents) was with the 
statement relating to the annual review of the AC charter, while the statement 
concerning AC members‘ understanding on their responsibilities was agreed with by the 
highest number (84%) of respondents of this sample group.    
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The majority of company secretaries agreed with the first (64%); third (70%); fourth 
(70%) and fifth (56%) statements relating to AC diligence. The only exceptional 
response was in the case of the second statement where only 29% of the company 
secretaries agreed that the AC charter is reviewed annually. This result indicates that 
most of the ACs have their charters in black and white, but that they are not regularly 
updated. 
 
It can also be seen that 50% (or 22 out of 44) of the finance heads agreed that the AC 
has a charter outlining their responsibilities, and only 29% of the respondents in this 
group agreed that the charter is reviewed annually. Furthermore, 66% of the finance 
heads agreed that the AC members have a clear understanding on their role, and 68% of 
the respondents of this group agreed that the members readily assume their 
responsibilities. However, only 41% of the finance heads agreed that the AC members 
devote sufficient time in carrying out their duties, and a significant portion (45%) of the 
finance heads neither agreed nor disagreed ( i.e. selected the ‗neutral‘ option) with this 
statement. This might happen because the finance heads are not sure about the time 
devoted by the AC members because in most of the cases the finance head is not a 
member of the AC and, therefore, he or she does not have frequent interactions with all 
AC members. 
 
The table also shows that 51% (or 15 out of 29) of the external auditors agreed that the 
AC has a charter of their duties; while only 17% of the respondents agreed that the 
charter is reviewed annually. Furthermore, 49% of the external auditors agreed that the 
AC members have a clear understanding of their role, and 66% of the respondents in 
this group agreed that the members readily assume their responsibilities. However, only 
38% of the respondents in this group agreed that the AC members devote sufficient time 
to their job. This result implies that, in the view of the external auditors, the amount of 
time given by the AC members to the committee‘s affairs is not enough to successfully 
achieve the objectives of the ACs. 
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Overall, 71% (or 99 out of 140) of the respondents agreed that the members readily 
assume the responsibilities of the ACs; 67% of the respondents agreed that the AC 
members have a clear understanding of their responsibilities in the committees; and, 
59% of the respondents  agreed that there is charter (terms of reference) for the ACs. 
However, only 32% of the respondents agreed that the AC charters are reviewed 
annually, and only 49% of the respondents agreed that the AC members devote enough 
time to the committees‘ affairs.  Since the majority of respondents felt that the charters 
are not updated regularly, the researcher feels that the charters of the ACs are there only 
in spirit and are not being followed properly. The reasons behind the insufficient time 
given by the AC members may include: firstly, that most of the AC members are 
executive directors of companies and also busy with their many other businesses; and 
secondly, the independent members are not adequately valued and paid for their efforts. 
Therefore, the findings suggest that AC diligence in Bangladesh is not at a satisfactory 
level as required for the effective functioning of the ACs. This is inconsistent with the 
results of Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) who noted that AC diligence is one of the key 
components for its effectiveness. 
 
6.3.1.4 Meeting 
All of the AC chairpersons participating in the survey agreed that:  
(i) The AC members can express their views freely;  
(ii) The agenda and related materials are supplied to the AC members in advance; 
and  
(iii) The duration of the AC meeting is sufficient for a full discussion of the issues. 
Further, the vast majority (more than 80%) of respondents in this sample group also 
agreed with the other four statements on AC meeting. 
 
Similarly, the majority of company secretaries agreed with all eight statements relating 
to AC meeting. The highest number of company secretaries (95%) agreed that the 
agenda and related materials are supplied to the AC members beforehand.  
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The responses of the third sample group (i.e. the finance heads) were similar to those of 
the previous two groups. The majority of finance heads agreed with all the statements 
on the procedure of AC meetings. However,  48% (or 21 out of 44)  of the finance heads 
disagreed or remained neutral with the statement that the AC chairman discusses the 
meeting agenda with other members before finalising them. As stated earlier, most of 
the finance heads are not members of the ACs and, perhaps for this reason, they are not 
quite sure how the agenda are finalised. 
 
Finally, the majority of external auditors agreed with all but one statement in this group. 
More specifically, only 12 (41%) respondents from this group agreed that the AC 
chairperson consults other members before finalising the meeting agenda, while the 
majority of external auditors agreed with the rest seven statements on AC meeting. This 
implies that the members of ACs in Bangladesh do not have significant role in choosing 
the agenda for the meetings, instead, the chairperson mainly finalises the agenda. 
 
Overall, it is a good sign that all eight statements on AC meeting were agreed with by 
the majority of respondents. The highest number (90%) of respondents agreed with the 
statement that the meeting agenda are supplied to the members beforehand, while 85% 
of the respondents agreed that the agenda is finalised mainly by the chairperson of the 
committee. Furthermore, 85% of the respondents agreed that the minutes of AC 
meetings are circulated to the members of the BoDs, and 75% of the respondents agreed 
that non-members do attend the meetings if required. On the other hand, only 86 
respondents (61%) agreed that non-members attend the AC meetings if required. The 
frequency of AC meetings has been regarded as an important factor by some researchers 
(such as Spira, 2002 and Anderson et al., 2004) and a vast majority (81%) of 
respondents participating in the questionnaire survey agreed that the frequency of AC 
meetings is adequate in order to carry out its responsibilities. Furthermore, 88% (123 
out of 140) of the respondents agreed that the duration of the AC meetings is long 
enough to discuss and decide on the committees‘ affairs. Overall, the responses reflect 
the view that the ACs in Bangladesh generate a congenial environment in which to 
conduct effective meetings. 
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6.3.1.5 Role in Financial Reporting 
In relation to the statements on AC‘s role in financial reporting, none of the AC 
chairpersons disagreed with any of the given statements, although a significant number 
of the AC chairpersons remained neutral in the expression of their opinion on some of 
the statements. Out of six statements of this group, the role of ACs in reviewing full 
disclosure in financial reports was agreed with by the highest number of respondents 
(97%). The responses reflect the view that the AC chairpersons of Bangladeshi ACs do 
play a significant role in relation to the financial reporting of the company. 
 
Regarding the responses of company secretaries regarding AC‘s role in financial 
reporting, all six statements were agreed with by the majority of respondents. The 
statement relating to AC‘s role in reviewing the integrity of company‘s financial 
statements was agreed to by the highest number of respondents (83%). It should also be 
noted that a significant portion (43%) of the company secretaries neither agreed nor 
disagreed (i.e. they selected the ‗neutral‘ option) with the statement that the ACs play a 
role in reviewing the compliance of accounting standards in financial reporting. This 
might be because, 62% of the company secretaries participating in the survey are from 
non-accounting background (see Table 6.2) and, therefore, they may be reluctant in 
commenting on such a purely accounting related technical issue. 
 
Similarly, a large portion of finance heads neither agreed nor disagreed (i.e. they 
remained neutral) with the statements on AC‘s role in financial reporting. However, 26 
(59%) of the finance heads agreed that the ACs review the integrity of financial 
reporting, and 30 (68%) respondents in this sample group agreed that the ACs review 
different reports and highlights (for example, auditors‘ report, chairman‘s report, 
financial highlights etc.) presented in the annual report.   
 
We can also see in Table 6.6 that none of the statements, with one exception, was agreed 
with by the majority of external auditors. The exceptional statement was that the AC 
reviews different reports and highlights presented in the annual report: 59% (or 17 out 
of 29) of the external auditors agreed with these statements. Overall, the responses of 
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the external group demonstrate that there are still plenty of vacuums relating to financial 
reporting where the ACs can, and should, significantly contribute. 
 
Concerning the statements on AC‘s role in financial reporting, all six statements were 
agreed with by the majority of respondents. The highest level of agreement was 75%, 
(or 105 out of 140 respondents) which was observed in the case of the statement that the 
ACs review relevant information (e.g. financial highlights and auditors‘ reports) which 
are presented in the annual report. On the other hand, only 51% of the respondents 
agreed that the ACs review the compliance of accounting standards in preparing 
financial statements. Although all the statements in relation to AC‘s role in financial 
reporting have been agreed with by the majority of respondents, it is important to note 
that a significant portion of respondents (around 30%) selected the ‗neutral‘ option 
when responding to the questionnaire. This might be because, either the respondents are 
not sure about AC‘s role in financial reporting or they are not willing to disclose the 
committee‘s lack in this respect. The AC‘s considerable role in financial reporting is 
documented by a great deal of research, including: Urbancic (1996); Spira (1999b); 
Rezaee et al. (2003); Gendron and Bedard (2006); and Turley and Zaman (2007). The 
responses generally indicate that the ACs in Bangladesh definitely play some role in the 
financial reporting of the company, but that there are some areas where the ACs can 
enhance their involvement in order to enhance the integrity in company‘s financial 
reporting. 
 
6.3.1.6 Role in External Auditing 
Table 6.6 shows that only 37%  (or 11 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons agreed that the 
AC reviews the Engagement Letter (EL)  prepared for the external auditors, and only 
40% of the respondents in this group agreed with the statements on AC‘s role in 
reviewing the expertise and resources of the external auditors. On the other hand, 94% 
of the AC chairpersons agreed that the ACs review the findings of external auditors, and 
77% of the respondents in this group agreed that the ACs monitor management‘s 
responsiveness to the findings obtained by the external auditors. 
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Mixed responses were received from the company secretaries in the case of the 
statements relating to AC‘s role in external auditing. Only 27% (or 10 out of 37) of the 
company secretaries agreed that the ACs review the EL prepared for the external 
auditors, and only 40% of the respondents from this group agreed with the statements 
relating to AC‘s role in reviewing the expertise and resources of the external auditors. 
On the other hand, 73% of the company secretaries agreed that the ACs review the 
findings of the external auditors, and 60% of the respondents from this sample group 
agreed that the ACs monitor management‘s responsiveness to the findings obtained by 
the external auditors. 
 
The finance heads participating in the survey also gave mixed opinions on AC‘s role in 
external auditing. Only one statement (i.e. that the ACs review the findings of the 
external auditors) was agreed with by the majority (64%) of respondents. Only 25% (or 
11 out of 44) of the respondents agreed that the ACs review and approve the EL 
prepared for external auditors. A significant portion of finance heads remained neutral in 
expressing their opinions on the statements relating to AC‘s role in external auditing. 
This might happen because, either the finance heads are reluctant to disclose AC‘s 
limited role in external auditing or they really are unsure about AC‘s role in this respect. 
 
The responses of the external auditors in relation to the eight statements on AC‘s role in 
external auditing show that only one statement was agreed with by the majority of 
respondents. The majority (62%) of external auditors participating in the survey agreed 
that the ACs review the findings of the external auditors. On the other hand, only 21% 
(or 6 out of 29) of the respondents in this group agreed that the ACs review and approve 
the EL prepared for external auditors. It can be inferred that in the view of the external 
auditors, the role of ACs in dealing with them and their activities is unsatisfactory. 
 
It can be seen from the responses of the 140 respondents from the four samples that 
three out of eight statements were agreed with by the majority of respondents. A vast 
majority (72%) of the respondents agreed that the AC reviews the findings of the 
external auditors, while only 27% of the respondents agreed that the AC reviews the EL 
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of the external auditors. Overall, the responses reflect the fact that the ACs in 
Bangladesh are still not yet able to perform their role in dealing with external auditing, 
as suggested by many prior researchers including Wolnizer (1995) and Lambe (2005). 
 
6.3.1.7 Role in Internal Auditing 
The majority of AC chairpersons agreed with all of the eight statements on AC‘s role in 
internal auditing. 90% (27 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons agreed with three 
statements which relate to: 
(i)   AC‘s role in reviewing internal auditor‘s report and findings; 
(ii)  AC‘s role in enhancing the independence of internal auditors; and, 
(iii) AC‘s role in monitoring the effectiveness of internal auditing. 
However, only 63% (or 19 out of 30) of the AC chairpersons agreed that the AC plays a 
significant role in appointing or removing the head of internal audit division of the 
company. 
 
Similarly, the majority of company secretaries agreed with all eight statements on AC‘s 
role in internal auditing. The statement regarding AC‘s role in evaluating the 
effectiveness of internal audit functions has been agreed with by 78% of the company 
secretaries. Again, 51% (or 19 out of 37) of the company secretaries agreed with three 
statements which relate to: 
(i) AC‘s role in the appointment or removal of the head of the internal audit 
division; 
(ii) AC‘s role in reviewing the charter of the internal auditor; and, 
(iii) AC‘s meeting with the internal audit team without presence of the top 
management. 
These findings indicate that AC‘s role in internal auditing is not as significant as 
expected. One reason for this might be that the AC members have neither the required 
expertise nor can they give much time to the committee‘s affairs. 
 
Table 6.6 also shows that only 41% (or 18 out of 44) of the finance heads agreed that 
the ACs recommend the appointment and/or removal of the head internal auditors, and 
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39% of the respondents in this group agreed that the ACs review the charter of internal 
auditors, although 73% of the finance heads agreed that the ACs monitor the 
management‘s responsiveness towards the recommendations of the internal audit team. 
68% of the finance heads agreed that the ACs evaluate the effectiveness of the internal 
audit function, while only 44% of the respondents from this group agreed that the ACs 
meet with the head internal auditor without the management‘s presence. 
 
Similarly, only 35% (10 out of 29) of the external auditors agreed that the AC makes 
recommendations on the appointment and/or removal of the head of the internal audit 
section, and that the AC reviews the charter of internal auditors. On the other hand, 73% 
of the external auditors agreed that the AC monitors the responsiveness if management 
towards the recommendations of the internal audit team. However, only 41% of the 
respondents in this group agreed that the AC meet with the head of the internal audit 
section in absence of the management. 
 
The overall response from all four sample groups indicates that the respondents tend to 
be somewhere between neutrality and agreement on the statements. The majority of 
respondents agreed with the last six statements, while only 47% (or 66 out of 140) 
respondents agreed with the first two statements, which are: (i) the AC recommends the 
appointment or termination of the internal audit head; and, (ii) the AC reviews the 
charter of the internal auditors. Therefore, the scenario of the Bangladeshi ACs indicates 
that they still have many areas in which they could play a role in making the internal 
auditing functions of the company more effective.    
 
6.3.1.8 Overall AC Practice 
Two general statements were aimed at investigating the overall independence and 
effectiveness of ACs in Bangladesh. The statement that the ACs can work independently 
was agreed with by the majority of respondents of four sample groups (80%; 81%; 
89%; and 72% respectively) and the statement that the ACs are effective was agreed 
with by 74% of the AC chairpersons, 76% of the company secretaries, and 66% of the 
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finance heads. Whereas only 31% of the external auditors agreed that the ACs are 
effective. It is important to note that 48% (or 14 out of 29) of the external auditors 
remained neutral in the case of the last statement. This might be because, the external 
auditors were unwilling to express concerns about the AC functions of their clients and, 
therefore, they neither agreed nor disagreed when responding to the overall 
effectiveness of the ACs. Overall, 82% of the respondents agreed that the ACs can work 
independently.  Regarding the overall effectiveness of the ACs in Bangladesh, 63% (or 
88 out of 140) of the respondents felt that the ACs are working effectively. This result 
indicates that the ACs in Bangladesh are somewhat effective, but that the level of 
effectiveness is not up to the mark.  
 
6.3.2 Responses towards the Statements on Audit Committee Practices:  
Mean and Standard Deviation 
Table 6.6 presented the percentage of frequencies of disagree (strongly disagree and 
disagree), neutral, and agree (agree and strongly agree) of the four sample groups. The 
analysis of the responses might be more facilitated if the mean values with standard 
deviations of response in relation to the statements are reported. Therefore, the 
following table (Table 6.7) presents the mean scores and standard deviations of the 
responses towards the 50 statements.                                                               
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Table 6.7: Analysis of Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) of Responses towards the Statements on Audit Committee Practices 
 
Statements AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External 
Auditor 
All Four 
Samples 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
A. Composition  3.54 0.91 3.39 0.84 3.32 0.90 2.81 0.95 3.29 0.95 
1. The AC members are appointed in consultation with the AC 
chairperson. 
4.23 0.97 3.68 1.03 3.73 0.92 3.14 0.79 3.70 0.99 
2. The AC members have sufficient knowledge on the entity's 
business. 
4.03 0.85 4.11 0.74 3.89 0.92 2.90 0.86 3.77 0.95 
3. The AC members have sufficient knowledge on Accounting and/or 
Auditing practices. 
3.80 0.81 3.62 0.79 3.55 0.85 2.72 1.00 3.45 0.93 
4. The AC members have sufficient experience in Accounting and/or 
Auditing. 
3.93 0.74 3.35 0.86 3.50 0.82 2.69 0.97 3.38 0.94 
5. The AC members are capable of mediating problems in performing 
their duties. 
3.90 0.84 3.76 0.68 3.66 0.75 2.93 0.88 3.58 0.85 
6. The majority of AC members are independent /non-executive 
directors. 
1.90 0.89 2.11 0.86 2.05 0.88 1.97 .98 2.09 0.91 
7. The chairperson of the AC is an independent director. 2.50 0.92 2.27 0.98 2.17 1.02 2.31 1.03 2.29 0.98 
8. The size of the AC is appropriate for carrying out its duties 
properly. 
4.00 0.95 4.22 0.71 4.07 0.82 3.79 0.77 4.04 0.82 
B. Authority and Resources  4.14 0.88 4.17 0.85 4.18 0.77 3.71 0.96 4.07 0.88 
9. The AC has adequate authority in order to carry out its 
responsibilities. 
4.33 0.80 4.30 0.81 4.39 0.65 3.83 0.93 4.24 0.81 
10. The AC has ready access to relevant information if required. 4.37 0.81 4.41 0.76 4.45 0.63 3.90 0.94 4.31 0.79 
11. The AC receives prompt responses from the management in 
carrying out its duties. 
4.30 0.92 4.38 0.72 4.45 0.63 3.72 1.03 4.25 0.85 
12. The AC is provided with sufficient resources including secretarial 
support to carry out its duties. 
4.20 0.85 4.30 0.88 4.23 0.89 3.90 0.94 4.17 0.89 
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Statements AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External 
Auditor 
All Four 
Samples 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
13. The non-executive AC members are adequately paid for their 
time and efforts. 
3.50 1.01 3.49 1.10 3.36 1.06 3.21 0.94 3.39 1.04 
C. Diligence  3.89 0.97 3.68 0.92 3.50 0.91 3.20 0.84 3.57 0.94 
14. The AC has a charter which outlines its objectives, duties and 
responsibilities. 
3.87 1.01 3.68 1.08 3.39 1.02 3.34 0.86 3.56 1.01 
15. The AC charter is reviewed annually. 3.47 1.04 3.00 0.97 3.07 1.02 2.66 0.86 3.05 1.01 
16. The AC members have a clear understanding of their 
responsibilities. 
4.23 0.82 4.00 0.91 3.89 0.81 3.34 0.81 3.88 0.89 
17. Members of the AC readily assume their responsibilities. 4.07 1.01 4.05 0.88 3.84 0.91 3.72 0.70 3.92 0.89 
18. The AC members devote sufficient time to the committee's 
affairs. 
3.83 0.95 3.68 0.75 3.34 0.81 2.93 0.96 3.45 0.91 
D. Meeting 4.41 0.63 4.10 0.82 4.14 0.72 3.66 0.84 4.09 0.80 
19. The agendas of the AC meetings are finalized by the chairperson. 4.50 0.90 4.14 0.89 4.30 0.76 3.79 0.86 4.19 0.87 
20. The chairperson cooperates with other committee members 
before finalizing the agenda of the meetings. 
4.10 0.71 3.76 0.80 3.55 0.76 3.38 0.68 3.69 0.78 
21. The agenda and related materials are provided to members fairly 
ahead of the meetings. 
4.63 0.49 4.51 0.61 4.36 0.61 3.83 0.71 4.35 0.67 
22. All members can express their views freely and independently in 
the meetings. 
4.80 0.41 4.41 0.72 4.39 0.69 3.79 0.86 4.36 0.76 
23. The frequency of the AC meetings is sufficient to carry out its 
responsibilities. 
4.40 0.62 4.03 0.73 4.07 0.79 3.66 0.94 4.04 0.80 
24. The duration of the AC meetings is sufficient for a full discussion 
of important issues. 
4.50 0.51 4.05 0.74 4.18 0.79 3.72 0.92 4.12 0.79 
25. Non-members attend the AC meetings if required. 3.83 0.83 3.81 1.10 4.00 0.72 3.52 0.83 3.81 0.89 
26. The minutes of the AC meetings are circulated to all members of 
the Board of Directors (BODs). 
4.53 0.57 4.11 0.97 4.30 0.67 3.62 0.90 4.16 0.84 
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Statements AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External 
Auditor 
All Four 
Samples 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
E. Role in Financial Reporting 4.26 0.69 3.88 0.73 3.61 0.86 3.23 0.75 3.74 0.84 
27. The AC reviews the integrity of companies' financial statements. 4.20 0.66 4.00 0.67 3.68 0.77 3.24 0.69 3.79 0.78 
28. The AC reviews accounting policies and changes made therein. 4.27 0.64 3.92 0.68 3.50 0.79 3.21 0.73 3.71 0.81 
29. The AC reviews accounting estimates and judgments done in 
preparing financial statements. 
4.20 0.85 3.78 0.75 3.45 0.85 3.21 0.77 3.65 0.87 
30. The AC reviews the compliance of the Accounting Standards 
(e.g. IAS, BAS etc.) in preparing financial statements. 
4.00 0.79 3.59 0.80 3.43 0.95 3.00 0.85 3.51 0.91 
31. The AC reviews the clarity and completeness of disclosures in 
financial statements. 
4.40 0.56 3.84 0.69 3.66 0.91 3.24 0.69 3.78 0.83 
32. The AC reviews other information (e.g. the auditors' report, 
financial highlights etc.) presented in the annual report. 
4.47 0.63 4.14 0.79 3.91 0.91 3.48 0.78 4.00 0.86 
F. Role in External Auditing 3.82 0.83 3.43 0.90 3.24 0.86 3.14 0.75 3.39 0.88 
33. External auditors are appointed and/or removed upon 
recommendation of the AC. 
3.53 0.82 3.35 1.03 3.02 1.09 3.00 0.80 3.21 0.98 
34. The AC reviews the expertise of the external auditors. 3.43 0.86 3.24 0.89 3.00 0.94 3.14 0.74 3.19 0.88 
35. The AC reviews and approves the terms of the Engagement 
Letter (EL) prepared for the external auditors. 
3.37 0.81 3.03 0.99 2.89 0.92 2.90 0.72 3.03 0.89 
36. The AC monitors the external audit firm's compliance with the 
existing ethical and regulatory requirements in Bangladesh. 
3.83 0.83 3.35 0.82 3.27 0.87 3.00 0.80 3.36 0.87 
37. The AC reviews the findings of the annual audit obtained by the 
external auditors. 
4.27 0.69 3.81 0.84 3.75 0.72 3.59 0.68 3.84 0.77 
38. The AC reviews the management's responsiveness to the external 
auditors' findings. 
4.07 0.83 3.62 0.89 3.52 0.73 3.34 0.72 3.63 0.83 
39. The AC meets with the external auditors without the presence of 
the management to discuss any issues, problems or reservations 
arising from the audit. 
3.87 0.86 3.32 0.88 3.11 0.75 3.00 0.76 3.31 0.86 
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Statements AC 
Chairperson 
Company 
Secretary 
Finance Head External 
Auditor 
All Four 
Samples 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
40. The AC reviews and monitors the independence and effectiveness 
of the external auditing process. 
4.17 0.95 3.70 0.88 3.34 0.83 3.17 0.80 3.58 0.93 
G. Role in Internal Auditing 4.18 0.85 3.70 1.02 3.58 0.90 3.46 0.85 3.72 0.94 
41. The AC recommends and approves the appointment or 
termination of the heads of the internal audit division. 
3.73 0.83 3.43 0.96 3.20 1.00 3.10 0.77 3.36 0.93 
42. The AC approves and reviews the charter of the internal auditors. 3.83 0.99 3.41 1.04 3.32 0.91 3.14 0.74 3.41 0.95 
43. The AC assesses and reviews the annual internal audit work plan. 4.07 0.83 3.57 1.04 3.57 0.93 3.45 0.91 3.65 0.95 
44. The AC reviews the internal audit reports, and other findings. 4.27 0.74 3.84 1.04 3.73 0.79 3.62 0.94 3.85 0.91 
45. The AC reviews and monitors the management's responsiveness 
to the internal auditor's findings and recommendations. 
4.40 0.86 4.00 1.05 3.77 0.89 3.66 0.86 3.94 0.95 
46. The AC meets with the head of the internal audit function without 
the presence of the management. 
4.23 0.90 3.49 0.99 3.36 0.92 3.31 0.76 3.57 0.96 
47. The AC enhances the independence of the internal auditors of the 
company. 
4.43 0.90 3.78 1.11 3.75 0.78 3.59 0.87 3.87 0.96 
48. The AC monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of the internal 
audit function. 
4.47 0.78 4.08 0.92 3.95 0.99 3.79 0.98 4.06 0.95 
H. Overall Practice 4.25 0.84 4.18 0.80 3.97 0.63 3.52 0.84 3.99 0.81 
49. The AC can work independently. 4.43 0.82 4.27 0.84 4.25 0.65 3.86 0.83 4.21 0.79 
50. The AC is effective. 4.07 0.87 4.08 0.76 3.68 0.60 3.17 0.85 3.76 0.83 
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Table 6.7 shows that the mean scores of the responses to the statements relating to the 
AC composition are: 3.54 (AC chairpersons); 3.39 (company secretaries); 3.32 (finance 
heads); and 2.81 (external auditors); and that these result in an aggregated mean score of 
3.29 for all 140 respondents. It is notable that the mean score of the responses of the 
external auditors is lower than that of the other three groups. This might happen because 
all of the other three groups are either executives or directors of the company (i.e. 
internals) and they might tend to hide some weaknesses of the ACs. It is important to 
note that both statements relating to whether the majority of AC members are 
independent directors, and whether the AC chairperson is an independent director, had 
significantly low means in the case of all four groups. This reflects the view that the 
ACs of Bangladesh are mainly led and dominated by the executive directors which is 
against the spirit of the formation of the ACs as suggested in the most of the guidelines, 
including: the Cadbury Report (1992); the BRC (1999); and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002). A lower aggregated mean score (which is less than 3.50) in the case of the 
statements on AC members‘ literacy and experience in a related area indicates that the 
AC members are lacking in terms of literacy and experience in related areas. However, 
the statement relating to the appropriateness of AC size has been agreed with by the 
highest number of respondents in the cases of each of the four sample groups, and this 
implies that there is no major problem regarding the size of ACs in Bangladesh. 
 
Regarding the statements on authority and resources provided to the ACs, the mean 
scores of the responses of the first three sample groups are very similar (4.14, 4.17, and 
4.18 respectively) while the mean score of the same three statements obtained from the 
external auditors‘ responses is slightly lower (3.71). The second statement of this 
section that the AC has ready access to the relevant information has received the highest 
combined mean score (4.31). This result is consistent with Bull and Sharp (1989) and 
Rittenberg and Nair (1994) who reported on the importance of open lines of 
communication that must exist between the ACs and those of the company who can 
provide them with the required information. However, the lowest mean value (3.39) was 
observed in the case of the statement on the payment of remuneration and benefits to the 
independent directors compared to their time and effort devoted to the committee‘s 
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affairs. This reflects the fact that the independent members of the committee are not 
paid adequate remuneration for their efforts. 
 
Relating to the statements on diligence of the ACs, the mean values obtained from the 
responses of the four sample groups are: 3.89 (AC chairpersons); 3.68 (company 
secretaries); 3.50 (finance heads); and 3.20 (external auditors). Furthermore, the 
statement that the AC charter is reviewed annually has been assigned the lowest mean 
value in the case of all the four sample groups. The statement that the AC members 
readily assume their responsibilities has achieved the highest combined mean value. In 
relation to the statement on the sufficiency of time devoted by the AC members for the 
committee‘s affairs, a lower aggregated mean score of 3.45 demonstrates that the AC 
members in Bangladesh do not devote enough time to the committee‘s affairs. 
 
Out of the eight sections of statements included in the questionnaire, the highest overall 
mean value (4.09) is observed in the case of the statements on AC meetings. Samples 
group-wise mean scores on this aspect are: 4.41 (AC chairpersons); 4.10 (company 
secretaries); 4.14 (heads of finance); and 3.66 (external auditors). It is encouraging that 
the statement stating that all members can express their views and opinions freely in the 
AC meeting has obtained the highest overall mean value in this section of statements 
(4.36). However, the lowest mean value (overall 3.69) is seen in the case of the second 
statement (i.e. the AC chairperson discusses with the other members before finalizing 
the agenda for the meetings). This result implies that the AC members do not play any 
significant role in choosing the agenda for the AC meetings. 
 
In relation to the statements on AC‘s role in financial reporting, the mean score of the 
responses from the AC chairpersons‘ group is relatively higher than those of the other 
three sample groups.  The statement on AC‘s role in reviewing relevant information 
(auditor‘s report, financial highlights) presented in the annual report has been assigned 
the highest overall mean score (i.e. 4.00) which implies AC‘s significant role in this 
regard. This view is not surprising because Jenkins and Robinson (1985) stated that the 
primary function of an AC is to oversee the financial reporting and disclosures prepared 
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by the management. On the other hand, the statement relating to AC‘s role in reviewing 
the compliances of accounting standards in preparing financial statements has obtained 
the lowest aggregated mean value (3.51), which shows the weakness of the ACs in 
ensuring the satisfactory compliance of the accounting principles and standards in 
preparing the financial reports. Although AC‘s considerable role in financial reporting is 
documented by a great deal of research (including McMullen, 1996; the SEC, 1999, 
2003; Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron and Bedard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; 
Cohen et al., 2007a), a lower mean score of the overall responses (i.e. 3.74 on a 5-point 
scale) indicates that the ACs can play more proactive role in this area. 
 
The significant role of ACs in the case of external auditing has been documented by a 
large amount of the prior research (such as: Rezaee and Farmer, 1994; Wolnizer, 1995; 
Beasley et al., 2009). However, the responses indicate that the ACs in Bangladesh 
cannot yet satisfactorily perform their role in this area (overall mean scores 3.39 out of 
5).  The mean values of the responses to eight statements on this aspect are: 3.82 (AC 
chairpersons); 3.43 (company secretaries); 3.24 (finance heads); and 3.14 (external 
auditors). A relatively lower mean score (3.17) for the responses from external auditors 
to the statements  on AC‘s role in insuring the independence of the external auditors 
indicates that the external auditors are not satisfied with the role of ACs  in relation to 
external auditing functions. 
 
In the case of the statements on AC‘s role relating to internal auditing, the mean score 
obtained from the responses of the AC chairpersons (4.18) is higher than that of the 
other three sample groups. The lowest mean value has been assigned in the case of the 
first statement (i.e. that the ACs recommend and approve the appointment or 
termination of the heads of internal audit division). This indicates that the ACs play 
insignificant role in appointing or terminating the head of internal audit functions. On 
the other hand, the highest mean value (overall 4.06) is observed in the case of the 
statement that the AC monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of internal audit 
functions. This result reflects the view that the ACs in Bangladesh do play an important 
role in ensuring effective internal auditing functions and this result is consistent with 
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DeZoort (1997) who highlighted the role of ACs in encouraging the internal audit 
division to work independently and effectively. 
 
Davidson and Ebersole (2002) pointed out that independence from management is 
widely recognised as an important characteristic of an effective AC.  The last two 
statements that aimed to measure the general scenario of the AC‘s independence and 
effectiveness obtained different mean values. The mean score of the statement regarding 
AC independence is 4.21, while the statement on the overall effectiveness of the ACs 
obtained a lower mean value of 3.76. The difference in mean scores in case of these two 
statements can be interpreted by the fact that the respondents have evaluated the ACs as 
independent, but they still think that the ACs are not yet able to fulfil their duties 
effectively. 
 
6.3.3 Responses towards the Factors Affecting the Audit Committee 
Practices: Mean, Standard Devotion (SD) and Ranking 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the respondents were requested to share their views on 
the factors that affect the AC practices in Bangladesh. A total of nine factors were listed 
in the questionnaire. It should be mentioned that the factors were chosen on the basis of 
the literature as reviewed in Chapter Four, and were also the participants‘ opinions 
obtained from the pre-testing of the questionnaire.  Table 6.8 presents the mean values 
along with the standard deviations of the responses towards these factors. Furthermore, 
the factors have also been ranked on the basis of the mean scores as obtained from the 
responses. 
 
It is seen in Table 6.8 that the AC chairpersons considered the non-appointment of 
independent directors as the chairperson of the AC as the most affecting factor (mean 
value of 4.13), followed by the non-inclusion of majority independent directors in the 
AC (mean value of 4.10). As per the responses received from the AC chairpersons, the 
third most affecting factor is the lack of AC members‘ experience and expertise (mean 
value of 3.83). The lack of AC members‘ qualification (mean value of 3.70) is perceived 
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as the fourth most affecting factor. These results are consistent with the earlier findings 
(as presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7) where shortfalls in these areas were clearly 
highlighted by the majority of respondents. 
 
The responses from the company secretaries indicate that lack of AC members‘ 
qualification (mean value of 4.11) is the most affecting factor, followed by lack of AC 
members‘ experience and expertise (mean value of 4.08). As viewed by this group of 
respondents, the third most affecting factor is the non-appointment of independent 
directors as the chairperson of the AC (mean value of 4.03), followed by non-inclusion 
of majority independent directors in the AC (mean value of 3.81). Inadequate authority 
has been considered to be the least important of the factors (mean value of 2.70) that 
affect AC effectiveness. 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of majority executive directors in the ACs has also been 
considered by the finance heads as the top most affecting factor (mean value of 4.25), 
followed by lack of AC members‘ qualification (mean value of 4.23). Lack of AC 
members‘ experience and expertise (mean value of 4.18) has been regarded as the third 
most affecting factor, while the fourth ranked factor is  the non-appointment of 
independent directors as the chairperson of the AC (mean value of 4.14). Consistent 
with the responses of the previous two groups of respondents, inadequate authority 
delegated to the ACs is perceived as the least affecting factor while inadequate 
resources provided to the ACs was regarded as the second least important factor (among 
the given nine factors) that affects AC practices in Bangladesh. 
 
The responses of the external auditors are similar to those of the other three samples. 
For example, the inclusion of majority executive directors in the ACs, and the non-
appointment of independent directors as the chairperson of the ACs, have been 
considered to be the top two most affecting factors of AC practices in Bangladesh. This 
group of respondents viewed the lack of AC members‘ qualification as the third most 
affecting factors (mean value of 3.97), followed by the lack of AC members‘ experience 
and expertise (mean value of 3.90). The two least affective factors out of the given nine 
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factors have been viewed as: the inadequacy of the authority of ACs, and the 
inadequacy of resources provided to the ACs. This finding is consistent with the 
responses towards the statements on authority and the resources of the ACs (see Table 
6.6) where most of the respondents agreed that the ACs in Bangladesh are provided 
sufficient authority and resources in order to carry out their responsibilities. 
 
Overall, Table 6.8 highlights the view that the non-appointment of independent directors 
as the chairperson of ACs is at the top of the given nine factors (mean value of 4.10), 
followed by the non-inclusion of majority independent directors in the ACs (mean value 
of 4.07). The respondents‘ emphasis on the importance of independent directors in the 
AC are supported by AcMullen and Raghunandan (1996) and Chan and Li (2008). 
These studies have emphasised the importance of independent members in ACs. 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001); Farber (2005); Krishan and Lee (2009); Bedard and 
Gendron (2010) and many other studies have argued that the background of the AC 
members in a similar area is a vital factor for an effective AC, and this view was 
reflected in the opinions of the respondents in this survey. For example, as per the 
combined responses of all participants, the third most affecting factor is the lack of AC 
members‘ qualification in relevant fields (mean value of 4.03), while lack of AC 
members‘ experience and expertise in the relevant field (mean value of 4.02) is regarded  
as the fourth most affecting factor. Although some researchers (including Klabers and 
Fogarty, 1993; and Sharma et al., 2009) noted that diligence of AC members is a vital 
factor for an effective AC, the respondents participating in this survey placed this as a 
less important factor in Bangladesh (where it was ranked as the fifth most affecting 
factor out of nine stated factors). One possible reason for the respondents‘ less emphasis 
on this factor might be that the ACs in Bangladesh are lacking heavily in some other 
areas (e.g. an independent director and experience of the AC members). Lack of support 
from the management (mean value of 2.98) was found to be the sixth most affecting 
factor, which implies that in the context of Bangladesh, the ACs are not significantly 
affected because of the lack of support from management. It can be interpreted that the 
AC members get quicker responses to their queries from the management because most 
of the AC members are the executive directors of their respective companies. The three 
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factors that generated low mean scores are: 
(i) The infrequent meeting of the ACs (mean score of 2.95); 
(ii) A lack of resources provided (mean score of 2.89); and, 
(iii) An insufficient authority delegated (mean score of 2.81). 
These results are consistent with the responses of earlier sections of the questionnaire 
where it was revealed that the majority of respondents feel that the ACs in Bangladesh 
are provided with sufficient authority and resources, and the frequency of AC meetings 
is quite satisfactory.                                                                                                              
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Table 6.8: Analysis of the Responses in Relation to Factors Affecting AC Effectiveness in Bangladesh 
 
Factors AC Chairperson 
(N=30) 
Company Secretary 
(N=37) 
Finance Head 
(N=44) 
External Auditor 
(N=29) 
All Respondents 
Combined (N=140) 
Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank 
1. Lack of AC members' qualification in 
relevant field. 
3.70 1.12 4 4.11 0.77 
 
1 4.23 0.94 2 3.97 1.15 3 4.03 1.00 3 
2. Lack of AC members' experience and 
expertise in the relevant field. 
3.83 1.09 3 4.08 0.86 2 4.18 1.06 3 3.90 1.18 4 4.02 1.04 4 
3. Non-inclusion of majority independent/ 
non-executive members in the AC. 
4.10 0.88 2 3.81 1.02 4 4.25 0.99 1 4.10 1.08 1 4.07 1.00 2 
4. Non-appointment of AC chairperson from 
independent/non-executive members. 
4.13 0.82 1 4.03 0.99 3 4.14 1.03 4 4.10 1.11 1 4.10 0.98 1 
5. Low frequency of AC meetings. 2.97 1.00 7 2.84 0.76 7 2.95 0.81 7 3.07 0.84 6 2.95 0.84 
 
7 
6. Lack of diligence in AC members. 3.20 1.21 5 2.92 0.98 6 3.16 0.94 5 3.10 0.86 5 3.09 1.00 
 
5 
7. Inadequate authority delegated to the AC. 2.93 1.31 9 2.70 1.13 9 2.86 1.29 9 2.72 1.22 8 2.81 1.23 
 
9 
8. Inadequate resources provided with the 
AC. 
3.20 1.42 5 2.73 1.10 8 2.93 1.28 8 2.72 1.00 8 2.89 1.22 
 
8 
9. Lack of supports from top management. 2.97 1.10 7 2.97 0.93 5 3.05 1.06 6 2.90 0.94 7 2.98 1.00 
 
6 
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Table 6.9: Analysis Showing the Suggestions for Improving AC Effectiveness 
 
Suggestions AC Chairperson 
(N=30) 
Company Secretary 
(N=37) 
Finance Head 
(N=44) 
External Auditor 
(N=29) 
All Respondents 
Combined (N=140) 
Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank 
1. Voluntary and self- regulation by the 
companies. 
3.83 1.02 10 3.50 0.85 10 3.39 1.06 10 3.03 0.98 10 3.44 1.01 10 
2. Increased pressure from general investors. 4.07 0.98 8 3.95 1.08 8 4.16 0.68 6 3.90 0.72 6 4.03 0.87 7 
3. Increased monitoring of existing rules and 
guidelines. 
4.27 1.05 5 4.19 1.08 4 4.36 0.87 4 4.55 0.69 2 4.34 0.93 3 
4. Introducing new rules and guidelines. 4.33 0.76 3 4.22 0.79 3 4.39 0.78 3 4.24 0.69 4 4.30 0.76 4 
5. Compulsory inclusion of AC report in the 
Annual Corporate Report. 
4.23 0.77 7 3.97 0.60 7 3.91 0.71 7 3.66 0.72 8 3.94 0.72 8 
6. Mandating the appointment of AC 
chairperson from independent /non-executive 
directors. 
4.67 0.55 1 4.57 0.77 1 4.59 0.66 1 4.62 0.49 1 4.61 0.63 1 
7. Mandating inclusion of majority 
independent/non-executive members in the 
AC. 
4.57 0.68 2 4.32 0.58 2 4.50 0.59 2 4.24 0.74 4 4.41 0.65 2 
8. Including AC practices in the listing 
requirements of stock exchanges. 
4.07 0.91 8 3.95 0.78 8 3.80 0.76 9 3.48 0.83 9 3.83 0.83 9 
9. Offering some incentives to the firms that 
comply with AC guidelines of SEC (issued 
in 2006). 
4.30 0.75 4 4.16 0.65 5 3.89 0.81 8 3.90 0.62 6 4.05 0.73 6 
10. Compulsory compliance of SEC order of 
2006 regarding the guidelines of AC 
practices. 
4.27 1.01 5 4.16 1.07 5 4.34 0.94 5 4.34 0.72 3 4.28 0.95 5 
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6.3.4 Responses on the Suggestions for Improving Audit Committee 
Effectiveness:  Mean, SD and Ranking 
The last section of the questionnaire consisted of ten possible ways of improving AC 
effectiveness in Bangladesh. Table 6.9 presents the responses towards this section in 
terms of mean, standard deviation and ranking of the responses. 
 
It is seen in Table 6.9 that the AC chairpersons emphasised some possible improvements 
for effectiveness of the ACs in Bangladesh. The three most recommended 
improvements, as viewed by the AC chairpersons are: 
(i) Mandating the appointment of independent directors as the chairperson of the 
ACs (mean value of 4.67); 
(ii) Mandatory inclusion of majority independent directors in the ACs (mean 
value of 4.57) and, 
(iii) Introducing new rules and guidelines in this respect (mean value of 4.33). 
It is not surprising that voluntary and self-regulations by the companies (mean value of 
3.83) have been regarded as the least recommended way of improving the AC 
effectiveness. It is interesting to see the consistency of responses regarding factors 
affecting AC practice and suggestions for improving AC effectiveness in Bangladesh. 
The key recommendations given by the respondents are related to the main factors that 
affect AC practices in Bangladesh.   
 
The suggestions as viewed by the company secretaries participating in the survey 
include: 
(i) The mandatory appointment of independent directors as the chairperson of 
ACs (mean value of 4.57); 
(ii) Mandating the inclusion of majority independent directors in the ACs (mean 
value of 4.32); 
(iii) Introducing new rules and guidelines in this respect (mean value of 4.22); 
and, 
(iv) Increasing monitoring of the existing compliance rules (mean value of 4.19). 
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The voluntary and self-regulations by the companies and the inclusion of AC practice as 
a compulsory listing requirement have unsurprisingly been regarded as the two least 
important ways of improving effectiveness of the ACs in Bangladesh. 
 
The responses of the finance heads are very similar to those of the previous two groups 
(i.e. the AC chairpersons and company secretaries). Table 6.9 shows that the top four 
and the bottom two suggestions (in terms of the mean scores) are very similar in the 
case of these three groups of respondents.  The appointment of independent directors as 
the chairperson of the AC is at the top of the ten given possible ways (mean value of 
4.59), and mandating the inclusion of majority independent directors in the AC (mean 
value of 4.50) has been regarded as the second most suggested way to improve the AC 
effectiveness. As per the responses of this group, the third ranked recommended 
measure (mean value of 4.39) is to introduce more new rules and guidelines in this 
respect, while increased monitoring of the existing rules is placed in the fourth position 
(mean value of 4.36) among the given ten recommendations. Voluntary and self-
regulations by the companies and the inclusion of AC practice as a compulsory listing 
requirement are in the two bottom positions of the list as per the ranking (with mean 
values of 3.39 and 3.80, respectively). 
 
The external auditors also emphasised on the appointment of independent directors as 
the chairpersons of the ACs (mean value of 4.62). However, they feel that the second 
most necessary step is to increase the monitoring of existing rules and guidelines (mean 
value of 4.55), and the inclusion of majority independent members in the AC has been 
considered to be the fourth most recommended way of improving the  effectiveness of 
the ACs (mean value of 4.24). The AC guidelines given by a SEC order in 2006 are now 
optional, which means that the listed companies will either comply or explain for non-
compliance. The external auditors generally think that if these guidelines are 
compulsorily imposed, the effectiveness of ACs will be significantly increased and, in 
their view, this is the third ranked (mean value of 4.34) recommended way of improving 
AC effectiveness in Bangladesh.  Although the external auditors differ in prioritising the 
top four recommendations, they agreed with the previous groups regarding the two least 
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effective ways out of a given ten. The two least suggested ways of improving the AC 
effectiveness in the views of the external auditors were: 
(i) Voluntary and self-regulations by the companies (3.03); and, 
(ii) The inclusion of AC practice as compulsory listing requirements of stock 
exchanges (3.48). 
 
The overall responses indicate that the appointment of independent directors as the 
chairperson of AC is the most recommended way of improving the effectiveness (mean 
value of 4.61) of the ACs followed by the mandatory inclusion of majority independent 
directors in the AC (mean value of 4.41). These suggestions are consistent with the 
guidelines for AC effectiveness as given in: the Olivencia Report (1998); the BRC 
(1999); the Treadway Commission report (1987) and the Cadbury Report (1992).  A 
great deal of research studies (including Baseley and Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002b; 
Bedard et al., 2004; Chan and Li, 2008; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009) have 
also highlighted the importance of independence directors in ACs.  Other suggestions 
that are seen to significantly improve the AC effectiveness include increasing 
monitoring in the case of existing rules and guidelines (mean value 4.34) and 
introducing new rules and guidelines (mean value 4.30). With rigorous monitoring by 
the SEC in ensuring the compliance of the guidelines issued, the AC practices can 
ensure that better AC practices in the corporations and, therefore, the scenario of AC 
practices is likely to improve significantly. New rules might include the minimum 
qualification and experience of AC members. Sensibly, the voluntary and self-
regulations by the companies and the inclusion of AC practice as a compulsory listing 
requirement are in the two lowest positions (with the mean values of 3.44 and 3.83, 
respectively). 
 
Therefore, there appears to be consensus among the four groups of respondents in 
relation to the possible measures to improve AC effectiveness in Bangladesh. Although 
the mean values differ in groups, the degree of importance (ranking) given to the 
suggestions is very similar. All the four sample groups unanimously agreed that it is 
very essential to appoint an AC chairperson from independent directors. Similarly, all 
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the four sample groups unanimously agreed that voluntary and self-regulation by the 
company itself is the least suggested measure out of the ten given ways of improving 
AC effectiveness. This is insistent with Bradbury‘s (1990) analysis of the extent of 
voluntary AC formation which indicated that, in a purely voluntary environment, very 
few firms form ACs. Furthermore, increased pressure from general investors has been 
considered to be of the least important measures (an aggregated mean value of 4.03) for 
improving the AC effectiveness, while mandating the AC chairperson from an 
independent director, the increased monitoring of existing rules, and introducing new 
rules have been assigned top priority in the list of recommendations.  These findings are 
not surprising because the majority of general investors in Bangladesh are not aware of 
the significance of having ACs in practice. Therefore, it is very unlikely that there will 
be severe pressure from general investors to enhance the AC effectiveness. Again, it 
should be admitted that the CG scenario in Bangladesh has not yet developed to an 
acceptable level where the companies themselves can voluntarily exercise the best 
guidelines on AC practices.  
 
This section has discussed descriptive statistics in order to describe the nature of the 
data collected from the field survey. These descriptive results need confirmation by 
some inferential statistics. Therefore, some non-parametric statistics (namely, the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, the Kruskal Wallis Test and the Mann Whitney U Test) 
have been run, and the results obtained in these tests are discussed in following section.   
 
6.4 Statistical Testing and Discussion 
The previous section focused on the descriptive characteristics of the questionnaire 
survey responses. This section continues with the analysis of the responses and a 
discussion of the test results of the hypotheses as proposed in Chapter Five. Firstly, the 
significance of the responses has been examined by the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test; 
and secondly, the hypotheses (as stated in Chapter Five) have been tested using the 
Kruskal Wallis Test and the Mann Whitney U Test as applicable. 
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6.4.1 Testing the Significance of Responses towards the Statements 
Table 6.7 reports the mean values and SDs of responses to the 50 statements on AC 
practices in Bangladesh. It is observed that some mean values are above 4.00, some are 
between 3.00 and 4.00, and a few values are below 3.00. The researcher feels that it is 
worth comparing the mean responses with 3 (the mid score of a 5 point scale) to 
examine the significance of agreement/disagreement using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test.  This test is used as non-parametric statistics, as opposed to one sample ‗t‘ test in 
parametric statistics (as explained in Chapter Five). Table 6.10 presents the mean scores 
of the responses to the statements as compared with ‗3‘ (the midpoint of a 5 point scale) 
to examine whether the agreement or disagreement of the responses to the statements is 
statistically significant or not. 
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Table 6.10: Analysis Showing the Significance of Responses towards the Statements on Audit Committee Practices  
 
Statements AC Chairperson Company Secretary Finance Head External Auditor 
Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value 
A. Composition   
1. The AC members are appointed in consultation 
with the AC chairperson. 
4.23 4.05 0.00* 3.68 3.33 0.00* 3.73 4.05 0.00* 3.14 0.94 0.35 
2. The AC members have sufficient knowledge on the 
entity's business. 
4.03 4.11 0.00* 4.11 4.92 0.00* 3.89 4.53 0.00* 2.90 0.65 0.51 
3. The AC members have sufficient knowledge on 
Accounting and/or Auditing practices. 
3.80 3.81 0.00* 3.62 3.67 0.00* 3.55 3.58 0.00* 2.72 1.41 0.16 
4. The AC members have sufficient experience in 
Accounting and/or Auditing. 
3.93 4.24 0.00* 3.35 2.29 0.02** 3.50 3.45 0.00* 2.69 1.66 0.10*** 
5. The AC members are capable of mediating 
problems in performing their duties. 
3.90 3.98 0.00* 3.76 4.50 0.00* 3.66 4.34 0.00* 2.93 0.43 0.67 
6. The majority of AC members are independent/ 
non-executive directors. 
1.90 3.19 0.00* 2.11 4.50 0.00* 2.05 4.59 0.00* 1.97 3.92 0.00* 
7. The Chairperson of the AC is an independent/non-
executive director. 
2.50 1.98 0.05** 2.27 2.94 0.00* 2.17 3.70 0.00* 2.31 2.59 0.01* 
8. The size of the AC is appropriate for carrying out 
its duties properly. 
4.00 3.83 0.00* 4.22 5.08 0.00* 4.07 5.12 0.00* 3.79 3.85 0.00* 
B. Authority and Resources   
9. The AC has adequate authority in order to carry 
out its responsibilities. 
4.33 4.52 0.00* 4.30 5.00 0.00* 4.39 5.74 0.00* 3.83 3.55 0.00* 
10. The AC has ready access to relevant information. 4.37 4.55 0.00* 4.41 5.13 0.00* 4.45 5.76 0.00* 3.90 3.70 0.00* 
11. The AC receives prompt responses from the 
management in carrying out its duties. 
4.30 4.37 0.00* 4.38 5.17 0.00* 4.45 5.76 0.00* 3.72 3.15 0.00* 
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Statements AC Chairperson Company Secretary Finance Head External Auditor 
Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value 
12. The AC is provided with sufficient resources 
including secretarial support to carry out its duties. 
4.20 4.33 0.00* 4.30 4.93 0.00* 4.23 5.25 0.00* 3.90 3.68 0.00* 
13. The non-executive AC members are adequately 
paid for their time and efforts. 
3.50 2.52 0.01* 3.49 2.43 0.02** 3.36 2.25 0.02** 3.21 1.22 0.22 
C. Diligence   
14. The AC has a charter which outlines its 
objectives, duties and responsibilities. 
3.87 3.48 0.00* 3.68 3.30 0.00* 3.39 2.43 0.02** 3.34 2.04 0.04** 
15. The AC charter is reviewed annually. 3.47 2.15 0.03** 3.00 0.00 1.00 3.07 0.55 0.58 2.66 2.05 0.04** 
16. The AC members have a clear understanding of 
their responsibilities. 
4.23 4.41 0.00* 4.00 4.39 0.00* 3.89 4.75 0.00* 3.34 2.13 0.03** 
17. Members of the AC readily assume their 
responsibilities. 
4.07 3.97 0.00* 4.05 4.51 0.00* 3.84 4.45 0.00* 3.72 3.87 0.00* 
18. The AC members devote sufficient time to the 
committee's affairs. 
3.83 3.62 0.00* 3.68 4.04 0.00* 3.34 2.61 0.01* 2.93 0.37 0.71 
D. Meeting  
19. The agendas of the AC meetings are finalized by 
the chairperson. 
4.50 4.69 0.00* 4.14 4.59 0.00* 4.30 5.52 0.00* 3.79 3.65 0.00* 
20. The chairperson cooperates with other committee 
members before finalizing the agenda of meetings. 
4.10 4.44 0.00* 3.76 4.14 0.00* 3.55 3.87 0.00* 3.38 2.67 0.01* 
21. The agenda and related materials are provided to 
members fairly ahead of the meetings. 
4.63 4.96 0.00* 4.51 5.34 0.00* 4.36 5.76 0.00* 3.83 4.07 0.00* 
22. All members can express their views freely and 
independently in the meetings. 
4.80 5.11 0.00* 4.41 5.12 0.00* 4.39 5.68 0.00* 3.79 3.63 0.00* 
23. The frequency of the AC meetings is sufficient to 
carry out its responsibilities. 
4.40 4.77 0.00* 4.03 4.86 0.00* 4.07 5.20 0.00* 3.66 3.12 0.00* 
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Statements AC Chairperson Company Secretary Finance Head External Auditor 
Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value 
24. The duration of the AC meetings is sufficient for 
a full discussion of important issues. 
4.50 4.93 0.00* 4.05 4.89 0.00* 4.18 5.31 0.00* 3.72 3.35 0.00* 
25. Non-members attend the AC meetings if required. 3.83 3.84 0.00* 3.81 3.42 0.00* 4.00 5.32 0.00* 3.52 2.88 0.00* 
26. The minutes of the AC meetings are circulated to 
all members of the Board of Directors (BODs). 
4.53 4.86 0.00* 4.11 4.42 0.00* 4.30 5.68 0.00* 3.62 3.08 0.00* 
E. AC Role in Financial Reporting  
27. The AC reviews the integrity of companies' 
financial statements. 
4.20 4.62 0.00* 4.00 4.99 0.00* 3.68 4.36 0.00* 3.24 1.81 0.07*** 
28. The AC reviews accounting policies and any 
changes made therein. 
4.27 4.70 0.00* 3.92 4.83 0.00* 3.50 3.54 0.00* 3.21 1.50 0.13 
29. The AC reviews accounting estimates and 
judgments done in preparing financial statements. 
4.20 4.33 0.00* 3.78 4.34 0.00* 3.45 3.16 0.00* 3.21 1.41 0.16 
30. The AC reviews the compliance of the 
Accounting Standards (e.g. IAS, BAS etc.) in 
preparing financial statements. 
4.00 4.21 0.00* 3.59 3.62 0.00* 3.43 2.80 0.01* 3.00 0.00 1.00 
31. The AC reviews the clarity and completeness of 
disclosures in financial statements. 
4.40 4.85 0.00* 3.84 4.67 0.00* 3.66 3.89 0.00* 3.24 1.81 0.07*** 
32. The AC reviews other information (e.g. the 
auditors' report, financial highlights etc.) presented in 
the annual report. 
4.47 4.77 0.00* 4.14 4.83 0.00* 3.91 4.61 0.00* 3.48 2.86 0.00* 
F. Role in External Auditing  
33. External auditors are appointed and/or removed 
upon the recommendation of the AC. 
3.53 3.01 0.00* 3.35 1.92 0.05** 3.02 0.04 0.97 3.00 0.00 1.00 
34. The AC assesses and reviews the expertise and 
resources of the external auditors. 
3.43 2.50 0.01* 3.24 1.60 0.11 3.00 0.10 0.92 3.14 1.00 0.32 
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Statements AC Chairperson Company Secretary Finance Head External Auditor 
Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value 
35. The AC reviews and approves the terms of the 
Engagement Letter (EL) prepared for the external 
auditors. 
3.37 2.30 0.02** 3.03 0.20 0.84 2.89 0.84 0.40 2.90 0.77 0.44 
36. The AC monitors the external audit firm's 
compliance with the existing ethical and regulatory 
requirements in Bangladesh. 
3.83 3.84 0.00* 3.35 2.38 0.02** 3.27 1.99 0.05** 3.00 0.00 1.00 
37. The AC reviews the findings of the annual audit 
obtained by the external auditors. 
4.27 4.66 0.00* 3.81 4.12 0.00* 3.75 4.74 0.00* 3.59 3.54 0.00* 
38. The AC reviews the management's 
responsiveness to the external auditors' findings. 
4.07 4.21 0.00* 3.62 3.42 0.00* 3.52 3.82 0.00* 3.34 2.36 0.02** 
39. The AC meets with the external auditors without 
the presence of management to discuss any issues, 
problems or reservations arising from the audit. 
3.87 3.85 0.00* 3.32 2.10 0.04** 3.11 1.01 0.31 3.00 0.00 1.00 
40. The AC reviews and monitors the independence 
and effectiveness of the external auditing process. 
4.17 4.18 0.00* 3.70 3.74 0.00* 3.34 2.51 0.01* 3.17 1.15 0.25 
G. Role in Internal Auditing  
41. The AC recommends and approves the 
appointment or termination of the heads of the 
internal audit division. 
3.73 3.62 0.00* 3.43 2.50 0.01* 3.20 1.26 0.21 3.10 0.73 0.47 
42. The AC approves and reviews the charter of the 
internal auditors. 
3.83 3.41 0.00* 3.41 2.23 0.03** 3.32 2.11 0.03** 3.14 1.00 0.32 
43. The AC assesses and reviews the annual internal 
audit work plan. 
4.07 4.21 0.00* 3.57 2.92 0.00* 3.57 3.37 0.00* 3.45 2.38 0.02** 
44. The AC reviews the annual internal audit reports, 
budget and other findings. 
4.27 4.57 0.00* 3.84 3.73 0.00* 3.73 4.43 0.00* 3.62 2.92 0.00* 
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Statements AC Chairperson Company Secretary Finance Head External Auditor 
Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value Mean z 
value 
P value 
45. The AC reviews and monitors the management's 
responsiveness to the internal auditor's findings and 
recommendations. 
4.40 4.54 0.00* 4.00 4.06 0.00* 3.77 4.29 0.00* 3.66 3.27 0.00* 
46. The AC meets with the head of the internal audit 
function without the presence of the management. 
4.23 4.29 0.00* 3.49 2.58 0.01* 3.36 2.37 0.02** 3.31 2.06 0.04** 
47. The AC enhances the independence of the 
internal auditors of the company. 
4.43 4.37 0.00* 3.78 3.50 0.00* 3.75 4.55 0.00* 3.59 3.04 0.00* 
48. The AC monitors and evaluates the effectiveness 
of the internal audit function. 
4.47 4.67 0.00* 4.08 4.55 0.00* 3.95 4.58 0.00* 3.79 3.41 0.00* 
H. Overall Practice  
49. The AC can work independently. 4.43 4.56 0.00* 4.27 4.88 0.00* 4.25 5.63 0.00* 3.86 3.84 0.00* 
50. The AC is effective. 4.07 4.12 0.00* 4.08 4.77 0.00* 3.68 4.99 0.00* 3.17 1.11 0.27 
* Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 10% level
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It can be seen in Table 6.10 that out of the eight statements on AC composition, six 
statements have been significantly agreed by the first three groups of respondents. On 
the other hand, the external auditors agreed (as it was found statistically significant) 
with only one statement (i.e. that the AC size is appropriate). It is notable that the size of 
ACs in Bangladesh has been regarded as appropriate for them to carry out their 
responsibilities. This result is consistent with the studies of Pincus et al. (1989) and 
Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) who emphasised on the importance of appropriate 
AC size. Unlike other three sample groups, the external auditors neither significantly 
disagreed nor significantly agreed at the 5% level of significance regarding the first five 
statements on AC composition. However, all four sample groups significantly disagreed 
with two particular statements, which are: firstly, that the majority of members of the 
ACs are independent directors; and secondly, that the chairperson of AC is appointed 
from independent directors. This finding is inconsistent with Davidson and Ebersole 
(2000) who noted that there is strong relationship between AC independence and AC 
effectiveness. Verschoor (1993) also pointed out that AC independent is widely 
recognised as an important characteristic of an effective AC. 
 
Regarding the statements on authority and resources provided to the ACs, the first four 
statements were agreed at a 1% level of significance by all four sample groups. This 
result is consistent with the recommendation of Bull and Sharp (1989) and Rittenberg 
and Nair (1994) who recommended the importance of management‘s support and open 
lines of communication with the AC members. However, in relation to the last statement 
of this group (i.e. whether the independent members receive enough remuneration or 
benefits for their time) the external auditors‘ agreement was insignificant, while the 
agreement with the statement by other three sample groups was found statistically 
significant at a 5% level of significance. 
 
Regarding the statements on diligence of the ACs, the first statement (i.e. that the AC 
has a charter for its duties) was significantly agreed with by the AC chairpersons and 
company secretaries at a 1% level of significance, and by the finance heads and external 
auditors at a 5% level. Extremely mixed responses were observed in the case of the 
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second statement in this group (i.e. that the AC charter is reviewed annually). While the 
AC chairpersons significantly agreed with this statement, the company secretaries and 
the finance heads neither agreed nor disagreed significantly at a 5% level of 
significance. On the other hand, the external auditors significantly disagreed with this 
statement. With the exception of the statement regarding the annual review of the AC 
charter, all of the other statements relating to AC diligence were agreed with by the 
three groups of respondents (namely, AC chairpersons, company secretaries and finance 
heads). The significance was high at a level of 0.01 in the case of the external auditors‘ 
responses in relation to the statement that the AC members readily assume their 
responsibilities, whereas agreement to the statements on availability of AC charters and 
AC members‘ understanding of their responsibilities was found to be significant at a 5% 
level. The external auditors disagreed that the AC members devote sufficient time to the 
committee‘s affairs, but their disagreements were found to be statistically insignificant 
at a 5% level of significance. 
 
As discussed earlier (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7), a better picture of AC practices was 
observed in the case of the statements relating to AC meeting. All of the statements on 
AC meeting were significantly agreed with at a 1% level, and this finding is consistent 
with the recommendations and results of Raghunandan et al. (1998); the BRC (1999); 
Gendron and Bedard (2006); Beasley et al. (2009) who emphasised the importance of 
various issues of effective AC meetings. Therefore, the responses reflect that there is no 
major lack of the ACs in Bangladesh of relation to AC meeting.   
 
In relation to the statements on AC‘s role in financial reporting, three groups of 
respondents (i.e. AC chairpersons, company secretaries and finance heads) significantly 
agreed with all six statements. This is reflected in the view of these three sample groups, 
that the ACs in Bangladesh are performing satisfactory role in relation to the company‘s 
financial reporting. Different views are observed in the case of the external auditors. 
The external auditors significantly agreed with only the last statement of this group (i.e. 
that the ACs review information included in the annual report) while their agreements 
with the other five statements were statistically insignificant at a 5% level. Therefore, it 
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is clear that the external auditors differ from the other three groups of respondents in 
relation to most of the statements on AC‘s role in financial reporting. 
 
There were eight statements related to AC‘s role in external auditing and the 
significance test produced mixed results. The AC chairpersons significantly agreed with 
all eight statements while the external auditors significantly agreed with only two of 
these statements, namely: that the ACs review the findings of the external auditors, and 
that the ACs review the management responsiveness to the external auditors‘ findings. 
The test reveals the agreement/disagreement of the external auditors in relation to the 
other six statements to be statistically insignificant (at a 5% significance level). The role 
of the ACs in reviewing the expertise of the external auditors and  reviewing the terms 
of EL prepared for the external auditors, was neither significantly agreed to nor 
significantly disagreed with by the three groups of respondents (i.e. company 
secretaries, finance heads and external auditors). Furthermore, the agreement of the AC 
chairpersons and the company secretaries with the first statement (i.e. that the external 
auditors are appointed and/or removed upon the recommendation of the ACs) and the 
seventh statement (i.e. that the ACs meet with the external auditors without the presence 
of management) was found to be statistically significant. However, the agreement with 
these two statements by the other two groups of respondents (i.e. the finance heads and 
the external auditors) was found to be statistically insignificant. In relation to the 
statement that the AC reviews and approves the EL prepared for the external auditors, 
the AC chairpersons significantly agreed but the agreement/disagreement of the other 
three sample groups was found to be statistically insignificant. Therefore, the results 
indicate that there are some differences in opinion within the four respondent groups, 
and in attempting to examine whether these differences are statistically significant, 
some other statistical techniques (e.g. Kruskal Wallis Test and Mann Whitney U Test) 
have been applied (as will be detailed in the next section). 
 
Concerning the statements relating to AC‘s involvement in internal auditing, agreement 
with all the eight statements by both the AC chairpersons and the company secretaries 
was found to be statistically significant at a 5% level of significance. Again, the finance 
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heads agreed with all of the statements (the mean scores are more than 3 in all cases) 
but agreement with the first statement (i.e. that the ACs recommend and approve the 
appointment or termination of the head of the internal audit division) was found to be 
statistically insignificant. Similarly, the external auditors neither significantly agreed nor 
significantly disagreed with the first statement (i.e. that the ACs recommend and 
approve the appointment or termination of the head of the internal audit division) and 
the second statements (i.e. that the ACs approve and review the charter of internal 
auditors). The rest of the statements were significantly agreed (at a 5% level) by all four 
groups of respondents. The overall results of the significance test reflect the view that 
the ACs in Bangladesh do play an important role in internal auditing, which is 
consistent with the AC duties that were suggested by Wolnizer (1995), Woodlock and 
Claypool (2001), and Porter and Gendrall (1998).   
 
In relation to the last two statements concerning the overall AC practices in Bangladesh, 
all four sample groups significantly agreed that the ACs can work independently. This 
result is consistent with the studies of McHugh and Raghunandan (1994), Yeo (2001); 
Scarborough et al. (1998) and Christopher et al., (2009) who noted the importance of 
AC independence for its effectiveness.  A great deal of studies (for example, Campbell, 
1990; Vicknair et al., 1993; Chen and Zhou, 2007; Chan and Li, 2008) noted the 
importance of an effective AC for sound governance of the company. Hence, the last 
statement was about the overall effectiveness of the ACs in Bangladesh, and the 
agreement with this statement was found statistically to be significant in the case of 
three of the samples (namely, the AC chairpersons, company secretaries and finance 
heads) although the external auditors‘ agreement on this statement was statistically 
insignificant at a 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 6.10 indicates that most of the statements were agreed with by the four sample 
groups, which were also found statistically significant using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test. However, it is clear that the significance of agreement in the case of the external 
auditor groups is much lower than that of the rest three groups. This implies that there 
are some differences in the responses of the four sample groups.  In attempting to 
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examine whether there is any significant difference in terms of the mean scores of the 
responses in the four sample groups regarding the different aspects of the ACs, the next 
section presents and discusses the Kruskal Wallis Test results. 
 
6.4.2 Analysis of Hypothesis Testing Results 
It was highlighted in Chapter Five that the main objective of hypothesis testing in this 
study is to examine whether there is significant difference in responses of sample 
groups. It also discussed that the first eight (hypotheses 1 to 8) hypotheses were 
developed on eight broad aspects of ACs with a view to compare the mean scores of 
responses obtained from the four sample groups.  Furthermore, three more hypotheses 
were developed to compare the mean scores of response obtained from two respondent 
groups divided according to: 
(i) The academic discipline; 
(ii) The professional qualification; and, 
(iii) The length of work experience.   
The test results will also assist in concluding whether different groups of respondents 
and the samples have been chosen from the same or identical population. The test 
results of these hypotheses have been presented in Tables 6.11; 6.12; 6.13 and 6.14.         
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Table 6.11:  Analysis Showing the Test Results of Hypotheses 1 to 8 
 
Hypothesis AC Aspect 1. AC 
Chairperson 
2. Company 
Secretary 
3. Finance 
Head 
4. External 
Auditor 
Kruskal Wallis 
(H)Test 
Kruskal Wallis Pair-Wise 
Comparison 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Sig Group Value Sig. 
Hypothesis 1 Composition  3.543 0.914 3.393 0.837 3.319 0.904 2.814 0.950 5.205 0.157 - 
 
- - 
Hypothesis 2 Authority and 
Resources  
4.140 0.876 4.173 0.854 4.177 0.771 3.710 0.956 5.458 0.141 
 
- - - 
 
Hypothesis 3 Diligence  3.893 0.966 3.681 0.919 3.504 0.914 3.200 0.838 7.011 0.072*** 
 
- - - 
 
Hypothesis 4 Meeting  4.412 0.631 4.101 0.819 4.142 0.723 3.664 0.837 17.669 0.001* 1 & 2 
1 & 3 
1 & 4 
2 & 3 
2 & 4 
3 & 4 
3.579 
5.465 
17.663 
0.177 
10.990 
7.478 
.059*** 
.065*** 
.001* 
.674 
.004* 
.006* 
 
Hypothesis 5 Role in Financial 
Reporting 
4.256 0.688 3.878 0.729 3.606 0.864 3.230 0.751 19.686 0.000* 1 & 2 
1 & 3 
1 & 4 
2 & 3 
2 & 4 
3 & 4 
7.030 
12.678 
19.686 
4.333 
12.458 
6.610 
.008* 
.002* 
.000* 
.037** 
.002* 
.010* 
 
Hypothesis 6 Role in External 
Auditing 
3.817 0.831 3.429 0.904 3.239 0.857 3.142 0.754 15.461 0.001* 1 & 2 
1 & 3 
1 & 4 
2 & 3 
2 & 4 
3 & 4 
5.843 
10.660 
15.461 
2.165 
5.336 
0.339 
.016* 
.005* 
.001* 
.141 
.069*** 
.561 
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Hypothesis AC Aspect 1. AC 
Chairperson 
2. Company 
Secretary 
3. Finance 
Head 
4. External 
Auditor 
Kruskal Wallis 
(H)Test 
Kruskal Wallis Pair-Wise 
Comparison 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Sig Group Value Sig. 
Hypothesis 7 Role in Internal 
Auditing 
4.179 0.851 3.699 1.020 3.582 0.899 3.457 0.854 14.972 0.002* 1 & 2 
1 & 3 
1 & 4 
2 & 3 
2 & 4 
3 & 4 
6.353 
10.860 
14.972 
1.103 
2.535 
.893 
.012* 
.004* 
.002* 
.294 
.282 
.345 
Hypothesis 8 Overall 
Independence and 
Effectiveness  
4.250 0.843 4.176 0.799 3.966 0.626 3.517 0.841 3.667 0.300 - - - 
 
*Significant at 1% level.    
**Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
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Hypothesis 1[Ho (1)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of the four sample 
groups (AC Chairperson, Company Secretary, Finance Head and External Auditor) 
with respect to composition of the ACs are statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.11 indicates that, at a 5% significance level, no significant difference was found 
in the opinions of the four sample groups on AC composition in Bangladesh (p>.05). 
The associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.157) shows that it is very likely 
to find such a value if a null hypothesis is true and, hence, the null hypothesis is 
accepted at a 5% significance level. Therefore, the test results suggest that no significant 
difference exists in the responses of the four different groups of respondents and, 
therefore, it can be inferred that the samples for the study have been taken from an 
identical population. This also reflects the fact that similar views on AC composition 
have been obtained from all samples which is an indication of robustness of the 
findings. 
 
Hypothesis 2[Ho (2)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within 
four sample groups with respect to authority and resources provided to the ACs are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
It can be seen that, at a 5% level, there is no significant difference in the views of the 
four responding groups in respect of authority and resources provided with the ACs in 
Bangladesh (p>.05). The associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.141) 
indicates that the null hypothesis is likely to be true and it is accepted at a 5% 
significance level. Therefore, it can be inferred from the test results that the differences 
observed in the response of the four responding groups are not statistically significant. 
 
Hypothesis 3[Ho (3)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within the 
four sample groups with respect to diligence of the ACs are statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.11 shows that at a 5% level, there is no significant difference in the responses of 
the four sample groups in relation to diligence of ACs in Bangladesh (p>.05). The 
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associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.072) suggests the null hypothesis to 
be accepted at a 5% significance level, which means there is no significant difference in 
the response of the four responding groups.   
 
Hypothesis 4[Ho (4)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within the 
four sample groups with respect to the effectiveness of AC meetings are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
It is interesting to note that, at a 5% level there is a significant difference in the opinions 
of the four sample groups regarding AC meeting in Bangladesh (p<.05), although all the 
statements in this group were significantly agreed with by all four sample groups (see 
Table 6.10). The associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.001) signals that it 
is very unlikely to find such a value if the null hypothesis is true. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 5% significance level. The reason that the Kruskal Wallis Test 
found a significant difference might be because the level of agreement measured by the 
mean score differs significantly between the groups. In order to identify exactly which 
sample group(s) differ(s) with which, further investigation has been undertaken using 
the Kruskal Wallis pair-wise comparison. The results show that the external auditor 
group differs with the other three sample groups (p= .001, p=.004 and p=.006 
respectively) regarding the statements on AC meeting. The test results indicate that 
there is no significant difference in the opinions of the other three sample groups 
(p>.05).  
 
Hypothesis 5[Ho (5)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within the 
four sample groups with respect to role of the ACs in financial reporting are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.11 also presents that, at a 5% level, there is significant difference in the 
responses of the four sample groups on AC‘s role in financial reporting (p<.05). The 
associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (p=.000) indicates that it is almost unlikely 
to find such a value if null hypothesis is true and, therefore, the null hypothesis is 
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rejected at a 5% significance level. A further investigation reveals that all four groups 
significantly differ with each other regarding their opinions on AC‘s role in financial 
reporting (p=.008; p=.002; p=.000; p=.037; p=.002 and p=.010 respectively). These 
results indicate that all four groups expressed different opinions in respect of AC‘s role 
in financial reporting. This might happen because some of the statements dealt with 
technical issues (such as: accounting estimates, accounting policies, accounting 
standards, disclosure etc.) and different sample groups (who also differed in terms of 
background) viewed differently on the statements.  
  
Hypothesis 6[Ho (6)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within the 
four sample groups in respect of AC’s role with respect to internal auditing are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.11 indicates that, at a 5% level, there is significant difference in the responses of 
the four sample groups in relation to AC‘s role in external auditing (p<.05). The 
associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.001) shows that it is very unlikely to 
find such a value if null hypothesis is true and, therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Further investigation using the pair-wise comparison reveals that AC chairpersons 
significantly differ with other three samples (p= .016; p=.005 and .001 respectively). 
However, the results suggest that there is no significant difference in opinion of the rest 
three groups (p> .05). Therefore, the pair-wise comparison results suggest that these 
three groups (with the exception AC chairpersons) belong to the same population. 
 
Hypothesis 7[Ho (7)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within the 
four sample groups in respect of AC’s role with respect to external auditing are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.11 also suggests that, at a 5% level, there is significant difference in the 
opinions of the four respondent groups on AC‘s role in external auditing (p<.05). The 
associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.002) indicates that it is very 
unlikely to find such a value if null hypothesis is true and, therefore, the null hypothesis 
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is rejected at a 5% significance level. A further investigation using Kruskal Wallis pair-
wise comparison reveals that the AC chairperson group differs with other three 
respondent groups (p= .012, p=.004 and p=.002 respectively) in relation to AC‘ role in 
internal auditing. The test results suggest that there is no significant difference in 
opinions of these three groups (p>.05).   
 
Hypothesis 8[Ho (8)]: Differences observed in the mean scales of responses within the 
four sample groups with respect to overall perception on independence and 
effectiveness of the ACs are statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.11 further indicates that, at a 5% level, there is no significant difference in the 
responses of the four sample groups on the overall independence and effectiveness of 
ACs in Bangladesh (p> .05). The associated p-value of Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.030) 
indicates that the null hypothesis seems to be true and, therefore, the null hypothesis is 
accepted at a 5% significance level; which implies that no significant difference has 
been found in the responses of the four sample groups.                                                                             
 
Hypothesis 9 [Ho (9)]: Difference observed in the mean scales of responses between 
the respondents having accounting subject and respondents having other subjects in 
last education is statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.12 indicates that, at a 5% significance level, there is a significant difference in 
the opinions of two responding groups (p<.05). The associated p-value of the Kruskal 
Wallis Test (i.e. 0.002) shows that it is very unlikely to find such a value if the null 
hypothesis is true and, therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at a 5% significance 
level. It can be inferred that the views of respondents having accounting background in 
education are significantly different from the views of respondents not having 
accounting background. This might happen because the respondents having accounting 
background are more familiar with the issues covered in the questionnaire and, 
therefore, their responses were different from the respondents without any accounting 
background. 
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Table 6.12: Analysis Showing the Test Results of Hypothesis 9 
Description Respondents Having 
Accounting Background 
Respondents Having 
Non-Accounting Background 
Mann Whitney U 
Test 
Frequency Mean S.D. Frequency Mean S.D. Value Sig 
AC Practices in Bangladesh (Responses on the 50 Statements) 66 3.56 0.56 74 3.83 0.50 -3.087 0.002* 
*Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.13: Analysis Showing the Test Results of Hypothesis 10 
Description Respondents Having 
Professional Qualification 
Respondents Not Having Any 
Professional Qualification 
Mann Whitney U 
Test 
Frequency Mean S.D. Frequency Mean S.D. Value Sig 
AC Practices in Bangladesh (Responses on the 50 Statements) 89 3.59 0.52 51 3.90 0.53 -3.413 0.001* 
*Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.14: Analysis Showing the Test Results of Hypothesis 11 
Description Respondents Having 
Experience of 10 or more Years 
in Relevant Area 
Respondents Having 
Experience of less than 10 
Years in Relevant Area 
Mann Whitney U Test 
Frequency Mean S.D. Frequency Mean S.D. Value Sig 
AC Practices in Bangladesh (Responses on the 50 Statements) 73 3.76 0.53 67 3.64 0.56 -1.068 0.286 
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Hypothesis 10[Ho (10)]: Difference observed in the mean scales of responses between 
the respondents having professional qualification and respondents without 
professional qualification is statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.13 indicates that, at a 5% significance level, there is a significant difference in 
the responses of two sample groups on the AC practices in Bangladesh (p<.05). The 
associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.001) indicates that it is very 
unlikely to find such a value if null hypothesis is true and, therefore, the null hypothesis 
is rejected at 5% significance level. The test results suggest that there is significant 
difference between the responses of the participants having professional qualification(s) 
and not having any qualification. The difference may occur because the respondents 
with related professional qualification are more knowledgeable on the issues and, 
therefore, they expressed views which were significantly different from the views of the 
respondents without any such qualification. 
 
 
Hypothesis 11[Ho 11)]: Difference observed in the mean scales of responses between 
the respondents having 10 and more years experience and respondents having below 
10 years experience in related field is statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6.14 shows that, at a 5% level of significance, there is no significant difference in 
the response of two sample groups in relation to the AC practices in Bangladesh 
(p>.05). The associated p-value of the Kruskal Wallis Test (i.e. 0.286) shows that it is 
very unlikely to find such a value if null hypothesis is false and, therefore, the null 
hypothesis is accepted at a 5% significance level. Therefore, no statistical significant 
difference was found in responses of more experienced (10 years and more) and less 
experienced (below 10 years) respondents. This implies that length of experience does 
not cause the respondents to respond differently to the issues on AC practices in 
Bangladesh. 
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6.4.3 Analysis of Regression Statistics 
The following subsections present two multiple regression models for investigating AC 
effectiveness in Bangladesh using the questionnaire survey data.    
 
6.4.3.1 Regression Model for AC Role 
Table 6.15 shows that the constant (intercept) and the slope of AC composition (X1) are 
2.325 (on a 5-point scale) and 0.550 respectively and these are statistically significant 
(p<.05). Therefore, the regression model is:  
 
Y= 2.325 + 0.550X1 (where, Y = AC Role, X1 = AC Composition). 
 
Table 6.15: Summary of Regression Model for AC Role 
 
Model 
Summary 
Constant Slope- X1 R R Square 
2.325 .550 .911 .784 
ANOVA 
Summary 
F-Ratio df1 df2 Significance 
205.479 4 15 .000* 
 
 
Coefficient 
Summary 
Variable B t-value Significance 
Constant 2.325 5.101 .000* 
X1 .550 5.214 .000* 
X2 -.227 -1.231 .210 
X3 .246 1.187 .254 
X4 .128 .512 .616 
*Significance at 5% level. 
 
The model explains that the composition of the AC has a significant positive impact on 
performing the AC role successfully and 55% of the score in AC composition is added 
with the constant in evaluating the role of an AC. This finding is consistent with the 
studies undertaken by Scarborough et al. (1998) and Raghunandan et al. (2001) who 
highlighted the significance of AC composition. The other variables (namely, authority 
and resources (X2), diligence (X3) and meeting (X4)) do not have a significant impact 
on the performance of AC role (p> .05), although two of these have strong positive 
correlations with AC role (see Table 6.16). This happens because a regression model 
explains the combined effect of the independent variables whereas a correlation 
explains the association of only two variables. It is important to note that R (.911) in 
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Table 6.15 is much higher than any bi-variant correlation with AC role as presented in 
Table 6.16. This reflects that the regression model is a significant improvement over the 
correlation results in explaining the impact of AC input variables on performing its role 
properly. It is interesting to note that authority and resource (X2) has a negative impact 
(although statistically insignificant i.e. p>.5) on performing AC role successfully. This is 
not consistent with previous AC literature and guidelines as discussed in Chapter Four 
(for example, the Treadway Report, 1987; Arthur Anderson, 1994; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
2002; Combined Code, 2003; and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). This might perhaps 
be happening because in Bangladesh, the ACs are composed of mainly executive 
directors who are very powerful in the company. Therefore, they do not suffer from a 
lack of authority or resources. The negative correlation between AC composition, and 
authority and resources (see Table 6.16) also supports this argument.  
 
Table 6.16:  Analysis of the Correlations between AC Characteristics and AC Role 
 
Description Composition Authority 
and 
Resources 
Diligence Meeting Role 
Composition - r= -.150 r= .557* r= .571* r= .661* 
Authorities & 
Resources 
r= -.150 
 
- r= .309 
 
r= .347 
 
r= -.148 
 
Diligence r= .557* r= .309 - r= .898* r= .542* 
Meeting r= .571* r= .347 r= .898* - r= .580* 
Roles r= .661* r= -.148 r= .542* r= .580* - 
*Significance at 5% level. 
 
6.4.3.2 Regression Model for AC Effectiveness 
Table 6.17 indicates that the constant (intercept) and the slope of AC role in financial 
reporting (X1) are 2.153 (on a 5-point scale) and 0.491 respectively, and these are 
statistically significant (p<.05). Therefore, the regression model is:  
 
Y= 2.153 + 0.491X1 (where, Y = AC Effectiveness, X1 = AC Role in Financial 
Reporting).  
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Table 6.17: Summary of the Regression Model for AC Effectiveness 
 
Model 
Summary 
Constant Slope- X1 R R Square 
2.153 .491 .879 .773 
ANOVA 
Summary 
F-Ratio df1 Df2 Significance 
7.538 3 4 .049* 
 
Coefficient 
Summary 
Variable B t-value Significance 
Constant 2.153 2.784 .0048* 
X1 .491 2.856 .046* 
X2 .284 1.381 .232 
X3 .221 1.205 .247 
*Significance at 5% level. 
 
The model describes that the AC role in financial reporting has a significant positive 
impact on AC effectiveness and this is consistent with the remarks of many researchers 
(for example, Turley and Zaman, 2007; Cohen et al, 2007a; Laux and Laux, 2009; 
Bedard and Gendron, 2010) who have noted the importance of AC role in financial 
reporting. As in the previous model, two independent variables (namely, AC role in 
external auditing (X2) and AC role in internal auditing (X3)) have an insignificant 
impact on AC effectiveness (p> .05); although they are strongly correlated (see Table 
6.18). It is important to note that R (.879) is much higher than any bi-variant correlation 
with AC effectiveness, as presented in Table 6.18. This reflects that the model is a 
significant improvement in explaining the impact of various AC roles on AC 
effectiveness.  
 
Table 6.18: Analysis of the Correlations between AC Roles and AC Effectiveness 
 
Description Role in 
Financial 
Reporting 
Role in 
External 
Auditing 
Role in 
Internal 
Auditing 
Effectiveness 
Role in Financial Reporting - r= .684* r= .601* r= .771* 
Role in External Auditing r= .684* - r= .769* r= .520 
Role in Internal Auditing r= .601* r= .769* - r= .552 
Effectiveness r= .771* r= .520 r= .552 - 
*Significance at 5
%
 level. 
 
6.4.3.3 Investigating Multicollinearity in Regression Models  
Since most of the independent variables of both regression models are strongly 
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correlated (see Table 6.16 and Table 6.18), the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
statistics (as explained in Chapter Five) have been used in order to investigate the 
multicollinearity problem of the regression models. The results (VIFs<8) indicate that 
the models are reasonably free from any extreme multicollinearity problem.   
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Several observations can be made from the results presented in this chapter. Firstly, it 
reflects the fact that the AC chairpersons in Bangladesh are appointed from executive 
directors of the company and the majority members of the AC are also executive 
directors of the company. These two factors relating to independent directors in the AC 
were also viewed as the two key factors that affect AC effectiveness in Bangladesh. 
Secondly, it appears that the AC members in Bangladesh do not have sufficient 
qualification and experience. Thirdly, the agreement level (mean score) towards the 
statements in the questionnaire viewed by the AC chairpersons is higher in comparison 
with that of the other three samples, whereas the lowest level of agreement is observed 
in the case of the responses obtained from the external auditors.    
 
The results of hypothesis testing suggest that there is no significant difference in 
opinions of the four groups in relation to four aspects of AC practices (such as: 
composition, authority and resources, diligence, and overall independence and 
effectiveness). The opinions of the company secretaries and finance heads are very 
similar.  However, the external auditors differ with the other three sample groups on one 
aspect i.e. AC meeting and the AC chairpersons differ with the other three sample 
groups on two AC aspects i.e. AC‘s roles in internal auditing and external auditing. The 
responses received from the respondents with an accounting background have been 
found to be significantly different from the responses obtained from those with a non-
accountancy background. Similarly, the respondents who have professional 
qualification(s) differ in views with the respondents who do not have any professional 
qualification. However, no such significant difference is observed in the opinions of the 
two groups of respondents divided by years of experience.  Furthermore, the regression 
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analysis results indicate that successful performance of an AC largely depends on its 
composition and that AC effectiveness is highly dependent on its role in financial 
reporting.  
 
This chapter has discussed the results obtained from the questionnaire survey of the 
study. The next chapter discusses the findings of interview survey. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
INTERVIEW SURVEY FINDINGS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse and discuss the findings of interview survey which 
was undertaken during the second phase of the data collection for the current study. As 
discussed in Chapter Six, the responses of questionnaire survey describe various aspects 
of the Audit Committee (AC) practices prevailing in Bangladesh. In fact, the outline of 
the interview checklist (appendix 5) broadly covers the same issues as are covered in the 
survey questionnaire (appendix 3).  Therefore, the structure of this chapter is similar to 
that of the previous chapter. Section 7.2 discusses the interview results in relation to a 
number of different aspects of the ACs in Bangladesh, namely: the attributes of the ACs; 
the different roles being played by the ACs; the scenario of the overall effectiveness of 
the ACs in Bangladesh; the factors that affect the AC effectiveness; and finally, some 
suggestions on how AC effectiveness can be improved are discussed. A summary of the 
interview findings are presented at the end of this section. Finally, Section 7.3 concludes 
the chapter. 
 
7.2 Interview Findings 
At the outset of the interview, the interviewees were asked to express their views on the 
importance of establishing an AC as a Corporate Governance (CG) mechanism in the 
company. As outlined in the interview checklist, the interviewees were gradually asked 
to talk on different aspects of ACs, namely: 
(i) The various attributes of the ACs, including composition, size, authorities, 
diligence, and meetings; 
(ii) The role and function of the ACs; 
(iii) The overall effectiveness of the ACs in Bangladesh; 
(iv) The major factors that have an impact on AC practices; and, 
(v) Some possible ways of improving the effectiveness of ACs. 
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The findings obtained from the interview responses are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
 
7.2.1 Importance of Audit Committees 
A great deal of the literature discussing the significance of ACs was discussed in 
Chapter Four of this thesis. It was highlighted that the role played by independent 
directors on the board continues to be a prominent feature of CG. In recent years, 
increasing attention has been paid to ACs, both by regulatory authorities and by 
academics. Given that the financial reporting oversight role is often delegated to ACs, 
Beasley (1996) noted that: “the audit committee is associated with a reduced likelihood 
of financial statement fraud”. An AC is commonly believed to be an effective 
mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability in corporate affairs, where the 
owners appoint professional management to undertake some responsibilities of the 
business in the best interests of all stakeholders. The AC plays an important role in 
bridging the gap between the owners and management (commonly known as the 
‗agency gap‘). In other words, an effective AC minimizes the agency problem by 
reducing information asymmetry between the owners and management, and also acts as 
a safeguard for the stakeholders‘ interests. All of the interview respondents agreed that 
the AC is a very important and effective CG mechanism for any company.  
 
The interviewees noted that the importance of ACs is vital in: monitoring the integrity 
of financial statements, preventing fraudulent activities, ensuring adequate disclosures, 
strengthening the internal audit, and appointing external auditors. These findings are 
consistent with those of Lambe (2005) who highlighted the role of ACs in all of these 
areas. However, a vast majority (90%) of respondents suggested that the role of an AC 
is more visible and important in financial reporting, particularly in reducing the 
likelihood of overstating the earnings and ensuring adequate disclosure.  Respondents 
further highlighted the fact that a positive relationship exists between the establishment 
of an AC and the quality of financial reporting, as well as the quality of earnings as 
shown in the annual or interim reports. These findings are supported by the results of 
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prior research studies. For example, Defend and Jiambalvo (1991) found that companies 
overstating their earnings were less likely to have ACs in practice; McMullen (1996) 
found a positive association between the existence of ACs and the quality of financial 
reporting and full disclosure; and, Wild (1996) found a positive association between AC 
formation and the quality of the accounting earnings. 
 
Highlighting the importance of ACs in Bangladesh, the company secretary of a large 
private bank noted: 
 
The audit committee is an important operating organ of the board of directors of 
publicly-traded companies. It bridges the gap between the management and the 
owners by undertaking some oversight responsibilities on the stakeholders‟ 
behalf. Audit committees have certainly enlightened our board of directors, 
mainly on financial and accounting matters. 
 
This implies that the ultimate beneficiaries of ACs are the stakeholders of the 
companies, and the most visible role of an AC is seen to be that of financial reporting. 
Illustrating this further, the AC chairperson of a medium sized textile company 
remarked that:   
 
Our audit committee ensures that the management and the board of directors 
behave better and make the external auditors more serious when they audit 
companies. I believe that if an audit committee is effectively functioning, internal 
problems can be identified early before the publishing of financial reports. The 
existence of the audit committee is also important for enhancing the 
independence of external and internal auditors, and improving the performance 
of the board of directors. 
 
Furthermore, the company secretary of a large real estate company remarked that: 
 
Establishing an audit committee makes the process of nominating the external 
auditors fair. Also, the comments of external auditors are carefully reviewed by 
the audit committee. The capability of management has increased since they are 
now accountable. Finally, the audit committee gives confidence to the 
stakeholders on the governance of the company as a whole. 
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It can be noted from the views above that the ACs do play a multiple role for the 
companies and that the necessity of the ACs in enhancing the quality of financial 
reporting, external auditing, internal auditing and the overall governance of the 
company has been widely acknowledged by the respondents.  
 
Furthermore, the AC chairperson of a small sized cement company reported that: 
 
An effective audit committee can improve the quality of financial reporting by 
reviewing the financial statements on behalf of the board which subsequently 
increases public confidence in the credibility and objectivity of the financial 
statements. 
 
This remark is consistent with the results of Osman and Noguer (2007); Sori et al., 
(2007); FRC (2008); Chen et al. (2008); and Sarens et al. (2009) who observed that ACs 
have a significant role in financial reporting. A similar opinion was given by the 
company secretary of a medium sized pharmaceutical company: 
 
An audit committee is an effective control mechanism and plays a very vital role 
in improving the governance system in the company by bringing out better 
internal control systems, better monitoring and oversight, and better disclosures 
and quality of internal and external reporting.  
 
This indicates that the establishment of AC enhances the stakeholders‘ confidence in the 
company‘s governance mechanism through its rigorous oversight role in internal control 
and financial reporting. This view is consistent with the studies of DeZoort et al. (2002); 
Hemraj (2003); Abbott et al. (2004); and Pergola (2005) who highlighted the necessity 
of the AC in carrying out different oversight responsibilities for the company. Similarly, 
an external auditor (partner of a Non-Big 4 audit firm) highlighting the benefits of ACs 
remarked:   
 
The extent to which the quality of financial reporting can be directly attributable 
to the audit committee is debatable. However, it can undoubtedly be said that if 
there is an effective audit committee, financial reporting irregularities are at 
least disclosed within the financial statements and, stakeholders are informed of 
these irregularities. 
 258 
This remark indicates the significance of ACs in detecting and preventing irregularities 
in financial reporting, which ultimately leads to enhancing the quality of the financial 
reports of the company. Although most of the interviewees viewed the necessity of ACs 
as an effective mechanism in protecting stakeholders‘ interests, the finance head of a 
state-owned company remarked that: 
 
The audit committee sometimes unnecessarily interferes in management 
activities.  In particular, external members come only to attend meetings and 
they criticise management decisions without properly understanding the whole 
thing. This causes misunderstanding between the management and the board.   
 
This view is consistent with the studies of Pomeranz (1997); Barker (2002); and 
Rainsbury et al. (2008) who criticised the non-performing AC for their wastage of time 
and resources without making any significant contributions. Furthermore, one external 
auditor remarked that: 
 
The audit committees have not done anything visible except nominating external 
auditors. The audit committees play advisory role only, their reports include 
some recommendations. The final decision is taken by the board of directors.   
 
Another external auditor (who was from a Big 4 audit firm) mentioned that the 
members of the ACs view themselves as investigators who control management, and 
this leads to growing gaps between them. He explained: 
 
There are some conflicts between the audit committee and management which 
lead to misunderstanding and non-interaction between them. The management 
feels that the committee are controlling them and, therefore, they may restrict 
some of the activities of the audit committees. Sometimes, the management 
recommends to the board of directors that the audit committee should be 
restricted and the board agrees with this recommendation. However, I strongly 
believe that the audit committee is much needed in the company.  At the same 
time, it should be truly effective. 
 
This reflects the fact that an inactive AC sometimes becomes a burden for the company 
instead of improving the company‘s governance.  
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Therefore, it can be inferred from the above discussion that the practice of ACs is very 
important to ensure good governance within the corporations. However, the state of the 
current practices of ACs in Bangladesh is not ideal and companies do not fully benefit 
from them at the moment. The ACs in Bangladesh need to be strengthened in terms of 
their composition and independence in order to function effectively. Otherwise, their 
contribution will always remain an illusion. Mendez and Garcia (2007) also highlighted 
that only the presence of an AC does not guarantee stronger financial reporting systems; 
the AC should perform more effectively in order for this to take place.  
 
7.2.2 Composition of the Audit Committees 
The prior literature (for example, Scarborough et al., 1998; Raghunandan et al., 2001) 
has documented that appropriate composition is one of the pre-requisites for AC 
effectiveness. Bedard and Gendron (2010) noted that most previous studies had found a 
positive association between members‘ independence and competence, and AC 
effectiveness. They also highlighted the fact that contemporary best practices and 
regulations recommend that the AC members should possess certain personal 
characteristics in terms of qualification and competencies.  Interestingly, the majority 
(75%) of interviewees in this study reported that the AC members do not have sufficient 
qualification and experience. This might be because the AC members are appointed on 
the basis of their personal relationship instead of qualification. However, the 
respondents regarded that the size of ACs in Bangladesh is appropriate in order to carry 
out their responsibilities and this response confirms the findings acquired through the 
earlier questionnaire survey (as reported in Chapter Six). 
 
Generally, the ACs in Bangladesh differ from organisation to organisation in relation to 
the terms of reference and organisational structure. However, there are certain common 
elements that should be present in order for the ACs to be considered effective. For 
instance, an AC must be perceived to be independent before it can be considered to be 
objective, credible, and useful. Although the Olivencia Report (1998) stated that ACs 
should be composed of a majority of independent members, all of interview respondents 
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of this study believe that this recommendation is not followed in Bangladesh. The 
finance head of a large commercial bank mentioned: 
 
Since the audit committees in Bangladesh are known as board sub-committees, 
the audit committee members are also members of the board of directors of the 
company. Therefore, most of the audit committee members are executive 
directors. Even though there are some audit committees that do not have any 
independent members, let alone the appointment of a chairperson from 
independent members. However, in the financial institution sector, most audit 
committees include at least one independent director and in some cases the audit 
committee chairpersons are appointed from independent directors. 
 
These remarks are consistent with the results obtained from the questionnaire survey 
which showed that the majority of AC members are executive directors.  Another 
finance head‘s comment was that: 
  
Because the majority of the audit committee members are appointed from the 
internal management team, it is obvious that the committee cannot achieve its 
objective independently. Because the audit committees are dominated by an 
executive director, most of the independent directors‟ opinions are not properly 
valued in the audit committee meetings and, as a result, they lose interest in 
playing an active role in the committee. As a result, they come only to attend the 
meetings, do not participate actively and go back with the remuneration in an 
envelope. 
 
This remark is consistent with the results of Gendron et al. (2004) and McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996), who noted that a probing attitude in AC members is seen if the 
majority of the committee are independent members. Most guidelines for AC best 
practices (for example, the Treadway Commission, 1987; the Cadbury Report, 1992; the 
American Law Institute, 1994; and the BRC, 1999) also recommend that independent 
directors should sit on the AC in order for it to function effectively. 
 
It was previously discussed in Chapter Four that researchers (such as: Beasley and 
Salterio, 2001; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; McDaniels et al., 2002; Bedard et al., 2004) 
documented that knowledge, expertise, and experience of the AC members are directly 
associated with the effective functioning of the ACs. In consistent with the responses in 
the questionnaire survey (see Table 6.6 in Chapter Six) which indicated that more than 
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50% of respondents did not agree that the AC members in Bangladesh have sufficient 
knowledge and experience in similar jobs, mixed opinions were observed in the 
interview survey on this issue. The AC chairperson of a medium sized company noted 
that: 
 
When appointing an external/independent member to the committee, his/her 
background in terms of education and experience is duly considered. Hence, the 
independent members of the committee do possess more or less relevant literacy 
and/or experience in an accounting and auditing field. 
 
These responses tend to indicate that the independent members of the ACs are appointed 
on the basis of their expertise in a related area. Different views were also observed in 
the responses of some interviewees. For example, an external auditor from a Big 4 audit 
firm noted: 
 
Most members of the board of directors have neither proper knowledge, nor do 
they have any previous experience in the field of accounting and/or auditing, but 
the majority of audit committee members are appointed from board of directors. 
So, how can you expect them to do the committees‟ jobs? Moreover, the 
independent members are appointed on the basis of their personal relationships 
with the chairperson or chief executive officer/managing director instead of on 
their expertise. You will be surprised to learn that I know of one audit committee 
chairperson who is an independent director of the company and more 
importantly, he is an engineer with no previous experience in auditing or in 
accounting related jobs.   
 
The quality of the non-executive directors was emphasised by an AC chairperson (who 
is an external director of the board): 
 
The background of some members is poor and they are chosen on the basis of 
patronage.  I mean „patronage‟ as the relationship with the chairperson/ 
managing director of the company or with other influential board members. 
Ideally the non-executive members should be selected mainly based on two 
criteria: the extent to which the audit committee members are financially 
literate; and the extent to which the audit committee is considered experienced 
and competent. 
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Therefore, the procedure of appointing non-executive members to ACs has been 
questioned by some of the respondents. Evidence exists to suggest that the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) may influence the composition of the board (Mace, 1971; 
Vancil, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Given that the AC members are chosen 
from the board, the preferences of the CEO may affect its composition. This may result 
in an AC which is composed of non-executive directors who are preferred by the CEO 
on the basis of their personal relationships, as opposed to those members who possess 
the appropriate skills and experience. Therefore, the system of nominating the members 
is identified as one of the main problems. There seems to be a preference for the 
nomination of members who would not upset the status quo. The regulations as they 
currently exist in Bangladesh are insufficient to overcome this problem. Emphasising 
this point further, the finance head of a bank remarked: 
 
I think the major problem lies with the members‟ expertise, because most of them 
are not practitioners and may not have the qualification or background on how 
they should undertake their duties and responsibilities. 
 
An external auditor added: 
 
Importantly, the audit committees are not really composed of qualified members 
because the audit committee members and the chairman of the committee are 
usually drawn and selected from among the members of the company's board of 
directors. 
 
These responses show that the AC members do not have sufficient experience and 
qualification in order to carry out their responsibilities properly. This view is consistent 
with the findings obtained in the questionnaire survey, where the majority of 
respondents opined that most of the ACs in Bangladesh fall behind in relation to the AC 
members‘ sufficient qualification and experience. The company secretary of a medium 
sized company however, gave a mixed view and remarked: 
 
I cannot evaluate all of the audit committees. There are many members who are 
brilliant, enthusiastic and highly qualified. However, in some companies, the 
opposite is the case, as a result of unqualified members and a lack of knowledge 
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of accounting that might threaten the activities of the organisation. 
 
In response to the question regarding the size of ACs in Bangladesh, an external auditor 
(who is also an independent member of an AC) remarked: 
 
Too many members in the audit committee sometimes create unnecessary 
conflicts within the committee instead of working more effectively. I think the 
committee should consist of three to five members, and most of the audit 
committees in Bangladesh are suitable in terms of their size. 
 
This opinion confirms the findings obtained through the questionnaire survey (presented 
in Chapter Six, see Table 6.7) that only 5% of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement on the ‗appropriateness‘ of the AC size in Bangladesh.  The opinion, on the 
number of members an AC should have, is also consistent with recommendations of the 
best practice suggested by the Cadbury Committee (1992); the Combined Code (1999); 
the Hampel Report (1998); KPMG (1999); and the BRC (1999) that the AC should 
include at least three members to provide the necessary expertise for the oversight 
function. Many studies, including Kalbers and Fogarty, (1996); Yermack (1996); 
Scarbrough et al. (1998) and Lin et al. (2008), have argued that a large AC may not 
necessarily result in more effective functioning as more members in an AC may lead to 
unnecessary debates and delay the decisions although Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes 
(2007) and Felo et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between the size of AC and 
the quality of financial reporting. 
  
7.2.3 Authority and Resources of the Audit Committees 
Because of the wide scope of responsibilities, an AC requires adequate resources to 
perform effectively (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). Most AC guidelines, including the 
Treadway Report (1987); the Cadbury Committee (1992); the Hampel Report (1998); 
the BRC (1999) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), recommend that an AC should be 
provided with sufficient authority and resources for its effective functioning. 
 
In the context of the ACs in Bangladesh, the majority (60%) of interviewee respondents 
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perceived that the ACs are delegated adequate authority. They explained that the main 
reason was due to the fact that all AC members are also executive board members and, 
hence, they are highly influential in the company. The majority (70%) of respondents 
agreed that the ACs receive prompt responses from management to their queries. 
However, interview responses highlighted the fact that the independent directors of ACs 
in Bangladesh are not compensated enough for the amount of their time and efforts 
which are devoted to the committee‘s affairs and this might be one of the reasons for 
their nominal involvement. These responses are consistent with the questionnaire survey 
findings as presented in the previous chapter (see Table 6.6 in Chapter Six). Higg‘s 
(2003) comment is notable in this relation that the remuneration of a non-executive 
director should be sufficient to attract and fairly compensate high quality individuals.  
 
With regards to the authority and resources provided to the ACs, the finance head of a 
small sized company noted that: 
 
The audit committee is typically provided with sufficient resources to perform 
their responsibilities. The secretary of the company ensures that all secretarial 
supports needed by the audit committee are provided and that top management 
provides access to information as and when the committee needs it. 
 
In a probing question he explained: 
 
In fact, most audit committee members are influential in the company because 
they are executive directors and, therefore, they always receive all the required 
support and prompt responses from all levels of the company. 
 
A similar view was echoed by the company secretary of a large bank: 
 
I think authority is not at all a problem for the audit committee, and the same for 
resources. Rather, management wants to keep them happy providing everything 
they need because they are in the board of directors that decides the fate of top 
management to some extent. But, the question is- Do the members use the 
resources for the committee‟s affairs efficiently? Perhaps not, instead they just 
enjoy the oversight authorities without making a significant contribution to the 
company. Independent members merely come to the meeting on the day and 
endorse most of the decisions taken by executive members; they could contribute 
more if they were given more scope to work.   
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Therefore, it is observed that because all of AC members are also members of the board 
of directors (BODs), authority and resources are not a problem for the smooth 
functioning of the committee. Different views, however, were also obtained; for 
example, one external auditor remarked: 
 
The audit committees do not have any real executive authority. What‟s more, the 
non-executive members lose interest in being involved in audit committee affairs 
because they have neither substantive authority nor physical support to work, 
nor are they compensated by a reasonable amount of remuneration. 
 
This opinion is consistent with the responses in the questionnaire survey in which the 
majority of respondents (56%) did not agree that independent members are provided 
with adequate remuneration for the amount of time devoted to the committee‘s affairs. 
Smith (2003) made some recommendations, which seem to be useful in the Bangladeshi 
environment: 
 
Each company should consider the further remuneration that should be paid to 
members of the audit committee to decompensate them for the additional 
responsibilities of membership. Consideration should be given to the time that 
the members are required to give, the skills they bring to bear and the onerous 
duties they take on and the value of their work to the company. 
 
7.2.4 Diligence of the Audit Committees 
The interviewees unanimously agreed that the diligence of the AC members is a vital 
factor for the effective functioning of the committee‘s affairs, which is consistent with 
the findings of Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and Sharma et al. (2009) in this regard. The 
members‘ understanding of the responsibilities and willingness to undertake these 
responsibilities are important indicators of AC diligence. A well-designed AC charter is 
essential for defining the responsibilities of AC members. The charter should be used to 
guide the functioning of the ACs so that the key roles delegated by the BoDs on behalf 
of the shareholders are properly performed. The charter should clearly define the role, 
responsibilities, and the authority of the committee. The interview responses also reveal 
that although the ACs do have their charters in black and white, these are not updated 
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regularly. The majority of interview participants noted that most of the AC members do 
not have a clear idea of their roles, and this finding differs from the questionnaire survey 
findings. This difference might because in the interviews the respondents could talk at 
length and more freely on the issue. However, the interview responses confirm that the 
AC members do not devote enough time to the committee‘s affairs, although they 
readily assume their responsibilities. 
 
It should be noted that the absence of an updated charter has been viewed by the 
majority (80%) of interviewees as a common phenomenon in Bangladeshi ACs, and this 
may cause the AC members to not be properly aware of their responsibilities. Knapp 
(1991) claimed that the lack of clearly defined responsibilities and insufficient authority 
for the ACs has severely hampered their effectiveness. In relation to the AC charter, the 
finance head of a medium sized textile company noted:   
 
There was no plan or charter for members, which made the duties of the audit 
committees disorganised. Therefore, the implementation of audit committees is 
jumbled. 
 
The reverse response was obtained from an AC chairperson who is also a member of 
another AC. He said: 
 
I am a member of two audit committees including this one, and in both 
companies there is a very clear charter and all responsibilities are explained.  
Most of the companies in Bangladesh do have a charter for their audit 
committees but few of them are reviewed from time to time. Again, most audit 
committee members are full time businessmen and members of the board of 
directors of different companies. Therefore, they cannot manage to devote 
sufficient time to the committee‟s affairs, although they are willing to assume 
their responsibilities as audit committee members. 
 
These remarks confirm the findings obtained from the questionnaire survey that the 
majority of respondents disagreed or remained neutral regarding the annual review of 
the AC charter, and that sufficient time is given by members to deal with AC affairs. 
Again, one company secretary remarked that: 
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The independent/external member of the audit committee is very experienced in 
this area and he is fully aware of his role and responsibilities. He always tries to 
contribute his best efforts to the committee‟s affairs. But, the problem is that the 
other three members who are the executive directors of the company, do not 
have know enough about the nature of their role within the committee, let alone 
their abilities to contribute to the committee‟s affairs. They rather enjoy the 
prestige of being members of such committees and try to have control over the 
committee‟s affairs, despite having no knowledge or expertise. 
 
The respondent highlighted the fact that some executive members of the AC behave as 
if the company belongs to only them. This might be happening because the executive 
directors are very powerful in the company and when they are in the AC, they also 
exercise their undue influence in the AC and tend to try to dictate most of the 
committee‘s affairs. 
 
7.2.5 Meetings of the Audit Committees 
The success of an AC largely depends on its effective meetings, as indicated in the 
literature; for example, Spira, (2002) and Anderson et al. (2004). As discussed in 
Chapter Four, Abbott et al. (2007) noted that an effective AC should meet at least four 
times annually. Further, Sharma et al. (2009) noted that the ACs in New Zealand 
formally meets on an average of 3.75 times in a year while R and R (2007) reported that 
the ACs of the U.S. S&P SmallCap 600 companies meet around seven times in a year. 
Interestingly, a negative association between AC independence and meeting frequency 
was found by Sharma et al. (2009), which might be because independent ACs can 
perform freely as part of their plan and they do not have to meet for frequent 
discussions. Bedard and Gendron (2010), however, noted that the number of meetings is 
not frequently associated with AC effectiveness, instead that the AC should meet as 
often as its role and responsibilities require. The interview survey reveals that most ACs 
hold formal meetings two to four times a year, and that each meeting lasts for an 
average of two hours. Most of the interviewees of this study agreed with the 
questionnaire survey finding that the frequency and duration of AC meetings are 
sufficient in order to carry out the responsibilities. The interviews also revealed that the 
AC members have a nominal role in fixing the agenda of meetings. In most cases, the 
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AC chairperson finalises the agenda of meetings, and to do this they are guided by the 
CEO and/or CFO. This response is somewhat inconsistent with the questionnaire survey 
findings (see Table 6.6, Chapter Six) that the majority (61%) of respondents agreed that 
the AC chairperson finalises the meeting agenda after discussion with other members.  
 
According to Sabia and Goodfellow (2005), asking questions during AC meetings and 
being demanding in the quality of the answers provided are, perhaps, the most important 
traits that AC members should have. This requires an independent and congenial AC 
environment where members can discuss all the important issuers freely and elaborately. 
While some respondents noted that AC members sometimes cannot freely express their 
views because of some unseen reasons; the majority (60%) of interviewees agreed with 
the questionnaire survey findings that the members can talk freely in the AC meetings. 
The interview survey reveals that sometimes non-members are also invited to attend AC 
meeting, most frequently, finance heads and internal audit division heads are invited to 
attend most of the AC meetings. One external auditor noted: 
 
The head of the internal audit division is also a member of the audit committee 
and the finance head regularly attends the audit committee meetings as an 
invitee. 
 
The AC chairperson of a large company mentioned: 
 
Members in the committee can speak freely because most of them are executive 
directors. Also, the independent directors can express their views without any 
interference; their opinions are given more importance in the committee. Last 
year we had four formal meetings, each of which lasted for around 2 to 3 hours. 
Apart from these, I discuss with other members on a regular basis on a number 
of important issues. Therefore, most of the decisions are taken unanimously in 
the committee, and it is functioning quite effectively. 
 
These remarks indicate that a congenial environment for effective AC meetings exists in 
Bangladeshi corporations, and this finding is consistent with Gendron et al. (2004) and 
Gendron and Bedard (2006) who highlighted the positive impact of effective AC 
meetings on the overall governance a company. 
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Most of the AC members in Bangladesh are full-time businessmen, and/or are holding 
directorship positions in more than one company. Therefore, they can usually not devote 
enough time to the committee‘s affairs. It is understandable that as the number of 
additional directorships held by AC members rises, the ability to fulfil their monitoring 
responsibility decreases. Because they are too busy, the AC members sometimes cannot 
manage to attend the AC meetings. Given the infrequency of meetings and the limited 
time available, it is important that a detailed agenda is prepared for each meeting. This 
agenda is necessary to focus the attention of members on the objectives of the meeting 
and, over the course of the year, should address all the duties and responsibilities 
outlined in the audit charter. The agenda should be circulated along with any relevant 
submissions to clarify the subject to the AC members in advance of the meeting. One 
AC chairperson noted that the notice along with the agenda of the meeting is served to 
the members at least one week before the meeting date so that they know the issues to 
be discussed beforehand, and have sufficient time to prepare for the meeting. Sabia and 
Goodfellow (2005) noted that current best practices and regulations recognise that the 
agenda is an important tool for the AC meetings to be effective. The company secretary 
of an insurance company noted: 
 
Choosing the agenda for the audit committee meeting is a collaborative effort 
between the board, senior management, legal counsel, both the internal and 
external auditors, and the audit committee itself; however, the chairpersons do 
not always discuss this issue with other members. 
 
Another company secretary stated: 
 
The agenda of meeting is mainly chosen by the chairperson after discussion with 
the finance head or the internal audit head of the company, and it is circulated 
to the audit committee members at least one week before the meeting. 
 
The effectiveness of the AC meeting, however, was questioned by one finance head: 
 
How can committees perform their tasks if we know that many audit committees 
meet once or twice a year and their reports are prepared in advance? I think it 
has just become a ritual. The committee meet occasionally and members are 
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paid their remuneration for it. In reality, most of the decisions are imposed by 
the board and the audit committee members just endorse them. 
 
Therefore it is indicated that the decision is taken in advance by the chairperson in 
discussion with the management, and the AC members simply endorse their decisions in 
the meeting.  One external auditor (who is a partner of a Big 4 audit firm) noted: 
 
Four meetings in a year, two hours each is not sufficient to take decisions on so 
many things that the audit committee has to undertake for the companies. Also, 
the independent members do not feel motivated to give enough time to the 
committee when they see that most of their recommendations are not 
implemented and also their remuneration compared to their time given for the 
companies is not adequate. Thus, in many cases the audit committee meeting 
becomes just another ritual that ends with a heavy lunch in a five star hotel. 
 
Some respondents highlighted the need for ACs to meet more frequently, and for a 
longer duration. This might facilitate in better decision making after detailed discussion 
of the issues. The dominance of the executive members in the AC meetings is also 
another problem for Bangladeshi ACs. However, in general it can be inferred that the 
process of holding AC meetings in Bangladesh is satisfactory for their effective 
functioning. 
 
7.2.6 Roles of the Audit Committees 
The main reason for the development of ACs, regardless of country, remains the same, 
which is to improve the credibility of financial reporting. An AC can also play an 
important role in some other areas of the company. Venables and Impey (1991) noted 
that ACs are developed in order to increase confidence in the credibility of the financial 
statements; and strengthen the independence of the external auditors. This indicates the 
point that an AC has to undertake multiple roles for the company, which are related to 
different functional areas. Wolnizer (1995) summarised the AC recommendations of the 
CG commissions and committees in the U.S.A., the U.K., Canada, and Australia. The 
author demonstrated that ACs are expected to perform almost exclusively in the 
technical areas of financial reporting, auditing, and internal control. Sharma et al. (2009) 
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noted that ACs play an important role in overseeing and monitoring financial reporting, 
external auditing, and internal auditing. Apart from these three key areas, the 
interviewees of this survey also mentioned some other areas of the company where ACs 
are expected to undertake some important oversight responsibilities. The following 
subsections discuss the interview responses in relation to how the ACs in Bangladesh do 
contribute to these three key areas and also to some other miscellaneous issues. 
 
7.2.6.1 Role in Financial Reporting 
Information about the company‘s operations is made publicly available through 
different statements, namely, the board of director‘s report, the auditor‘s report, the 
balance sheet, the income statement, the statement of retained earnings, cash flow 
statements and the notes to the financial statements included in the annual corporate 
report (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). However, the annual corporate report is 
considered to be the key source of public information regarding the company and its 
performance for the general stakeholders. In general, the interview respondents agreed 
that the ACs in Bangladesh play a role in the financial reporting of the company; for 
example, the ACs review financial highlights presented in the annual corporate reports, 
and they also review the adequacy of financial disclosures. However, the majority of 
interview participants felt that most ACs rarely review the accounting policies, 
compliance of accounting standards, and account estimates done by accountants. Some 
interviewees (40%) also questioned the ability of AC members to review the integrity of 
company‘s annual report. 
 
It is considered that certain financial reporting problems which primarily arise due to 
inadequate disclosures within the financial statements may be attributable to an 
ineffective AC. One finance head noted: 
 
The audit committee is mainly charged with the oversight responsibilities of 
financial reporting and disclosure. The committee mainly oversees the integrity 
of the financial statements and other statements (e.g. auditor‟s report) before 
these are included in the annual corporate report.   
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This response is consistent with the remarks of Rezaee and Farmer (1994), and Laux 
and Laux (2009) who highlighted AC‘s role in financial reporting. One external auditor 
mentioned: 
 
The audit committee typically reviews financial reports quarterly, half yearly 
and annually in publicly-traded companies. In addition, the committee often 
reviews complex accounting estimates and judgements made by management, 
and the implementation of new accounting principles or regulations. 
 
The respondent further added: 
 
Sometimes the committee reviews the accounting disclosures, but it hardly ever 
reviews the compliance of accounting standards. The committee relies heavily on 
the external auditors for this. 
 
This might happen because most of the AC members feel that the external auditors are 
more expert and qualified in this field and that they can judge it more accurately. 
Another external auditor reported: 
 
A very insignificant involvement of the audit committee is seen in reviewing the 
overall quality for financial reporting. Sometimes, it reviews some accounting 
disclosures, estimates and judgements done by accountants. But in general, they 
do not play the sufficient roles which are expected. The reason for this minimum 
involvement is mainly the fact that they are incapable of doing such a job, and in 
some cases they lack the scope to do what they should.  
 
The review of interim financial statements is also a part of the financial oversight role of 
the ACs. Interim reports have become increasingly important to investors and security 
analysts. The share price of a company may change dramatically in response to interim 
reports if the reported earnings are significantly different from those that the investors 
expected or anticipated. The Treadway Commission Report (1987) recommends that 
ACs should oversee the interim reporting process. This recommendation has been 
adopted in the U.S.A., where the SEC rules suggest that the ACs are expected to review 
the interim reports. In Bangladesh, the listed companies are required to publish interim 
financial reports (i.e. quarterly and half yearly financial statements) and submit them to 
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the SEC. The ACs have a significant role in the reviewing of these financial statements 
and considering whether they are complete and consistent. On this subject, the finance 
head of a bank said: 
 
The interim reports are reviewed by the audit committee before making them 
publicly available. But, it is not possible to review these reports in a two-hour 
meeting while there is only one accounting expert on the committee. So, the 
committee mostly relies on the external auditors review, and they just endorse 
the prepared report. However, it is a good sign that these reports have to go 
through the audit committee.    
 
It is important to re-state the fact that the AC reviews the going concern status of a 
company on behalf of the board. Kida (1980) was one of the pioneers to suggest a 
separate section in the auditor‘s report regarding the going concern status of the 
company. Kida's results indicated that the auditor may be influenced by the perceived 
consequences of issuing or of not issuing a qualified audit report. An AC is generally 
responsible for reviewing the compliance of international accounting standards, 
principles, and conventions. However, the majority (75%) of interview participants 
noted that the ACs in Bangladesh rarely review these standards (including the going 
concern assumption of the company) and principles. For example, the company 
secretary of a leasing company said that: 
 
The audit committee does not properly review whether the going concern 
assumption has been properly reflected in the financial statements. Instead, they 
simply rely on the external auditor's opinion on the going concern status of the 
company. 
 
This might happen because most AC members in Bangladesh are not competent enough 
to review such technical matters and to disagree with the external auditors‘ opinion. 
 
7.2.6.2 Role in External Auditing 
One of the main responsibilities of ACs is to oversee the external audit functions; 
including the selection, compensation, work, and independence of the external auditor 
(Bedard and Gendron, 2010). Their study further noted that ACs are directly responsible 
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for the appointment and oversight of their work, including the regulation of the 
disagreement and the auditor. The ultimate focus of the audit process is to arrive at an 
opinion on the truth and fairness of the financial statements and, thus, to convey an 
independent opinion to the users of the financial statements as to whether these 
statements as a whole, represent a true and fair view of the company's profits or losses, 
and its state of affairs at balance sheet date. To achieve these objectives, the external 
auditors should be assured that they can work independently. In general, an AC is 
expected to protect and enhance the independence of external auditors. 
 
The majority (85%) of interview respondents noted that the ACs in Bangladesh play a 
significant role in appointing external auditors or approving the Engagement Letter (EL) 
prepared for the external auditors. Their responses suggest that the ACs typically 
approve the selection of the external auditors and fix their fees. It was also agreed by 
most of the interviewees (75%) that the ACs review the findings of the external auditors 
and monitor management responsiveness to these findings. The external auditors 
traditionally review the entity's financial statements quarterly and issue an opinion on 
the accuracy of company‘s annual financial statements. The ACs also review the key 
findings obtained by the external auditors and monitor management responsiveness to 
these findings. 
 
Significant involvement of the ACs in appointing external auditors is observed in 
Bangladesh. The response of an external auditor on this issue was: 
 
The audit committees‟ roles are to appoint the external auditor, negotiate audit 
fees, and sometimes to invite one representative from an external audit team to 
attend the audit committee meetings. 
 
This implies that the ACs play a key role in appointing or dismissing the external 
auditors, and that they also negotiate and fix the audit fees to be paid to the auditors.  
Another external auditor, however, mentioned that: 
 
Many audit committees do not comprehend much of what they should do. The 
main objective of the committee, in actual practice is to find the cheapest price 
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for the external auditors whereas the external auditors should be selected 
according to their quality and experience. 
 
The respondent further added:  
 
There is no obvious contribution of the audit committee to the effectiveness of 
the external auditing since they hardly saw any of audit committee members 
during the last year. 
 
This indicates that role of most ACs in Bangladesh in relation to external auditing is 
limited to making recommendation to the board on the appointment or removal of 
external auditors. 
 
Furthermore, an AC does have a defined role in ensuring the external auditors‘ 
independence and mitigating the conflict of interests that might interfere with the 
auditors‘ ability to express their opinions on the financial statements. The committee 
should, therefore, ensure that no such factor exists that might impair the independence 
of the external auditors. The response of an AC chairperson (who is an independent 
director of the company) was: 
 
While the committee is supposed to oversee and ensure the independence of the 
external auditor; its role seems quite inadequate and almost absent regarding 
this issue 
 
This reflects the view that the AC does not play any significant role in protecting and 
enhancing the independence of the external auditors. Another AC chairperson‘s 
comment was: 
 
The audit committees draw management's attention to the weaknesses that are 
discovered in the company. The committee reduces the level of interaction 
between the companies and the external auditors since they work as a liaison 
between the management and external auditors. Additionally, external auditors 
are able to talk to audit committees about any problem that arise. 
 
One company secretary appreciated the role of the AC in external auditing, saying: 
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External auditors benefited from audit committees through increased 
responsibilities since the external auditors are also required to meet with the 
audit committee in addition to their meetings with the management. 
 
Therefore, the ACs in Bangladesh maintain a close relationship with external auditors 
on behalf of the management and the BODs so that the auditors can perform their tasks 
more independently and objectively. An external auditor from a Big 4 audit firm 
highlighted the fact that an AC report should be included in the annual corporate report 
and that this report should state: 
(i) Whether the AC has reviewed and discussed certain matters with the 
independent auditors; 
(ii) Whether the AC has reviewed and discussed the audited financial statements 
with the management; and, 
(iii) Whether the AC has followed up the management responsiveness to the 
auditors‘ findings. 
 
7.2.6.3 Role in Internal Auditing 
Scarborough et al (1998) and Raghunandan et al (2001) suggested that the existence and 
composition of an AC greatly improves the effectiveness of an internal audit division.  
Laux and Laux (2009) also argued that one of the key responsibilities of the AC is to 
oversee the internal auditing function. Sarens et al. (2009) had also noted that the 
internal auditing function serves as a comfort provider for the AC. A key feature of an 
effective internal audit department is its independence. Independence is crucial to the 
nature of internal auditing because it allows the auditor to render impartial and unbiased 
judgement. In relation to AC‘s role in internal auditing, an external auditor noted: 
 
The internal auditor cannot work independently.  Sometimes, they are dictated to 
by the board of directors through the CEO. The audit committee can play a role 
in enhancing the independence of internal auditors. 
 
The AC can also protect the independence of internal audit department by ensuring that 
the chief internal auditor is not dismissed as a result of reports which reflect 
unfavourably on the management. Furthermore, the chief internal auditor should have 
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direct communication with the AC. The finance head of a small pharmaceutical 
company viewed:   
 
The audit committees in Bangladesh do not have frequent communication with 
internal auditors; they sometimes invite the head of the internal audit division to 
attend the audit committee meetings. 
 
The majority of interviewees argued that the internal audit functions were strengthened 
after the ACs had been established. For example, the AC chairperson of a medium sized 
company noted: 
 
The audit committees added something new to internal auditing, which is the 
interaction with the board of directors. In the past, they only interacted with the 
management. Also, the role of the internal auditors has increased dramatically. 
However, the concern about independence matters is on-going since the internal 
auditors are mostly dictated by their dependence on the chief officer/managing 
director in all affairs. 
 
The finance head of a small company (who is also in charge of the internal audit 
division) noted the role of internal audit division in making the AC functional, and 
remarked: 
 
There are many differences between companies in actual practice. Generally, the 
audit committees have frequent interaction with internal auditors. The role of 
internal auditing in achieving the objectives of the audit committees is important 
since they can help the audit committees discharge their duties. In addition, its 
success depends on the skills and abilities of the team of internal auditors 
because an effective internal control division can significantly contribute to 
making the audit committee more effective. 
 
The Treadway Commission (1987) stressed this fact and recommended that the 
committee should review the appointment and dismissal of the chief internal auditor. 
Further, the company secretary of a large sized company remarked: 
 
The establishment of the audit committee in 2006 has advanced the role of 
internal auditors by informing them on how to realise the risks inside companies 
and how to detect them. Similarly, the role of the internal auditors has changed 
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from reviewing invoices to participating in putting strategies and plans of 
companies together. In brief, there has been a big change in the manner of 
thinking about the role of the internal audit and audit committees within 
companies‟ management. 
 
One AC chairperson noted that the AC interacts regularly with the senior financial 
management, including the finance head or internal control head, to review their 
activities and decisions on some vital issues. 
 
Some interviewees (30%), however, expressed their concerns on the extent of the role 
played by the ACs in relation to internal auditing. For example, the finance head of a 
large bank felt that: 
 
Theoretically, the audit committees should help the internal auditors in two main 
areas: firstly, to enhance their independence; and secondly, to develop their 
positions by making sure that the management looks into the points of weakness 
that internal auditors discover. However, practically speaking, these two benefits 
are not derived so far since the audit committees are not qualified enough to be 
helpful to internal auditors. 
 
An external auditor (who is a partner of a Big 4 auditing firm) also claimed: 
 
The internal auditors have not yet benefited much from the establishment of the 
audit committee. The internal auditors are actually influenced and pressured by 
management. The management seems to restrain the internal auditors from 
raising any issue related to management activities. 
 
This reflects the insufficient role of the ACs in ensuring the independence of the internal 
auditors. The responses suggest that although the ACs in Bangladesh play some roles in 
the internal auditing of the company, these seem to be generally insufficient.   
 
7.2.6.4 Other (Miscellaneous) Roles 
Apart from the three broad roles discussed above, the interviewees noted a few other 
roles (including the oversight of regulatory compliance and risk management strategies 
of the company) of the ACs in Bangladesh. Many interviewees (9 out of 20) noted that 
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the ACs in Bangladesh do play some role in minimising the risk of the company by 
reviewing company‘s strategies. For example, a finance head noted: 
 
The audit committees discuss the status of litigation or regulatory compliance 
with the management, generally via briefings or reports from the top lawyer in 
the entity. 
 
The majority (65%) of interviewees also mentioned the role of an AC in advising the 
company on ethical issues. These responses are consistent with the recommendations of 
the AICPA (2004) that highlighted the role of an AC in risk management and 
compliances issues of the company. The AC chairperson of a commercial bank, who is a 
university professor and also an independent board member of the bank, elaborated the 
necessity of an AC as: 
 
Among many responsibilities, the boards can entrust the audit committee with 
ethics and compliance systems, review of the risk management strategies etc. But 
frankly speaking, in reality we [i.e. the committee] have a very limited 
contribution to risk management for the company. However, we monitor whether 
the company lacks compliance with existing laws and rules. 
 
Furthermore, another AC chairperson remarked: 
 
Many organisations are developing their practices towards a goal of a risk-
based management approach called enterprise risk management. The audit 
committee‟s involvement in non-financial risk topics varies significantly from 
company to company.   
 
The interaction between the AC and the management was highlighted by the company 
secretary of a medium sized bank.  He noted that many audit committee chairpersons 
conduct interim calls with key members of the management between quarterly 
meetings. Key contacts might include the CEO/MD, CFO/FD, chief internal auditor, 
and external audit partner. One AC chairperson stated: 
 
These are formally scheduled, private meetings between the AC and key 
members of the management or the external auditor. These meetings are 
typically unstructured and provide the opportunity for the committee to get 
feedback on the company‟s affairs from the managers in private.   
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The responses, therefore, reflect the view that the ACs play an interactive role in the 
company by liaising with different parties in the company (including the external 
auditors, internal auditors, finance head, BoDs etc).  
 
7.2.7 Overall Effectiveness of the Audit Committees 
An effective AC is needed to boost up investors‘ confidence on the governance of a 
company, to improve trust in the financial reporting process, and to lend more 
credibility to the audited financial statements (McMullen, 1996; Urbancic, 1996; Spira, 
1999b; Rezaee et al., 2003). Although effectiveness is an elusive concept that can be 
approached through several models, none of which is appropriate in all circumstances 
(Cameron, 1981), it is commonly believed that an effective AC enhances the protection 
of the interests of stakeholders. Mixed views are observed in the interview responses on 
the overall effectiveness of ACs in Bangladesh. Some interviewees (30%) perceived that 
AC effectiveness is reasonably satisfactory, while other respondents (40%) stated that 
the ACs seem to be unsuccessful. There are some respondents who believed that the 
ACs had not been as successful as expected. With respect to the overall effectiveness of 
the ACs in Bangladesh, one external auditor (who is a partner of a Big 4 audit firm) 
highlighted: 
 
The audit committee practice in Bangladesh is still in its early stages, and more 
time is needed to evaluate its success. However, the audit committees in 
Bangladesh have moderately achieved their objectives since they carry out an 
important role in protecting shareholders' interests overall. Actual practice 
could be divided into two main categories: banks and other corporations. I think 
the audit committees in the banks are much better than other corporations. The 
reason that the audit committees in banks are better than others is because in 
banks there are double controlling parties namely, the SEC and the central bank.  
 
These remarks are in conformity with the findings of Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007), who 
noted that in Bangladesh, the financial sector is subject to close monitoring and 
supervision by the Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) and the SEC and, therefore, 
more restrictions are imposed on this sector while the non-financial sector is more 
relaxed. It is worth mentioning that all banks in Bangladesh must have an AC, as 
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provided by the Bangladesh Bank's Circular No: 12, 23 December 2002
25
. 
 
Regarding the achievement of ACs, another external auditor stated that: 
 
The audit committee has been established with the aim of enhancing confidence 
in the integrity of an organisation‟s processes and procedures relating to 
internal control and corporate reporting including financial reporting. However, 
to be very honest, I think the audit committees in most firms in Bangladesh can 
hardly achieve their objective properly. 
 
One finance head, who is also an AC member of another company said: 
 
Although the audit committee has become one of the main pillars of the 
corporate governance system in most of the developed economies, in 
Bangladesh it is still a new issue and general investors are not properly aware 
of its role until now. However, it is good that in steering companies through 
today‟s complex business environment, many boards have started emphasising 
greater and stronger leadership from their audit committees. 
 
These responses indicate that the overall AC effectiveness is not currently at a 
satisfactory level. However, the scenario is gradually improving. Furthermore, one AC 
chairperson noted that the issue of AC in Bangladesh is still in its early stage. It should 
be re-stated that the first formal guidelines on AC practices in Bangladesh was issued by 
the SEC in February 2006. 
 
The comments of a finance head of a large sized commercial bank are important to note 
here because he covered some key aspects of AC effectiveness and stated that: 
 
The background of the AC members is not in the field of accounting or finance. 
Also, their meetings seem to be insufficient and there is no follow up from the 
members for their reports. I would say that the systems for internal auditing in 
companies are very weak and the members of audit committees are not full-
timers as far as the company is concerned; so it is difficult to properly deliver 
what is expected from them. However, there are many members who have the 
desire to work hard but they encounter many difficulties in discharging their 
                                                 
25
  The Bangladesh Bank Circular has covered different issues such as the overall purpose/objectives, 
roles and responsibilities of the audit committee, the structure and composition of the audit committee, 
the qualifications of the member; and the meetings. 
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responsibilities. Much of the advice of independent directors is not implemented 
at all. Also, the remuneration paid to the members is insufficient. 
 
This indicates that the members of the ACs are not properly utilised for the effective 
functioning of the committee, and they do not have the scope to contribute to the 
committee‘s affairs. This might be happening because the majority of AC members are 
executive directors who are often dictated to by the BODs and/or CEO. One external 
auditor remarked: 
 
The decisions of the audit committees are not influential; they do not have 
sufficient executive authority. Instead of detecting regularities and violations, 
many audit committee members flatter the board. Even the non-executives 
cannot ignore the policies of the executives. 
 
The company secretary of one large sized organization reported that: 
 
The goals of audit committees have not been achieved yet, but the scenario is 
improving year by year. For the first two years, the audit committee was just a 
committee without any significant role, but in the last three years the committee 
is coming into the limelight through some of its contributions in some areas 
including financial reporting and internal control. 
 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the significance of the ACs in Bangladesh is gradually 
being acknowledged, and their effectiveness has recently shown signs of improvement.   
 
7.2.8 Factors Affecting the Audit Committee Effectiveness 
The majority of interview respondents emphasised two broad issues: composition and 
diligence. This finding is consistent with the earlier findings of the questionnaire survey. 
More specifically, the interviewees highlighted the fact that the lack of requirements for 
qualification and experience is one of the main causes that affects the performance of 
ACs in Bangladesh. Consequently, the AC members cannot perform their duties 
properly. In general, the interviewees also highlighted the fact that the majority 
members (including the chairperson) of most ACs in Bangladesh are executive (i.e. 
shareholding) directors of the company. It is understandable that these executive 
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directors often tend to take decisions favouring their vested interest, and this hampers 
the AC effectiveness. The majority (70%) of respondents also pointed out that the AC 
members do not devote sufficient time to the committee‘s affairs, which hampers the 
effectiveness of ACs in Bangladesh.   
 
The selection process of AC members has been viewed as a major cause of existing 
weaknesses of the ACs in Bangladesh. For example, the company secretary of a small 
leasing firm remarked:   
 
The idea of audit committees is excellent, but the current practice is not as 
expected because these duties have been entrusted to unqualified members. They 
have been nominated according to personal relationships and favouritism. 
 
The level of financial/accounting knowledge and skill of the AC members has obvious 
consequences in dealing with different financial issues. One external auditor said: 
 
Many members of the audit committees, who are also members of the board of 
directors, have no knowledge or qualification in business. They are in the 
committee not because of their competence but because they are rich or wealthy. 
The task of the external auditor is specialised but only members of audit 
committees have enough ability to follow them. 
 
These remarks are consistent with most of the previous studies that found positive 
association between members‘ independence and competence, and AC effectiveness 
(Bedard and Gendron, 2010). The interviewee further noted that: 
 
One of the members is a specialist in one of the pure sciences, so you can 
imagine which criteria they are looking for when they nominate an external 
auditor. Low fees are the most important criteria for audit committee members 
when they nominate an audit firm. 
 
The finance head of one large company focused on a few factors: 
 
Inadequate numbers of qualified members, lack of awareness of the purposes of 
audit committees, a lack of members' independence. Also, little knowledge about 
an entity's business (firm-specific knowledge) is one of the problems. 
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Similarly, one company secretary noted that: 
 
The audit committees need to strive harder to reach the required level of 
competence. The audit committee members who have financial expertise are 
capable of providing professional evaluation on financial estimates, and the 
appropriateness of accounting principles and disclosure practices of the firm. A 
firm can enhance transparency in financial reporting and can gain a positive 
impression in the market by appointing reputed financial experts to the audit 
committee.   
 
Another finance head added: 
 
The members are not qualified and, with a few exceptions, they have no 
accounting or financial knowledge. There is hardly any interaction between the 
shareholders and the audit committee. 
 
Therefore, the respondents highlighted two main factors that impair the effectiveness of 
ACs in Bangladesh: firstly, the AC members are not truly independent, they merely 
serve the wills of management; and secondly, the AC members are not properly 
qualified and experienced in related areas. The finance head of a state owned company 
remarked: 
 
At present the independence of the audit committees is relative because they are 
nominated by the board, mostly because of their personal relationships. There is 
not enough concern from the board of directors in nominating specialists to the 
audit committee. In many cases, there are no specialists in accounting who have 
been appointed as members and this is one of the major reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of audit committees. 
 
Similarly, an external auditor disclosed that: 
 
The appointment of the audit committee is made by the board of directors on the 
basis of personal relationships. How can the audit committee control the 
management? The major difficulty is that the committee members are not 
qualified enough to monitor and oversee the activities of the internal auditors. 
 
The responses indicate that most members of the ACs are nominated from the BoDs of 
the same company. It was also noted that there are some bureaucratic procedures to be 
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followed when the members of ACs are drawn from the BoDs. One AC chairperson 
suggested including an AC report in the annual corporate report so that the general 
shareholders can be made aware of the AC and its activities.  
 
The physical distance of the AC members and the company‘s head office has been noted 
as another factor that affects the functioning of the ACs in some cases. One external 
auditor pointed out this issue: 
 
The distance between the companies and the members of the audit committees is 
another big problem. I live here [in Dhaka] and am a member of an audit 
committee in Chittagong, which is more than 200 km away. Therefore; I cannot 
contribute to the committee as much as I am supposed to. 
 
It might be worth mentioning here that the remote distance of AC members from a 
company‘s head office was one of the criticisms of the AC of Enron before it failed 
(Tonge et al, 2003). 
 
7.2.9 Measures for Improving Audit Committee Effectiveness 
The majority (85%) of interview respondents highlighted that the AC should include 
more independent directors who are qualified and experienced in carrying out similar 
tasks. Many interviewees (70%) also emphasised that the chairperson of the committee 
should be an independent director. They felt that these measures will enhance 
independence of the ACs, which will ultimately lead to the improved effectiveness of 
the ACs. It can also be inferred from the interview responses that the existing rules 
(including the SEC Order of 2006) regarding AC practices should be imposed on a 
compulsory compliance basis instead of on a ‗comply or explain‘ basis. Rigorous 
monitoring of the compliance with existing rules should be done by regulatory bodies, 
including the SEC. The interviewees also highlighted that some new rules (such as: AC 
members‘ minimum qualification in terms of education and experience) should be 
introduced for the proper functioning of the ACs. These suggestions from the 
interviewees are almost identical and consistent with the findings obtained from the 
questionnaire survey responses.   
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The interview respondents re-emphasised the necessity of AC member‘s knowledge and 
experience in the field of accounting and/or auditing. One finance head suggested: 
 
The members should have sufficient accounting knowledge and experience but 
some members have qualification in political science or geography. Therefore, 
everything is controlled by a board of directors. If the executive directors were in 
the position for the long term, they might consolidate their positions and even 
carry out their responsibilities as if the company belonged to them. 
 
One AC chairperson suggested that all members of the AC should be qualified in 
accounting or finance. He also recommended holding regular meetings between the AC 
members and the BoDs to carry out their responsibilities. Again, one company secretary 
focused on the role of BoDs when they nominate members of the AC.  He added: 
 
If the board of directors is interested in having good governance in the company, 
they should nominate qualified members and give them sufficient authority. 
 
In relation to composition, another AC chairperson thought that the AC should be 
comprised of a wide variety of members (such as shareholders, auditors, academics, and 
businessmen). The members of the BODs ought to be outside the AC. One finance head 
noted: 
 
I highly recommend that an expert in accounting and auditing who is financially 
literate should be one of the members of the audit committee. 
 
This response indicates that there should be a minimum level of qualification and 
experience for AC members. The opinion of an AC chairperson of a bank was that: 
 
Since the primary task of an audit committee is to oversee corporate financial 
reporting and the auditing processes, I think all of its members should have 
sufficient knowledge and exposure in this area. 
 
A similar opinion was given by the company secretary of a large company: 
 
I think the members‟ knowledge and experience in the field of accounting and 
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auditing experience is essential for enabling an audit committee to be effective. 
If the audit committee comprises knowledgeable and experienced members, it 
will undoubtedly play a leading role in the committee by providing valuable 
views and comments, which will increase the committee‟s productivity. 
 
These views are consistent with the findings of Lin et al. (2008), who highlighted the 
significance of AC members‘ expertise in a related area. Some respondents argued that 
the AC effectiveness may be enhanced if the external auditor is co-opted in the AC. 
Another company secretary added: 
 
Since most of the current members do not have accounting or financial 
competence, I think it would be better if one of the external auditors is 
included/co-opted in the audit committee.   
 
Most of the interviewees (95%) emphasised on the importance of AC composition for 
its effectiveness, and they felt that the AC should be composed in a way that it can work 
independently and confidently. The respondents emphasised on the need for the 
inclusion of more independent members in the AC for it to be effective, which confirms 
the questionnaire survey results (see Table 6.10, in Chapter Six) where the inclusion of a 
majority of independent members has been regarded as one of the top ranked 
suggestions for improving the effectiveness of ACs in Bangladesh. This is also 
consistent with the results of Chan and Li (2008) who focused on the importance of 
including independent directors in ACs. Furthermore, Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes 
(2007) revealed that the inclusion of independent members in the AC has a positive 
impact on improving the reporting quality (both externally and internally). The 
establishment of an AC aims to delegate the responsibilities to hire external auditors and 
to facilitate and supervise their work and, therefore, the AC should be composed of a 
majority of independent members (Osma and Noguer, 2007). An external auditor of a 
Big4 audit firm suggested that: 
 
The audit committee should consist of independent directors for its 
independence and effective functioning. Even if all members are not independent 
directors in the committee, the chairman should be elected from amongst 
independent directors. 
 
 288 
The company secretary of a leasing firm noted: 
 
The audit committees should be composed of independent directors nominated 
from outside, with at least one qualifying as a financial expert. 
 
It is, therefore, reasonable to consider that for effective functioning, the ACs should be 
comprised of a majority of non-executive directors, who, as a whole, possess sufficient 
background experience.   
 
The existence of an updated AC charter, or terms of reference, is very important for 
understanding and successfully carrying out members‘ responsibilities. One AC 
chairperson noted that: 
 
A well-designed charter detailing the terms of reference is essential as this 
charter should be used to guide the audit committee in their performance, in 
order for them to adequately fulfil the roles required of them by the main board 
of directors, shareholders and other third parties. 
 
One external auditor mentioned that a work plan (i.e. charter) for the AC should be 
established for a whole year since the members spend very little time with the company 
and they do not know much about what is happening in the company. Another external 
auditor, however, suggested that the existing responsibilities of the AC should be made 
known to the public so that they will be informed about what the AC is doing on their 
behalf. He also suggested that the AC should submit, annually, a report to the AGM 
about its activities during the year. The respondent emphasised the fact that the 
shareholders should be informed about the activities of the AC. One external auditor 
recommended amending some provisions of exiting guidelines as: 
 
The SEC guidelines given in 2006 regarding the audit committees have covered 
most of the  key issues, but we need to make many changes (such as the charter, 
required qualification, and expertise in accounting) to move from an excellent 
idea to best practices.  Most importantly, the existing guidelines should be 
mandatory for all companies, instead of leaving them as an option for 
explanation in case of non-compliance. 
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One finance head noted an interesting suggestion: that any company applying for a loan 
to any bank should submit a compliance report obtained from the SEC in relation to AC 
practices in the company. He added: 
 
Loans should not be approved unless this party issues a positive report about the 
audit committee practices in these companies. 
 
Further, the finance head of a bank noted: 
 
An effective internal audit department is a valuable resource to an audit 
committee. The scope of internal auditing should encompass the evaluation of 
the organisations system of internal audit and the quality of the performance in 
carrying out the assigned responsibilities. The internal audit department is in a 
key position to review the adequacy of internal controls. Furthermore, it may 
ideally provide the audit committee with the support for the public statements 
required by the directors on internal control. 
 
This implies that an effective internal auditing system can ensure sound internal control 
within the company and, thus, can significantly contribute to achieving the objectives of 
the AC. This view is consistent with the remarks of Sarens et al. (2009) who highlighted 
the role of the internal audit function in AC effectiveness. 
 
The company secretary of a large sized firm suggested that a closer relationship 
between the AC and internal auditors could allow them to share their views on 
important matters in the companies. It could, he felt, also help them to discuss the 
problems that the internal auditor might identify.  He noted: 
 
The role of internal auditing in achieving the objectives of the audit committees 
is crucial. Therefore, there should be frequent interactions between the 
committee and internal auditors.   
 
A different suggestion was given by an external auditor (who is a partner of one Big 4 
firm): 
 
A supervisory panel should exist to ensure the full independence of audit 
 290 
committees, and to ensure that the committee is free from any influence from the 
board of directors or the management. 
 
An AC chairperson‘s recommendation was: 
 
Internal auditors should be independent and they should be fully associated with 
the audit committees. Also, the members of the committee should give more time 
and effort in order to attend more meetings and spend more time in the 
companies. The remuneration that is paid to external members should be 
increased so as to give them more incentive to increase their efforts. 
 
The views of this respondent indicate that the internal audit division should be 
strengthened, and that this can significantly contribute to the effectiveness of ACs. He 
also suggested motivating the independent members with more benefits so that they 
devote sufficient time to the committee‘s affairs.  Another interesting recommendation 
was given by a company secretary: 
 
While appointing independent/external directors, apart from their qualification 
and experience, I think age should also be considered. Usually people who have 
served for long period in a similar area have already become bored and lost 
their enthusiasm. Instead, from my experience, I suggest appointing younger, 
more qualified people who perform their job more sincerely, with interest and, 
more importantly, they are aware of new technologies, sales wares, and changes. 
Please do not get me wrong, I am not opposing the necessity of experience any 
way, experienced people must be on the audit committee but it doesn‟t mean it 
should be someone who has retired or who is going to retire soon. 
 
 
Similarly, another external auditor suggested: 
 
Members should be carefully selected from specialists in accounting and 
auditing. Also, greater authority should be given to the audit committees, and 
management should be prevented from putting obstacles in their way . The 
committees should, as well, undertake the responsibility of choosing and 
changing the head of internal auditing to ensure his independence.  
 
One finance head noted: 
 
 291 
Suppose the audit committee is composed of a majority of non-executive 
directors and the financial reporting oversight role is usually delegated to the 
audit committee. Also assuming the audit committee members possess the 
necessary background and skills to undertake this role; there is no doubt that the 
committee will achieve most of their objectives for which these are established.   
 
The response of the company secretary of a medium sized firm seems worth citing 
regarding this issue: 
 
The three main factors that are needed in order to improve the effectiveness of 
the audit committee regarding the membership of the audit committee are: (i) a 
minimum of three directors is considered necessary for the audit committee to be 
effective; (ii) all members of the audit committee are to be independent for the 
audit committee to be considered independent and effective; and, (iii) the 
independent members with qualification and experience in accounting/finance 
/auditing or similar jobs are considered necessary for the effectiveness of the 
committee. 
 
It is, therefore, considered that an AC composed of non-executive directors, who, as a 
whole, possess sufficient expertise, tend to be effective. It is interesting to observe that 
various suggestions have been given by the respondents and that most of these 
suggestions confirm the results of the questionnaire survey and are also supported by 
the best AC guidelines and recommendations such as: the Treadway Commission 
(1987); the Cadbury Report (1992); the BRC (1999). Further, the SEC and stock 
exchanges should encourage all the companies to include a statement of CG, including 
AC practices, in their annual reports.   
 
7.2.10 Synopsis of the Interview Findings 
The above discussion indicates that most of the earlier findings of the questionnaire 
survey have been confirmed by the interview survey responses.  However, there are a 
few areas which reveal an inconsistency in the findings obtained from these two 
methods of data collection. As stated earlier, the objective of adopting an interview 
survey for this study was to acquire a greater and more detailed picture of the AC 
practices in Bangladesh. More insight in addition to the questionnaire survey findings 
have been obtained from the interviews. Table 7.1 presents a summary of the key 
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findings, with a comparison made to the questionnaire survey findings. Although most 
of the interview findings are consistent with the questionnaire survey results, a few of 
them were not in conformity with the interview survey findings. It should be noted that 
in addition to the questionnaire survey findings, a greater insight of the AC practices 
was obtained from the interview survey. These additional findings, and the 
questionnaire survey findings that were not agreed with by the interviewees, have been 
presented in the same column of the table but to differentiate them from each other the 
latter has been presented in italic text. 
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Table 7.1: Summary of the Interview Survey Findings 
Broad Aspect Key Findings : Consistent with Questionnaire Survey Additional Findings/ Key Findings Inconsistent with 
Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
 
Composition 
 The chairperson plays an influential role in appointing other 
members of the AC. 
 The majority of AC members are executive directors of the same 
company and most of the AC chairpersons are executive directors 
in the board of the company. 
 The AC members do not have sufficient qualification and 
experience in accounting/auditing.   
 The size of the AC is appropriate. 
 
 
 
No major difference observed. 
 
 
Authority and 
Resource 
 The AC is provided with sufficient authority and resources. 
 The committee gets ready access to information and quick 
responses from management level as and when needed. 
 The non-executive members are not remunerated enough for their 
time spent for the committee‘s affairs. 
 
 
No major difference observed. 
 
Diligence 
 The AC charter is not reviewed periodically. 
 The AC members readily assume their responsibilities. 
 The members do not devote enough time to the committee‘ affairs. 
 
No major difference observed. 
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Broad Aspect Key Findings : Consistent with Questionnaire Survey Additional Findings/ Key Findings Inconsistent with 
Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
Meeting 
 The agenda of AC meetings, which is finalised mainly by the 
chairperson, are distributed to the other members beforehand. 
 The members can discuss issues in the meeting freely. 
 The frequency and duration of the meeting is sufficient for the 
effective functioning of the committee‘s affairs. 
 Non-members are also invited to attend the AC meetings. 
 Non-members who occasionally attend AC 
meetings include the finance head and/or the 
internal audit division head  
 The chairperson rarely discusses the contents 
with other members before finalising the 
meeting agenda. 
Role in 
Financial 
Reporting 
 Reviews the integrity of financial reporting. 
 Reviews the completeness of accounting disclosures in financial 
statements included in the annual corporate reports. 
 Does not properly review compliances of 
going concern status of the company and its 
financial statements.  
 
Role in External 
Auditing 
 Reviews the findings and comments of external auditors. 
 Monitors management‘s responsiveness to external auditors‘ 
queries and findings. 
 Monitors the independence of external auditors. 
 Plays vital role in appointing and/or 
removing external auditor and preparing EL 
for them. 
 
Role in Internal 
 Auditing 
 Plays insignificant role in recommending the appointment/removal 
of the head of internal audit division. 
 Meet with the internal auditors in absence of the top management. 
 Evaluates the effectiveness of internal audit division. 
 Monitors the compliance of existing rules and 
regulations 
 Monitors compliance of ethical issues. 
 Review the risk management strategies. 
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Broad Aspect Key Findings : Consistent with Questionnaire Survey Additional Findings/ Key Findings Inconsistent with 
Questionnaire Survey 
 
Factors Affecting 
the Effectiveness  
of the ACs 
 The majority of executive directors in the AC. 
 Lack of members‘ knowledge/qualification. 
 Lack of members‘ experience. 
 Lack of appointing non-executive members as the chairperson. 
 Lack of members‘ diligence. 
 
 Remote distance between company‘s office 
and AC members. 
 
 
 
 
Possible Measures 
to Enhance the 
Effectiveness 
 Inclusion of a majority of members of the committee from non-
executive/independent directors. 
 Appointing the chairperson from non-executive directors. 
 Imposing new rules and guidelines in relation to the minimum 
qualification and/or experience of the AC members.  
 Increase monitoring of the compliance of the existing rules and 
guidelines relating to CG and AC practices. 
 Mandating compliance of the SEC order relating to CG practices 
issued in 2006. 
 The new rules and guidelines should include 
minimum qualification and/or experience for 
AC members in accounting/auditing field. 
 The internal auditing function should be 
strengthened.   
 Relatively young qualified external members 
who have reasonable work experience with 
more enthusiasm that leads to becoming more 
functional. 
 External auditor should be included in the 
AC. 
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Table 7.1 shows that the interview responses are consistent with the questionnaire 
survey responses in most cases, including: 
(i) The majority members of the AC, including the chairperson, are nominated 
from executive directors of the board; 
(ii) The AC members do not possess sufficient qualification and expertise; 
(iii) The AC is provided with sufficient authority and resources to undertake 
their responsibilities; 
(iv) The independent members are not paid sufficient remuneration for their time 
devoted to the committee‘s affairs; 
(v) The AC charter is not reviewed periodically; 
(vi) The AC members do not devote sufficient time to the committee‘s affairs, 
although they readily undertake the responsibilities; 
(vii) The agenda of AC meetings is finalised mainly by the chairperson; 
(viii) The AC reviews the integrity and disclosures of financial reporting; 
(ix) The AC reviews the findings of the external auditors, and also monitors 
management‘s responsiveness to those findings; and, 
(x) The AC evaluates the effectiveness of the internal audit function of the 
company. 
 
The factors that mostly affect the AC practices in Bangladesh as reported by the 
interview respondents include: 
(i) Lack of qualification and experience of the AC members; 
(ii) Non-appointment of AC chairpersons from independent/non-executive 
directors; 
(iii) Appointment of AC members from the executive directors of the board; and, 
(iv) To some extent, lack of diligence of the AC members. 
 
The interviewees largely agreed upon the recommendations obtained in the 
questionnaire survey to overcome the above problems including: 
(i) Appointing a chairperson from external/independent directors; 
(ii) Introducing new rules and guidelines regarding the AC practices; 
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(iii) Rigorously monitoring the compliance of the existing rules and guidelines; 
and, 
(iv) Appointing the majority of AC members from the independent/non-
executive directors. 
 
The interview responses, however, identified several aspects which are inconsistent with 
the questionnaire survey results, namely: 
(i) That the chairperson does not usually discuss content with other members of 
the committee before finalising the meeting agenda; and, 
(ii) That the AC does play a vital role in appointing external auditors and 
preparing EL for them. 
 
As expected from the interviews, the responses also revealed some additional insight 
that were not covered in the close-ended questions of the questionnaire survey, they 
include: 
(i) The new rules and guidelines (as recommended in both questionnaire and 
interview surveys) should include the minimum qualification and/or experience 
of AC members in an accounting or auditing field; 
(ii) The finance head and/or the internal audit division head occasionally attend 
the AC meetings as an invitee(s); 
 (iii)  A remote distance between the company‘s office and the AC members 
sometimes does have adverse impact on its effectiveness; 
(iv) An external auditor should be co-opted in the AC for its better functioning; 
and, 
(v) Initiative should be taken to strengthen the internal audit division.  
(vi) In general, ACs in Financial Institution sector are more effective than other 
sectors.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
The aim of the interview survey was to complement the questionnaire survey findings 
through gaining a greater insight of the AC practices in Bangladesh. Several 
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observations on the current scenario of AC practices in Bangladesh as obtained from the 
interview responses have been discussed in this chapter. There is a consensus between 
the respondents that the ACs have had limited success in achieving their objectives. The 
survey also noted some key factors that influence the ability of the ACs to be effective.  
Furthermore, the respondents also gave some suggestions on how AC effectiveness can 
be enhanced in Bangladesh.  
 
This chapter has briefly discussed the findings obtained from the interview responses. 
The next chapter concludes the thesis by presenting a chapter by chapter overview of 
the thesis, some policy implications of the research, the major limitations of the study, 
and the potential scope for future researchers. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As set out in Chapter One that the main objective of this study is to investigate the 
current state of Audit Committee (AC) practices in Bangladesh. This thesis is motivated 
primarily by the fact that to the best of researcher‘s knowledge there has been no prior 
academic study in the area of the practices of ACs in Bangladesh. Therefore, the study 
has comprehensively covered a wide range of issues relating to the AC practices in 
Bangladesh. The main aim of this chapter is to conclude the thesis with a chapter by 
chapter overview. It also highlights some policy implications of the study; 
acknowledges some limitations; and makes several recommendations for further study. 
Therefore, the structure of this final chapter is: Section 8.2 provides a summary of each 
chapter of this thesis; Section 8.3 states some policy implications of this research on the 
capital market development in Bangladesh; Section 8.4 points out some limitations of 
the research; Section 8.5 indicates some potential areas for future researchers; and, 
finally, Section 8.6 ends the thesis with some concluding notes. 
 
8.2 Summary and Overview 
This thesis has elaborately presented the whole journey of the study including: the 
background of the study, an environment analysis, the literature review, methodological 
issues, the findings and finally the implications of the study. Chapter One pointed out 
the need for the study, and also highlighted the prospective contributions of the study. 
The chapter also discussed the justification of the study, its contribution to accounting 
knowledge and existing literature, and its potential benefits to Bangladesh. Furthermore, 
the chapter briefly stated the research methodology, and an outline of the structure of 
the thesis. 
 
Chapter Two outlined the current environment in Bangladesh in which the ACs operate. 
This chapter discussed the economic environment, capital market, and the institutional 
 300 
and legal framework relating to the Corporate Governance (CG) as well as AC practices 
in Bangladesh. The chapter also gave a brief account of the prevailing guidelines on CG 
related issues in Bangladesh.  It is seen that Bangladesh is improving gradually in terms 
of most economic indicators. Although there is no mandatory CG law (Act) in 
Bangladesh, the Company Act, 1994 has included some clauses regarding the 
governance of companies and has given investors some protection. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) plays a leading role among the monitoring bodies in 
Bangladesh and in 2006 it issued an order of CG guidelines for the listed companies 
(which is to be followed on a ‗comply or explain‘ basis). In addition, the Bangladesh 
Enterprise Institute (BEI) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh 
(ICAB) have developed separate codes of CG for Bangladesh on the basis of the CG 
codes of developed economies including the U.K. and the U.S.A. 
 
Chapter Three reviewed the literature on CG in general. It commenced with the 
background to the concept of CG which is about ensuring that the business is run 
properly. This chapter discussed some theories that have underpinned the development 
of CG. The agency problem, which was brought about by the separation of ownership 
(principals) and control (agent) is examined in detail. It has also been argued that the 
focus of CG is to ensure the protection of interests, as well as the welfare, of all 
stakeholders, instead of considering the shareholders alone. Furthermore, the chapter 
discussed the guidelines and models of CG as practised across the world. In the case of 
CG practices, the developing countries follow the models and guidelines instituted in 
the developed countries. The role of ACs as an effective mechanism of CG has been 
discussed in this chapter. The chapter underpinned the fact that if CG mechanisms are 
substitutable, then strong alternative CG mechanisms should mitigate the need for a 
firm to have an effective AC. 
 
Chapter Four focused on the review of literature relating to the various facets of an AC. 
Commencing with a definition of an AC, the chapter highlighted that corporate ACs 
have developed and evolved as a result of dissatisfaction with the methods of CG in 
avoiding corporate scandals. It is interesting to note that in all of the countries where 
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they have become established, the ACs have been stimulated by unexpected company 
failures and/or corporate malpractices. The chapter discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of having the AC in practice. The advantages and disadvantages that have 
been highlighted in this chapter support the proposition that establishing an AC is one 
thing, but establishing an effective AC is another. This chapter further examined the role 
and function of an effective AC. The chapter also presented a review of the 
effectiveness of ACs. Effectiveness is an elusive concept that can be approached 
through several models, none of which is appropriate in all circumstances. Furthermore, 
the chapter outlined the determinants of AC effectiveness. These main attributes are 
abridged as: 
 
(A) Input Attributes: 
(i) Composition; 
(ii) Authority and Resources; 
(iii) Diligence;  
(iv) Meeting. 
 
(B) Output Attributes: 
(i) Role in Financial Reporting; 
(ii) Role in Internal Control and Auditing; and, 
(iii) Role in External Auditing.   
 
Furthermore, this chapter presented a model for AC effectiveness developed by the 
researcher. A brief background to the development of ACs in the U.K. and several other 
countries (including the U.S.A. and Bangladesh) was presented in this chapter. This 
chapter has been very useful in constructing the instruments of this study (i.e., the 
questionnaire and interview checklist) since it presented the best practices of the AC 
which has been used to compare with the actual AC practices in Bangladeshi 
corporations.  
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Chapter Five focused on the adoption of the research approach. There are two main 
types of empirical research in Social Science, namely: the quantitative approach and the 
qualitative approach. Many researchers have pointed out that quantitative research, 
while being very useful, is greatly improved when used in conjunction with other 
qualitative research method(s) (such as: case studies, interviews and observation). 
Triangulation exists when qualitative and quantitative research approaches are 
combined. The current study has adopted a mixed method of research, comprising a 
questionnaire survey and an interview survey. This chapter elaborated how the pilot 
study was carried out to develop the questionnaire, how it was conducted, and the 
benefits that were gained from respondents to the pilot study. The respondents 
contributing to the pilot research stage included: academics with an interest in 
accounting/auditing; AC chairpersons; company secretaries; finance heads; external 
auditors; and PhD students.  The final version of the questionnaire consisted of fifty 
statements divided into eight broad aspects of an AC. The questionnaire also included 
nine factors that generally affect AC effectiveness, and also ten suggestions for 
improving AC effectiveness in Bangladesh. The chapter also gave details of the 
questionnaire administration procedures.  
 
Chapter Five further discussed the second phase of data collection i.e. semi-structured 
interviews. The interview participants included five representatives from each of the 
four sample groups, namely: AC chairpersons, company secretaries, finance heads and 
external auditors. It had already been decided that the second method for collecting data 
in this research would be an examination through interviews to explore in more detail 
the effectiveness of the ACs in Bangladeshi. This chapter introduced eleven research 
hypotheses, and also explained the statistical tools used for analysing the data and 
testing the hypothesis. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used in this study 
to analyse the data. The descriptive findings have been presented using frequencies, 
percentage, rank, mean, median and standard deviations. The significance of responses 
was examined using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. The main objective of the 
hypothesis testing was to investigate whether there are any significant differences in the 
different responding groups. In order to test these hypotheses, two non-parametric tests 
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(namely, the Kruskal Wallis Test and the Mann Whitney U Test) were used. 
Furthermore, multiple regression models have been used to investigate the AC 
effectiveness. The interview responses of the study have been analysed using the 
‗Grounded Theory‘ which was also discussed in this chapter.  
 
Chapter Six discussed the findings obtained from the questionnaire survey.  The widely 
regarded statistical software ‗Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS)‘ was used to 
present the responses with descriptive statistics in the form of frequency, mean, standard 
deviation, and ranking. Several observations can be made from the results presented in 
this chapter. Firstly, the ACs are mostly dominated by executive directors, which raises 
a big question mark about the independence of the committees. Secondly, the expertise 
(i.e. qualification and experience) of the AC members is not at a satisfactory level. 
Thirdly, although the ACs play important role in some areas (including financial 
reporting, external auditing and internal auditing), there are still plenty of vacuums in 
these areas in which the ACs can play more proactive role. Finally, the regulatory bodies 
(including the SEC) and the stock exchanges should impose some new rules regarding 
the above issues, and they should also rigorously monitor the compliance of existing 
rules instead of leaving them on a ‗comply or explain‘ basis.  
 
Chapter Six also focused on the inferential data analysis. For example, the Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test was employed to examine the significance of agreement/disagreement 
to the fifty statements included in the questionnaire. The test results show that most of 
the statements were significantly agreed with by the three sample groups, namely: the 
AC chairpersons, company secretaries and finance heads. However, the external 
auditors significantly agreed with only 27 (out of 50) statements. It is noticeable that all 
four sample groups commonly disagreed with two statements, both of which relate to 
AC composition. This reflects the view that there are some major issues and absences in 
the composition of Bangladeshi ACs. The test results also indicate that there may have 
been some differences in responses within the sample groups.  
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Furthermore, the Kruskal Wallis Test was used to investigate whether there are 
differences in responses between the four samples. It has the distinct advantage of being 
applicable when more than two means are being compared. Another advantage of using 
this test is that it does not require normality in the distribution of the data set. The test 
results suggest that there is no significant difference in the responses of the different 
sample groups regarding four aspects of ACs in Bangladesh which are: (i) composition; 
(ii) authority and resources; (iii) diligence; and (v) overall independence and 
effectiveness. However, the null hypotheses in relation to the other four aspects 
[namely, (i) meeting; (ii) role in financial reporting; (iii) role in external auditing; and 
(iv) role in internal auditing] have been rejected by the test results at a 5% level of 
significance. This implies that there is a significance difference in the mean scores of 
responses obtained from the sample groups in relation to these four aspects. The 
Kruskal Wallis pair-wise comparison was used to address exactly which group differ 
with whom. The results suggest that, regarding one aspect (i.e. meeting) of AC, the 
responses of the external auditors differ to the responses provided by the other three 
sample groups. Meanwhile, the AC chairpersons differ with the other three groups 
relating to AC‘s role in internal auditing and external auditing. However, the company 
secretaries and the finance heads provided almost similar responses. Further, the Mann 
Whitney U Test has revealed that there is significant difference in responses between the 
two groups of respondents divided on the basis of their last education disciplines (i.e. 
accounting versus others), and professional qualification (i.e. having professional 
qualification versus not having any professional qualification); however, no significant 
difference was found between the two groups of responses divided on years of 
experience. Finally, the multiple regression models indicate that successful performance 
of an AC‘s role is significantly dependent on its composition; and the effectiveness an 
AC is highly dependent on AC‘s role in financial reporting.  
 
Chapter Seven reported the results of the interview survey that was conducted with 
twenty participants consisting of five AC chairpersons, five company secretaries, five 
finance heads and five external auditors. The primary aim of these interviews was to 
complement the findings of the close-ended questionnaire survey and, therefore, this 
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approach was adopted to gain more insight into the research issue (i.e. the scenario of 
AC practices and the problems faced in carrying out AC responsibilities). Most of the 
interview survey findings were found to be consistent with that of the questionnaire 
survey findings. However, the interviewees disagreed with a few of the questionnaire 
survey findings and, importantly, they added more insight of the AC practices in 
Bangladesh. Several observations can be made from the interview results presented in 
this chapter. For example, there was a consensus between respondents that the ACs 
provide limited benefits compared to what they are expected to do. However, some of 
them claimed that the ACs enhance the independence of internal and external auditors, 
give confidence to the shareholders, enlighten the board of directors (BoDs), reduce 
personal relationship and favouritism, make the internal and external auditors more 
conscientious, detect problems early, and create a useful dialogue between the AC and 
the external auditors. One of the interviewees mentioned that we should not be 
pessimistic since the ACs in Bangladesh are at an ‗infant‘ stage of evolution, and are 
still ‗finding their feet‘, in terms of developing their role within companies. 
Furthermore, the affecting factors identified by the interviewees were: 
(i) In general, the AC members do not have sufficient expertise (qualification 
and experience);   
(ii) The ACs usually include the executive directors from the board; 
(iii) Independent AC members are chosen mainly on personal relationship; 
(iv) There is an absence of an updated charter or agenda; 
(v) Proper functioning of the ACs is sometimes hampered by the physical 
separation of the AC members from the head office of the company; 
(vi) The AC members do not devote much time to the committee‘s affairs; and, 
(vii)The remuneration of the independent members is insufficient. 
 
The interview respondents distinguished between the ACs in financial institutions and in 
other companies, which are obviously different as a result of the effective control of 
financial institutions by the central bank (Bangladesh Bank). The scenario of AC 
practices was better reported in the case of financial institutions when compared to 
companies of other sectors. The interviewees explained that this difference exists 
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because financial institutions are closely monitored and regulated by the Bangladesh 
Bank on the top of the SEC. The interviewees highlighted that the SEC should introduce 
new guidelines in relation to AC practices. Other suggestions given by the interviewees 
include: 
(i) The SEC and other regulatory bodies including the stock exchanges should 
increase their vigilance in monitoring the existing rules in relation to CG 
practices  
(ii) The majority of AC members (including the chairperson) should be 
appointed from independent/non-executive directors; 
(iii) The AC should include more expert (knowledgeable and experienced) 
members; and, 
(iv) An AC report should be included in the annual report of the company. 
 
8.3 Policy Implications 
In this thesis some general recommendations have been made, which may serve to 
advance the work of the ACs in Bangladesh and enhance their role to achieve the 
requisite effectiveness of these committees. The study shows that the ACs in 
Bangladesh have a number of weaknesses resulting in many ACs being seen as 'rubber 
stamps‘. Some key attributes (for example, composition, independence from 
management, diligence) discussed in this research should be addressed for the better 
functioning of the ACs. There is an obvious need for the specification of the background 
and experience required for the members of the ACs, to ensure that they are not affected 
by company management. Furthermore, the duties of the AC, its authorities, literacy, 
and diligence should be clearly defined. This could be achieved by establishing a 
feasible mechanism to prepare the members of the ACs and specify their remunerations 
to enable them to work without any restriction from management. 
 
Therefore, in addition to the contribution to the existing literature, the findings seem to 
have important policy implications from the perspective of the significance of CG in the 
development of the capital market in Bangladesh. The study also supports the policy 
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agenda of the multilateral organisations such as the World Bank (WB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which have 
encouraged the government to improve overall CG standards as a necessary pre-
condition of broad-based corporate sector reform. The development partners emphasise 
the need to change the corporate laws and develop the capacity building of the 
regulatory agencies to improve firm-level CG, which in turn helps to avoid potential 
vulnerability in the financial system, and in enhancing the capital market and corporate 
sector development. 
 
Whilst the government and regulatory institutions seem to encourage people to invest in 
the capital market, there have not been any noticeable measures to improve the 
governance role of the capital market. The issues of transparency and accountability at 
both firm-level and operational level of the capital market seem to be very important in 
attracting foreign investors and in restoring the local investors' confidence that has been 
damaged because of the recent crash in the DSE. The government has taken some 
initiatives to bring back confidence in investors such as restructuring the SEC. The 
newly appointed members and chairman of the SEC are committed to reforming the 
capital market regulations.  Since the current study investigated the AC scenario of 
recent times, it is believed to have made a significant contribution in the development of 
new capital market regulations as intended by the SEC.  
 
Finally, it is important to mention that the poor state of AC as well as CG practices in a 
developing country like Bangladesh tends to be derived from the lack of an ethical 
business philosophy, combined with cronyism amongst the businessmen, the politicians 
and a group of managers and civil servants, who are trying to maximise their economic 
benefits. Without breaking this pattern of relationship and instilling ethical values 
amongst the powerful stakeholders concerned, any type of reform initiative to re-
structure the CG framework is less likely to be successful. In this line, the researcher 
feels that the government should take an initiative to establish a National Corporate 
Governance Institute (similar institutes already exist in some neighbouring countries 
including India and Pakistan) with the goal of promoting a framework of best CG 
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practices, structure, processes and ethics in Bangladesh. This study hopefully 
significantly contributes by recommending establishing such an institution or centre in 
Bangladesh. 
 
8.4 Limitations 
It is important for both the researcher and the users of the research to be aware of the 
relevant limitations as they seek to develop and interpret the results of the study or to 
clarify their meaning (Anderson and Poole, 2001). It should be acknowledged that the 
questionnaire survey method is not free from some of its inherent limitations. Matthews 
(2002) noted that all surveys have some inherent weaknesses. For instance, the 
respondents might give answers which they think are expected of them, or which show 
themselves and their firm in the best light. This concern might be directed to some 
responses of the internals (AC chairpersons, company secretaries and finance heads) 
who may have exaggerated their evaluation of the AC practices as this was found to be 
significantly more than the other sample group (i.e. external auditors). Furthermore, it is 
possible that the questionnaire may have lacked in clarity, which might have caused the 
respondents to interpret some questions differently; even though the questionnaire 
underwent a rigorous pilot survey. Another limitation of the research stems from the 
small sample size of the interview survey. It may be argued that conducting more 
interviews could have obtained deeper insight into the issue. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, the interview survey was only one of the two data collection methods 
adopted in the study and the main objective of the interview survey was to complement 
the questionnaire survey methods by acquiring more insight so that the findings 
obtained from the questionnaire survey could be more reliable.  
 
8.5 The Potential for Future Research 
This has been one of the first academic studies on the AC practices in Bangladesh. 
Arguably, many of the areas covered in this study warrant more specific and in-depth 
investigation. Further research could investigate the effectiveness of ACs including 
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some control variables of the companies (for example, size, industry, age etc) in 
regression model. Again, it would be interesting to see if there is any relationship 
between the setting up of ACs in Bangladesh and any increase in earnings and profits 
within these corporations. Further research could also focus on the second part of AC 
effectiveness model (i.e. the consequences of AC effectiveness) presented in Chapter 
Four of the thesis. The study can also be extended in some other South Asian countries 
(such as: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) to ascertain and compare the effectiveness of 
their ACs and so present a larger and more substantial analysis of economies from 
developing countries. The future research could also solicit opinions of some other 
stakeholder groups including members of executive management (e.g. CEO); members 
of BODs; members of regulatory bodies including the SEC and the DSE; internal 
auditors; independent AC members; institutional investors; academicians, politicians; 
and ordinary shareholders.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
This study has been able to achieve its main objective. It has also been able to answer 
all of the research questions posed. More specifically, the study has comprehensively 
investigated the AC practices in Bangladesh. It has also identified the crucial factors that 
affect the AC effectiveness.   Essentially, this study has taken a holistic view to describe 
the scenario of AC practices in Bangladesh in light of the AC effectiveness model as 
depicted in Chapter Four. The model has been thoroughly used in both data collection 
and data analysis of this study. The results of regression analysis also indicate the 
soundness of the AC effectiveness model. Overall, the model has been very useful in 
achieving the objective of this study. This study will hopefully add to the literature on 
AC practices from the perspective of an emerging economy and also will contribute to 
the development of Bangladeshi capital market. It is hoped that future researchers will 
be able to carry through the issues highlighted by this study, modify the model of AC 
effectiveness and also extend the avenues that the study has opened up.   
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Appendix 1: Cover Letter from the Researcher for Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
 
 
May 02, 2010 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
Re: PhD Research on Audit Committee Practices in Bangladesh 
 
I am an assistant professor of the Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Dhaka University. 
Currently, I am pursuing my PhD at Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, UK as a 
Commonwealth Scholar under the supervision of Dr. Yusuf Karbhari. 
  
I am particularly interested in investigating into the audit committee practices of firms listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. The study findings are expected to be useful in strengthening corporate 
governance practices particularly audit committee practices in Bangladeshi firms. This survey is an 
important part of the research and your valuable cooperation and participation in answering the 
questionnaire will be greatly appreciated. 
 
I would therefore, be most grateful if you could spare some of your valuable time to complete the 
enclosed questionnaire and return it in the enclosed envelope. I can assure you that all responses 
will be used for research purpose only and will be treated with the strictest confidence and 
anonymity. Results relating to individual organizations will not be tabulated in the research report. 
Please note that a summary of the research findings will be despatched to all the participants in the 
study who wish to receive it. If you have any query, please do not hesitate to contact me at: voice: 
(+88) 01552441240, fax: (+8802) 8621411 and e-mail: mm@iba-du.edu or MohiuddinM@ 
cardiff.ac.uk. 
 
 
Thank you for your kind cooperation. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
(Md. Mohiuddin) 
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Appendix 2: Cover Letter from the Supervisor for Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
 
March 30, 2010 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
Re: PhD Research on Audit Committee Practices in Bangladesh 
 
This is to confirm that Md. Mohiuddin is enrolled as a PhD student at Cardiff Business School, 
Cardiff University, U.K. under my supervision. The research he is undertaking for his PhD studies 
involves an empirical investigation of the audit committee practices within firms listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. The research he is undertaking is both highly relevant and topical and his 
findings will hopefully contribute to some major policy implications for the advancement of 
corporate governance in Bangladesh. I would therefore be extremely grateful if you could assist in 
this very important study by sparing a few moments of your valuable time in completing the 
attached questionnaire. I am very much hopeful that Md. Mohiuddin can count on your cooperation 
in this respect. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
(Dr. Yusuf Karbhari) 
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Appendix 3: Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
AUDIT COMMITTEE PRACTICES IN 
BANGLADESH: THE CASE OF COMPANIES 
LISTED ON THE DHAKA STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL 
 
MAY 2010 
 
________________________________________________________________________________
Md. Mohiuddin 
Assistant Professor (on leave) 
Institute of Business Administration (IBA) 
University of Dhaka, Bangladesh 
Under the supervision of: 
Dr. Yusuf Karbhari 
Reader in Accounting 
Cardiff University, UK 
 
 351 
 
Dear Respondent: 
 
 
Although you are an extremely busy person, please note that this questionnaire has been 
designed specifically so that it can be completed with minimum time and effort. 
 
May I also take this opportunity of thanking you in advance for your contribution and 
cooperation by devoting a few moments of your time in this interesting and topical 
piece of research on ‗Audit Committee Practices of the Companies Listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange‘. I hereby reassure that the details provided in the completed 
questionnaire will be treated with utmost confidence. It should also be noted that 
findings of the study will be presented in an aggregate form and individual company 
will not be identified.  
 
Kind regards. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Md. Mohiuddin 
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Part I: Respondent’s Information (please circle the appropriate option) 
 
1.1 Your last educational degree: 
Bachelors Degree Masters Degree Ph. D Degree Other (please specify) 
1 2 3 
 
4________________ 
 
1.2 Major of your last educational degree:  
Accounting Finance Marketing Management Economics Other (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6_________________ 
 
1.3 Do you have any professional qualification (e.g. CA/ACCA/CMA/CFA/CS etc.) in 
Accounting/Auditing/Finance or related area?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
If yes, please specify the qualification:_______________________________________ 
 
1.4 Please specify for how long (in years) you are holding the current position in this 
company._____________ 
 
1.5 Do you have any previous work experience in Accounting/Auditing/Finance or related area? 
   1. Yes   2. No 
 
If yes, please specify total number of years of such experiences: ____________ 
 
 
Part II: Responses about Prevailing Audit Committee Practices in the Company 
 Instructions: The following set of statements deal with your perception towards some issues that relate 
to the Existing Practice (NOT the Ideal Practice) of audit committees (ACs) in your company. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by circling only 
one number, where; 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree, and 5= Strongly Agree. 
For example, if you strongly agree with any particular statement, please put a circle around 5. 
 
Statements Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
A. Composition 
1. The AC members are appointed in consultation with the 
AC chairperson. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The AC members have sufficient knowledge on the entity's 
business. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The AC members have sufficient knowledge on 
Accounting and/or Auditing practices. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The AC members have sufficient experience in Accounting 
and/or Auditing. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The AC members are capable of mediating problems in 
performing their duties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The majority of AC members are independent /non-
executive directors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The chairperson of the AC is an independent/non-executive 
director*. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The size of the AC is appropriate for carrying out its duties 
properly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*An external/independent member of the AC is he/she who is not a member of the Board of Directors 
and/or Management/Executive Committee and/or   any other employee of the company.  
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Statements Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
B. Authority and Resources  
 
9. The AC has adequate authority in order to carry out its 
responsibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The AC has ready access to relevant information if required. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. The AC receives prompt responses from the management in 
carrying out its duties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. The AC is provided with sufficient resources including 
secretarial support to carry out its duties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The non-executive AC members are adequately paid for 
their time and efforts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
C. Diligence  
 
14. The AC has a charter which outlines its objectives, duties 
and responsibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. The AC charter is reviewed annually. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. The AC members have a clear understanding of their 
responsibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Members of the AC readily assume their responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. The AC members devote sufficient time to the committee's 
affairs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
D. Meeting 
 
19. The agendas of the AC meetings are finalized by the 
chairperson. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. The chairperson cooperates with other committee members 
before finalizing the agenda of the meetings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. The agenda and related materials are provided to members 
fairly ahead of the meetings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. All members can express their views freely and 
independently in the meetings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. The frequency of the AC meetings is sufficient to carry out 
its responsibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. The duration of the AC meetings is sufficient for a full 
discussion of important issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Non-members attend the AC meetings if required. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. The minutes of the AC meetings are circulated to all 
members of the Board of Directors (BODs). 
1 2 3 4 5 
E. Role in Financial Reporting 
 
27. The AC reviews the integrity of companies' financial 
statements. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. The AC reviews accounting policies and any changes made 
therein. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. The AC reviews accounting estimates and judgments done 
in preparing financial statements. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. The AC reviews the compliance of the Accounting 
Standards (e.g. IAS, BAS etc.) in preparing financial statements. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31. The AC reviews the clarity and completeness of disclosures 
in financial statements. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 354 
Statements Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
32. The AC reviews other information (e.g. the auditors' report, 
financial highlights etc.) presented in the annual report. 
1 2 3 4 5 
F. Role in External Auditing 
33. External auditors are appointed and/or removed upon the 
recommendation of the AC. 
1 2 3 4 5 
34. The AC assesses and reviews the expertise and resources of 
the external auditors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. The AC reviews and approves the terms of the Engagement 
Letter (EL) prepared for the external auditors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
36. The AC monitors the external audit firm's compliance with 
the existing ethical and regulatory requirements in Bangladesh. 
1 2 3 4 5 
37. The AC reviews the findings of the annual audit obtained by 
the external auditors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38. The AC reviews the management's responsiveness to the 
external auditors' findings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. The AC meets with the external auditors without the 
presence of the management to discuss any issues, problems or 
reservations arising from the audit. 
1 2 3 4 5 
40. The AC reviews and monitors the independence and 
effectiveness of the external auditing process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
G. Role in Internal Auditing 
41. The AC recommends and approves the appointment or 
termination of the heads of the internal audit division. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. The AC approves and reviews the charter of the internal 
auditors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
43. The AC assesses and reviews the annual internal audit work 
plan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
44. The AC reviews the annual internal audit reports, budget 
and other findings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
45. The AC reviews and monitors the management's 
responsiveness to the internal auditor's findings and 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
46. The AC meets with the head of the internal audit function 
without the presence of the management. 
1 2 3 4 5 
47. The AC enhances the independence of the internal auditors 
of the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
48. The AC monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of the 
internal audit function. 
1 2 3 4 5 
H. Overall Practice 
49. The AC can work independently. 1 2 3 4 5 
50. The AC is effective. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Part III: Factors affecting Audit Committee Practices in Bangladesh 
Instructions: The following statements deal with your perception towards some factors that affect the 
existing practice of audit committees (ACs) in the Bangladesh.  
 
Factors Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral  Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Lack of AC members‘ qualification in 
relevant field. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Lack of AC members‘ experience and 
expertise in the relevant field. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.Non-inclusion of majority 
independent/external members in the ACs.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Non-appointment of AC chairperson from 
external/independent members. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Low frequency of AC meetings.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Lack of diligence in AC members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Inadequate authority delegated to the ACs. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Inadequate resources provided to the AC. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Lack of supports from top management.  
1 2 3 4 
5 
 
 
 
Part IV: Suggestions 
Instructions: The following issues deal with your perception about how AC effectiveness can be 
enhanced in Bangladesh. 
  
Possible Measures Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral  Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Voluntary and self regulation by the 
companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Increased pressure from general investors. 
1 2 3 4 
5 
 
3. Increased monitoring of existing rules and 
guidelines. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Introducing some new rules and guidelines. 
1 2 3 4 
5 
 
5. Compulsory inclusion of AC report in the 
Annual Corporate Report. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Mandating the appointment of AC 
chairperson from independent/external 
directors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Mandating inclusion of majority 
independent /external members in the ACs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Including AC practices in the listing 
requirements of stock exchanges. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Offering some incentives to the firms that 
comply with AC guidelines of SEC (issued in 
2006). 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Compulsory compliance of SEC order of 
2006 regarding the guidelines of AC practices. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Follow Up  
Would you be willing to be contacted for any further participation (e.g. interview) in this research? 
  
 
(A) Yes   (B) No 
 
If yes, please state your contact number(s):___________________________________________ 
 
Study Feedback 
Would you like to receive a copy of the summary findings of this research? 
  
(A) Yes  (B) No 
 
If yes, please provide your contact address below: 
Name  
 
Mailing Address  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phone Number(s)  
 
E-mail Address(s)  
 
 
 
Researcher’s Contacts: 
Room # 315 
IBA, Dhaka University 
Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh. 
Phone: +88-02-9668718 (Office) 
Mobile: +88-01552441240 
E-mail: mm@iba-du.edu 
MohiuddinM@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR GENEROUS COOPERATION. 
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Appendix 4: Interview Consent Form 
 
Interview Consent Form 
 
This consent form outlines my rights as a participant in the study of ―An Empirical 
Investigation into the Audit Committee Practices in Bangladesh: The Case of 
Companies Listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange‖ being conducted by Md. Mohiuddin, 
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, UK. The interview is intended to explore 
my opinions about existing Audit committee practices in Bangladesh.    
 
I understand that: 
 
Taking part in this study is entirely voluntary; 
The purpose and nature of the interview has been clearly explained to me; 
It is my right to decline to answer any question that I am asked; 
I am free to end the interview at any time; 
I may request that the interview not be taped; and 
My name will not appear on any tapes or transcripts resulting from the interview. 
 
 
I HAVE READ THIS CONSENT FORM. I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO ASK 
QUESTIONS CONCERNING ANY AREAS THAT I DID NOT UNDERSTAND. 
 
_____________________________ 
(Signature of Interviewee and Date) 
 
_____________________________ 
(Printed Name of Interviewee) 
 
 
You may decline to participate in this study. You may end your participation in this 
study at any time. Maintaining your anonymity is a priority and every practical 
precaution will be taken to disguise your identity. There will not be any identifying 
information on audiotapes or transcripts of this interview. I will not allow anyone other 
than the research advisor to hear any audiotape of your voice or review a transcript of 
this interview. All materials generated from your interview will remain in my direct 
physical possession and will be dealt with full confidentiality. 
 
I have explained the project and the implications of being interviewed to the interviewee 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications 
of participation. 
 
___________________________ 
(Md. Mohiuddin) 
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Appendix 5: Interview Checklist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
AUDIT COMMITTEE PRACTICES IN 
BANGLADESH: THE CASE OF COMPANIES 
LISTED ON THE DHAKA STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL 
 
JUNE 2010 
 
_____________________________________________________________________
Md. Mohiuddin 
Assistant Professor (on leave) 
Institute of Business Administration 
(IBA) 
University of Dhaka, Bangladesh 
Under the supervision of: 
Dr. Yusuf Karbhari 
Reader in Accounting 
Cardiff University, UK 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE AUDIT 
COMMITTEE PRACTICES IN BANGLADESH: CASE OF COMPANIES 
LISTED ON THE DHAKA STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
Interview Schedule: 
Date:___________________________________________________________ 
Time:___________________________________________________________ 
Place:___________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction: 
Thanks for the consent and appointment. 
Introduce yourself (exchange of visiting cards) 
Mention nature, relevance and importance of the survey. 
Assure anonymity and strictest confidentiality. 
 
Section I: Background Information 
 Organization (Name, Sector and Paid up Capital (BDT):_________________  
________________________________________________________________ 
 Name of the Participant:_____________________________________________ 
 Current Position:___________________________________________________ 
 Experience: (i) Current position: ________years. (ii) Relevant Area: _____years 
 Educational Qualification: (i)Last Degree:__________(ii)Subject:____________ 
 Professional Qualification (if any):___________________________________ 
 
Section II: Starting Question 
 Would you please share your opinions about the importance of an Audit 
Committee (AC)in improving the overall governance quality of the company 
and protecting stakeholders‘ interest? 
 Do you think all stakeholders in Bangladesh are properly aware of AC 
importance? 
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Section III: Composition of the AC 
 Would you please tell us something about the AC in your company in terms of 
its size, composition etc.? 
 Please tell me about the procedure how AC members/chairman are appointed in 
Bangladesh. 
 How do you evaluate the necessity of the following characteristics of AC 
members for its effective functioning? 
-Relevant qualification: 
-Relevant experience: 
-Independence: 
-Size: 
 
Section IV: Authority and Resources of the AC 
 Do you think the ACs in Bangladesh are delegated adequate authority required to 
perform its duties properly? 
 Can the ACs perform their duties independently? Please explain. 
 Do the committees get ready access to the information required for performing 
their job? 
 Do the ACs get adequate secretarial supports for carrying outs their duties? 
 Are the external independent members of the AC paid enough remuneration and 
benefits for their time and efforts deployed for the company? 
 
Section V: Diligence and Meeting of the AC 
 Are the AC members properly aware of their role and responsibilities? 
 Do the members of ACs wilfully assume their responsibilities? 
 Do the AC members devote adequate time and effort for performing their duties? 
 Does the AC meet regularly? How often? 
 Please tell me how the agenda of AC meeting is decided. 
 Can all members talk freely in the AC meetings? 
 Does anybody else (other than AC members) attend the AC meetings regularly? 
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Section VI: Role of the AC 
 What are main areas where the ACs in Bangladesh play role? 
 What role does the AC undertake for the company is the following areas? 
-Financial Reporting 
-Internal Control and Auditing 
-External Auditing 
 In what other areas (if any) does the AC play role for the company? 
 Does the AC have regular contacts with both external auditors and external 
auditors? 
 Does the AC sit with the head of internal audit section to discuss about their role 
in absence of management? 
 Does the AC have any role in appointing external auditor for the company? 
Please explain. 
 
Section VII: Overall Scenario and Recommendations 
 What do you think about independence of ACs in Bangladesh? 
 Do you think that ACs in Bangladesh can achieve their objectives? Explain. 
 Please comment on the overall effectiveness of AC in Bangladesh. 
 
Section VIII: Factors Affecting the AC Effectiveness 
 What factors main effect the AC practices in Bangladesh and how? 
 What are the main barriers of effective AC practices in Bangladesh? 
 
Section IX: Suggested Measures 
 Do you think that the existing regulations adequate for ensuring sound AC 
practice in Bangladesh? 
 Would you please recommend on the following issues that you believe can 
enhance the AC effectiveness in Bangladesh? 
   -Size of AC and members‟ category 
-Chairmanship of AC 
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-Qualification/Education of AC members 
-Experience of AC members 
-Authorities of the ACs 
-Resources of the ACs 
-No of meetings in a year, choosing the agendas for meetings etc. 
-Reporting and Communication of the ACs: 
 
Section X: Ending Question 
Are there any issues relating to AC practice in Bangladesh that have not been covered in 
this interview and which you feel important? Please feel free to share as elaborate as 
you like. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR GENEROUS COOPERATION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
